Diversity Allegations, Void Judgments, and Timely Appeals:
A Commentary on Williamson v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

I. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Williamson v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as Trustee of Stanwich Trust A, No. 25‑30386 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), offers a compact but revealing treatment of three recurring procedural themes:

the jurisdictional rigidity of appellate deadlines under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4;
the narrow scope of relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) (void judgments), particularly when the alleged defect is lack of diversity jurisdiction; and
district courts’ authority to sanction repetitive, frivolous post‑judgment filings by barring further submissions in a closed case.

Larry Williamson, the plaintiff–appellant, filed a federal civil action in October 2024 in the Western District of Louisiana. He sought, via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), to vacate a September 2019 Louisiana state‑court final judgment. The defendant, Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB (acting as trustee for a securitized trust), never appeared in the federal proceeding. The district court dismissed the complaint by final judgment on March 18, 2025, and thereafter denied a sequence of post‑judgment motions. Ultimately, the court barred Williamson from filing any further documents in the closed case.

Williamson noticed an appeal on July 8, 2025, specifically listing the July 3 order that denied his latest Rule 60(b)(4) motion and imposed the filing bar. On appeal, he attempted two moves:

to obtain review of the March 18 final judgment by arguing that his post‑judgment motions extended the time to appeal; and
to argue that the district court’s judgment was void for lack of diversity jurisdiction, because (he claimed, for the first time on appeal) both parties were Texas citizens at the time of filing.

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over the underlying judgment and, in the course of explaining why, clarified several important procedural and jurisdictional rules. It also affirmed the district court’s authority to bar additional filings in the closed case.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

The key procedural steps were:

October 2024: Williamson files a federal complaint in W.D. La., invoking Rule 60(b) to “vacate” a 2019 Louisiana state‑court judgment.
March 18, 2025: The district court enters final judgment dismissing the federal complaint.
April 25, 2025: Williamson files a “motion for reconsideration” under Rule 60(b) — 38 days after judgment.
April 30, 2025: The district court denies that motion.
June 20, 2025: Williamson files a “motion to vacate executory process judgment” under Rule 60(b)(4).
June 23, 2025: The district court denies the motion and warns that repetitive filings may result in sanctions.
July 2, 2025: Williamson files another Rule 60(b)(4) motion, now to vacate the federal court’s own March 18 judgment.
July 3, 2025: The district court denies the motion and directs the clerk not [to] accept any more filings in this closed case from Larry Williamson.
July 8, 2025: Williamson notices an appeal from the July 3 order.

B. Holdings

The Fifth Circuit reached three central conclusions:

No appellate jurisdiction over the March 18 final judgment: The court held that the notice of appeal was filed far outside the 30‑day deadline, and no timely post‑judgment motion tolled that deadline. The Rule 60 motion filed on day 38 was too late to have any tolling effect.
Denial of Rule 60(b)(4) relief affirmed: Reviewing de novo, the court held that the district court’s judgment was not void for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction. Williamson’s own pleadings alleged diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000; his new assertion of shared Texas citizenship lacked record support.
Sanctions and filing bar upheld: The district court did not abuse its discretion in barring further filings in the closed case as a sanction under Rule 11 for repetitive, previously rejected motions.

Although the disposition line states that The appeal is DISMISSED, the opinion effectively:

dismisses the challenge to the underlying March 18 judgment for lack of appellate jurisdiction; and
upholds the July 3 order denying Rule 60(b)(4) relief and imposing the filing restriction.

III. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

A. Appellate Deadlines and Jurisdiction

The court relies on a cluster of authorities to underscore that timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional:

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)
Cited for the proposition that time limits for filing a notice of appeal are “jurisdictional in nature” and not subject to equitable exceptions.¹
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1), (4)
In civil cases against non‑federal defendants, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Certain timely post‑judgment motions (including some Rule 60 motions) render the judgment non‑final and restart the appeal period.
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188 (2019), quoting United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1 (1991)
Cited for the principle that the pendency of timely post‑judgment motions can render an otherwise final decision “not final” for purposes of appeal.
Barber v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1991)
Applied to show that when a post‑judgment motion is untimely, it is “ineffective to extend the 30‑day period,” so the appeal clock runs from “entry of judgment.”
Williams v. Toyota Motor Eng’g & Mfg. N. Am., Inc., 470 F. App’x 309 (5th Cir. 2012)
Another example of calculating the appeal window from entry of judgment where post‑judgment motions are untimely.
Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrs. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978)
Reinforces that appellate timelines are “mandatory and jurisdictional.”
Bebout v. Beto, 472 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973)
Dismissing an appeal where a rehearing motion was untimely and thus did not extend the time for notice of appeal.

