Doe v. Green and the Limits of Retroactive Accrual for Childhood Sexual Abuse Claims in Virginia

I. Introduction

Doe v. Green, decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia on November 26, 2025, addresses two interrelated questions of substantial importance in Virginia civil practice:

When does the statute of limitations begin to run on civil claims arising from childhood sexual abuse?
Under what circumstances will later-enacted “accrual statutes” governing such claims apply retroactively?

The plaintiff, Jane Doe (“Doe”), alleged a sexual relationship with the defendant, Joseph Robert Green, Jr. (“Green”), beginning when she was 14 and he was 33. Years later, after being diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 2021, she filed a civil suit in tort. The core dispute was whether her suit, filed in 2021, was time-barred, or whether changes in Virginia’s accrual statutes for childhood sexual abuse allowed her to sue based on the 2021 diagnosis date.

The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, holding that:

The 2005 version of Code § 8.01-249(6) (“2005 Accrual Statute”) governs the accrual of Doe’s claim.
Doe waived her argument that Code § 8.01-1 makes the 2021 amendment to § 8.01-249(6) (“2021 Accrual Statute”) retroactive, because she did not timely raise it.
The 1995 amendment to Article IV, § 14 of the Constitution of Virginia permits (but does not mandate) retroactive accrual for intentional torts against minors; it does not itself make any statute retroactive.
Under the 2005 Accrual Statute, Doe’s cause of action accrued when she turned 18, because her own pleadings show she already knew of her mental injury and its causal connection to the improper relationship while still a minor.

This decision not only resolves Doe’s individual claim but also clarifies:

How strictly Virginia courts apply retroactivity principles to amendments benefiting survivors of childhood sexual abuse.
How tightly appellate courts enforce waiver rules on new legal theories (such as Code § 8.01-1) raised for the first time in a reply brief.
How allegations in a plaintiff’s own complaint can establish accrual — and therefore trigger the statute of limitations — long before a later formal diagnosis of PTSD or similar conditions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

Doe filed suit in 2021 alleging negligence per se, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of a sexual relationship with Green in 2005–2006, when she was a minor.
Green filed a plea in bar, asserting that the claims were time-barred under the statute of limitations as governed by the 2005 Accrual Statute.
The Circuit Court agreed and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that Doe’s claims accrued when she turned 18 (December 2008) and expired in December 2010.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion, rejecting Doe’s retroactivity arguments and finding that her complaint showed knowledge of injury and causation before age 18.
The Supreme Court of Virginia granted an appeal. Justice Powell authored the opinion affirming the Court of Appeals.

B. Core Holdings

No retroactive application of the 2021 Accrual Statute on this record.
The Court held that Doe had waived reliance on Code § 8.01-1 as a basis for retroactivity by not raising it in the circuit court or her opening brief in the Court of Appeals. Without that argument, there was no sufficient basis to apply the 2021 Accrual Statute retroactively.
1995 constitutional amendment is permissive, not self-executing.
The 1995 amendment to Article IV, § 14 of the Virginia Constitution grants the General Assembly the power to enact retroactive accrual rules for intentional torts against minors, but it does not itself make any particular statute retroactive, nor does it require the General Assembly to exercise that power in any given statute.
Under the 2005 Accrual Statute, Doe’s claim accrued when she turned 18.
The 2005 Accrual Statute provides that a cause of action for injuries from sexual abuse of a minor accrues (i) upon removal of the disability of infancy (i.e., when the victim turns 18), or (ii) if the injury and its causal connection are not then known, when first communicated by a licensed physician or psychologist. The Court held that Doe’s own pleadings showed that, while still a minor, she knew she was suffering psychological harm and that the harm was connected to the improper relationship. Thus, the default rule (accrual at majority) applied, and the two-year limitation period expired in 2010.
Pleadings bind the plaintiff; courts will not look behind them.
Invoking long-standing doctrine from Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, the Court rejected Doe’s argument that the complaint should be read as reflecting only her later “adult” understanding of her injuries. The Court emphasized that litigants are bound by the facts they plead, and accrual can be determined from those factual allegations on a plea in bar.
Judicial restraint: unresolved issues left undecided.
The Court expressly declined to decide whether Doe’s allegations met the statutory definition of “sexual abuse” or whether she was a “complaining witness” under Code § 18.2‑67.10, and it took no position on the substantive operation of Code § 8.01‑1. Those issues were unnecessary to the disposition in light of waiver and the accrual analysis.

