Dor v. Bondi: Fixing the Relevant Time for “Controlled Substance” Deportability to the Date of Conviction

I. Introduction

In Dor v. Bondi, No. 25-1278 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2025), the First Circuit squarely answered a question that had long lingered in immigration law: when a noncitizen is ordered removed for a state “controlled substance” conviction under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), which version of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) controls—its contents at the time of the state conviction, or its contents at the time of removal proceedings?

The court joined a growing and now unanimous line of circuits in holding that the relevant federal benchmark is the CSA as it stood at the time of the noncitizen’s conviction, not at the time of removal proceedings. This “time-of-conviction rule” has major consequences for noncitizens, criminal defense counsel, and immigration adjudicators. It fixes immigration consequences based on the law as it existed when guilt was adjudicated, rather than allowing post-conviction changes in federal drug schedules or definitions to retroactively create or erase removability.

The facts of the case emerge from a relatively common scenario in removal litigation: the intersection of state marijuana offenses and evolving federal definitions—particularly the removal of “hemp” from the federal definition of marijuana in the 2018 Farm Bill. The First Circuit’s opinion uses that concrete backdrop to articulate a generally applicable rule of law about how to apply the categorical approach in drug-removability cases.

II. Background and Procedural Posture

A. The Petitioner and His State Conviction

Petitioner Jonalson Dor is a native and citizen of Haiti who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2007. On August 6, 2018, he pled guilty in Massachusetts state court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32C(a).

At that time (August 2018):

Massachusetts law defined “marijuana” to include hemp (subject to certain carve-outs for industrial hemp defined elsewhere in state law).
The federal CSA likewise defined “marihuana/marijuana” in 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) to include hemp.

Later that year, Congress enacted the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (“2018 Farm Bill”), effective December 2018, which amended the CSA definition of “marihuana” to exclude “hemp” from the definition at 21 U.S.C. § 802(16). After that amendment:

Massachusetts continued to criminalize some hemp-related conduct under its marijuana statute.
The federal CSA definition of “marijuana” no longer included hemp.

This divergence between state and federal law after December 2018 created the hook for Dor’s later argument that his Massachusetts conviction no longer matched any “controlled substance” under federal law.

B. The Removal Proceedings and Prior Litigation

Dor’s immigration saga had multiple chapters:

Initial removal proceedings (2019) – The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings in 2019, charging Dor as removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) based on two 2016 Massachusetts marijuana convictions. An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered him removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed on the ground that the 2016 convictions were “particularly serious crimes” that barred relief.
First trip to the First Circuit – Dor v. Garland (2022) – Dor petitioned for review. In Dor v. Garland, 46 F.4th 38 (1st Cir. 2022), the First Circuit granted the petition and remanded to the BIA, effectively reopening the case. Subsequently, Dor’s 2016 convictions were vacated, and all parties agreed these prior convictions were no longer relevant to removability.
Amended removal charges (2023) – On March 13, 2023, DHS amended its Notice to Appear to rely instead on Dor’s August 2018 marijuana conviction as the sole basis for removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i).

Dor moved to terminate removal proceedings in November 2023. He argued that his 2018 conviction was not a removable “controlled substance” offense when compared to the CSA as it existed by then—i.e., after the December 2018 Farm Bill had excluded “hemp” from the definition of marijuana. In other words, he implicitly asked the IJ to compare his state conviction to the CSA in effect at the time of removal proceedings, not at the time of his conviction.

The IJ rejected this argument, ruling that the relevant federal benchmark is the CSA as it existed at the time of the conviction. Because at that time both federal and Massachusetts law treated marijuana (including hemp) in materially the same way, the IJ found a categorical match and held Dor removable.

Dor appealed to the BIA, which upheld the IJ and expressly adopted the time-of-conviction rule, joining multiple circuit courts that had already done so. The BIA also rejected Dor’s attempt to soften the time-of-removal approach via a “one-way ratchet” that would only allow changes in the CSA to benefit, but never to harm, noncitizens.

Dor then sought review in the First Circuit, resulting in the present decision.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit framed the core question as:

When evaluating whether a noncitizen’s state criminal conviction renders them deportable for a controlled substance offense under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), must courts refer to the CSA’s definition of a controlled substance as it existed at the time of the individual’s conviction, or at the time of their removal proceedings?

