Introduction

This published order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addresses a recurring but under-clarified problem in appellate practice: what happens to a notice of appeal when the district court has not fully resolved a tolling motion that seeks reconsideration of an appealable order. The case arises from the tragic death by suicide of Ashleigh Gelin shortly after she entered the Baltimore County Detention Center. Her parents, Edward and Deborah Gelin, sued Baltimore County and multiple correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Maryland tort law. After the district court partially denied the defendants’ request for judgment on the pleadings and refused various immunity defenses, the County sought “reconsideration.” Before the district court finished adjudicating all aspects of that reconsideration request, the County noticed an appeal.

In this third interlocutory visit to the Fourth Circuit, Baltimore County and seven correctional officers (collectively, “the County”) urged reversal of the district court’s partial denial of judgment. The appellees (the Gelins) countered that the appeal was procedurally improper under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4. Chief Judge Diaz, writing for a unanimous panel, agreed that the appeal was premature and not yet effective because the district court’s reconsideration order left part of the County’s motion unresolved. The court held the appeal in abeyance and directed the parties to notify the court once the district court “dispos[es] of the last such remaining motion.”

Beyond the case-specific disposition, the order establishes important circuit law on three fronts: (1) FRAP 4(a)(4) applies to interlocutory appeals (including qualified-immunity appeals), because “judgment” in Civil Rule 54(a) includes any appealable order; (2) substance governs over labels in characterizing post-judgment motions for tolling purposes (a mislabeled Rule 52(b) motion that in substance seeks alteration of an appealable order is treated as a Rule 59(e) motion); and (3) a notice of appeal filed while such a tolling motion remains partially unresolved is “dormant” and ineffective until the district court fully disposes of the motion, though the court of appeals may hold the appeal in abeyance rather than dismiss when significant resources have already been expended.

Summary of the Opinion

• The County filed a post-judgment motion styled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) asking the district court to amend its “findings” and enter judgment for defendants on all claims. Because there had been no bench trial, Rule 52(b) did not apply; nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit treats the motion by its substance as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend an appealable order (here, the district court’s interlocutory denial of qualified immunity at the pleading stage).
• Under FRAP 4(a)(4)(A), a timely Rule 59(e) motion tolls the time to appeal until the district court enters “the order disposing of the last such remaining motion.”
• The district court’s reconsideration order did not fully resolve the County’s motion; it expressly left open whether the officers had public official immunity from the plaintiffs’ negligence claim and directed additional briefing. Because the court had not “disposed of” the motion, the County’s notice of appeal had not yet “become[] effective” under FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(i).
• Even so, the notice was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2107; the defect is not jurisdictional (Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services). The Fourth Circuit has adjudicatory authority but cannot proceed to the merits until the notice ripens.
• Rather than dismiss, the court holds the appeal in abeyance, following sister-circuit practice where substantial resources have been invested, and clarifies that the district court retains authority to resolve the remaining issue because the notice of appeal is dormant.
• Key holding: FRAP 4(a)(4)(A)’s tolling regime applies to interlocutory appeals, including qualified-immunity appeals, because “judgment” in Civil Rule 54(a) means any appealable order. This opinion expressly disagrees with contrary Eleventh Circuit language (Pruett v. Choctaw County).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Decision