III. Factual and Statutory Background

A. Factual Background

The parties’ sexual relationship allegedly began in June 2005, when Doe was 14 and Green was 33. Doe alleged that Green stressed secrecy, picked her up from school, and watched her soccer games “from afar,” which increased her anxiety over the inappropriateness of the relationship.
Doe ended the relationship in September 2006 by running away to New York. She later returned to Virginia and became “increasingly angry at her parents for not protecting her from [Green].”
In 2009, after turning 18, Doe reconnected with Green via Facebook, then reported the past sexual relationship to police. Green was criminally charged with carnal knowledge of a 13–15 year old under Code § 18.2‑63 but was acquitted.
Doe alleged long-term psychological harm: anxiety, nightmares, flashbacks, sleep and concentration problems, and difficulty forming adult relationships and engaging in sexual activity. In 2021 she received a PTSD diagnosis from a licensed clinical psychologist, which she linked causally to the earlier relationship.
Doe filed her civil complaint on September 17, 2021, asserting (after amendment) negligence per se, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

B. Statutory Framework

1. The 2005 Accrual Statute – Code § 8.01‑249(6) (2005)

The 2005 version of Code § 8.01‑249(6) provided that in:

In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, [the cause of action accrues] upon removal of the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in Section 8.01‑229 or, if the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is not then known, when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist.

“Sexual abuse” is cross‑referenced to definitions in Code § 18.2‑67.10 and certain rape/sexual offense statutes. Critically, the 2005 language contemplated that if a victim already knew of both injury and causation by the time minority ended, the cause accrued at majority; the later “medical‑discovery” trigger applied only if that knowledge did not exist at majority.

2. The 2021 Accrual Statute – Code § 8.01‑249(6) (2021)

In 2021, the General Assembly amended § 8.01‑249(6). The new version provides that accrual is:

upon the later of the removal of the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in § 8.01‑229 or when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist.

Unlike the 2005 version, the 2021 language does not condition the medical‑discovery trigger on a lack of prior knowledge at majority; it simply says “the later of” majority or medical communication. Standing alone, this change is highly favorable to survivors who do not receive a formal diagnosis until well into adulthood.

The critical question was whether this 2021 amendment applied retroactively to Doe’s already‑accrued or already‑barred claims.

3. Related Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

Code § 8.01‑243 – Governs limitation periods for personal injury actions generally; a later amendment extended the limitations period for certain sexual abuse claims to 20 years. The courts below held that this change was not retroactive; the Supreme Court did not need to reach that issue on appeal.
Code § 8.01‑229 – Addresses tolling of limitations for disabilities, including infancy. Under this statute, limitations do not begin to run while a person is under a disability such as minority.
Code § 1‑238 – Provides that when statutes are reenacted, changes are “effective prospectively unless the bill expressly provides that such changes are effective retroactively on a specified date.”
Code § 8.01‑1 – A key “general application” statute for Title 8.01. It states that, except as otherwise provided, provisions of Title 8.01 apply to causes of action arising before their effective date, unless doing so would materially change substantive rights or cause a miscarriage of justice. Whether this section can make accrual statutes retroactive was the center of Doe’s alternative theory — a theory the Court found waived and expressly declined to decide on the merits.
1995 Amendment to Article IV, § 14, Constitution of Virginia – Adds:
The General Assembly's power to define the accrual date for a civil action based on an intentional tort committed by a natural person against a person who, at the time of the intentional tort, was a minor shall include the power to provide for the retroactive application of a change in the accrual date.
This amendment responds to constitutional concerns about retroactively extending civil remedies for childhood abuse. It empowers — but does not compel — the legislature to authorize retroactive changes in accrual rules.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Retroactivity of the 2021 Accrual Statute

1. General Rule: Statutes Are Prospective Unless Clearly Retroactive

The Court began with a well-settled canon: statutes are presumed to operate prospectively absent a “manifest and plain” contrary intent. The Court cited:

Town of Culpeper v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 215 Va. 189, 194 (1974)
City of Charlottesville v. Payne, 299 Va. 515, 528–29 (2021)
Code § 1‑238 (prospective effect of changes unless expressly retroactive)

These authorities reinforce that explicit, unequivocal retroactivity language is required in the statute itself or in other clearly applicable law before courts will apply new provisions to earlier‑accrued or earlier‑barred claims.

Doe effectively conceded that the 2021 version of § 8.01‑249(6) contains no such explicit retroactivity clause. Her argument therefore shifted to external mechanisms — namely, Code § 8.01‑1 and the 1995 constitutional amendment — as sources of retroactive effect.

