Divisional Conflict and Prompt Diligence as “Extraordinary Circumstances”: Washington Supreme Court Clarifies CR 60(b)(11) Relief for Legal Errors

Introduction

In Luv v. West Coast Servicing, Inc. (Supreme Court of Washington, Oct. 9, 2025), the court resolved whether Civil Rule 60(b)(11)—the catchall provision authorizing relief from final judgments for “any other reason justifying relief”—can be used to vacate a judgment entered on an error of law when extraordinary, extraneous circumstances arise after judgment. The case arises from a quiet title judgment entered in favor of Prince Eric Luv after a trial court erroneously held that bankruptcy discharge triggered the six-year statute of limitations for all future installments on a deed-of-trust-secured loan.

After the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling and the Supreme Court initially denied review, the same division of the Court of Appeals issued Copper Creek I, expressly rejecting Luv’s statute-of-limitations analysis. West Coast sought CR 60(b)(11) relief in the trial court, which was denied, and the Court of Appeals twice affirmed that denial. The Supreme Court—against the backdrop of its own intervening merits decisions in Copper Creek II and Merritt—now reverses, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard to CR 60(b)(11) and that the combined, extraordinary circumstances justify relief from the quiet title judgment.

The decision clarifies two key points: (1) CR 60(b)(11) relief does not require a formal “change in law,” and (2) a rapid, conflicting appellate decision (even intradivisional), combined with a party’s prompt, proper pursuit of remedies, can be an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting relief from a final judgment.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the court en banc, Justice Johnson concludes that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring a “change in law” and by failing to consider the totality of the extraordinary circumstances that developed after the original judgment. The court emphasizes that:

CR 60(b)(11) is a narrow safety valve for extraordinary situations not captured by the other ten enumerated grounds; it does not require a showing of a formal change in law.
An error of law can justify CR 60(b)(11) relief when accompanied by extraordinary, extraneous circumstances—here, an intervening appellate conflict and West Coast’s prompt, diligent efforts while the appellate mandate was still pending.
Union Bank supports treating conflicting Court of Appeals decisions as sufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance akin to a change in law; the court treats an intradivisional conflict as qualifying for this purpose.
Because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, it abused its discretion; the Supreme Court reverses and remands with instructions to vacate the quiet title judgment and conduct further proceedings.

Justice Madsen concurs in the result but would reach it under the Rules of Appellate Procedure—specifically RAP 2.5(c)(2)’s exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine—allowing the Court of Appeals to revisit and correct its own clearly erroneous decision (Luv I) on later review. Justice Mungia dissents, arguing the court has exceeded its role under CR 60 by directing vacatur and that the majority departs from long-standing precedent that errors of law must be corrected on direct appeal, not by CR 60.

Factual and Procedural Background

The controversy centers on whether a lender may foreclose on a deed of trust after a borrower’s bankruptcy discharge. Luv stopped paying on a 20-year note in 2008 and obtained a Chapter 7 discharge in 2009. The deed of trust beneficiary later assigned its interest to West Coast Servicing, which started nonjudicial foreclosure in 2018. Luv sued to quiet title, arguing the six-year statute of limitations ran from the 2009 discharge. The trial court agreed and quieted title in Luv.

West Coast appealed. In 2021, the Court of Appeals (Division One) affirmed in an unpublished opinion, Luv I. The Supreme Court denied review. Within weeks, the same Division One issued Copper Creek I, explicitly disavowing Luv I’s statute-of-limitations rule. West Coast immediately sought renewed reconsideration and review; the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court denied those requests, and Luv I’s mandate issued on February 17, 2022.

After exhausting direct review, West Coast moved in March 2022 to vacate the quiet title judgment under CR 60(b)(11). The trial court denied relief, reasoning Copper Creek I was not a “change in law” and that Luv I was merely an error of law that could not be corrected via CR 60. The Court of Appeals affirmed (Luv II). The Supreme Court stayed West Coast’s petition pending Copper Creek II and Merritt; those 2023 decisions endorsed West Coast’s merits position and rejected Luv I’s approach. On remand, however, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the denial of CR 60 relief (Luv III). The Supreme Court granted review and now reverses.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities That Shaped the Decision

