Dixon v. Brown – The Second Circuit’s Firm Line on “Lip-Service” Acceptance of Plaintiff’s Facts in Qualified-Immunity Appeals

1. Introduction

In Dixon v. Brown, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal by three Syracuse police officers who sought qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage. The plaintiff, Peter Dixon, claimed that the officers used excessive force during a chaotic arrest involving multiple punches and knee strikes while his children sat nearby. After the district court denied summary judgment—finding genuine factual disputes as to whether the force was excessive and whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity—the officers attempted an immediate appeal.

The Second Circuit’s summary order, though formally non-precedential, sharply reinforces two critical jurisdictional principles:

An appellant must genuinely accept the plaintiff-friendly version of facts to obtain interlocutory review of a qualified-immunity ruling; mere “lip service” will not suffice.
Where disputes remain about the reasonableness of the officer's perception—even when that perception may involve a mistake of fact—those issues are for the jury, not the appellate court, on an interlocutory record.

The decision therefore tightens the gate for defendants hoping to secure early appellate relief and clarifies the evidentiary posture required for such appeals.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Livingston, Park, and Nardini, JJ.) dismissed the officers’ appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that:

The collateral-order doctrine allows immediate review of qualified-immunity denials only when purely legal questions are presented.
The officers purported to accept Dixon’s version of events but, in their brief, repeatedly described him as “actively resisting,” contradicting the facts credited by the district court.
Whether the officers’ perception of resistance was “reasonable” is a fact-intensive inquiry reserved for the jury; therefore, it cannot form the basis of interlocutory review.

Consequently, because the appeal turned on disputed facts and because the officers did not truly accept Dixon’s narrative, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Second Circuit weaves a consistent line of authority emphasizing its limited jurisdiction in qualified-immunity appeals:

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) – The Supreme Court’s foundational case recognizing qualified-immunity rulings as collateral orders when they raise only legal questions.
Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2007) – Clarified that appellate review is confined to “purely legal questions.”
Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2014) – Distinguished between disputes over historical facts (non-reviewable) and purely legal questions (reviewable).
Golodner v. Berliner, 770 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2014) – Stated that courts “are without jurisdiction” when qualified-immunity appeals hinge on factual disputes.
Jok v. City of Burlington, 96 F.4th 291 (2d Cir. 2024) – Dismissed appeal where officers only “lip-service” accepted plaintiff’s facts. This case is heavily relied upon in Dixon.
Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2020); Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006) – Both underscored that the reasonableness of force amid disputed facts is a jury question.
Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2010) – Allowed review only to decide if a dispute is “material,” not whether it is “genuine.”
McColley v. County of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817 (2d Cir. 2014) – Same principle regarding “material” versus “genuine” disputes.

By repeatedly citing these cases, the panel signaled that Dixon fits squarely within the court’s existing jurisprudence: unless the appellant fully concedes the plaintiff’s factual narrative, the appeal cannot proceed.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The panel’s logic unfolds in two layers:

Acceptance of Facts. The officers claimed to rely on Dixon’s account, but their briefing (e.g., references to his “active resistance”) revealed continuing factual disputes. Citing Jok, the court held that pretending to adopt plaintiff’s facts while contesting them in substance does not satisfy the requirement for interlocutory review.
Reasonableness as a Fact Question. Even if the officers had accepted Dixon’s narrative, their core argument—that they reasonably perceived resistance—still depends on jury determinations. Under Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2003), mistakes of fact go to whether a constitutional violation occurred, not whether the law was “clearly established.” Therefore, “reasonableness” cannot be resolved on appeal when material facts are in dispute.

The combination of (1) false acceptance of facts and (2) reasonableness as a jury issue stripped the appellate court of jurisdiction.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Litigation

Although summary orders technically lack precedential force, Second Circuit litigants, district judges, and practitioners read them closely. Dixon will have three principal effects:

Tighter Brief-Writing Standards. Defense counsel must meticulously purge appellate briefs of language contradicting the plaintiff’s version when seeking qualified-immunity review.
Limited Appellate Path. Officers may think twice before filing collateral appeals in excessive-force cases where any factual grey area remains, thereby expediting district-court resolution.
Guidance to District Courts. Trial judges can point to Dixon when rejecting premature appeals, citing its reaffirmation that “lip-service” acceptance is insufficient.

More broadly, Dixon fortifies the Second Circuit’s reputation for strict policing of the collateral-order doctrine in civil-rights cases, limiting the strategic use of interlocutory appeals to delay proceedings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity. A doctrine shielding government officials from damages liability unless they violated “clearly established” constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have known.
Collateral-Order Doctrine. A narrow exception allowing certain non-final orders (like qualified-immunity denials) to be appealed immediately if they resolve an important question completely separate from the merits and would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.
Purely Legal vs. Fact-Dependent Questions. An appellate court can decide “purely legal” issues (e.g., whether the right at stake was clearly established), but it cannot resolve disputes about what actually happened on the ground.
Material vs. Genuine Fact Disputes. A “material” fact might affect the outcome; a “genuine” dispute means a reasonable jury could find for either side. On interlocutory review, the appellate court may assess materiality but not genuineness.

5. Conclusion

Dixon v. Brown adds another robust link to the Second Circuit’s chain of decisions constraining interlocutory qualified-immunity appeals. The court underscores that:

“An appellant’s assertion that it accepts the plaintiff’s facts must be more than lip service.”

By demanding authentic acceptance of plaintiff-favorable facts and relegating “reasonableness” disputes to juries, the court keeps the focus on trial-level fact-finding where it belongs. Practitioners should treat Dixon as a practical—if not formally precedential—roadmap: (1) concede the facts honestly, or (2) wait for final judgment. Any middle path, the panel signals, will be dismissed at the courthouse door.