B. Waiver of the Code § 8.01‑1 Argument

A central procedural holding of Doe v. Green is that Doe waived any reliance on Code § 8.01‑1 as a ground for retroactivity.

1. Timing of the Argument

Doe did not raise Code § 8.01‑1 in the circuit court.
She did not rely on § 8.01‑1 in her opening brief in the Court of Appeals.
She raised Code § 8.01‑1 for the first time in her reply brief in the Court of Appeals, after Green had already briefed his own arguments.

By the time Doe expressly invoked § 8.01‑1, the case was already fully joined around a different set of theories: that the statute’s own history, and the 1995 constitutional amendment, made the 2021 Accrual Statute retroactive.

2. The Palmer Line of Cases and Rules 5:27(d)/5A:20(e)

The Court relied heavily on Palmer v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 293 Va. 573 (2017), which held that an appellant’s failure to present a specific argument in the opening brief results in waiver of that argument. The reasoning in Palmer rests on Rule 5:27(d), which provides that an appellant’s opening brief “must contain … the argument, and the authorities relating to each assignment of error.”

The Supreme Court noted that Rule 5A:20(e) — governing opening briefs in the Court of Appeals — is “functionally analogous” and likewise requires that the argument and controlling authorities be set out in the opening brief.

From these rules and precedents, the Court drew two important points:

New legal bases for an existing assignment of error are waived if first raised in a reply brief.
Doe argued that Code § 8.01‑1 was merely a “new point of law” supporting her longstanding position that the 2021 Accrual Statute is retroactive. The Court rejected that characterization, treating § 8.01‑1 as an entirely new basis for retroactivity, not just a refinement of existing arguments.
Reframing an argument to rely on new law is functionally a new argument.
Citing Palmer v. R.A. Yancey Lumber Corp., 294 Va. 140, 158 n.13 (2017), the Court reiterated that significantly reframing an argument on appeal so that it relies on a different legal basis constitutes waiver under Rule 5:25 (the contemporaneous‑objection rule).

Having found waiver, the Court explicitly stated that it was expressing “no position” on whether Code § 8.01‑1 would permit retroactive application of accrual statutes for sexual abuse. That question remains an open one in Virginia law.

C. Effect of the 1995 Amendment to Article IV, § 14

Doe’s remaining retroactivity argument was constitutional rather than statutory. She contended that the 1995 amendment to Article IV, § 14:

demonstrated an overarching policy favoring retroactivity in sexual abuse accrual statutes, and
therefore should be read as implicitly making all subsequent amendments to Code § 8.01‑249 retroactive.

The Court rejected this interpretation.

1. Textual Reading of the Amendment

The amendment states that the General Assembly’s power to define accrual in intentional tort cases against minors “shall include the power to provide for the retroactive application of a change in the accrual date.” The Supreme Court emphasized:

This language is permissive, not mandatory. It authorizes but does not require retroactivity.
The Constitution itself does not specify that any statute is retroactive; it merely removes constitutional barriers that might otherwise prevent retroactive accrual legislation.

The Court cited Kopalchick v. Catholic Diocese of Richmond, 274 Va. 332, 338 (2007), which described the 1995 amendment as “empower[ing] the General Assembly to make a retroactive change in the accrual date of the right of action for childhood sexual abuse.”

Thus, absent an express statutory provision invoking that constitutional power, the standard prospectivity rule remains in force.

D. Determining Accrual Under the 2005 Accrual Statute

1. Standard of Review and Record on a Plea in Bar

Because the issue came up on a plea in bar based solely on the pleadings, no evidence was introduced. The Supreme Court therefore reviewed the matter de novo, limited to the facts alleged in Doe’s complaint. The Court relied on:

Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 460 (2010) – de novo review of limitations issues decided on a plea in bar.
The principle that on a plea in bar “we are limited to the facts set forth in the complaint” and the defendant bears the burden of showing that the limitation period has run.

2. What Counts as “Injury” and When Is It “Known”? – Locke and McHenry

The Court restated two key doctrines about “injury” in the accrual context:

Locke v. Johns‑Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 957 (1981): “Injury” means a “positive, physical or mental hurt.” It does not require catastrophic damage; any real, identifiable harm suffices.
McHenry v. Adams, 248 Va. 238, 243 (1994): The injury “need only be slight”; it is immaterial that more substantial damage occurs later.

Applying these definitions, the Court asked: did Doe’s complaint show that she experienced “positive, physical or mental hurt” while still a minor, and did she understand that hurt as connected to the relationship with Green?