• BEHRENS v. PELLETIER, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): These cases confirm that the denial of qualified immunity at the pleading stage is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Their role here is twofold: to establish that the district court’s order was an appealable “judgment” within the meaning of Civil Rule 54(a), and to underscore why the County sought interlocutory review.
• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007): Cited to explain sequencing: the court may address certain threshold, non-merits issues (like compliance with appellate rules) before resolving subject-matter jurisdiction questions on the merits.
• Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17 (2017): Critical distinction between statutory time limits (jurisdictional) and rule-based time limits (claim-processing rules). The court uses Hamer to explain that, although the notice is not yet effective under FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(i), the appeal is nonetheless timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2107, and the court therefore has adjudicatory authority.
• Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116 (2017), and Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736 (2023): Support the flexible “background principle” that a notice of appeal typically transfers adjudicatory authority to the court of appeals but that this is not absolute; where a notice is dormant, the district court can still act in aid of the appeal.
• OTIS v. CITY OF CHICAGO, 29 F.3d 1159 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc): Describes the “harsh trap” that pre-1993 FRAP created, in which premature notices self-destructed; this case explains the policy animating the 1993 amendments that now allow a premature notice to ripen rather than vanish.
• FLORIAN v. SEQUA CORP., 294 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam): Provides the “suspended-dormant-unripe” description for premature appeals while a tolling motion remains unresolved, which the Fourth Circuit adopts.
• Katerinos v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 368 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. v. Karaoke Kandy Store, Inc., 782 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2015), and HODGE EX REL. SKIFF v. HODGE, 269 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2001): Endorse holding an appeal in abeyance (rather than dismissing) when the FRAP 4(a)(4) defect surfaces after significant effort has been invested.
• Harborside Refrigerated Services v. Vogel, 959 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1992); Emory v. Secretary of the Navy, 819 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Krivak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2 F.4th 601 (7th Cir. 2021); Lee-Thomas v. Prince George’s County Public Schools, 666 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 2012): All recognize that the substance of a post-judgment motion controls (not its label) for purposes of FRAP 4(a)(4) tolling. The Fourth Circuit applies this principle to treat the County’s mislabeled Rule 52(b) motion as a Rule 59(e) motion.
• RODRIGUEZ v. BANCO CENTral, 790 F.2d 172 (1st Cir. 1986) and Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3950.4: Authorities supporting that “judgment” in Rule 54(a) includes any appealable order, thereby extending FRAP 4(a)(4)(A) to interlocutory appeals.
• Pruett v. Choctaw County, 9 F.3d 96 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam): The Eleventh Circuit’s contrary view that FRAP 4(a)(4) cannot apply in interlocutory appeals because there is no “final judgment.” The Fourth Circuit expressly rejects this reasoning, creating a clear inter-circuit disagreement.
• Stone v. J&M Securities, LLC, 55 F.4th 1150 (8th Cir. 2022), and Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morell Bauza Cartagena & Dapena, LLC, 832 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2016): Support that the district court may act while the notice is dormant, without a formal remand.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Circuit’s analysis proceeds in three steps.

1. Characterizing the post-judgment motion. Although the County labeled its filing a Rule 52(b) motion to amend findings, there had been no bench trial and thus no findings under Rule 52(a). The district court treated the filing as a request for reconsideration under Rule 54(b). The Fourth Circuit, applying the substance-over-form principle, treats the motion as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a “judgment” because it asked the court to change an appealable order—the denial of qualified immunity. This characterization matters because a timely Rule 59(e) motion is one of the motions listed in FRAP 4(a)(4)(A) that toll the time for appeal.
2. Applying FRAP 4(a)(4) to interlocutory orders. The court holds that the tolling regime in FRAP 4(a)(4)(A) applies even when the underlying order is interlocutory, so long as it is appealable. Civil Rule 54(a) defines “judgment” as “any order from which an appeal lies,” which covers collateral-order appeals like denials of qualified immunity at the pleading stage. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit rejects Eleventh Circuit dicta to the contrary and aligns with authorities recognizing that interlocutory, appealable orders fall within the “judgment” definition for tolling purposes.
3. Determining whether the notice is effective. FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(i) provides that a notice of appeal filed while a Rule 59(e) motion is pending “becomes effective” only when the district court enters an order “disposing of the last such remaining motion.” Here, the district court’s reconsideration order left unresolved whether public official immunity barred the plaintiffs’ negligence claim. Because the County’s motion sought entry of judgment “on all claims,” the court’s order did not “dispose of” the motion as to that component. The Fourth Circuit gives “dispose of” its ordinary meaning—“to finish dealing with”—and concludes the notice remains dormant and ineffective until full resolution.

Having determined the notice is not yet effective, the court addresses how to proceed:

• Jurisdiction and timeliness. The notice was filed within the statutory 30-day period in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a), so the court retains adjudicatory authority. The non-effectiveness under FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(i) is a claim-processing issue, not a jurisdictional bar, under Hamer.
• Remedy—abeyance, not dismissal. When the defect surfaces after substantial investment of resources, the court may hold the appeal in abeyance to allow the district court to complete its work. The panel adopts this practical approach from sister circuits, avoiding the inefficiency of dismissal-and-refiling.
• District court’s continuing authority. Because the notice is dormant, adjudicatory authority has not been fully transferred to the court of appeals. The district court may therefore decide the remaining issue “in aid of the appeal” without a formal remand.