These authorities collectively anchored the court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to review the March 18 judgment.

B. Rule 60(b)(4) – Void Judgments

On the Rule 60(b)(4) issue, the court invoked:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4)
Authorizes relief from a final judgment when “the judgment is void.”
Callon Petroleum Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2003), citing Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998)
Establishes that denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is reviewed de novo, rather than for abuse of discretion.
Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998), and Borne v. River Parishes Hosp., L.L.C., 548 F. App’x 954 (5th Cir. 2013)
Reinforce the principle that relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is not discretionary. If a judgment is truly void, the court must set it aside.

C. Diversity Jurisdiction and the Time-of-Filing Rule

Regarding subject‑matter jurisdiction, the panel looked to:

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004)
Cited for the “time‑of‑filing rule”: diversity jurisdiction turns on the citizenship of the parties at the time the complaint is filed.

D. Belated Subject-Matter Challenges and Finality

To address Williamson’s attempt to raise lack of jurisdiction only after losing in the district court, the panel expressly drew on:

City of Detroit Pension Fund v. Prudential Securities Inc., 91 F.3d 26 (6th Cir. 1996)
Quoted for the notion that, particularly when a plaintiff has invoked federal jurisdiction and then loses, the court of appeals should not lightly dismiss the case for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction if a basis for jurisdiction appears in the record (including appellate filings). The panel found this approach “instructive” and followed its spirit.

E. Sanctions and Filing Restrictions

On sanctions, the court relied on:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Provides courts with authority to sanction litigants who file frivolous or abusive pleadings, motions, or papers.
Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1993)
Cited for the proposition that Rule 11 gives courts “discretion to fashion a remedy when faced with a frivolous litigant.” This supports the use of tailored filing restrictions.

F. A Notable Rhetorical Aside

The panel also cites:

Yates v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 9928, 2006 WL 2239430 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006)
to borrow Judge Lynch’s famous observation about the term chutzpah being “vastly overused,” but nevertheless apt in certain cases. The Fifth Circuit uses this reference to characterize the audacity of Williamson’s new, contradictory citizenship allegations.

Although Yates is not a precedential authority on any doctrinal issue in this case, its inclusion signals the panel’s view that Williamson’s litigation tactic — changing his own jurisdictional allegations after losing — was particularly bold and unwarranted.

IV. Legal Reasoning and Application

A. The Jurisdictional Time Bar: Untimely Notice of Appeal

1. The 30‑Day Rule and Its Limited Exceptions

Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), in a civil case against a non‑federal defendant, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed.

Certain specified post‑judgment motions — including a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment and some Rule 60 motions — can temporarily render the judgment not final and restart the clock, but only if they are filed within prescribed time limits. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) provides that a Rule 60 motion extends the time to appeal only if it is filed “no later than 28 days after the judgment is entered” — the same period that governs Rule 59(e) motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

2. Why Williamson’s Post-Judgment Motions Did Not Toll the Deadline

Here:

Final judgment was entered on March 18, 2025.
The first post‑judgment motion — a Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration — was filed on April 25, 2025, 38 days after entry.

Because it was filed after the 28‑day window, the April 25 motion was:

timely as a Rule 60(b) motion in the sense that Rule 60(b) itself permits filings within a “reasonable time” (and sometimes up to one year for certain grounds); but
untimely for tolling purposes under Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), which incorporates the 28‑day Rule 59(e) deadline.

Therefore, the judgment remained final as of March 18, and the 30‑day appeal period expired in mid‑April (around April 17). Williamson’s July 8 notice of appeal — 111 days after entry of judgment — came far too late to confer appellate jurisdiction over that judgment.

