Documentary Appraisals and the Need for Evidentiary Hearings in MVRA Restitution: A Commentary on United States v. Anderson (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Anderson, No. 24‑3040‑cr (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 2025), affirming a restitution order imposed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A et seq.

Although issued as a “Summary Order” with no precedential effect under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision provides practically important guidance on two recurring issues in federal sentencing:

• When and how documentary appraisal records—particularly hearsay, unsworn jewelry appraisals—can suffice to establish loss for restitution purposes; and
• Under what circumstances a district court must (or, more accurately, need not) hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve contested restitution issues under the MVRA.

The case arises from a high‑profile robbery of a Brooklyn church during Sunday services, in which the defendants stole expensive jewelry and personal items from the pastor and his wife. After pleading guilty to Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), Defendant‑Appellant Juwan Anderson challenged only the restitution component of his sentence. He argued that the government failed to prove the amount of the victims’ loss and that the district court abused its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing.

The Second Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed. In doing so, it reinforced two central themes in its MVRA jurisprudence:

1. Restitution is governed by a flexible, common‑sense standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence), not by trial‑like formalities; and
2. District courts have broad discretion to rely on hearsay and documentary evidence and to forgo full‑blown evidentiary hearings where defendants fail to produce concrete counter‑evidence.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Offense

On July 24, 2022, during Sunday morning services at the Leaders of Tomorrow church in Brooklyn, New York, Anderson and two co‑defendants entered the church. While the co‑defendants brandished firearms, the trio robbed the pastor (“Victim 1”) and his wife, also a clergy member (“Victim 2”), taking jewelry and personal items.

The opinion notes:

“Anderson and two co‑defendants allegedly entered the Leaders of Tomorrow church in Brooklyn, New York, during morning services and, while the co‑defendants brandished firearms, they stole jewelry and personal items from the pastor of the church (‘Victim 1’) and his wife, who was also a member of the clergy (‘Victim 2’).”

Co‑defendant Say‑Quan Pollack pled guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment, two years’ supervised release, and ordered to pay $402,639 in restitution. The third co‑defendant, Shamar Leggette, died and the charges against him were dismissed.

B. Guilty Plea and Restitution Request

Anderson pled guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery. The government claimed that the victims suffered $402,639 in losses and sought restitution in that full amount under the MVRA.

Crucially, the government’s evidentiary basis was:

• Photographs of appraisal documents for seven specific items of jewelry that Anderson had admitted in his plea agreement to stealing; each appraisal:
  • Was dated,
  • Identified the gemologist/appraiser, and
  • For all but one item, included a photograph and description of the jewelry.
• One document was a “Certificate of Authenticity” identifying the ring, including an insurance replacement estimate but no photograph.

In his plea agreement, Anderson admitted stealing ten items; the government sought restitution only for the seven items for which it possessed third‑party appraisal records.

C. Defense Objections in the District Court

In his sentencing memorandum, Anderson opposed the restitution request on two grounds:

1. Insufficiency of the appraisal records.
   He argued that photographs of the appraisal documents were an inadequate basis to establish value and that the appraisals were unreliable unsworn hearsay of uncertain provenance.
2. Request for an evidentiary hearing.
   In the alternative, he asked the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the actual loss amount.

Anderson also argued that the appraisals were suspect because he believed they were provided by Victim 1, whom he characterized as “a convicted fraudster with an established history of forging financial documents.” The government responded that most of the appraisals had been supplied not by Victim 1 directly, but by Victim 1’s attorney.

D. The District Court’s Sentencing and Restitution Order

The district court (Judge William F. Kuntz, II, E.D.N.Y.) discussed restitution at length during sentencing and considered the parties’ briefing. It:

• Found the appraisal records sufficiently reliable to support the government’s requested restitution amount;
• Noted that the jewelry was unrecoverable because it had presumably been sold to a “fence” (i.e., a person who receives stolen goods for resale into a legitimate market);
• Observed that the requested restitution was consistent with the $402,639 restitution order previously imposed on co‑defendant Pollack.

