Dual-Track Appellate Review of CAFA Remand Orders and the Rebuttable-Presumption Test for Local-Controversy Citizenship
A Comprehensive Commentary on Elizabeth Goldberg v. Television Tower, Inc. (4th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit delivered a published opinion clarifying two unsettled issues under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). First, the Court held—joining the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits—that a party may appeal a district-court order remanding a removed class action on the basis of CAFA’s local-controversy exception through an ordinary notice of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; petitions for permission to appeal under § 1453(c) are permissible but not exclusive. Second, the Court adopted a practical, rebuttable-presumption approach to proving the citizenship element of the local-controversy exception, permitting plaintiffs to rely on evidence of residence plus property ownership to satisfy their burden by a preponderance of the evidence. These holdings arise out of environmental-contamination claims connected to the hydro-blasting of a landmark Baltimore television tower and shape the procedural terrain for class actions throughout the Circuit.

Parties and Procedural Posture

• Plaintiffs / Respondents: Eight Baltimore property owners led by Elizabeth L. Goldberg, filing a putative class action on behalf of all owners within 4,000 feet of the TV tower.
• Defendants / Petitioners: Television Tower, Inc. (“TTI,” a Maryland corporation that owns the tower) and Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. (“Skyline,” a Colorado corporation with its P.P.B. in Nebraska).
• Amicus: U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
• Underlying ruling: The District of Maryland remanded the suit to state court under CAFA’s local-controversy exception.
• Appeals: Defendants filed both § 1291 notices of appeal and parallel § 1453(c) petitions for permission to appeal.

II. Summary of the Judgment

Judge Wynn, writing for a unanimous panel (Chief Judge Diaz and Judge Thacker joining), held:

1. Section 1291 provides appellate jurisdiction over remand orders that invoke CAFA exceptions because such orders are not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and § 1453(c) is non-exclusive. The § 1453 petitions were therefore dismissed as unnecessary.
2. On the merits, the plaintiffs satisfied each element of CAFA’s local-controversy exception:
   • Citizenship: Evidence showed > 2/3 of class members were Maryland citizens; a rebuttable presumption of domicile from residence plus property ownership applied.
   • Local Defendant Requirement: TTI, a Maryland citizen, was a defendant from whom significant relief was sought and whose conduct formed a significant basis of the claims.
   • In-state Injury & No Similar Class Actions: Undisputed.
   The district court’s remand order was affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s reasoning is grounded in an interlocking set of Supreme Court and circuit precedents:

• Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) – provides the foundational reading that § 1447(d)’s “non-reviewability” applies only to remand orders based on § 1447(c) grounds (procedural defect or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Everything else is reviewable.
• Things Remembered v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995) and Quackenbush v. Allstate, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) – re-affirm Thermtron’s narrow scope of § 1447(d).
• Hinson v. Norwest Financial South Carolina, 239 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2001) – earlier Fourth-Circuit authority stating that remand orders outside § 1447(d)’s bar are appealable via § 1291.
• Cheapside Minerals v. Devon Energy, 94 F.4th 492 (5th Cir. 2024); Jacks v. Meridian Resources, 701 F.3d 1224 (8th Cir. 2012); Simring v. GreenSky, 29 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2022) – sister-circuit decisions recognizing that § 1453(c) is non-exclusive.
• Scott v. Cricket Communications, 865 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2017) – preponderance standard for CAFA jurisdiction generally.
• Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, 842 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2016) – endorses a rebuttable presumption that residence indicates domicile when evaluating the local-controversy exception.
• Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins., 561 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2009) – “significant basis / significant relief” comparative test.
• Benko v. Quality Loan Service, 789 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) – guidance on quantifying “significant.”

In synthesizing these authorities, the Court aligned itself with the prevailing multi-circuit view on both the jurisdictional gateway and the substantive local-controversy criteria.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction under § 1291 notwithstanding § 1447(d)

• The panel applied Thermtron: because a CAFA remand relying on § 1332(d)(4) is neither a “procedural defect” nor a “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,” § 1447(d) does not bar review.
• Section 1291 therefore supplies appellate jurisdiction; the notices of appeal were timely.
• Section 1453(c)(1) adds a permissive route; it does not repeal § 1291 by implication. The statutes are complementary: § 1453 uniquely permits appeals of denials of remand and other § 1447(d)-blocked scenarios, while § 1291 remains available for final remand orders like the one at issue.