The court held:

Rule adopted: Courts must use the CSA as it existed at the time of the conviction (the “time-of-conviction rule”).
Reasoning: This approach is most consistent with:
- The structure and purpose of the categorical approach.
- Fair notice and the ability of noncitizens and their counsel to assess immigration consequences at the time of a plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky.
- The general aversion to retroactive imposition of harsher consequences for past conduct.
- The unanimous direction of sister circuits that had already addressed the question.
Rejection of time-of-removal rule: The court rejected Dor’s argument that the 1986 amendments to the INA, which cross-referenced the CSA, implicitly require using the CSA as it stands at the time of removal proceedings. The court also rejected Dor’s proposed “one-way ratchet” version of the time-of-removal rule.
Application to Dor: In August 2018, both Massachusetts law and the CSA defined “marijuana” to include hemp. Consequently, Dor’s Massachusetts conviction was a categorical match with the federal definition at that time, making him removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i). His petition for review was therefore denied.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Central Legal Issue: The Relevant CSA “Snapshot”

Under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), a noncitizen is deportable if they:

“have been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21),”

subject to a narrow personal-use exception for a single offense involving 30 grams or less of marijuana.

Key moving parts:

The state conviction (here, Massachusetts marijuana with intent to distribute).
The federal definition of “controlled substance” incorporated via reference to 21 U.S.C. § 802.
The categorical approach: removability turns on a legal comparison between the state statute and the federal definition, not on the underlying facts of the case.

The dispute in Dor was not over the method (everyone agreed the categorical approach applies) but over the temporal reference for the federal comparator:

Dor’s position (time-of-removal rule): Courts should apply the CSA in effect at the time removal proceedings are initiated or adjudicated. Under this rule, post-conviction changes to the CSA—like the 2018 removal of hemp from the marijuana definition—would govern the removability analysis.
Government’s position (time-of-conviction rule): Courts should use the CSA as it existed at the time of the state conviction. Under this rule, immigration consequences are “locked in” based on how federal law treated the substance when guilt was established.

The First Circuit adopted the government’s view.

B. Precedents and Authorities Considered

1. Supreme Court Cases on the Categorical Approach and Counsel’s Duties

The opinion relies heavily on the logic and structure of the categorical approach as elaborated in:

Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015) – The Court held that a noncitizen’s state paraphernalia conviction was not a removable “controlled substance” offense when the state statute did not require the substance to be on the federal drug schedules. Crucially, Mellouli:
- Emphasized that removal under § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) requires a conviction that “necessarily” involves a federally controlled substance.
- Endorsed the categorical approach’s role in promoting “efficiency, fairness, and predictability.”
- Used language suggesting that the comparison is made to the federal schedules “at the time of Mellouli’s conviction,” though without squarely litigating the time-reference issue.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) – Clarified that the categorical approach focuses on “the minimum conduct criminalized” by the state statute and stressed the benefit of “promoting judicial and administrative efficiency” by avoiding relitigation of the underlying criminal case.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) – The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense counsel to advise noncitizen clients about the deportation risks of a guilty plea. This is pivotal in Dor, because a rule that makes removal consequences depend on future, unpredictable changes in federal schedules would undermine counsel’s ability to give constitutionally adequate advice.

The First Circuit reads these cases as collectively emphasizing:

The categorical approach’s orientation toward what a past conviction “necessarily established”.
The importance of predictability and fair notice at the time of plea or trial.
The constitutional overlay from Padilla that demands noncitizens and their attorneys be able to anticipate immigration consequences at the time of the criminal proceeding.

2. Sister Circuit Decisions on the Time Reference

By the time Dor was decided, five circuits had already addressed the exact question and adopted the time-of-conviction rule:

Second Circuit – Doe v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2018):
- Held that removability depends on the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of conviction.
- Stressed that using the time-of-removal schedules would make it “impossible” for noncitizens and prosecutors to predict immigration consequences when negotiating pleas.
- Warned against making removability turn on the “fortuities” of when removal proceedings commence or when the DEA changes schedules.
Third Circuit – Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 906 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2018) – Likewise read Mellouli as consistent with a time-of-conviction focus.
Ninth Circuit – Medina-Rodriguez v. Barr, 979 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2020) – Emphasized the categorical approach’s function in providing “fair notice” at the time of the plea.
Eleventh Circuit – Gordon v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 962 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2020) – Adopted the same rule, with a short but explicit endorsement of time-of-conviction.
Eighth Circuit – Salinas v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 840 (8th Cir. 2025) – Issued just one day after the BIA’s decision in Dor’s case; the Eighth Circuit became the fifth circuit to accept the time-of-conviction rule.

