Doe v. City of Boston: Title VII Retaliation Requires But-For Causation and Decisionmaker Knowledge; Authorized or Legally Compelled Record Disclosures Do Not Suffice Absent Evidence of Deviation

I. Introduction

In Doe v. City of Boston (1st Cir. Jan. 27, 2026), former Boston Police Department (“BPD”) officer Jane Doe alleged Title VII retaliation based on BPD’s post-employment disclosures of her disciplinary history. Two disclosure channels were at issue:

1. Prospective-employer background checks: BPD responded to hiring agencies that submitted requests accompanied by Doe’s signed authorizations, providing information reflecting that Internal Affairs charges were sustained and that Doe “resigned with charges pending.”
2. A media public-records request: BPD’s Office of Media Relations disclosed similar information to the Washington Post in response to a public records request.

The core issues on appeal were whether a reasonable jury could find (a) a materially adverse action and, critically, (b) that retaliation for protected conduct was the but-for cause of BPD’s disclosures—especially where Doe authorized the employer inquiries and where BPD had a legal obligation to respond to public-records requests.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit (Lynch, J.) affirmed summary judgment for BPD. Applying Title VII retaliation standards, the court held that no reasonable jury could find retaliation was the but-for cause of either:

• BPD’s provision of disciplinary information to prospective law-enforcement employers pursuant to Doe’s authorizations; or
• BPD’s disclosures to the Washington Post in response to a public-records request BPD was legally required to fulfill under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7(26)(c).

The court emphasized two evidentiary gaps fatal to causation: (1) lack of evidence that BPD deviated from ordinary practice when responding to the requests, and (2) lack of evidence that the relevant BPD personnel handling those requests even knew about Doe’s protected conduct.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary judgment framework and evidentiary sufficiency

• Stratton v. Bentley Univ. — The court relied on Stratton for de novo review and for the retaliation-specific point that causation is “but-for,” and that decisionmaker knowledge of protected conduct is essential to infer retaliatory motive.
• Theidon v. Harvard Univ. — Provided the governing summary-judgment standard and reiterated that plaintiffs may not defeat summary judgment with speculation, and that Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation.
• Johnson v. Univ. of P.R. — Cited through Theidon for the Rule 56 standard (“no genuine dispute as to any material fact”).
• Henderson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. — Reinforced that conclusory allegations and “rank speculation” cannot create a triable issue.

2. Elements of retaliation and the but-for causation requirement

• Carlson v. Univ. of New England — Restated the First Circuit’s standard three-element retaliation test (protected conduct, adverse action, causal nexus).
• Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar — The Supreme Court anchor for the heightened retaliation causation standard: the protected activity must be the but-for cause of the challenged action (not merely a motivating factor).

3. Deviation-from-policy as circumstantial evidence (and its absence here)

• Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. — Used to illustrate that where the record does not show deviation from normal procedures, retaliation inferences weaken; here, BPD’s responses matched typical practice for law-enforcement background inquiries.
• Micheo-Acevedo v. Stericycle of P.R., Inc. — Similarly supported the proposition that absent evidence of departure from standard process, a jury cannot reasonably infer retaliatory causation.

4. Knowledge of protected activity as a prerequisite to retaliatory intent

• Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc. and Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack — Cited via Stratton for the principle that without evidence the relevant decisionmaker knew of the protected conduct, the action “could not have been caused by a desire to retaliate.” This was decisive because Doe offered no evidence that BAT/IAD/BPS staff (for employer requests) or Media Relations staff (for the public-records request) knew of her protected activity.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Employer background checks: authorization, ordinary practice, and the “but-for” problem

Doe’s theory depended on showing BPD departed from an alleged “default rule” by sending disciplinary materials when not specifically requested, and that such departure was driven by retaliation. The court found that chain unsupportable on the undisputed record:

• Authorization undermined inference of retaliatory action: BPD responded only when provided Doe’s executed releases. The court treated BPD’s conduct as routine compliance with authorized inquiries, not as a targeted retaliatory act.
• No evidence of deviation: The record contained unrebutted testimony that law-enforcement agencies “typically” want Internal Affairs history. Four of the five sample requests explicitly sought “discipline” or “disciplinary” information. Without proof of irregular handling, the court saw no basis to infer retaliatory causation.
• No decisionmaker-knowledge evidence: Even if disclosure could be framed as adverse, Doe produced no evidence that the individuals processing the requests knew of her protected conduct. Under Stratton v. Bentley Univ., Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc., and Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack, that knowledge gap blocks an inference of retaliatory motive and therefore but-for causation.

