1. Introduction

This case arises from a pretrial suppression ruling in a criminal prosecution against Amanda M. Mire. After a hearing, the circuit court made a docket entry suppressing (i) statements Mire made after emergency medical personnel involuntarily administered Versed and (ii) blood test results obtained when Mire allegedly could not knowingly consent.

Although the court had asked defense counsel to prepare a written order “consistent with” the oral pronouncement, the court nevertheless entered a suppression ruling on the docket on February 26, 2024, and later entered a more formal “judgment and order” on March 11, 2024. The State filed its notice of appeal on March 11.

The controlling issue before the Supreme Court of Missouri was appellate jurisdiction: whether the State’s notice of appeal was filed within the statutory five-day period in section 547.200.4, and specifically whether the February 26 docket entry was an “order” having the “substantive effect” of suppressing evidence that started the five-day clock.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the February 26 docket entry qualified as an order with the substantive effect of suppressing evidence under section 547.200.1(3). Because section 547.200.4 requires the State to file its interlocutory appeal within five days of the entry of such an order, the State’s March 11 notice of appeal was untimely. Timeliness is jurisdictional; therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

A dissent would have treated the March 11 formal “judgment and order” as the operative suppression order, emphasizing the circuit court’s expressed intention at the hearing to receive a proposed written order and later enter a formal ruling, as well as perceived differences between the docket entry and the later written order.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• State v. Harris, 675 S.W.3d 202 (Mo. banc 2023): The Court relied on Harris for the proposition that appellate courts must assess jurisdiction sua sponte when necessary. Here, that duty prompted the Court to raise timeliness before oral argument and ultimately to decide the case on jurisdictional grounds.
• P.D.E. v. Juv. Officer, 669 S.W.3d 129 (Mo. banc 2023): This decision supplied two core jurisdictional axioms: (1) appeals exist only by statute, and (2) a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement. The Court used P.D.E. to justify strict enforcement of section 547.200.4 and to frame dismissal as mandatory when the deadline is missed.
• State v. Moore, 698 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. App. 2024); State v. Allen, 295 S.W.3d 179 (Mo. App. 2009); State v. Faudi, 141 S.W.3d 83 (Mo. App. 2004); State v. Beaver, 697 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. App. 1985): These cases illustrate a consistent practice of dismissing untimely state interlocutory appeals. Among them, Allen was pivotal because it treated a docket entry sustaining a suppression motion as the operative appeal-triggering order, notwithstanding later clarifications.
• State v. Robbins, 269 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. banc 1954): The Court invoked Robbins to distinguish liberal construction of appeal statutes from excusing noncompliance with statutory deadlines: liberal construction cannot “save” an untimely appeal.
• State v. Thompson, 467 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. App. 2015): The Court cited Thompson for the proposition that a docket entry can qualify as a suppression determination so long as it is not too vague and makes a final determination on suppression. This supported treating the February 26 docket entry—explicitly stating suppression—as an appealable order.
• State v. Kampschroeder, 985 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. App. 1999): Used to rebut any argument that the docket entry was inadequate because it lacked detailed findings. Absent requested findings, appellate courts presume findings consistent with the decree entered. The Court leveraged this to reinforce that section 547.200 does not require a detailed rationale to start the appeal clock.
• State v. Taylor, 965 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App. 1998): Discussed in a footnote as the rare instance where a later order restarted the appeal time because the trial court vacated its earlier order and entered a new one. The Court distinguished Taylor because the circuit court here did not vacate the February 26 ruling.
• State v. Vandervort, 663 S.W.3d 520 (Mo. App. 2023): Cited to show that when multiple orders “render the same decision,” the State preserves jurisdiction by appealing the initial suppression decision. The Court used Vandervort as a practical contrast: prosecutors can file quickly “in abundance of caution,” even if a later formal order may follow.
• Dissent-cited authorities (context and competing approach): In re Cir. Att'y, 22nd Jud. Cir. ex rel. Dunn, 708 S.W.3d 867 (Mo. banc 2025); Sanford v. CenturyTel of Mo., LLC, 490 S.W.3d 717 (Mo. banc 2016); Meadowfresh Sols. USA, LLC v. Maple Grove Farms, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 758 (Mo. banc 2019); State ex rel. Henderson v. Asel, 566 S.W.3d 596 (Mo. banc 2019). The dissent cited these to argue for liberal construction favoring appeals, to emphasize trial-court intent and interlocutory control, and to analogize to civil “judgment” finality concepts. The majority’s approach effectively prioritizes a statute-driven bright line over intention-focused finality analysis.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning is built on three linked propositions:

1. Statutory trigger: Section 547.200.1(3) authorizes a state interlocutory appeal from any “order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in … suppressing evidence.” If an entry functions as such an order, it is appealable immediately.
2. Jurisdictional deadline: Section 547.200.4 mandates the notice of appeal be filed within five days of entry of that order; Rule 30.02(a) incorporates this statutory time limit. Under P.D.E., a late notice eliminates appellate jurisdiction and compels dismissal.
3. Docket entry as an “order”: The February 26 docket entry unambiguously suppressed the challenged statements and blood draw-related evidence. Because the statute and rules do not require detailed findings, and because a lack of findings does not preclude review (Kampschroeder), the docket entry itself started the five-day clock.

The Court rejected arguments that the parties’ expectation of a later written order should control. It reasoned the circuit court could have taken the matter under advisement if it intended to delay the ruling. Instead, it “immediately entered its order,” and that definitive suppression ruling is what the statute treats as appeal-triggering.

The opinion also articulates an administrability concern: allowing intent-based, record-scouring determinations of whether a docket entry “counts” would undermine the legislature’s five-day mandate. The Court proposed a simple trial-court practice to avoid inadvertent triggering: if the judge is not ready to rule, the judge can clearly state the matter is taken under submission.

3.3 Impact

Practical rule for prosecutors: When a circuit court enters a docket entry that clearly suppresses evidence, the State should treat it as the operative “order” under section 547.200.4—regardless of whether a later, more formal written order is anticipated—unless the prior ruling is expressly vacated (as in State v. Taylor) or the court plainly takes the matter under advisement.

Incentives and litigation behavior: The decision pushes the State toward filing “protective” interlocutory appeals promptly after suppression docket entries (as the Court notes occurred in State v. Vandervort), potentially increasing early appellate filings and related requests for stays, transcripts, and record assembly.

Trial-court docketing discipline: Circuit courts may respond by (i) delaying docket entries until a written order is ready, (ii) explicitly marking matters “under submission,” or (iii) ensuring docket entries clearly indicate whether they are intended as the operative ruling. The majority’s framework makes the clarity of docket language outcome-determinative for appellate timing.

Doctrinal clarity (and tension): The majority favors a bright-line statutory trigger; the dissent favors a context-sensitive, intent-driven finality inquiry that would reduce the risk of forfeiting an appeal when the judge has requested a later written order. The decision therefore sets a firm jurisdictional baseline while leaving open practical debate about best practices in suppression-order entry.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Interlocutory appeal: An appeal filed before the criminal case ends, permitted only in specific situations—here, when an order suppresses evidence (section 547.200.1(3)).
• “Substantive effect” of suppressing evidence: The court looks at what the order does in practice. If it bars evidence from use at trial, it has the substantive effect of suppression.
• Docket entry as an “order”: A docket entry can function as a binding court order if it clearly states the ruling. A separate, later written document is not required to make the ruling operative.
• Jurisdictional deadline: If the notice of appeal is late, the appellate court lacks legal power to decide the case—even if the suppression issue is important.
• “Taken under advisement/under submission”: A signal that the judge is not ruling yet. The majority suggests this is the straightforward way for a circuit court to avoid triggering the five-day appeal clock.

5. Conclusion

State of Missouri v. Mire establishes a stringent and practice-shaping rule: a clear docket entry suppressing evidence is an appealable “order” that starts the State’s five-day deadline under section 547.200.4. Unless the trial court vacates that ruling or unmistakably withholds decision by taking the matter under submission, a later “formal” written order does not restart the clock.

The case underscores that Missouri’s interlocutory appeal regime for suppression rulings is governed less by expectations about later written findings and more by the immediate, objective legal effect of what the circuit court entered on the docket—making timing, docket practice, and protective filing strategy central to preserving appellate review.