2. Standard of Proof for CAFA Exceptions

• The Court expressly adopted the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for the party seeking remand.
• Textual silence plus CAFA’s structure and policy goals guided the choice; the Court declined to invent higher or lower thresholds.

3. Rebuttable Presumption of Citizenship from Residence and Property Ownership

• The Court endorsed the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Mason and held that evidence a putative class member resides and owns property in the forum state presumptively establishes domicile.
• The presumption is rebuttable: defendants may offer contrary evidence (e.g., transient populations, military postings, vacation-home districts). No such evidence was produced here.
• On the facts, plaintiffs demonstrated 84 % Maryland citizenship among property owners—well above the two-thirds threshold.

4. “Significant Basis” and “Significant Relief” Applied

• Rejecting a “superlative” or plus-factor requirement, the Court used a comparative approach: a local defendant need only be an important, not the most, source of liability.
• TTI’s alleged negligence (ownership, permitting failures, hiring an unqualified contractor) rendered it a central actor alongside Skyline; the relief sought against TTI (compensatory, injunctive, punitive) was substantial.
• Statutory usage of “at least one” versus “primary” defendants (home-state exception) reinforced this reading.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Procedural Impact

• Parties in the Fourth Circuit now have a settled roadmap: file a notice of appeal under § 1291 to challenge any CAFA remand order not grounded in § 1447(c). A § 1453(c) petition is optional and strategic.
• District judges can expect more straightforward appellate oversight; litigants cannot argue lack of appellate jurisdiction.
• The decision reduces gamesmanship: defendants cannot wait out § 1453’s 10-day window and then claim a remand is unreviewable.

Substantive Impact

• By lowering the practical burden for proving citizenship, local plaintiffs gain a clearer path to state-court adjudication of genuinely intrastate disputes.
• The comparative “significant” test will steer district courts away from mechanically counting claims or liability percentages and toward a holistic assessment.
• Companies operating facilities in the Fourth Circuit should anticipate increased exposure to state-court class actions when a local entity plays any substantial role.

National Context

• The Fourth Circuit’s alignment with the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits on § 1291 perpetuates an emerging consensus, potentially influencing the First, Second, Seventh and Tenth Circuits where the issue is not definitively resolved.
• The rebuttable-presumption framework may encourage other circuits to abandon stricter “residence is not enough” rules, mitigating circuit splits.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. CAFA’s Local-Controversy Exception

A safety valve keeping lawsuits that are truly local in state court. Plaintiffs must show: (a) > 2/3 of class citizens belong to the forum state; (b) at least one in-state defendant is a major player; (c) principal injuries occurred in-state; (d) no similar suits filed in past 3 years.

2. Section 1291 vs. Section 1453(c)

• § 1291 – Ordinary appeals as of right from final decisions; 30-/60-day deadline; no page-limited petition; no 60-day merits clock.
• § 1453(c) – Special CAFA mechanism; 10-day petition; appellate court chooses to “accept” or reject; 60-day decision clock. Useful mainly for immediate review of remand denials.

3. Rebuttable Presumption of Domicile

If a person’s official records show an in-state residence and (here) property ownership, courts presume she intends to stay there (domicile). The other side can disprove it—e.g., by showing the person is a student from out-of-state.

4. “Significant Basis / Significant Relief”

Think of liability pie charts: a defendant with a meaningful slice, not necessarily the biggest, satisfies the requirement.

V. Conclusion

Elizabeth Goldberg v. Television Tower, Inc. fortifies two pillars of CAFA jurisprudence in the Fourth Circuit. Procedurally, it guarantees a dual-track avenue for appellate review, eliminating uncertainty created by CAFA’s specialized petition process. Substantively, it balances CAFA’s federal-forum preference with practicality by presuming domicile from tangible residential evidence and by adopting a realistic, non-superlative reading of “significant.” Future litigants will cite Goldberg when challenging or defending remand orders, and district courts now possess a detailed, circuit-approved blueprint for analyzing the local-controversy exception. In short, the decision advances clarity, curbs strategic maneuvering, and reaffirms that genuinely local environmental or consumer controversies belong—absent extraordinary circumstances—in the courts of the communities they affect most.