3. Doe’s Allegations as Proof of Knowledge

The Court pointed to specific allegations in the complaint:

Doe was “constantly worried about getting in trouble, her lack of control over the relationship, and her parents’ reaction if the [sexual relationship] was discovered.”
Green’s conduct (picking her up from school and attending soccer games from afar) “contributed to her anxiety about the inappropriate nature of the [sexual relationship].”
She became “increasingly angry at her parents for not protecting her from Mr. Green.”

These allegations, taken as true, show:

She experienced mental hurt (anxiety, worry, anger) while the relationship was ongoing.
She recognized the relationship as “inappropriate” and felt that her parents had failed to protect her from it — indicating she understood both the impropriety of the conduct and its causal role in her psychological distress.

The Court also noted that Doe contacted law enforcement in 2009, shortly after turning 18, to report the prior relationship. This action further corroborated her awareness, by that time, of the wrongfulness of Green’s conduct and its significance.

Under the 2005 Accrual Statute, the “medical discovery” provision applies only “if the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is not then known” at the time the disability of infancy is removed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Doe’s own allegations demonstrated she already knew of her injury and its connection to the relationship before she turned 18. Thus:

Her cause of action accrued when she reached majority in December 2008.
The two‑year limitation period under Code § 8.01‑243 expired in December 2010.
Her 2021 civil complaint was therefore filed more than a decade too late under the applicable law.

E. The Binding Effect of Pleadings – Potts and the Court’s Refusal to “Look Behind” the Complaint

Doe argued that her complaint was drafted with the benefit of adult insight gained during therapy and thus should not be read as proof of her knowledge while still a minor. The Court found that argument “simply untenable” under Virginia pleading rules.

Quoting Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 207 (1935), the Court emphasized:

No court can base its decree upon facts not alleged, nor render its judgment upon a right, however meritorious, which has not been pleaded and claimed. Pleadings are as essential as proof, the one being unavailing without the other.

The Court underscored:

The issues in a case are “made by the pleadings, and not by the testimony of witnesses or other evidence.”
A plaintiff is responsible for the “plain and explicit language” of her complaint; if she intended to allege something different, that was her drafting error.

Thus, the Court refused to speculate about Doe’s subjective or evolving understanding beyond what she actually alleged. The written complaint controlled, and its language satisfied the “injury and causal connection known” standard before majority.

F. Judicial Restraint: Issues Left Unresolved

Finally, the Court invoked the doctrine of judicial restraint, citing Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015): courts decide cases on the “best and narrowest grounds available.”

Because Doe’s claim failed on limitations grounds:

The Court did not decide whether Doe’s experiences satisfied the statutory definition of “sexual abuse” under Code § 18.2‑67.10(6).
It did not resolve whether Doe qualified as a “complaining witness” under Code § 18.2‑67.10(1).
It expressly took no position on whether Code § 8.01‑1, properly invoked and preserved, could authorize retroactive application of accrual statutes.

As a result, Doe v. Green is a strong limitations and waiver case, but it leaves several important substantive issues open for future litigation.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Retroactivity and Statutory Construction

Town of Culpeper v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 215 Va. 189 (1974)
Established the baseline rule that statutes are construed to operate prospectively unless a contrary intent is “manifest and plain.” Doe applies this rule to accrual statutes in the sensitive context of sexual abuse claims.
City of Charlottesville v. Payne, 299 Va. 515 (2021)
Reaffirmed the presumption against retroactivity and cited Code § 1‑238. Doe uses Payne to reinforce that, absent express retroactive language, courts will treat reenacted statutes as prospective.
Kopalchick v. Catholic Diocese of Richmond, 274 Va. 332 (2007)
Interpreted the 1995 constitutional amendment as an empowerment provision. Doe relies on this to reject Doe’s argument that the amendment itself mandated retroactivity for all later accrual statutes.

B. Accrual, Injury, and Limitations

Locke v. Johns‑Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951 (1981)
Defined “injury” as a “positive, physical or mental hurt,” which may be slight. In Doe, this definition allowed the Court to treat Doe’s described anxiety and emotional distress as sufficient “injury” to trigger accrual.
McHenry v. Adams, 248 Va. 238 (1994)
Held that even slight injury is enough to start limitations, even if more substantial damage appears later. Doe applies this logic to argue that later PTSD does not postpone accrual if earlier mental harm was already known and linked to the wrongful conduct.
Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457 (2010)
Clarified the standard of review and scope of record on a plea in bar addressing the statute of limitations. Doe uses Van Dam to justify its de novo review and its restriction to the facts within the complaint.

