Distinguishing Religious Belief and Practice Claims under Title VII: Carter v. Southwest Airlines

1. Introduction

In Charlene Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company, 5th Cir. No. 23-10008 (May 8, 2025), the Fifth Circuit clarified how Title VII’s nondiscrimination and reasonable-accommodation provisions apply separately to religious beliefs versus religious practices, and imposed limits on federal‐court jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The dispute arose when Southwest Airlines terminated flight attendant Charlene Carter for sending graphic, anti-abortion images and messages to her union president and posting similar content on social media. An arbitrator had upheld the termination under Southwest’s neutral social‐media, harassment, and bullying policies. Carter then sued Southwest and her union (Local 556, Transport Workers Union) in federal court, claiming:

Intentional religious discrimination (Title VII “because of” discrimination)
Failure to accommodate her religious practices (Title VII reasonable-accommodation claim)
Retaliation and interference under the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.)
Breach of the union’s duty of fair representation (RLA)

A jury sided largely with Carter. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit refined the law in several areas: it held that Title VII claims based on religious belief and on religious practice must be analyzed separately; reaffirmed that Southwest carried its burden on belief‐based claims; upheld the practice‐based verdict under the pre-Groff “more‐than‐de minimis” test; restricted RLA causes of action to those involving anti-union animus or union‐function impairment; and vacated injunctive and contempt orders for overbreadth, vagueness, and punitive misuse of civil‐contempt power.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit rendered a multifaceted decision:

Belief-Based Title VII Claims: Reverse the jury verdict — Carter failed to present direct or indirect evidence that Southwest fired her “because of” her pro-life Christian beliefs apart from her conduct.
Practice-Based Title VII Claims: Affirm — Southwest’s neutral policies (social media, harassment, bullying) could be overridden only if Carter’s practice (sending graphic videos) imposed no “more-than-de minimis” hardship; the jury found the airline failed to prove undue hardship under the then-controlling Fifth Circuit standard.
RLA Claims:
- Interference claim (no anti-union animus): Affirm district court’s dismissal — no private cause of action absent animus or functional breakdown in union representation.
- Retaliation claim: Reverse the jury verdict — RLA affords no standalone retaliation right unconnected to anti-union animus in a post-certification context.
- Fair Representation claim: Affirm — the union’s president acted arbitrarily by reporting Carter out of personal animus, breaching the duty of fair representation.
Permanent Injunction: Vacate and remand — the order was vague, overbroad (sweeping all flight attendants and practices), and failed Rule 65(d) specificity.
Contempt Sanctions: Vacate — Southwest substantially complied with the notice requirement; ordering “religious-liberty training” for attorneys was punitive and exceeded civil-contempt power.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023): Rejected the “de minimis” undue-hardship standard as too low, but applied Fifth Circuit law pre-Groff on appeal.
Hebrew v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 80 F.4th 717 (5th Cir. 2023): Emphasized separate analysis of belief-based versus practice-based Title VII claims.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Federation of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989): Held RLA grievance/arbitration scheme is the primary forum; federal courts limited to anti-union animus or preventing destruction of union representation.
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) & Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Implied union duty of fair representation under the RLA.
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978): Injunctions must be concrete and not “obey the law” only.
Bagwell v. Kentucky, 512 U.S. 821 (1994): Civil contempt is remedial/coercive, criminal contempt is punitive.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Separate Treatment of Belief and Practice: The court read 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) to exempt only “religious observance or practice” from Title VII’s definition of religion when accommodation imposes undue hardship. Belief alone cannot be subject to an undue-hardship defense. Thus:

Belief-based claims → analyzed solely as intentional-discrimination claims (“because of” religion).
Practice-based claims → filtered through the undue-hardship accommodation defense before adjudicating intentional discrimination based on practice.

Belief-Based Claim Failure: Carter offered no direct evidence (e.g., “your beliefs are unacceptable”) and no proper comparator to show Southwest treated similarly situated non-Christians more favorably. The jury verdict could not stand.

Practice-Based Claim Affirmed: Under pre-Groff Fifth Circuit law (Weber v. Roadway Express, “more-than-de minimis cost” test), Southwest’s evidence of harm to co-worker morale and workplace disruption was insufficient as a matter of fact to show undue hardship. The jury could reasonably find that permitting Carter’s posts would not impose more-than-de minimis burden on the business.

RLA Restriction: The court reaffirmed that post-certification RLA claims in federal court must allege:

“Anti-union animus” by the carrier, or
A “fundamental attack” on the union’s functional bargaining role that cannot be remedied in arbitration.

Carter’s retaliation and interference claims failed this test. However, a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation remains viable when union action is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”

Injunction and Contempt: The Fifth Circuit stressed that a Rule 65 injunction must:

Clearly state its terms in proper detail;
Be no broader than necessary to remedy the prevailing party’s injury;
Not apply to large classes of non-parties in sweeping language.

Civil‐contempt sanctions must be coercive and remedial. Requiring attorneys to attend “religious-liberty training” was punitive and beyond the court’s remedial authority.

3.3 Impact

This decision will guide future Title VII cases by:

Forcing plaintiffs and courts to distinguish sharply between religious belief and religious practice claims;
Confirming that employers face no undue-hardship defense when accused of discriminating against belief alone;
Affirming the “more-than-de minimis” standard for pre-Groff cases in this circuit, while signaling that a post-Groff analysis may require more robust proof of substantial business impact;
Clarifying that post-certification RLA litigation in federal court is limited to disputes grounded in anti-union animus or attacks on the union’s core representation function;
Reinforcing injunction-specificity requirements under Rule 65 and policing the civil-contempt power to avoid punitive overreach.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Belief vs. Practice under Title VII: You may believe anything, and firing you for that belief is sometimes actionable. When you act on your belief (e.g., wearing a symbol, changing hair), employers can defend by showing the act is an “undue hardship.”
“More-Than-de Minimis” vs. “Substantial” Hardship: Pre-2023 Fifth Circuit law said employers win if any slight business disruption results from an accommodation. Groff (2023) says employers now must prove a truly substantial cost or disruption.
RLA Court Jurisdiction: The RLA channels most airline and railroad labor disputes into arbitration. Federal courts step in only when a carrier shows naked hostility to union organizing or tries to destroy the union’s bargaining role.
Civil vs. Criminal Contempt: Civil contempt tries to force you to obey (“we’ll lock the gate, you hold the key by obeying”). Criminal contempt punishes you for past disobedience (“no key, you serve the full sentence”).

5. Conclusion

Carter v. Southwest Airlines sets a new benchmark in Title VII jurisprudence by drawing a doctrinal line between religious beliefs and religious practices, preserving employers’ undue-hardship defense for practice claims, and closing the courthouse door to RLA disputes absent anti-union animus or dysfunction in union representation. It also reminds courts to craft injunctions with laser‐like precision and use civil‐contempt powers only as a lever for compliance, not as a hammer for punishment. This decision will shape religious-discrimination litigation and labor-law disputes in the Fifth Circuit for years to come, ensuring that the twin goals of Title VII—non-discrimination and accommodation—are applied with both rigor and restraint.