The DHS incident (where an investigator reviewed more detailed records) failed for the same reason: Doe offered no evidence that the access was contrary to standard practice for in-person background investigations, and no evidence tied it to retaliatory intent.

2. Public records disclosure: legal obligation and accuracy defeating “but-for” retaliation

The court separately rejected retaliation based on the Washington Post request because:

• Legal compulsion breaks the causation narrative: BPD produced records in response to a request it was “legally obligated to fulfill” under Massachusetts public records law. That obligation made it implausible to attribute the response to retaliatory desire as a but-for cause.
• Falsity argument failed on the record: Doe contended the disclosure contained false information, but the record supported that “Resign w/ Charges Pend” and the reporter’s understanding that the charge was sustained were accurate (as the Internal Affairs investigation had sustained charges and Doe resigned with charges pending).
• Again, no knowledge evidence: Doe did not produce evidence that Media Relations staff knew of her protected conduct—foreclosing retaliatory intent.

3. The decision’s implicit guardrails: retaliation claims cannot be built from speculation

While the district court also referenced the absence of admissible evidence (including that hearsay about alleged phone calls did not create a triable dispute), the First Circuit’s central point was doctrinal: Title VII retaliation requires proof capable of supporting a finding that retaliation was the but-for cause, and that usually requires evidence connecting protected activity to the relevant decisionmakers and to a non-routine or unjustified action.

C. Impact

1. Post-employment disclosures and retaliation theory

The opinion strengthens a practical rule for retaliation claims premised on post-employment communications: when an employer discloses information pursuant to the former employee’s authorization or pursuant to a legal duty, plaintiffs must produce concrete evidence of retaliatory deviation (e.g., selective disclosure, embellishment, procedural irregularity) and decisionmaker knowledge.

2. Importance of “knowledge” proof in decentralized institutions

For large public entities like police departments, the opinion highlights a recurring evidentiary hurdle: where routine requests are processed by administrative units, plaintiffs must identify and link the protected activity to the specific actors involved. Absent that, courts may treat the conduct as bureaucratic compliance rather than retaliatory choice.

3. Public-records compliance as a causation barrier

The decision signals that, at least where disclosures are accurate and legally required, a public employer’s compliance with open-records statutes will be difficult to recharacterize as Title VII retaliation without evidence that the employer had lawful discretion it exercised in a retaliatory manner (e.g., discretionary timing, selective inclusion, or unnecessary extra detail beyond statutory requirements).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Protected conduct: Activity Title VII protects from retaliation (here, reporting alleged sexual assault, filing administrative charges, and lawsuits).
• Materially adverse action (retaliation context): An action that might deter a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity. The court did not need an extended adverse-action holding because causation failed; still, the district court noted no evidence that the disclosures differed from ordinary practice.
• But-for causation: The plaintiff must show the adverse act would not have occurred “but for” retaliatory intent; it is not enough that retaliation was one motive. This is the Nassar standard applied through Theidon v. Harvard Univ. and Stratton v. Bentley Univ..
• Decisionmaker knowledge: If the person who took the challenged action did not know about the protected conduct, they generally cannot have acted because of it—central to the court’s reasoning via Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc. and Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack.
• Summary judgment: A case-ending ruling when, even viewing evidence favorably to the nonmoving party, no reasonable jury could find for that party. Speculation and inadmissible hearsay typically cannot create a genuine dispute.
• Claim preclusion (background context): The district court treated claims based on acts before Feb. 2, 2017 as barred due to prior state-court proceedings; the First Circuit accepted the post-Feb. 2, 2017 framing for purposes of this appeal.

V. Conclusion

Doe v. City of Boston reinforces that Title VII retaliation claims require evidence supporting but-for causation, not inference piled on routine administrative conduct. Where disclosures are made with the plaintiff’s authorization (prospective-employer background checks) or under legal obligation (public-records requests), plaintiffs must identify concrete proof of retaliatory deviation and decisionmaker knowledge. The opinion thus narrows the path for retaliation claims premised on record disclosures by public employers, while clarifying the evidentiary showing required to get such claims to a jury.