Double Deference Shields Strategic Withholding of Psychiatric Testimony under AEDPA: Martinez v. Salisbury (1st Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In Martinez v. Salisbury, the First Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief to Gerardo E. Martinez, who was convicted in Rhode Island state court of first-degree murder for the 2005 killing of Lindsay Ann Burke. The appeal turned on whether the Rhode Island Superior Court’s denial of post-conviction relief (PCR) — rejecting Martinez’s claim that trial counsel performed ineffectively by forgoing a diminished-capacity defense and not calling a defense psychiatrist at trial — constituted an “unreasonable application” of Strickland v. Washington under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The decision crystallizes how the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) layers a “double deference” framework on top of Strickland’s deferential standard for reviewing attorney performance. It further clarifies that where a trial court instructs on a lesser-included offense (here, second-degree murder), that instruction itself undercuts the argument that a competing trial strategy (a “no premeditation” defense) was legally unavailable or “no defense at all.”

Parties:

Petitioner–Appellant: Gerardo E. Martinez
Respondent–Appellee: Wayne T. Salisbury, Jr., Interim Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit (Howard, J., joined by Rikelman and Kayatta, JJ.) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Martinez’s habeas petition. The court held that the Rhode Island post-conviction court did not unreasonably apply Strickland’s performance prong in concluding that trial counsel’s strategic choices were constitutionally adequate.

Key determinations:

Under AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” standard, relief is unavailable unless all fairminded jurists would agree the state court contradicted clearly established Supreme Court precedent (Harrington v. Richter).
Strickland’s deference to strategic choices “after thorough investigation” applies with special force when filtered through AEDPA’s lens (“double deference”).
Trial counsel’s decision to press a “no premeditation” theory of second-degree murder and to reserve psychiatric expert testimony (PTSD diagnosis) for sentencing was a reasonable strategic choice, not constitutionally deficient performance.
The trial court’s issuance of a second-degree murder instruction under Rhode Island law demonstrates the legal viability of counsel’s trial strategy and undermines the assertion that it “amounted to no defense at all.”
Because the state court reasonably rejected the performance prong, neither the state courts nor the First Circuit needed to reach Strickland prejudice.

Factual and Procedural Background

Martinez and the victim, Lindsay Burke, had a volatile two-year relationship marked by abuse. On the day of the killing in September 2005, an argument escalated from the living room to the bathroom, where Martinez inflicted fatal knife wounds. A photo of Burke’s new romantic interest was found in the sink. Martinez recorded a confession and fled to New Hampshire, where he was arrested with a suicide note.

Trial counsel (Mark Smith) consulted a forensic psychiatrist (Dr. Ronald Stewart), who diagnosed Martinez with PTSD. Counsel elected not to present Dr. Stewart at trial and instead pursued a “no premeditation” strategy aimed at a second-degree murder verdict; he then presented Dr. Stewart’s testimony at sentencing. The jury convicted Martinez of first-degree murder, and the sentencing judge imposed life without parole.

In state PCR, Martinez alleged that counsel was ineffective for not presenting a diminished-capacity defense supported by expert testimony — a strategy that could have reduced the conviction to voluntary manslaughter (capped at 30 years). After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the state PCR court denied relief on the performance prong. The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied certiorari. The district court subsequently denied federal habeas relief but granted a certificate of appealability. The First Circuit affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Federal habeas and Strickland standards:

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Establishes the two-part test for ineffective assistance — deficient performance and prejudice — with a strong presumption of reasonable strategic decision-making based on the information available to counsel at the time.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): AEDPA’s constraint on habeas relief where the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits; relief available only for decisions involving an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011): Clarifies that a state court’s rejection of a claim precludes habeas relief so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s decision; reframes the AEDPA inquiry to be highly deferential.
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (2013): Describes the “doubly deferential” standard that governs review of Strickland claims under AEDPA.
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004): Emphasize the leeway afforded state courts under general standards.
Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122 (2018); Webster v. Gray, 39 F.4th 27 (1st Cir. 2022): Direct federal courts to “look through” to the last reasoned state-court decision and defer to its stated reasons if reasonable.
Hensley v. Roden, 755 F.3d 724 (1st Cir. 2014): Particularly salient; counsel’s decision not to present a retained psychiatrist can be reasonable where the testimony is a “mixed bag” and risks undermining the defense — an analogy the First Circuit found persuasive here.
Other First Circuit formulations of AEDPA/Strickland deference: Bebo v. Medeiros, 906 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2018); Strickland v. Goguen, 3 F.4th 45 (1st Cir. 2021); Dorisca v. Marchilli, 941 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2019); Field v. Hallett, 37 F.4th 8 (1st Cir. 2022); Collins v. Roden, 749 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2014); Rivera v. Thompson, 879 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2015).