The First Circuit explicitly “joins” these circuits and describes a near “unanimous trend” in federal appellate law on this question.

3. Prior First Circuit and Related Precedents

The court also situates its decision within its own precedent:

Boulanger v. United States, 978 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2020) – Described the categorical approach as asking whether federal law encompasses the “least culpable conduct” criminalized by the state statute.
Swaby v. Yates, 847 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2017) – Applied the categorical (and where appropriate, modified categorical) approach in the immigration context.
Espinoza-Ochoa v. Garland, 89 F.4th 222 (1st Cir. 2023) – Reiterated that legal conclusions of the BIA are reviewed de novo, while giving some deference to reasonable agency interpretations of immigration statutes.
United States v. Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016) – Recognized that Padilla overturned the prior understanding that deportation consequences were merely “collateral” to criminal proceedings and thus outside Sixth Amendment protections.
United States v. Abdulaziz, 998 F.3d 519 (1st Cir. 2021) – Addressed timing rules in the sentencing-enhancement context. Dor attempted to analogize this to support a time-of-removal rule, but the court found that argument waived because it was raised only at oral argument.

The court also briefly notes that issues of deference to the BIA under Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019), or to agencies more broadly under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), were not implicated because neither party raised them.

4. Statutory Background: The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act

Dor’s central statutory argument relied on § 1751 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which:

Amended the INA to incorporate the CSA by reference, thereby replacing what had been a static list of controlled substances in immigration law with the dynamic CSA schedules.
Provided in § 1751(c) that the amendments “shall apply to convictions occurring before, on, or after the date” of enactment—explicitly making that expansion of deportability retroactive to past convictions.

Dor argued that this dynamic incorporation and retroactive effect showed Congress intended immigration adjudicators to always use the current CSA when determining whether a prior conviction is a “controlled substance” offense. The court rejected this reading, as discussed below.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Silence and the 1986 Amendments

The First Circuit agrees with both parties that the text of INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) itself does not specify which temporal version of § 802 to use. The statute simply refers to “a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21)” without a temporal qualifier. The court therefore assumed, without deciding, that the text is ambiguous in this respect.

On the 1986 Amendments:

The court acknowledges Congress clearly intended retroactivity at that moment in time—i.e., when the INA was first amended in 1986 to use the CSA framework, that expansion of deportability applied to convictions “before, on, or after” enactment.
But the court holds that this does not answer the distinct question of which version of the CSA applies decades later in a specific removability proceeding.
The amendments are “silent” as to whether later amendments to the CSA (such as adding or removing particular substances) must be applied by immigration courts as of the time of removal or as of the time of conviction.

The court also rejects the notion that the mere “dynamic” nature of the CSA (the ability of Congress or the DEA to add or remove substances over time) implies a time-of-removal rule:

Changes to the CSA will affect outcomes under both the time-of-conviction and time-of-removal rules; dynamic change alone does not indicate which snapshot should be used.
The question is when that dynamic reference is “frozen” for a particular case—something Congress did not specify.

2. The Categorical Approach, Predictability, and Fair Notice

The core of the court’s reasoning comes from the structure and purposes of the categorical approach:

Conviction-focused trigger: Removal hinges on whether the noncitizen “has been convicted” of a certain type of offense, not on the underlying conduct alone. The categorical approach thus looks to the legal elements of the prior offense, not case-specific facts.
What the conviction “necessarily established”: The Supreme Court has said that immigration courts must ask what the conviction necessarily established under the statute of conviction, not what the noncitizen actually did (Mellouli, Moncrieffe).
Predictability and efficiency: The categorical approach avoids relitigation of old criminal cases and allows uniform, rule-like adjudication.

Importantly, the First Circuit emphasizes that these goals are served only if noncitizens and counsel can know, at the time of plea or trial, whether a given state conviction will be a removable offense.

