Distinguishing Weapons Offenses from “Marijuana Offenses” Under Missouri Amendment 3
A Comprehensive Commentary on C.S. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Justice Information Service, 645 S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2025)

1. Introduction

On 22 July 2025 the Supreme Court of Missouri, sitting en banc, delivered a seminal decision construing the expungement provisions added to the Missouri Constitution by Amendment 3 (2022). The appellant, C.S., sought to expunge two convictions: (i) possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) – which the circuit court granted, and (ii) unlawful use of a weapon for possessing a firearm while knowingly in possession of a controlled substance under § 571.030.1(11) – which the circuit court refused to expunge. The narrow but far–reaching question was whether the latter conviction is a marijuana offense within the meaning of Art. XIV, § 2.10(7)(a)c of the Missouri Constitution, thereby qualifying for mandatory expungement absent good cause to deny. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that § 571.030.1(11) is a weapons offense, not a marijuana offense, and therefore falls outside the automatic-expungement regime. A lone dissent argued that the majority’s construction unduly narrows voter-approved relief and ignores the amendment’s plain language and purpose.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Major Holding: Offenses prosecuted under § 571.030.1(11) (possession of a firearm while in possession of a controlled substance) are not marijuana offenses because their primary legislative purpose is to prevent conduct that endangers others with firearms, not to regulate simple marijuana possession.
• Result: C.S. remains incarcerated on the weapons conviction; only his drug-possession conviction was expunged.
• Vote: 6–1 (Fischer, J. for the Court; Ransom, J., dissenting).
• Standard of Review: De novo review of constitutional and statutory interpretation; no disputed facts.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

• State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410 (Mo. banc 2013) – reiterated the rule that constitutional terms must be given the meaning voters understood.
• Boone County Court v. State, 631 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. banc 1982) – source of the ordinary and usual meaning canon for constitutional interpretation.
• Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189 (Mo. banc 2014) – held that when a constitutional provision defines a term, that definition controls.
• Zahner v. City of Perryville, 813 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. banc 1991) – endorsed dictionary use when a term is undefined.
• State v. Onyejiaka, 671 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. banc 2023) – emphasized distinct purposes of firearms vs. drug statutes.
• Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Communications, 533 S.W.3d 720 (Mo. banc 2017) – restated plain-language statutory interpretation.
• Several interpretive canons: expressio unius, constitutional surplusage doctrine, and strict scrutiny for Article I, § 23 firearm rights (addressed in the dissent).

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Focus on “Marijuana Offense”.
   The Constitution defines marijuana but not marijuana offense. The Court combined dictionary definitions (offense = infraction of law) with the contextual structure of Art. XIV. It rejected C.S.’s suggested but-for test (if marijuana is any element, it is a marijuana offense) because it ignores surrounding provisions and the amendment’s internal limitation in § 2.3.
2. Reliance on § 2.3 “Limitations”.
   Section 2.3(1)(j) states that the amendment does not affect laws regulating conduct that endangers others. The Court held that § 571.030.1(11) squarely fits this category: the legislature deemed simultaneous possession of a firearm and a felony-level quantity of controlled substances to increase public danger.
3. Legislative Purpose of § 571.030.
   Using statutory-placement and chapter-title clues, the Court concluded that Chapter 571 targets weapons misuse, whereas Chapter 579 targets drug conduct. The firearms statute therefore addresses a distinct evil and cannot be re-characterised as a marijuana statute merely because marijuana triggers one element.
4. Harmonising with Amendment 3 Purpose.
   Article XIV’s stated purpose is to prevent arrest/penalty for personal possession and cultivation of limited amounts of marijuana by adults. Reading the expungement clause in light of that purpose, the Court limited marijuana offense to crimes criminalising personal possession or non-remunerative transfer of ≤ 3 oz (≈ 0.19 lb) – a much narrower band than the dissent favoured.
5. Rejecting Expressio Unius Argument.
   The dissent argued that the amendment’s three explicit exclusions (distribution to a minor, violence, DUI-marijuana) imply no other exclusions exist. The majority responded that expressio unius is weak in constitutional interpretation and cannot override the explicit limitation in § 2.3.

3.3 Impact Assessment

Practical Effects

• Expungement Window Narrows. Inmates or probationers whose convictions blend marijuana possession with firearms, violence, or other “dangerous” elements will not receive automatic expungement. Defence counsel must scrutinise charging instruments to determine eligibility.
• Charging & Plea‐Negotiation Strategy. Prosecutors may continue to combine § 571.030.1(11) with § 579.015 for leverage, knowing that the weapons count will be sticky post-Amendment 3.
• Future Litigation. Expect continued challenges: What other statutes qualify as conduct that endangers others? For example, possession of marijuana inside a school zone or corrections facility (explicitly restricted in § 2.3) will likely be treated similarly.
• Legislative Clarification. The General Assembly might codify a statutory definition of marijuana offense to avoid piecemeal judicial construction.
• Firearms & Cannabis Industry. The decision leaves unresolved tensions between state-legal cannabis possession and firearm rights under Art. I, § 23; the dissent’s strict-scrutiny concerns foreshadow possible Second-Amendment–style litigation at the state level.

Doctrinal Significance

• The Court reinforces a narrow textualist approach: constitutional innovations such as Amendment 3 will be interpreted in harmony with pre-existing criminal-law regimes unless the text unmistakably says otherwise.
• Introduces a new two-step test for Art. XIV expungement petitions:
  1. Is the conviction prima facie a marijuana offense (i.e., targeting personal possession/transfer of ≤ 3 oz)? If not, petition fails.
  2. If yes, verify that none of the three explicit exclusions applies and determine whether good cause exists to deny.
• Signals the Court’s willingness to rely on chapter location and legislative titles as indicators of statutory purpose.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Expungement: Court order that seals or destroys all official records of an arrest/conviction, legally restoring the person’s status as if it never occurred.
• Class D and E Felonies: In Missouri, felonies are ranked A (most serious) to E (least). A class E felony can carry up to four years’ imprisonment; a class D up to seven.
• “But-for” Test (defence view): If marijuana is an element in any part of a crime, the crime is a marijuana offense.
• Article XIV, § 2.10(7)(a)c: Automatic expungement clause created by Amendment 3, limited to non-violent, non-DUI marijuana offenses involving ≤ 3 lb (the text says pounds but the Court re-reads it as 3 oz for marijuana offense).
• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: Canon that saying one thing implies the exclusion of others. The Court cautions it has limited force in constitutional cases.
• Strict Scrutiny (Dissent’s reference): Highest judicial standard of review; laws burdening fundamental rights (e.g., firearms) must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored.

5. Conclusion

The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in C.S. crystallises the boundary between personal-use cannabis crimes protected by Amendment 3’s expungement mandate and ancillary crimes that weaponise marijuana’s presence to address broader public-safety concerns. By branding § 571.030.1(11) a weapons statute aimed at conduct that endangers others, the Court forecloses relief for defendants whose marijuana misdemeanours are intertwined with firearms. The ruling underscores the judiciary’s fidelity to textual context and legislative purpose while foreshadowing inevitable clashes between Missouri’s evolving cannabis policy and entrenched firearm protections. Going forward, litigants and legislators alike must grapple with this delineation: only those offenses criminalising pure marijuana possession (or its modest, non-remunerative handling) will enjoy the constitutional path to expungement; once marijuana co-exists with a gun, personal liberty remains subject to traditional penal constraints.