Rhode Island homicide and instructional law:

State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73 (R.I. 2013): Direct appeal affirming this conviction; frames first-degree/second-degree distinctions.
State v. Ros, 973 A.2d 1148 (R.I. 2009); State v. Texieira, 944 A.2d 132 (R.I. 2008); State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894 (R.I. 2003); State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969 (R.I. 2008): Define premeditation, including the “more than a momentary duration” requirement for first-degree murder and the “fleeting intent” concept for second-degree murder.
State v. Campbell, 691 A.2d 564 (R.I. 1997); State v. Tassone, 749 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 2000); State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321 (R.I. 2020): Examples where extensive or brutal wounds supported first-degree murder; Campbell particularly highlighted.
State v. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d 412 (R.I. 1998); Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934 (R.I. 2010): Rhode Island’s rule that lesser-included instructions should be given only where supported by evidence — critical to the First Circuit’s rejection of Martinez’s “no viable defense” argument.
State v. LaCroix, 911 A.2d 674 (R.I. 2006); State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926 (R.I. 1987): Rhode Island diminished-capacity doctrine can reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Statutes: R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-23-1, -2, -3 (murder/manslaughter definitions and penalties); § 12-19.2-1 (life without parole); § 12-19.2-4 (sentencing considerations in life-without-parole context).
Other: State v. Tiernan, 645 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1994) (no harsher punishment for exercising constitutional rights); Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2007) (deference to state factual findings).

Distinguishing out-of-circuit cases cited by Martinez:

Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1987): Pre-AEDPA; counsel abandoned a plausible insanity defense without adequate investigation; unlike here, the lawyer’s failure flowed from faulty investigation and no alternative strategy.
Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2000): Applied an earlier “objective reasonableness” framing of § 2254(d)(1) later superseded by Richter’s “fairminded jurists could disagree” standard; not controlling post-Richter.
Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928 (3d Cir. 2019): Reviewed de novo because the state court had not adjudicated the claim on the merits; thus, it does not overcome AEDPA deference here.

Legal Reasoning

The First Circuit embeds Strickland within AEDPA’s framework and asks the only question that matters on federal habeas: whether all fairminded jurists would have to conclude that the state PCR court unreasonably applied Strickland in rejecting counsel’s performance.

The court identifies several pillars supporting the state court’s ruling:

Strategic choice within Strickland’s safe harbor. Strickland declares that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Here, counsel investigated, retained Dr. Stewart, obtained records, consulted the expert, and deliberated. He also consulted an experienced criminal defense lawyer (Robert Mann), who warned that presenting PTSD testimony risked devastating impeachment and suggested using it at sentencing. This evidences deliberation, not abdication.
Legal viability of the trial strategy demonstrated by the jury instruction. The trial judge instructed on second-degree murder — a lesser-included instruction Rhode Island law permits only where supported by evidence. That instruction refutes the claim that the “no premeditation” approach was legally invalid or “no defense at all.” The trial judge later stated the jury could “absolutely” have returned second-degree, further validating the strategy’s viability at the time.
Sound reasons to reserve psychiatric evidence for sentencing. The state PCR court credited multiple, commonsense reasons:
- Presenting Dr. Stewart would likely “open the door” to highly damaging evidence of Martinez’s prior abuse of Lindsay and other women (including his ex-wife and ex-girlfriend), risk not taken when reserving the testimony for sentencing.
- Given the damning evidence (graphic crime-scene photos, videotaped confession where Martinez appeared calm, and a suicide note admitting responsibility), counsel reasonably feared the jury would react poorly to a PTSD-based diminished-capacity defense.
- Counsel believed first-time presentation of mitigation evidence to the sentencing judge would carry greater persuasive force — an unremarkable and reasonable litigation judgment. The sentencing judge’s reaction (rejecting mitigation as a “shallow attempt[] to blame others”) corroborates the concern that the jury might have been even less receptive.
Analogy to Hensley v. Roden. As in Hensley, calling a psychiatrist to opine that the defendant could not form the requisite mens rea can be a “mixed bag,” potentially undermining the defense and inviting harmful rebuttal. Hensley’s reasoning counseled deference; the First Circuit found it apt here.