Under a time-of-removal rule:

A noncitizen might enter a “safe harbor” plea to a state offense that, at the time, is overbroad compared to the CSA (i.e., it covers some substances not on the federal schedules), and thus does not trigger removability under the categorical approach.
But if the CSA is later amended to add those extra substances to the federal schedules, the same state offense could retroactively become a deportable “controlled substance” conviction by the time removal proceedings commence.
This would render counsel’s contemporaneous advice regarding deportation risk unreliable and undercut noncitizens’ ability to make informed choices about plea bargains.

The First Circuit finds this unacceptable in light of Padilla and the logic of the categorical approach. Checking for removability against the CSA as of the date of conviction:

Provides “maximum clarity” at the moment when the noncitizen must decide how to proceed in the criminal case.
Aligns with how the categorical approach is typically implemented—looking backward to a fixed conviction event and the law as it then stood.
Prevents new immigration consequences from being imposed based on post-conviction changes in drug law (thus avoiding retroactive imposition of harsher penalties).

3. Constitutional Backdrop: Padilla and Effective Assistance of Counsel

Although the decision does not formally ground itself on constitutional due process, the court’s reasoning is clearly informed by the Sixth Amendment standard set in Padilla v. Kentucky:

Padilla requires that defense counsel advise noncitizen clients whether a plea “carries a risk of deportation.”
If immigration consequences are dependent on future changes to federal drug schedules that cannot be predicted at the time of the plea, counsel cannot meaningfully fulfill this constitutional duty.
Thus, a time-of-removal rule would tend to “run afoul” of Padilla by making accurate advice effectively impossible in many cases.

The court expressly cites Doe v. Sessions on this point, endorsing the Second Circuit’s view that the time-of-conviction rule best harmonizes immigration law with the Sixth Amendment’s requirements for criminal defense counsel.

4. Rejection of Dor’s Counterarguments

a. Dynamic Incorporation and the 1986 Amendments

Dor argued that by dynamically incorporating the CSA into the INA and making that incorporation retroactive as of 1986, Congress signaled an intent for immigration courts to always apply the then-current version of the CSA whenever a question of removability arises.

The court responds:

Section 1751 clearly made the initial expansion of deportability retroactive. But that says nothing about whether future changes to the CSA must be applied to prior convictions for purposes of removability.
There is no clear congressional statement authorizing indefinite retroactive application of every later change to the CSA to all past convictions.
Dynamic incorporation alone does not specify the temporal reference point for a given adjudication.

b. “Future Retroactivity” Concerns

Dor suggested that there is a difference between the 1986 decision to make an initial expansion retroactive and the notion that Congress intended perpetual “future retroactivity” whenever the CSA changed decades later.

The First Circuit is not persuaded, especially since:

The case involves events long after 1986; the question is how courts today should interpret a cross-reference adopted nearly forty years ago.
The government’s rule (time-of-conviction) in fact avoids retroactivity problems because it prevents later expansions of the CSA from making old convictions newly deportable.

c. The “One-Way Ratchet” Proposal

To mitigate the retroactivity problem, Dor proposed a compromise at oral argument: a “one-way ratchet” under which courts would:

Use the CSA in effect at the time of removal, except when doing so would disadvantage the noncitizen or upset reliance interests.
In other words, allow later ameliorative changes in drug law (like removing hemp from the marijuana definition) to benefit noncitizens, but disallow later aggravating changes from harming them.

The BIA and the First Circuit rejected this for several reasons:

It reframes the issue as a policy choice about fairness rather than a matter of statutory interpretation. Courts must interpret what Congress actually enacted, not craft asymmetric rules based on desired fairness outcomes.
It would create doctrinal complexity and uncertainty—courts would have to decide case by case whether applying a later CSA version is “detrimental” or “defies reliance-based expectations.”
The argument was, in any event, waived, as it was presented for the first time at oral argument rather than in briefs.

d. The Timing Anchor for a Time-of-Removal Rule

The government argued that even if one adopted a time-of-removal rule, it is unclear what exact “time of removal” should be used:

The date DHS issues the Notice to Appear?
The date the IJ issues a removal order?
The date the BIA decides the appeal?
The actual date of physical removal from the United States?

Dor only belatedly suggested that the issuance of the charging document (the NTA) should be the anchor. The court notes that this lateness prevented meaningful engagement by the government and further highlights the practical difficulty of implementing a time-of-removal standard.