The court sentenced Anderson to 63 months’ imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release, and ordered $402,639 in restitution. The court reserved the right to hold an evidentiary hearing within 90 days to determine whether any additional restitution was owed, but no such hearing was ever held.

E. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, Anderson did not challenge his conviction or prison term. His sole challenge concerned restitution. He argued:

1. The district court abused its discretion in finding that the government had met its burden to prove the victims’ losses by relying on unsworn, hearsay appraisal documents of uncertain origin; and
2. Even if restitution were permissible, the court abused its discretion by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the proper restitution amount.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit (Judges Jacobs and Bianco, and District Judge Bolden sitting by designation) affirmed the restitution order in all respects.

A. Restitution Amount: Appraisal Records Were Sufficiently Reliable

The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the government had proven the $402,639 restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence based on the third‑party appraisal records:

• Hearsay is admissible at sentencing, including in determining restitution, so long as it bears “some minimal indicia of reliability.”
• The appraisals identified the gemologist/appraiser, provided detailed descriptions (and, for most items, photographs), and matched the items Anderson admitted to stealing.
• Anderson offered no concrete contrary evidence or alternative valuations; he instead attacked the appraisals in general terms and relied on the victims’ alleged lack of credibility.
• The MVRA does not require sworn affidavits or mathematical precision, only a reasonable approximation of actual loss proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Court also upheld the district court’s reliance on one appraisal that was prepared after the robbery based on photographs of the stolen item, noting that this was a sensible and permissible method of valuation when the item is no longer in the victim’s possession.

B. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying an Evidentiary Hearing

The Court further held that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on restitution. It emphasized that:

• A sentencing court is not required to conduct a full‑blown evidentiary hearing to resolve sentencing disputes, including restitution issues.
• Due process requires only that the defendant be given an adequate opportunity to present his position and to rebut the government’s assertions.
• Anderson had access to the appraisal documents in discovery, filed a sentencing memorandum, and was invited at sentencing to present evidence contradicting the appraisals—but he did not offer any such evidence.
• His request for a hearing was framed largely as a desire to explore “how the appraisals were performed,” not to present competing expert testimony or documentary evidence.

On that record, the Second Circuit found “no abuse of discretion” in the district court’s decision to rely on the written record and arguments, without convening a separate evidentiary hearing.

IV. The Legal Framework

A. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA)

The MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A et seq., requires federal courts to impose restitution for certain offenses, including crimes of violence and property offenses, regardless of the defendant’s ability to pay. For covered offenses:

• Restitution is generally mandatory (not discretionary).
• It must reflect the victims’ “actual loss” caused by the offense.
• The government bears the burden of proving the amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).

The Second Circuit reaffirmed its prior decision in United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2013), making clear that “actual loss” in this context does not require “mathematically precise” calculation. A reasonable estimate, supported by reliable evidence, suffices.

B. Standard of Proof and Burden Allocation

Under § 3664(e):

• The government must demonstrate the amount of the victim’s loss by a preponderance of the evidence;
• The defendant may contest the government’s evidence and may present contrary proof; and
• The sentencing court must resolve any factual disputes regarding the amount or type of restitution.

Restitution orders require what the Court, quoting United States v. Ismail, 219 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2000), called a “delicate balancing of diverse, sometimes incomparable factors,” and the sentencing judge is in the best position to undertake that balancing.

C. Standard of Appellate Review

The Second Circuit reviews MVRA restitution orders for abuse of discretion, as reaffirmed in United States v. James, 151 F.4th 28, 49 (2d Cir. 2025):

• An abuse of discretion occurs where a ruling rests on an error of law, a clearly erroneous factual finding, or falls outside “the range of permissible decisions.”
• The same deferential standard applies to procedural decisions concerning what hearing or evidentiary procedures to employ in resolving restitution disputes.

The Court cited United States v. Goodrich, 12 F.4th 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2021), for the general framing of abuse‑of‑discretion review, and Gushlak for the specific point that “[d]ecisions as to what types of procedure are needed lie within the discretion of the sentencing court.”

V. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Restitution and the Use of Appraisal Records

1. Hearsay and “Minimal Indicia of Reliability”

Anderson’s core challenge was that the appraisal documents were:

• Unsworn hearsay; and
• Of questionable provenance, allegedly prepared or submitted by a victim with a history of fraud.

The Second Circuit rejected these arguments by re‑stating a key sentencing principle:

“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not bar the consideration of hearsay testimony at sentencing proceedings” but hearsay must have “some minimal indicia of reliability” to satisfy due process. (United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243–44 (2d Cir. 2005), quoting United States v. Egge, 223 F.3d 1228, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000)).

This principle applies equally in MVRA restitution determinations. The Court emphasized that the appraisals were, in fact, reasonably reliable:

• They were prepared by identified gemologists/appraisers, whose names appeared on the documents;
• They were dated;
• For six of seven items, they included photographs and descriptions; and
• They corresponded precisely to the items Anderson admitted stealing in his plea agreement.

That combination—professional preparation, specific identification, descriptive detail, and consistency with the defendant’s own admissions—provided more than the “minimal indicia of reliability” needed.

2. Post‑Robbery Appraisals and Inference of Loss

Anderson highlighted one appraisal conducted after the robbery, apparently based on photographs of the item rather than an in‑person inspection of the physical object. The Court agreed with the district court that such an appraisal was acceptable, especially where the item had been stolen and could not be re‑examined.

The Court invoked United States v. Cheng, 96 F.3d 654, 657–58 (2d Cir. 1996), for the proposition that:

“The passage of stolen goods through untraceable, illegal traffic does not prohibit district courts from making inferences as to the actual loss suffered by victims.”

In other words, the impossibility of physically inspecting stolen property does not immunize a defendant from restitution. Courts may rely on reasonable inferences and indirect evidence—such as photographs and appraisal based on those photos—to approximate actual loss.

3. No Requirement of Sworn Affidavits or Trial‑Like Proof

Anderson argued that at minimum, the government should have been required to produce sworn affidavits supporting the appraisals. The Court rejected this argument as inconsistent with both the statute and Second Circuit precedent:

• The MVRA requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• The rules of evidence—including restrictions on hearsay—do not apply at sentencing in the same way they do at trial.
• Neither the statute nor the Court’s prior cases require sworn statements or live testimony to support restitution.

Indeed, the Court underscored that the appraisal amounts were uncontroverted. Anderson never offered:

• Alternative appraisals;
• Evidence challenging the authenticity of the documents; or
• Evidence suggesting that the stated values were inflated or impossible.

In that posture, insisting on sworn affidavits from appraisers would elevate form over substance and would go beyond what due process and the MVRA require.

4. The Victim’s Prior Fraud Conviction and the Pescatore Analogy

A notable feature of Anderson’s attack was the claim that Victim 1 was “a convicted fraudster with an established history of forging financial documents,” implying that any document associated with him was suspect.

The Second Circuit dealt with this in two ways:

1. The government represented that a majority of the appraisals came via Victim 1’s attorney, not directly from Victim 1; and
2. More importantly, there was no evidence that the appraisal records themselves were fabricated, altered, or otherwise unreliable.

The Court invoked United States v. Pescatore, 637 F.3d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 2011), which rejected a defendant’s bare assertion that a loss chart was overstated where the defendant “proffered no facts” to support the claim. Applying the same logic, the Court held that Anderson’s “vague and conclusory assertions” about the victims’ trustworthiness were insufficient to make the district court’s reliance on the appraisals an abuse of discretion.

Put bluntly: allegations about a victim’s character or past wrongdoing do not, standing alone, undermine seemingly professional third‑party documents—particularly when the defendant provides no competing evidence.

B. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying an Evidentiary Hearing

1. The Governing Standard: Adequate Opportunity, Not a Full Trial

Anderson next argued that, even if restitution was permissible, the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. The Second Circuit drew on a line of its own precedents to reject this:

• United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2010): “the sentencing procedures employed to resolve [restitution] disputes are within the district court’s discretion so long as the defendant is given an adequate opportunity to present his position.”
• United States v. Maurer, 226 F.3d 150, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam), quoting United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1091 (2d Cir. 1996): the district court is not required “to hold a full‑blown evidentiary hearing in resolving sentencing disputes”; due process is satisfied if “the court afford[s] the defendant some opportunity to rebut the Government’s allegations.”

These cases collectively establish that:

• There is no categorical right to a live evidentiary hearing whenever the defense disputes restitution; and
• A paper record—discovery, written submissions, and argument in a sentencing proceeding—often suffices.

2. The Procedural Record in Anderson

The Court found that Anderson received more than an adequate opportunity to present his position:

• He received the appraisal documents in discovery;
• He filed a sentencing memorandum disputing the government’s reliance on those appraisals and asking for a hearing; and
• During the sentencing hearing, the district court invited him to challenge the appraisals and to produce any evidence undermining their reliability.

When asked what he sought to prove at an evidentiary hearing, Anderson’s counsel did not propose to present a competing expert or alternate valuations; instead, he “generally wished to explore ‘how the appraisals were performed.’”

Against that backdrop, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court was not obliged to convene a mini‑trial. Without even a proffer of contrary evidence, the request to question the appraisers about their methodology was insufficient to require an evidentiary hearing.

3. Role of the Existing Record

Citing Maurer and Sabhnani, the Court emphasized that where “the trial record shed[s] substantial light on the propriety of the restitution award” and the defendant has had a fair chance to contest it, a separate evidentiary hearing is not necessary.

Here, the record already contained:

• The plea agreement, in which Anderson admitted stealing the items in question;
• The detailed appraisal documents; and
• The defense’s written and oral arguments attacking those documents.

The absence of any concrete counter‑evidence made the district court’s decision to forego a hearing not only permissible but arguably efficient and sensible.

C. Deference to the Sentencing Court’s Discretion

Under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard, the appellate court’s role is not to decide whether it would have weighed the evidence differently, but whether the district court’s decision fell within the range of permissible choices.

By anchoring its reasoning in a series of prior decisions—Gushlak, Ismail, James, Goodrich, Sabhnani, Maurer, Pescatore—the Second Circuit portrayed the district court’s rulings as thoroughly mainstream:

• Using hearsay appraisals with clear professional indicia as the basis for restitution is consistent with Martinez and Cheng.
• Rejecting vague attacks on reliability without a factual proffer follows Pescatore.
• Declining to hold a hearing when the defense offers no contrary evidence aligns with Maurer and Sabhnani.

Taken together, these authorities support the conclusion that the district court’s actions were well within the permissible zone of discretion.

VI. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Actual Loss” and Reasonable Approximation

The MVRA requires restitution to be based on the victim’s “actual loss.” Practically, this means:

• The court must aim to restore the victim to the position they would have been in absent the crime—often using fair market value or replacement cost, depending on the nature of the property.
• Precision is not required. As Gushlak makes clear and Anderson reiterates, “actual” does not mean “mathematically precise”; a reasonable approximation based on reliable evidence suffices.

B. “Preponderance of the Evidence”

This is a civil‑style standard of proof. It means:

• The court must find that it is more likely than not (i.e., >50% probability) that the government’s asserted loss amount is correct.
• This is distinctly lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which applies at the guilt‑phase of a criminal trial.

C. Hearsay at Sentencing

“Hearsay” is an out‑of‑court statement being used to prove the truth of what it asserts. At trial, the rules of evidence severely restrict its use—but at sentencing:

• Courts may consider hearsay evidence, including unsworn documents, so long as the evidence bears some “minimal indicia of reliability.”
• The Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of such hearsay at sentencing, as confirmed in Martinez.

D. “Minimal Indicia of Reliability”

This phrase, borrowed from Egge and adopted by Martinez, sets a low but meaningful threshold:

• The document or statement should come from a plausible, identifiable source (e.g., a professional appraiser).
• It should contain enough detail that the court can assess its plausibility (e.g., specific description, date, professional credentials).
• It should be consistent with other evidence in the record (e.g., the defendant’s own admissions).