The court also addresses two counterpoints:

State’s failure to object to the second-degree instruction. That the State did not object is immaterial under Rhode Island law, which independently requires evidentiary support for lesser-included instructions. The instruction’s presence remains probative of the defense’s legal viability.
Ambiguity about sentencing strategy. The state PCR court reasonably construed the record to reflect a deliberate choice to preserve the mitigation’s impact at sentencing, rather than a legal misapprehension about admissibility. Under Teti and AEDPA, that reasonable reading is entitled to deference.

Impact

The opinion reinforces several practice and doctrinal points that will influence future ineffective assistance claims in the First Circuit and beyond:

Reaffirmation of AEDPA’s “double deference.” When trial counsel’s investigated choices are on the table, AEDPA’s Richter standard makes habeas relief extraordinarily rare unless the state court’s Strickland application is beyond the bounds of disagreement among fairminded jurists.
Documented strategy protects counsel. Retaining experts, consulting with experienced practitioners, and articulating contemporaneous reasons (risk of opening the door, jury reaction, sentencing impact) can be outcome-determinative in defeating Strickland claims.
Lesser-included instructions matter. A trial court’s decision to instruct on a lesser-included offense demonstrates legal viability and undercuts claims that counsel’s chosen theory was “no defense.” Defense and PCR litigants should treat such instructions as powerful evidence in Strickland disputes.
Mental-health evidence as a strategic double-edged sword. The decision validates saving psychiatric evidence for sentencing when trial presentation risks admission of damaging character or prior-acts evidence and risks juror backlash.
Rhode Island homicide jurisprudence. The First Circuit’s reliance on Campbell, Tassone, Gumkowski, and related cases signals how evidence of multiple or defensive wounds tends to support premeditation findings; counsel may reasonably calibrate strategies accordingly.

For habeas petitioners, Martinez underscores that:

It is not enough to show an alternative strategy might have succeeded; one must show that counsel’s chosen course was outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance as assessed at the time, and that the state court’s contrary conclusion is one no fairminded jurist could reach.
If a state court reasonably resolves the performance prong against the petitioner, federal courts can affirm without reaching prejudice — depriving petitioners of a second bite at the apple.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Key terms and doctrines:

Strickland v. Washington: To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show (1) deficient performance (attorney acted unreasonably under prevailing norms) and (2) prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for the errors). Courts strongly defer to strategic choices made after adequate investigation.
AEDPA “unreasonable application” (§ 2254(d)(1)): Federal habeas relief is barred unless the state court identified the correct rule but applied it so unreasonably that no fairminded jurist could agree. This is more than error; it is error beyond reasonable disagreement.
“Double deference”: When reviewing a Strickland claim under AEDPA, the federal court defers both to the state court’s decision and to counsel’s strategic judgment — a stacked deference that is exceptionally hard for petitioners to overcome.
Diminished capacity (Rhode Island): A doctrine that can reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter where the defendant’s mental state negates the level of culpability needed for murder. It differs from legal insanity; the defendant may still be criminally responsible, but for a lesser offense.
First-degree versus second-degree murder (Rhode Island): First-degree requires a premeditated intent to kill that lasts more than a moment; second-degree involves a contemporaneous, fleeting intent without premeditation.
Opening the door: A trial tactic risk where presenting certain evidence (e.g., psychiatric testimony) permits the prosecution to introduce otherwise inadmissible or more prejudicial evidence in rebuttal (e.g., prior abusive acts).
Lesser-included instruction: A jury instruction on a lesser offense supported by evidence. Its issuance often indicates that the defense theory is legally and factually viable.

Conclusion

Martinez v. Salisbury is a rigorous reaffirmation of AEDPA’s high bar for federal habeas relief on ineffective assistance grounds. The First Circuit carefully canvassed the state court’s reasoning and found it comfortably within Strickland’s zone of deference — especially given counsel’s thorough investigation, considered strategic judgment to avoid opening the door to damaging prior-abuse evidence, and the legal viability signaled by the second-degree instruction.

The decision’s central teaching is practical and doctrinal: where counsel documents informed strategic choices — particularly regarding whether and how to deploy mental-health evidence — federal courts applying AEDPA will be loath to second-guess those choices. And when a trial court instructs on a lesser-included homicide offense, it becomes exceedingly difficult to argue that a no-premeditation theory was “no defense at all.”

In the broader legal context, Martinez strengthens the “double deference” shield that protects strategic lawyering decisions from collateral challenge, ensuring that habeas relief remains the exception reserved for decisions that cannot be reconciled with Strickland by any fairminded jurist.