5. Application to Dor’s Case: Categorical Match at the Time of Conviction

Having adopted the time-of-conviction rule, the First Circuit’s application is straightforward:

In August 2018, when Dor was convicted, both:
- Massachusetts law, and
- The CSA (21 U.S.C. § 802(16))
defined “marijuana” to include hemp.
Thus, the Massachusetts offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute was not overbroad relative to the federal definition at that time; it did not criminalize substances outside the federal definition.
Under the categorical approach, this yields a categorical match between Dor’s state conviction and a federal “controlled substance” as defined at the time of conviction.
Therefore, Dor is removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), and his petition for review is denied.

The later 2018 Farm Bill amendment, which excluded hemp from the federal definition of marijuana, is immaterial under the newly announced time-of-conviction rule.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. The Controlled Substances Act and “Marijuana” vs. “Hemp”

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is the federal statute that organizes regulated drugs into schedules (I–V) and defines what counts as a “controlled substance” in 21 U.S.C. § 802. “Marijuana” (or “marihuana”) is one such controlled substance.

Historically:

Before December 2018: The CSA definition of marijuana included virtually all cannabis plant material, including what we now commonly call “hemp.”
After December 2018 (2018 Farm Bill): “Hemp” was carved out from the federal marijuana definition and separately regulated, making some cannabis with low THC content no longer a federally controlled substance as “marijuana.”

However, some states (including Massachusetts) continued to define “marijuana” more broadly, at least for some period, so that certain hemp-related conduct remained criminal at the state level but not at the federal level.

2. The Categorical and Modified Categorical Approaches

The categorical approach is a method courts use to decide whether a past conviction qualifies as a particular type of offense under federal law (e.g., an aggravated felony or a controlled substance offense).

Courts examine the elements of the state statute and imagine the least serious conduct that the statute criminalizes.
If that least serious conduct would still qualify as, here, a “controlled substance” offense under the federal definition, the statute is a categorical match.
If the statute criminalizes some conduct that would not be a controlled substance offense under federal law (e.g., because it covers substances that are not federally scheduled), the statute is overbroad and not a categorical match.

The modified categorical approach is used when a state statute is “divisible”—meaning it sets out multiple alternative elements creating several distinct crimes in a single statute. In that case:

Court may look at a limited set of documents (indictment, plea agreement, jury instructions, etc.) to determine which alternative formed the basis of the conviction.
Once the correct alternative is identified, the usual categorical analysis is applied.

3. Dynamic vs. Static Incorporation

A statute can incorporate another statute by reference either:

Statically – “As it exists now.” The incorporating law is tied to the content of the referenced statute at a fixed point in time and does not change when the referenced statute is amended later, unless the incorporating law is itself amended.
Dynamically – “As it may be amended from time to time.” The incorporating law automatically tracks future amendments to the referenced statute.

The INA’s reference to “controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21)” is generally understood as dynamic incorporation of the CSA. But Dor shows that even with dynamic incorporation, courts still must decide which moment in time is relevant when evaluating a prior conviction—here, the First Circuit chooses the date of conviction.

4. Retroactivity

“Retroactivity” in legal terms refers to whether a new law (or interpretation) is applied to conduct or events that occurred before the law was changed.

Retroactive punishment concern: There is a strong presumption against laws that impose new, harsher consequences for actions that were taken in the past.
In this case, a time-of-removal rule could allow a later expansion of the CSA to reach substances not previously controlled, and then retroactively treat old convictions as deportable—even though, at the time of conviction, federal law did not treat that conduct as removable.
The time-of-conviction rule avoids this by freezing the analysis at the legal landscape that existed when the noncitizen was convicted.

5. Padilla and the Duty to Advise About Deportation

Padilla v. Kentucky held that criminal defense attorneys must advise their noncitizen clients about the risk of deportation that a guilty plea entails.

This requires that:

At plea bargaining time, counsel can determine whether a contemplated conviction will render the client deportable.
Legal rules that make deportability contingent on unpredictable, future federal regulatory changes (and on the timing of immigration proceedings) undermine this requirement.