C. Pleadings and Appellate Waiver

Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196 (1935)
A foundational case on the central role of pleadings. Doe uses Potts to hold Doe to the facts as she alleged them, rejecting attempts to reinterpret the complaint through later explanations.
Palmer v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 293 Va. 573 (2017)
Held that failing to present an argument in the opening brief waives that argument on appeal. Doe applies this strictly to Doe’s late‑raised reliance on Code § 8.01‑1.
John Crane, Inc. v. Hardick, 283 Va. 358 (2012)
Quoted in Palmer for the proposition that non‑compliance with briefing rules results in waiver of unargued points. Doe incorporates this waiver principle.
Palmer v. R.A. Yancey Lumber Corp., 294 Va. 140 (2017)
Explained that significantly reframing an argument on appeal is tantamount to raising a new argument and is thus barred by Rule 5:25. Doe uses this reasoning to treat Code § 8.01‑1 as a new ground, not a mere refinement.
Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194 (2015)
Articulated the doctrine of judicial restraint — deciding cases on the best and narrowest grounds. Doe cites Swann to justify not reaching broader issues, such as the precise contours of “sexual abuse” under criminal definitions.

D. Other References

Hannah v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 106 (2024)
Cited for the proposition that retroactivity is a pure question of law reviewed de novo. This frames the standard of review for Doe’s retroactivity arguments.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Statute of Limitations vs. Accrual

A statute of limitations sets the time period within which a plaintiff must file suit (e.g., two years from accrual for personal injury).
Accrual is the legal moment at which a cause of action comes into existence and the clock begins to run. In many cases it’s the date of injury, but in special contexts (like childhood sexual abuse) the legislature may define a different accrual rule.
Accrual statutes (like § 8.01‑249(6)) specify when the cause of action accrues and thereby indirectly control when the limitations period begins.

B. Disability of Infancy

In Virginia, minority (being under 18) is a “disability” under Code § 8.01‑229. While under that disability, in most cases the statute of limitations does not run.
For childhood sexual abuse, the legislature has used that disability as a reference point — e.g., by pegging accrual “upon removal of the disability of infancy” (when the victim turns 18), plus possible later triggers.

C. Retroactivity

Prospective application means a statute governs events or causes of action arising after its effective date.
Retroactive application means a statute is applied to events or causes of action that occurred, accrued, or even expired before the statute was enacted.
Virginia law presumes prospectivity; retroactivity requires clear legislative intent either in the statute’s text or in unequivocal related provisions.
The 1995 constitutional amendment authorizes the General Assembly to enact retroactive accrual statutes in childhood intentional tort cases but does not itself make any statute retroactive.

D. Waiver and Forfeiture in Appellate Practice

Waiver in this context refers to losing the ability to raise an argument on appeal because it was not properly preserved:
- Not raised in the trial court (Rule 5:25), or
- Not presented in the opening brief (Rules 5:27(d) and 5A:20(e)).
A party cannot raise a legal theory for the first time in a reply brief and expect the appellate court to consider it. The adverse party must have a fair chance to respond.
Doe v. Green exemplifies strict enforcement of these rules: Code § 8.01‑1 was off the table because it was raised too late.

E. Plea in Bar

A plea in bar is a defensive pleading that asserts a single, dispositive legal bar to the plaintiff’s claim (such as the statute of limitations).
If decided on the pleadings alone, the court assumes the facts alleged are true and determines whether, as a matter of law, those facts defeat the claim.
Here, Green’s plea in bar argued that even accepting Doe’s allegations as true, her claims were untimely.

F. “Sexual Abuse” and “Complaining Witness”

“Sexual abuse” for purposes of § 8.01‑249(6) is tied to the criminal definition in Code § 18.2‑67.10(6) and to certain sexual offenses (rape, sodomy, sexual battery, etc.).
A “complaining witness” under Code § 18.2‑67.10(1) is a person alleged to have been subjected to conduct constituting an offense under Article 7 of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2.
Green argued that Doe had not adequately alleged statutory “sexual abuse” or that she was a “complaining witness,” which, if accepted, could have defeated the applicability of § 8.01‑249(6) altogether. The Supreme Court deliberately did not decide these issues, leaving them for another day.