The Fifth Circuit, invoking Bowles, Browder, and its own cases such as Barber and Bebout, treats this deadline as jurisdictional, leaving no room for equitable excuses:

“The time limit of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) is mandatory and jurisdictional; we lack jurisdiction to review the underlying final judgment.”

3. Scope of Appellate Review: Only the July 3 Order Is Properly Before the Court

Because the notice of appeal identified the July 3 order and was filed within 30 days of that order, the Fifth Circuit could review:

the denial of the July 2 Rule 60(b)(4) motion; and
the directive that the clerk refuse further filings in the closed case.

It could not, however, revisit the merits of the March 18 dismissal, meaning Williamson’s attempt to attack the underlying federal judgment (or indirectly, the state judgment) was jurisdictionally barred at the appellate level.

B. Rule 60(b)(4) and Alleged Lack of Diversity Jurisdiction

1. The Nature of Rule 60(b)(4) Relief

Rule 60(b) provides various grounds for relief from a final judgment; subsection (b)(4) specifically addresses judgments that are “void.” A judgment is void only in exceptional circumstances, typically when:

the rendering court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction; or
there was a serious violation of due process (e.g., complete lack of notice).

Unlike other Rule 60 grounds, relief under 60(b)(4) is:

subject to de novo review on appeal; and
mandatory if the judgment truly is void — the district court has no discretion to leave a void judgment in place.

The Fifth Circuit cites Carter v. Fenner and Borne v. River Parishes Hosp. to reaffirm that if a judgment is void, the court “must necessarily set the judgment aside.”

2. Williamson’s Argument: No Diversity, No Jurisdiction

On appeal, Williamson argued that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction because, he claimed, at the time of filing:

he and the defendant bank were both citizens of Texas.

If true, that would defeat diversity jurisdiction, as 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires “complete diversity” — no plaintiff sharing citizenship with any defendant.

But the panel noted something crucial: this was the first mention of Texas anywhere in the record. In his pleadings:

In the original complaint, Williamson alleged that:
- he was a citizen of Louisiana, and
- the defendant bank was a citizen of California.
In the amended complaint, he continued to allege that he was a citizen of Louisiana, but now alleged the bank was a citizen of Delaware.
He also alleged an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.

Thus, the record itself, constructed by Williamson, supported diversity jurisdiction. His new Texas assertion appeared only in his appellate brief; it contradicted his own prior sworn allegations, and he offered no supporting evidence.

3. The Time-of-Filing Rule and Record-Based Jurisdiction

The court invoked Grupo Dataflux to emphasize that diversity is determined at the time of filing the complaint. The record at that time — in particular, the plaintiff’s own jurisdictional allegations — showed:

Williamson: Louisiana citizen;
Wilmington Savings: California citizen (later amended to Delaware);
Amount in controversy: > $75,000.

This sufficed to establish a facial basis for diversity jurisdiction.

The panel then endorsed a pragmatic approach drawn from the Sixth Circuit’s City of Detroit Pension Fund decision:

“[P]articularly where a plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the federal courts, loses in the district court, and then seeks to avoid the preclusive effects of that judgment by challenging on appeal the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, it seems to us that a court of appeals should avoid dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction if a basis for federal jurisdiction appears in the record, including the appellate briefs and arguments of the parties.”

In other words, plaintiffs should not be allowed to weaponize subject‑matter jurisdiction after losing, if the record they themselves created demonstrates a valid jurisdictional basis.

4. The Court’s Implicit View of Williamson’s Tactic

By citing Yates v. City of New York and its famous discussion of “chutzpah,” the panel signaled its view that Williamson’s reversal of his own jurisdictional allegations — from Louisiana/California (or Delaware) to Texas/Texas — was audacious and not credible.

While federal courts are ordinarily obliged to raise subject‑matter jurisdiction issues sua sponte at any time, the Fifth Circuit made clear that they will look to the entire record and will not accept a litigant’s opportunistic, contradictory assertions at face value when the record shows a legitimate jurisdictional basis.

5. Conclusion on Rule 60(b)(4)

Because:

the record showed complete diversity and sufficient amount in controversy; and
Williamson’s belated Texas‑citizenship claim lacked support and contradicted his own pleadings,

the panel held that the district court did have subject‑matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the judgment was not “void” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(4), and the district court correctly denied the motion.