E. “Abuse of Discretion”

An appellate court finds an “abuse of discretion” when:

• The lower court applied the wrong legal rule; or
• It made clearly erroneous factual findings; or
• Its decision, even under the correct law and factual view, falls outside a reasonable range of choices.

In Anderson, the Second Circuit held that none of these conditions were present.

F. “Fence”

The opinion briefly defines “fence” using Black’s Law Dictionary:

“Someone who receives stolen goods, with the intent to sell them in a legitimate market.”

The reference underscores why the physical items were unavailable and why the court had to rely on indirect evidence (photographs and appraisals) to assess the victims’ losses.

G. Evidentiary Hearing vs. Sentencing Proceeding

A full evidentiary hearing resembles a mini‑trial:

• Witnesses testify under oath;
• They may be cross‑examined;
• Evidence is introduced formally; and
• The court makes findings based on that expanded record.

A typical sentencing proceeding, by contrast, relies principally on:

• The presentence report;
• Exhibits submitted in advance;
• Written memoranda; and
• Argument of counsel, with or without brief testimony.

Under Maurer, Slevin, and now reaffirmed in Anderson, a full evidentiary hearing is not required so long as the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to rebut the government’s evidence through the available sentencing procedures.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Non‑Precedential But Persuasive

Anderson is a “Summary Order,” which the Second Circuit’s rules specify has no precedential effect. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, however, parties may cite it (with the notation “SUMMARY ORDER”) as persuasive authority.

As a result, while it does not formally bind future panels or district courts, it provides useful insight into how the Second Circuit is likely to view similar restitution disputes.

B. Guidance for Prosecutors

For the government, Anderson suggests:

• Well‑documented third‑party appraisals—identifying the appraiser, including dates, descriptions, and (ideally) photographs—are strong evidence of loss under the MVRA, even if unsworn.
• Appraisals obtained post‑offense based on photographs can be sufficient, especially when the property is unrecoverable.
• Consistency with a co‑defendant’s restitution order (as in Pollack’s case) is a relevant, though not dispositive, factor supporting the reasonableness of the amount.

Prosecutors can thus be confident that they need not always call appraisers to testify or obtain formal affidavits, provided the documentary record is professionally prepared and internally consistent.

C. Guidance for Defense Counsel

For defense attorneys, Anderson is a cautionary tale:

• Generalized attacks on the reliability of victim‑supplied records or on the victim’s character are unlikely to succeed without concrete counter‑evidence.
• If the defense seriously disputes valuation, it should:
  • Obtain its own expert appraisal or valuation;
  • Identify specific inconsistencies or implausibilities in the government’s documents; and
  • Proffer evidence at sentencing (or explain what evidence it would present at a hearing).
• When asking for an evidentiary hearing, counsel should be prepared to show that the hearing will introduce new, material evidence (e.g., contrary expert testimony), not merely provide an opportunity to cross‑examine the government’s sources.

Without such a proffer, courts will be inclined to find that the existing sentencing procedures provide sufficient due process.

D. Implications for Sentencing Courts

For district judges within the Second Circuit, Anderson reinforces:

• They may reasonably rely on documentary hearsay, including appraisals and certificates of authenticity, to determine restitution, so long as those documents bear minimal indicia of reliability.
• They need not hold an evidentiary hearing in every contested restitution case; rather, they should focus on whether the defendant has had a fair opportunity to rebut the government’s evidence and whether the existing record allows a reasonable estimate of loss.
• They should articulate, as Judge Kuntz did, the reasons for crediting particular documents (e.g., professional source, consistency with admissions, unrecoverability of goods) to facilitate deferential appellate review.

E. Implications for Victims of Property Crimes

From the victims’ perspective, Anderson provides some comfort:

• Existing appraisals and certificates of authenticity can form a solid basis for restitution, even if the items are never recovered.
• When no pre‑offense appraisal exists, a post‑offense appraisal based on detailed photographs may suffice.
• A victim’s prior criminal history does not automatically render all supporting documentation inadmissible or unreliable.