VII. Impact of Doe v. Green

A. On Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse

Doe v. Green sends a sobering message to survivors with decades‑old abuse:

Unless the legislature has clearly made new accrual or limitations provisions retroactive, claims will remain governed by the law in effect when the cause of action accrued.
The fact that a formal PTSD or similar diagnosis occurs years later does not necessarily restart the clock if the survivor already knew of mental harm and its connection to the abuse as a minor.
Complaints that candidly acknowledge earlier awareness of harm may be used against the plaintiff to establish early accrual and limitations bars.

Practically, the decision may:

Encourage careful drafting of complaints in historical sexual abuse cases.
Lead some plaintiffs to explore alternative theories (e.g., fraud or concealment) that could trigger different accrual rules or tolling, where supported by facts.

B. On Pleading and Litigation Strategy

Attorneys must be acutely aware that pleadings are not merely narrative; they are evidentiary in the sense that they can establish the factual predicates for accrual and limitations.
Plaintiffs’ counsel should consider, consistent with Rule 11 and ethical obligations, how to plead mental harm and awareness in ways that truthfully describe the experience without unnecessarily front‑loading facts that confirm early accrual.
Defense counsel may increasingly rely on pleadings-only pleas in bar in sexual abuse cases, arguing that the complaint itself shows knowledge of injury and causation at an earlier date.

C. On Legislative Drafting

The decision highlights for the General Assembly:

If the legislature intends amendments to accrual or limitation rules to revive previously‑barred childhood abuse claims, it must say so explicitly and unambiguously in the statute, including specifying the date to which retroactivity attaches.
Reliance on general provisions like Code § 8.01‑1, without clear textual retroactivity language in the specific statute, may not suffice, especially given judicial caution around retroactivity.

In the wake of Doe, legislative efforts to extend civil remedies for childhood sexual abuse may focus on:

Express revival provisions.
Clear retroactivity clauses that fall within the authority granted by the 1995 constitutional amendment.

D. On Appellate Practice in Virginia

Doe v. Green reinforces a strict approach to appellate preservation and briefing:

All legal theories — including statutory bases for retroactivity — must be raised in the trial court and developed in the opening brief on appeal.
Courts will treat late‑raised statutes (like Code § 8.01‑1 here) as new arguments, not as mere clarifications.
The case underscores the risk of waiting to “discover” or refine important issues in reply briefs.

E. On Future Interpretation of Code § 8.01‑1

Although the Court declined to interpret Code § 8.01‑1 in this case, its explicit reservation of that question signals that:

Code § 8.01‑1 remains a potentially significant vehicle for arguing that certain procedural changes in Title 8.01 apply retroactively.
Future plaintiffs may more carefully preserve and fully brief § 8.01‑1 arguments in new cases testing the retroactive effect of accrual or limitations amendments.

Until such a case is decided, however, Doe v. Green effectively preserves the status quo ante: retroactivity will not be inferred absent clear, explicit direction.

VIII. Conclusion

Doe v. Green stands as an important decision at the intersection of childhood sexual abuse litigation, statutory retroactivity, and appellate procedure in Virginia.

The Court:

Reaffirmed the strong presumption against retroactive application of statutes, even in the emotionally charged context of childhood sexual abuse claims.
Clarified that the 1995 amendment to Article IV, § 14 of the Virginia Constitution is permissive, not self‑executing: it authorizes but does not itself enact retroactive accrual rules.
Applied strict waiver and briefing rules to bar reliance on Code § 8.01‑1 as a source of retroactivity, leaving that statute’s scope for another day.
Held that a plaintiff’s own allegations of anxiety, awareness of the “inappropriate nature” of a relationship, and anger at parents for failing to protect her can establish knowledge of “injury and its causal connection” before majority, triggering accrual at age 18 under the 2005 Accrual Statute.
Reemphasized that pleadings define the case and can, standing alone, resolve a limitations defense on a plea in bar.

In the broader legal landscape, Doe v. Green underscores:

The necessity for precise legislative drafting when expanding remedies for survivors of childhood abuse.
The importance of careful, strategically aware pleading in historical abuse cases.
The unforgiving nature of appellate waiver rules for litigants seeking to rely on broad, remedial statutes like Code § 8.01‑1.

While the decision leaves open significant questions — particularly regarding the potential retroactive reach of Code § 8.01‑1 and the exact boundaries of “sexual abuse” for civil accrual purposes — it firmly establishes that, without clear legislative direction or properly preserved arguments, courts will not revive long‑expired childhood abuse claims. In that sense, Doe v. Green is both a roadmap for future legislative and appellate strategy and a cautionary tale about the limits of judicial power to retroactively expand civil remedies.