C. Sanctions and the Filing Bar in a Closed Case

1. Authority Under Rule 11

Rule 11 authorizes courts to impose sanctions when parties present pleadings or motions:

for an improper purpose (e.g., to harass or cause unnecessary delay), or
that are frivolous, legally unreasonable, or unsupported by fact.

Sanctions may include monetary penalties, orders to pay the other side’s fees, or non‑monetary directives designed to deter future misconduct. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Mendoza v. Lynaugh affirms that Rule 11 gives courts discretion to fashion remedies for frivolous litigants.

2. The District Court’s Rationale

The district court observed that Williamson had filed:

several motions regurgitating the same alleged facts and claims that have already been summarily denied with prejudice.

The court also had previously warned him that “continuous filings that have already been rejected by this Court will result in sanctions.” Despite that warning, Williamson continued to file duplicative Rule 60(b)(4) motions.

In response, the court directed the clerk not to accept any further filings in this closed case from Williamson.

3. Fifth Circuit’s Review and Affirmance

Although the opinion does not explicitly state the standard of review for this sanction, Rule 11 sanctions are ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion. Here, the panel’s reasoning is succinct:

Williamson had been warned about sanctions.
He nonetheless persisted in filing motions repeating previously rejected claims.
The sanction was narrowly tailored — it barred only further filings in this particular closed case, not in the district generally.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion and upheld the filing bar.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Reinforcing the Strictness of Appellate Deadlines

The opinion underscores — again, in line with Supreme Court precedent — that:

Appellate deadlines are jurisdictional. A late notice of appeal simply deprives the court of power to review the underlying judgment.
Post‑judgment motions must be timely under Rule 59(e) to toll the appeal period. A Rule 60 motion filed after 28 days may still be considered on its own merits by the district court, but it does not extend the time to appeal.

For litigants and counsel, this case is a pointed reminder: if you intend to appeal, calendar the 30‑day deadline from entry of judgment, and if you also wish to file post‑judgment motions that may extend this time, they must be filed within the 28‑day Rule 59(e) window.

B. Narrowing the Use of Rule 60(b)(4) to Attack Jurisdiction

The decision illustrates the Fifth Circuit’s continued adherence to a narrow view of “void” judgments. A post‑judgment challenge under Rule 60(b)(4) is not a free‑floating second chance at the merits; it is reserved for genuinely jurisdictionally defective or fundamentally unfair judgments.

In particular:

Where the record contains a plausible basis for jurisdiction, especially one created by the plaintiff’s own allegations, the court is unlikely to deem the judgment void.
Belated, inconsistent jurisdictional allegations — such as asserting a different state of citizenship on appeal — will not, standing alone, suffice to show that the earlier judgment was void.

This reinforces judicial finality. A party may not characterize a routine adverse judgment as “void” simply to evade appeal deadlines or preclusion rules.

C. Adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s Approach to Plaintiff-Initiated Jurisdictional Attacks

By quoting and embracing the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in City of Detroit Pension Fund, the Fifth Circuit aligns itself with a pragmatic principle:

When a plaintiff voluntarily invokes federal jurisdiction and then loses, courts should not lightly dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction if the record supports jurisdiction.

This approach:

discourages gamesmanship, where litigants invoke federal jurisdiction opportunistically and later disavow it to avoid the consequences of a loss; and
preserves the integrity of judicial resources by ensuring that outcomes based on merits (or valid threshold grounds) are not undone on technical jurisdictional attacks invented post hoc.

D. Encouraging Use of Tailored Sanctions Against Repetitive Filings

The affirmation of a filing bar in this case gives district courts further comfort that:

they may impose targeted filing restrictions in a specific closed case when a litigant repeatedly files frivolous or duplicative motions; and
such restrictions are well within judicial discretion under Rule 11, particularly after a clear warning.

This is especially salient in cases involving pro se litigants, who sometimes (though not always) engage in serial post‑judgment filings. The decision signals that pro se status does not immunize litigants from sanctions when they ignore explicit warnings and re‑assert previously rejected claims without new grounds.