Practically, victims—especially owners of high‑value jewelry or similar items—are incentivized to maintain appraisal records and photographs, which can be invaluable in both insurance and criminal restitution contexts.

VIII. Relationship to Cited Precedents

The Court’s reasoning is tightly woven with prior Second Circuit and related case law. The main precedents and their roles are as follows:

• United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2013)
  Cited for two propositions:
  • Restitution may be based on reasonable approximations; and
  • Sentencing procedures, including how to resolve contested restitution issues, are largely within the district court’s discretion.
• United States v. Ismail, 219 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2000)
  Quoted for describing restitution as involving a “delicate balancing” and emphasizing that the sentencing court is best situated to perform that balancing.
• United States v. James, 151 F.4th 28 (2d Cir. 2025)
  Cited for the abuse‑of‑discretion standard of review for MVRA restitution orders.
• United States v. Goodrich, 12 F.4th 219 (2d Cir. 2021)
  Supplies the general definition of abuse of discretion—error of law, clearly erroneous fact‑finding, or decision outside the permissible range.
• United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2005)
  Establishes that the Sixth Amendment does not bar the use of hearsay at sentencing, so long as the evidence bears minimal indicia of reliability. This is the primary authority for the admissibility of the unsworn appraisals.
• United States v. Egge, 223 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2000)
  Quoted in Martinez for the “minimal indicia of reliability” standard. Although a Ninth Circuit case, it has been incorporated into Second Circuit sentencing law.
• United States v. Cheng, 96 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 1996)
  Supports the notion that courts may infer actual loss even when stolen goods pass through illegal, untraceable channels. This directly undergirds the acceptance of post‑robbery appraisals based on photographs.
• United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010)
  Emphasizes that sentencing procedures in contested restitution cases are within the district court’s discretion, as long as the defendant has an adequate opportunity to present his position. Anderson applies this framework to uphold the denial of a hearing.
• United States v. Maurer, 226 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
  Holds that due process and the Guidelines do not require a full evidentiary hearing to resolve sentencing disputes; “all that is required is that the court afford the defendant some opportunity to rebut the Government’s allegations.” This is central to the Court’s rejection of Anderson’s hearing claim.
• United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086 (2d Cir. 1996)
  Quoted in Maurer for the same proposition regarding the lack of a categorical hearing requirement at sentencing.
• United States v. Pescatore, 637 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011)
  Illustrates that mere assertion—without factual support—that loss amounts are overstated is insufficient to undermine a restitution or loss calculation. This is applied by analogy to Anderson’s generalized reliability attack on the appraisals.

In effect, Anderson does not create new law; it synthesizes and applies this existing body of precedent in the specific context of jewelry theft, appraisal documents, and the procedural handling of restitution disputes.

IX. Conclusion

United States v. Anderson stands as a clear, if non‑precedential, reaffirmation of the Second Circuit’s pragmatic approach to restitution under the MVRA. The decision underscores:

• Restitution is about reasonable, evidence‑based approximation of the victim’s actual loss, not mathematical certainty or trial‑level procedural formalism.
• Unsworn third‑party appraisal documents—especially those prepared by identified professionals, with detailed descriptions and photographs, and consistent with the defendant’s own admissions—can carry the government’s burden of proof.
• A defendant who challenges such evidence must do more than cast aspersions on the victim or speculate about unreliability; he must present concrete, fact‑based counter‑evidence or at least proffer what such evidence would show.
• District courts retain broad discretion to decide whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary, and they act well within that discretion when they decline to hold a hearing in the absence of a meaningful evidentiary proffer.

For practitioners, Anderson is a useful roadmap: it illustrates both how the government can effectively prove restitution amounts through documentary appraisals and how defendants must structure their objections if they hope to obtain either a reduction in restitution or an evidentiary hearing. More broadly, it reflects the Second Circuit’s continuing commitment to a flexible, common‑sense, and deferential approach to MVRA restitution, grounded in existing precedent and the practical realities of post‑crime valuation.