CR 60(b)(11): The catchall allows relief for “[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” The court emphasizes its narrow application to “extraordinary circumstances” not covered by other subsections, but rejects the notion that a formal “change in law” is required.
Union Bank, NA v. Vanderhoek Associates, 191 Wn. App. 836 (2015): A newly published Court of Appeals decision issued 18 days after judgment created a divisional conflict on the controlling law. The Court of Appeals approved CR 60(b)(11) relief and recognized that a conflict between divisions constitutes a “change in law” for CR 60 purposes. The Supreme Court reads Union Bank to support relief when conflicting appellate holdings quickly emerge; it also treats an intradivisional conflict as meeting the same standard (noting the uniqueness of an intradivisional split).
State v. Gentry, 183 Wn.2d 749 (2015): A trial court abuses its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard. This anchors the holding that the lower court erred by insisting on a “change in law” and ignoring the full set of circumstances.
Kingery v. Department of Labor & Industries, 132 Wn.2d 162 (1997) (plurality): Stands for the principle that CR 60 cannot substitute for a missed direct appeal. The Supreme Court distinguishes Kingery because West Coast diligently and promptly pursued appeals and relief; CR 60(b)(11) is not a workaround for neglect.
In re Marriage of Tang, 57 Wn. App. 648 (1990); Burlingame v. Consol. Mines & Smelting Co., 106 Wn.2d 328 (1986); State v. Keller, 32 Wn. App. 135 (1982); Hurley v. Wilson, 129 Wn. 567 (1924): These decisions embody the general rule that errors of law must be corrected on direct appeal, not via CR 60. The court clarifies that rule does not bar CR 60(b)(11) relief where a party did appeal and only extraordinary, extraneous circumstances later justify reopening.
Edmundson v. Bank of America, NA, 194 Wn. App. 920 (2016); Merritt v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 1 Wn.3d 692 (2023); Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Ass’n v. Kurtz, 1 Wn.3d 711 (2023): On the merits, the Supreme Court in Copper Creek II and Merritt rejected the view (embraced in Luv I) that a bankruptcy discharge starts the limitations period for all future installments; instead, the statute of limitations accrues installment by installment even after discharge. This context underscores that Luv I was wrong on the merits and that West Coast’s position was legally sound.
RAP 2.5(c)(2), RAP 12.2, RAP 12.7(d) (concurring opinion): Justice Madsen highlights an alternative path: the “law of the case” exception allowing an appellate court to revisit its own earlier decision when it is clearly erroneous, its continued application would work a manifest injustice, and revisiting it would not cause a corresponding injustice. This concurrence frames an appellate remedy distinct from CR 60.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

CR 60(b)(11) is a flexible but narrow safety valve. The rule authorizes relief for reasons not captured by the first ten specific grounds. While not a license to relitigate, its plain, broad language allows courts to remedy an erroneous judgment when extraordinary, extraneous circumstances arise. Notably, CR 60(b)(11) does not require a party to prove a formal “change in law.”
Extraordinary circumstances existed here. The court identifies a confluence of factors:
- An intradivisional conflict emerged when Copper Creek I expressly denounced Luv I’s holding.
- West Coast acted immediately—seeking reconsideration the same day Copper Creek I was published and while the Luv I mandate had not yet issued.
- West Coast had pursued every proper appellate avenue and advanced the same legal theory later vindicated in Copper Creek II and Merritt.
- The conflict arose in a compressed time frame and before finality fully attached, weakening the finality argument and aligning the case with Union Bank’s logic.
Taken together, these circumstances are “extraordinary” and “extraneous to the proceeding” and justify relief from a judgment that rested on a legal error.
The trial court applied the wrong legal standard—an abuse of discretion. The trial court and the Court of Appeals insisted Copper Creek I did not “change the law,” treated Luv I as mere legal error, and concluded CR 60(b)(11) was unavailable. That legal framing was wrong. Under Union Bank, a conflict between Court of Appeals decisions suffices for CR 60(b)(11), and, more broadly, CR 60(b)(11) does not require a “change in law” prerequisite. By inserting a non-existent requirement and failing to weigh the extraordinary circumstances, the lower courts abused their discretion.

Remedy: The Supreme Court reverses and remands with directions to vacate the quiet title judgment and conduct further proceedings—a point contested by the dissent on the scope of appellate authority under CR 60.

What the Separate Opinions Add

Concurrence (Madsen, J.). Agrees with the disposition but would use the RAP 2.5(c)(2) exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine, allowing the Court of Appeals to revisit its own clearly erroneous Luv I decision on remand in light of Copper Creek II. The concurrence emphasizes fairness, manifest injustice, and the rules’ recognition that an appellate mandate does not eliminate all power to revise an earlier appellate decision in the same case once it is again before the appellate court.
Dissent (Mungia, J.). Would affirm. The dissent warns that the majority departs from century-old precedent limiting CR 60 to issues extraneous to the merits and forbidding the use of CR 60 to correct legal errors. It argues the majority impermissibly exercises the trial court’s discretion and expands CR 60(b)(11), jeopardizing finality and increasing litigation costs. If the law truly changed, the proper course would be to remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion under CR 60(b)(11), not to direct vacatur.