Impact: What This Opinion Means Going Forward

This published order sets important procedural guideposts in the Fourth Circuit:

• Interlocutory appeals and tolling are compatible. Litigants pursuing qualified-immunity appeals (and other collateral-order appeals) must now account for FRAP 4(a)(4). If they file motions that qualify under Rule 4(a)(4)(A)—such as Rule 59(e) motions—the time to appeal runs from the order resolving those motions, and any notice filed before full disposition is dormant until then.
• Labels matter less than substance. Post-judgment motions will be evaluated by what they seek, not the captions parties choose. A motion styled under Rule 52(b) or as “reconsideration” may be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if it seeks to alter an appealable order. This can save an appeal (by tolling) but can also suspend it if the motion is left partially unresolved.
• Strategic choice for defendants—appeal now or seek reconsideration. Government defendants seeking immediate review of qualified-immunity denials should weigh the benefits of a reconsideration motion against the cost: the appeal will be on hold until the district court fully rules. Counsel should press for prompt, complete resolution of all issues raised in such motions to avoid a procedural limbo.
• District courts retain authority while a notice is dormant. District judges in the Fourth Circuit should feel confident adjudicating unresolved components of tolling motions despite the filing of a notice of appeal, because the notice does not divest them of authority where FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(i) renders the notice ineffective.
• Abeyance as a case-management tool. The Fourth Circuit endorses holding appeals in abeyance rather than dismissing them when a FRAP 4(a)(4) problem becomes apparent after significant work has been done. This reduces wasted effort and preserves appellate rights once the motion is fully resolved.
• Inter-circuit disagreement. By expressly disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit’s position in Pruett, the Fourth Circuit contributes to a circuit split regarding the application of FRAP 4(a)(4) to interlocutory appeals. This could invite further clarification, either by amendments to the rules or by the Supreme Court.
• FRAP 3(c)(5) coverage. When a party designates in its notice only the order resolving a tolling motion described in FRAP 4(a)(4)(A), that notice will also encompass the underlying appealable order once the tolling order is entered—another reason precision about motion types and timing matters.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Collateral order doctrine: A narrow exception allowing immediate appeals from orders that conclusively decide important issues separate from the merits, and that would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment. Denials of qualified immunity at the pleading stage fit this category because immunity is a right not to stand trial.
• “Judgment” under Rule 54(a): Not just final judgments. It covers any order from which an appeal lies, including interlocutory orders appealable under the collateral order doctrine. This definition is why FRAP 4(a)(4) can apply to qualified-immunity appeals.
• FRAP 4(a)(4) tolling: Certain timely post-judgment motions (like Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend) pause the clock for filing a notice of appeal. A notice filed while such a motion is pending does not take effect until the district court fully decides the motion.
• Dormant notice of appeal: A notice filed too early (while a tolling motion is unresolved) does not vanish; it is “dormant” and will automatically “ripen” and become effective when the district court disposes of the last tolling motion.
• Substance-over-form for motions: Courts look at what a motion asks the court to do, not the title at the top of the filing. A mislabeled motion may still be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if it seeks to change an appealable order.
• Jurisdictional vs. claim-processing rules: Statutory deadlines (like § 2107’s 30 days) are jurisdictional; missing them means the court of appeals has no power to hear the case. Court-made rule deadlines (like certain parts of FRAP 4) generally are not jurisdictional—they govern procedure and can lead to other consequences (like dormancy), but do not eliminate the court’s adjudicatory authority.
• Abeyance: A procedural pause. The appellate court holds the case in place without dismissing it, usually to allow the district court to complete an action that will clarify or control the appeal.

Conclusion

This published order delivers a clear, practical rule for federal appellate practice in the Fourth Circuit: FRAP 4(a)(4)’s tolling framework applies to interlocutory, appealable orders (including qualified-immunity denials); a post-judgment motion that in substance seeks to alter such an order will be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion for tolling; and any notice of appeal filed while such a motion remains partially unresolved is not yet effective. Rather than reflexively dismissing such appeals, the court may hold them in abeyance, and the district court retains authority to finish adjudicating the unresolved issues because the notice is dormant.

For litigants and district courts, the message is straightforward: ensure that reconsideration motions are fully disposed of before expecting a notice of appeal to take effect. For appellate practitioners, the opinion supplies both a safety net and a caution—premature notices will not self-destruct, but they will not empower appellate review until the district court completes its work. Finally, by expressly recognizing FRAP 4(a)(4)’s reach into interlocutory territory and rejecting contrary Eleventh Circuit language, the Fourth Circuit has added a consequential voice to an inter-circuit dialogue about the meaning of “judgment” and the management of appellate timing in qualified-immunity and other collateral-order appeals.