Hence, Dor highlights that the time-of-conviction rule is not merely a technical choice; it directly affects whether Padilla’s constitutional expectations can be met in practice.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Noncitizens and Criminal Defense Counsel

The most immediate impact of Dor v. Bondi is on plea bargaining and defense strategy in the First Circuit:

Predictable baseline: Defense counsel can now advise clients that the immigration consequences of a conviction will be measured against the CSA as it stands at the time of conviction.
Safe-harbor pleas: If a state statute is broader than the CSA at that time (i.e., it covers substances not federally controlled), a plea to that statute may be a viable “safe harbor” from removability—even if Congress or the DEA later add those substances to the CSA schedules.
No windfall from later decriminalization: The downside for noncitizens is that later narrowing of federal drug law (such as the removal of hemp from the marijuana definition) does not retroactively erase removability. The immigration consequences are effectively “locked in” at the time of conviction unless Congress expressly enacts a retroactive ameliorative rule.

In short, Dor greatly enhances clarity but does not guarantee that noncitizens benefit from subsequent, more lenient drug policy reforms.

B. For Immigration Courts, the BIA, and DHS

For adjudicators and enforcement agencies:

Uniform approach in the First Circuit: IJs and the BIA, when handling cases arising in the First Circuit, must now apply the CSA as it existed at the conviction date in all controlled-substance removability analyses under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i).
Consistency with sister circuits: The First Circuit’s ruling harmonizes its approach with the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. This national convergence reduces the likelihood of a circuit split warranting Supreme Court intervention—at least on this precise issue.
Administrative simplicity: While the time-of-conviction rule requires evidence of what the CSA looked like at the conviction date, that inquiry is largely legal and historical. It avoids case-by-case disputes over when exactly “removal proceedings” begin for timing purposes.

C. For the Substantive Development of Immigration and Drug Law

Dor also signals several broader trends:

Entrenchment of the categorical approach: The decision reaffirms the centrality of the categorical approach, resisting calls for more flexible or fact-based methods in immigration law.
Interaction with evolving drug reform: As states and the federal government continue to liberalize some aspects of drug law (especially concerning cannabis), the time-of-conviction rule means:
- Noncitizens convicted under now-outdated drug laws may remain deportable despite modern reforms.
- Unless Congress or agencies specifically provide retroactive relief, immigration law will often lag behind criminal law in reflecting changes in societal views on drugs.
Limit on “ameliorative” judicial constructions: The court’s rejection of a “one-way ratchet” underscores a formalist approach to statutory interpretation: courts cannot unilaterally skew timing rules in favor of noncitizens absent clear statutory text.

D. Open Questions and Potential Future Litigation

Although Dor clarifies much, some issues remain open:

Relief and discretion: Noncitizens whose convictions are removable under the time-of-conviction rule may still seek various forms of relief (cancellation of removal, asylum, etc.), where equitable and humanitarian considerations can play a role. How will courts weigh evolving drug norms in those discretionary contexts?
Congressional response: Congress could, if it chose, enact specific retroactive ameliorative measures—for example, making certain pre-Farm-Bill marijuana convictions categorically non-removable. Whether it will do so remains a political question.
Interaction with other timing rules: While Dor addresses § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), similar timing disputes may arise regarding other cross-referenced statutes or under different immigration provisions (e.g., aggravated felony definitions tied to “drug trafficking,” or subsequent changes to the CSA schedules).

VII. Conclusion

Dor v. Bondi is a significant precedent in the First Circuit’s immigration jurisprudence. It resolves a previously unsettled question by holding that, for purposes of removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), courts must compare a noncitizen’s state drug conviction to the Controlled Substances Act as it existed at the time of the conviction.

The decision aligns the First Circuit with at least five other circuits, reinforces the conviction-focused nature of the categorical approach, and fortifies the constitutional expectation under Padilla that noncitizens can receive meaningful advice about deportation risks at the time of plea bargaining.

At the same time, the ruling underscores the sometimes harsh reality that later liberalizations in drug law—like the exclusion of hemp from the federal marijuana definition—do not automatically erase the immigration consequences of older convictions. Those consequences remain fixed unless and until Congress or the political branches explicitly provide retroactive relief.

In sum, Dor v. Bondi establishes a clear and administrable timing rule that will govern controlled-substance deportability determinations in the First Circuit going forward: the relevant federal law is the CSA as it stood on the day the noncitizen was convicted, not the day the government seeks to remove them.