Impact

The decision has meaningful consequences for civil practice in Washington:

CR 60(b)(11) clarified and broadened in application (but still narrow in scope). Trial courts may grant relief for legal errors when extraordinary, extraneous circumstances exist. A formal “change in law” is not required. A swift, intervening appellate decision that conflicts with the earlier decision, coupled with prompt diligence by the movant, can qualify as extraordinary.
Divisional and intradivisional conflicts matter. Conflicts within or across divisions of the Court of Appeals can be sufficient circumstances supporting relief—particularly when they arise quickly after judgment and before mandate or shortly thereafter.
Finality vs. fairness recalibrated. While the court underscores CR 60(b)(11)’s narrowness, it gives practical room to correct judgments resting on legal errors where fairness considerations are acute and where the party diligently preserved and pursued its rights.
Foreclosure and title litigation. Because Copper Creek II and Merritt resolved the merits question, this case provides a procedural pathway to unwind quiet title judgments obtained under the now-rejected statute-of-limitations theory tied to bankruptcy discharge—at least where the extraordinary circumstances described here are present.
Strategic options on remand and beyond. The concurrence signals an alternative appellate vehicle: RAP 2.5(c)(2)’s exception to law-of-the-case. Litigants encountering a post-judgment appellate conflict may consider both CR 60(b)(11) in the trial court and, when a case returns to the appellate court, invoking RAP 2.5(c)(2).
Unresolved tension. The dissent highlights potential friction over the scope of CR 60(b)(11) and the propriety of directing vacatur. Future cases may refine when appellate courts may direct specific relief versus remanding for the trial court’s discretionary determination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CR 60(b)(11): A “catchall” rule that lets a court vacate a final judgment for reasons not listed in CR 60(b)(1)-(10). It is used sparingly for extraordinary situations that fairness demands be corrected, not to redo litigation.
Extraordinary circumstances “extraneous to the proceeding”: Developments outside the original case (e.g., a new, conflicting appellate opinion issued shortly after judgment) that make enforcing the judgment unjust.
Divisional/intradivisional split: When different panels of the Court of Appeals (across divisions, or even within the same division) announce conflicting rules. The court treats an intradivisional conflict as functionally similar to a divisional split for CR 60(b)(11) purposes.
Mandate: The formal conclusion of an appeal. Before the mandate issues, the appellate court’s decision is not final; its status bears on how strongly “finality” should weigh against reopening.
Abuse of discretion: An error standard focusing on whether the lower court used the wrong legal standard, ignored relevant factors, or reached a decision no reasonable court could reach. Applying a non-existent requirement (e.g., insisting on a “change in law”) is an abuse.
Law of the case (RAP 2.5(c)(2) exception): Normally, an appellate court’s ruling binds later stages, but the rule permits revisiting an earlier decision in the same case upon remand when it was clearly erroneous, would work a manifest injustice if left standing, and revisiting it would not cause a corresponding injustice.
In personam vs. in rem, and bankruptcy discharge: A bankruptcy discharge eliminates the borrower’s personal liability (in personam), but a creditor may still enforce its security interest against the property (in rem). After discharge, limitations on foreclosure accrue installment by installment; discharge does not start the clock for all future installments (Copper Creek II; Merritt).
Quiet title: A judgment resolving competing claims to property. Here, it was granted based on an erroneous limitations analysis and is ordered vacated.

Timeline Snapshot

2009: Luv obtains bankruptcy discharge; stops paying 2008 onward.
2018: West Coast acquires deed of trust; begins nonjudicial foreclosure.
2020: Trial court quiets title in Luv; holds limitations ran from discharge.
Aug. 2021: Court of Appeals affirms in Luv I; Supreme Court denies review.
Jan. 18, 2022: Copper Creek I (same division) denounces Luv I’s rule; West Coast immediately seeks reconsideration and renewed review; mandate in Luv I issues Feb. 17, 2022.
Mar. 2022: West Coast moves under CR 60(b)(11); trial court denies; Court of Appeals affirms (Luv II).
2023: Supreme Court decides Copper Creek II and Merritt (rejecting Luv I’s merits rule); remands for reconsideration in light of Copper Creek II; Court of Appeals again affirms denial (Luv III).
Oct. 9, 2025: Supreme Court reverses; directs vacatur of quiet title judgment.

Conclusion

Luv v. West Coast Servicing, Inc. confirms that CR 60(b)(11) remains a narrow but potent mechanism for correcting final judgments when fairness so demands. The court holds that a legal error, coupled with extraordinary circumstances extraneous to the proceeding—here, a swift, intervening appellate conflict and the movant’s prompt and proper diligence—can justify relief without a formal “change in law.” In doing so, the court clarifies how Union Bank’s logic applies and underscores that trial courts abuse their discretion when they impose non-existent requirements or refuse to weigh the full context.

The concurrence highlights an alternate appellate path (RAP 2.5(c)(2)) to revisit clearly erroneous appellate rulings in the same case upon remand, while the dissent warns of the risks to finality and the bounds of CR 60(b)(11). Together, the opinions chart a careful but more flexible approach to reconciling finality with fairness in the wake of rapidly evolving appellate law—particularly salient in the foreclosure and bankruptcy contexts following Copper Creek II and Merritt.