E. Practical Takeaways for Litigants and Counsel

Be accurate and consistent in jurisdictional allegations. Changing your story later, especially after losing, can be fatal to credibility and ineffective legally.
Understand the difference between “void” and merely “erroneous” judgments. Only the former can be attacked at any time via Rule 60(b)(4); the latter must be challenged through a timely appeal or other appropriate mechanism.
Use post‑judgment motions strategically and promptly. If tolling of the appellate deadline is important, file within 28 days.
Heed court warnings about sanctions. Continued filings of the same rejected arguments can lead to filing restrictions or other penalties.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Subject‑matter jurisdiction is the court’s power to hear a particular type of case. In federal courts, this typically means:

Federal question jurisdiction (cases arising under federal law); or
Diversity jurisdiction (cases between citizens of different states with an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000).

If a federal court lacks subject‑matter jurisdiction, its judgment is often considered void and can be attacked at any time.

B. Diversity of Citizenship and the Time-of-Filing Rule

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction requires:

complete diversity: no plaintiff can share citizenship with any defendant; and
amount in controversy > $75,000.

The time‑of‑filing rule means that courts look at the parties’ citizenship as it existed when the complaint was filed, not at later changes or new assertions.

C. Notice of Appeal and Jurisdictional Deadlines

A notice of appeal is the document that initiates appellate review. In most civil cases, it must be filed:

within 30 days of entry of judgment; and
the deadline is jurisdictional, meaning the appellate court cannot forgive lateness.

Certain timely post‑judgment motions, filed within 28 days of judgment, can pause the clock and restart it when those motions are resolved.

D. Rule 59(e) vs. Rule 60(b)

Rule 59(e): Motion to alter or amend the judgment; must be filed within 28 days. If timely, it tolls the time for appeal.
Rule 60(b): Motion for relief from judgment on specific grounds (mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, voidness, etc.). It can often be filed later, but only Rule 60 motions filed within the same 28‑day window as Rule 59(e) toll the appellate deadline.

E. Rule 60(b)(4) – Void Judgments

Rule 60(b)(4) applies when a judgment is “void,” typically because:

the court lacked subject‑matter or personal jurisdiction; or
there was a fundamental due process violation (e.g., no notice, no opportunity to be heard).

It does not apply simply because a party believes the court made a legal or factual error. Those are issues for a direct appeal.

F. Sanctions and Filing Restrictions

Under Rule 11 and the court’s inherent powers, a court can sanction litigants for:

filing frivolous papers;
harassing the other side; or
wasting judicial resources through repetitive, baseless filings.

Sanctions can include:

warnings;
monetary fines; or
filing restrictions — for example, a directive that the clerk refuse further filings in a particular closed case.

VII. Conclusion

Williamson v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society is a concise but instructive opinion that reinforces several core procedural doctrines:

Appellate deadlines, especially the 30‑day deadline under Rule 4(a)(1), are strictly jurisdictional. Untimely notices of appeal deprive appellate courts of authority to review underlying judgments, and untimely Rule 60 motions do not revive or extend the appeal period.
Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is narrow and reserved for truly void judgments. A losing party cannot recast an adverse judgment as void by belatedly changing its own jurisdictional allegations, particularly where the existing record supports diversity jurisdiction.
Appellate courts will look to the entire record — including the plaintiff’s own pleadings — to determine jurisdiction, and will not allow strategic, post‑hoc jurisdictional challenges to undo otherwise valid judgments.
District courts are fully empowered, under Rule 11 and their inherent authority, to impose targeted filing restrictions in closed cases when litigants persist in filing duplicative, frivolous motions despite explicit warnings.

In the broader legal landscape, the decision emphasizes finality, candor, and procedural discipline. Litigants invoking federal jurisdiction bear the responsibility of accurate jurisdictional pleading and timely appellate practice; they cannot later disavow the very jurisdiction they invoked to avoid the consequences of an unfavorable result. At the same time, the decision affirms courts’ ability to protect their dockets — and opposing parties — from the burdens of serial, meritless post‑judgment filings.

¹ While the Supreme Court has since distinguished between truly jurisdictional rules and non‑jurisdictional claim‑processing rules in other contexts, Bowles expressly treats the statutory time limits for civil appeals as jurisdictional, and the Fifth Circuit follows that directive here.

Diversity Allegations, Void Judgments, and Timely Appeals: A Commentary on Williamson v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB