Distinguishing Knowledge of a Lawsuit from Service of Citation: The Supreme Court of Texas Refines the Craddock Test in Tabakman v. Tabakman

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam opinion in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman (No. 24‑0919, opinion delivered December 5, 2025) is a significant development in Texas default‑judgment doctrine, particularly in the context of divorce proceedings and alternative service of process.

The case centers on a no‑answer default divorce, where the trial court granted a default final decree of divorce after alternative service of process and the petitioner’s failure to answer. The key issue before the Supreme Court was whether, under the equitable Craddock test, Jenna was entitled to a new trial. Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded she was not, primarily on the ground that her failure to answer was the product of conscious indifference. The Supreme Court disagreed, reversed, and remanded for a new trial.

The decision refines the law in several important respects:

It clarifies the first element of the Craddock test in cases involving alternative service, emphasizing the distinction between:
- mere awareness that a lawsuit has been filed, and
- actual awareness that one has been served with citation.
It confirms that a defendant’s mistake of law about how service must occur can, under the circumstances, satisfy the first Craddock element.
It reinforces that evidence of technically proper alternative service is not evidence that the defendant actually received the suit papers, and therefore does not itself controvert an assertion of non‑receipt.
It applies and clarifies the second and third elements of Craddock in the context of:
- community vs. separate property and reimbursement claims, and
- claims of “injury” and “delay” arising from reopening a default divorce decree.

Within the broader framework of recent Texas precedents—especially In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024)—this opinion is another strong statement of the Court’s commitment to the principle that default judgments are disfavored and that doubts must be resolved against the party who secured the default.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Setting

Jenna and Gary Tabakman were married for thirteen years and had one child. Jenna left the marital home to live with her parents, alleging mistreatment by Gary. Shortly thereafter, Gary:

Filed for divorce and told Jenna that he had done so.
Set in motion attempts to serve Jenna with process at her parents’ residence.

Jenna testified that:

She was scared, had no funds for an attorney, and did not know how to respond.
She assumed she would be personally served with divorce papers.
She and her father were waiting for personal service at the parents’ house.

After repeated unsuccessful attempts at personal service, the trial court authorized alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). The process server:

Posted the citation, the petition, and the alternative‑service order on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ house.
Never personally saw or spoke with Jenna.

No answer was filed by Jenna within the applicable time. Gary moved for default judgment.

B. Default Judgment and Subsequent Events

At the default hearing, the trial court orally rendered a default judgment. Around that same time—but apparently unaware of both the alternative service and the default hearing—Jenna contacted an attorney because:

Gary allegedly told her he was planning to abscond with their child and the family dog.

Within three weeks of this development, Jenna’s attorney:

Filed an answer on Jenna’s behalf, and
Filed a motion for new trial under Craddock.

Despite Jenna’s appearance by answer and her pending motion for new trial, the trial court signed the Default Final Decree of Divorce a few days later. Jenna did not claim on appeal that the court erred in signing the decree after she appeared; the Supreme Court notes this in a footnote and leaves that issue aside.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Jenna’s motion for new trial. It found that:

Jenna had set up a meritorious defense, but
She was consciously indifferent in failing to answer, and
She failed to show that a new trial would not harm or injure Gary.

The motion for new trial was therefore denied.

C. Court of Appeals’ Decision

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Houston) affirmed. It:

Held that Jenna had been properly served by alternative service, rejecting her challenge to service.
Addressed only the first element of the Craddock test.
Concluded that Jenna’s explanation—lack of awareness of service and failure to avoid service—did not negate conscious indifference, especially in light of:
- Evidence that Gary had informed her of the lawsuit and attempts at service, and
- Her admitted knowledge that a divorce case had been filed.
Relied heavily on the idea that the factual conflict over Jenna’s awareness allowed the trial court to resolve credibility against her.

D. Supreme Court of Texas

In the Supreme Court, Jenna:

Renewed her challenge to the validity of service, and
Argued that she satisfied all three Craddock elements and was entitled to a new trial.

The Supreme Court:

Declined to disturb the lower courts’ ruling that service was valid, finding no reversible error and considering that issue unimportant to state jurisprudence (citing Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024)).
Nevertheless held that Jenna was entitled to a new trial under Craddock even assuming valid service.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reverses the court of appeals and remands for a new trial. The central holdings are:

First Craddock element – No intentional or consciously indifferent failure to answer.
Jenna’s evidence, if true, showed that:
- She believed she would be personally served and was mistaken about the law.
- She did not attempt to evade service and never saw the citation posted on the door.
- She promptly sought counsel and filed an answer once she learned of the default.
This “some excuse,” though not necessarily a strong one, was sufficient to negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct. The Court also held that:
- Evidence that alternative service was properly executed does not controvert a sworn assertion of non‑receipt.
- Awareness of a pending lawsuit is not the same as awareness of having been served with citation.
Second Craddock element – Meritorious defense.
Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense by alleging a reimbursement claim for separate property funds used as a down payment on the marital home and supporting it with testimony and documentation. Regardless of whether she will ultimately prevail or meet the clear‑and‑convincing standard at trial, this was enough for the Craddock standard.
Third Craddock element – No undue delay or injury.
Jenna:
- Alleged that a new trial would not cause undue delay or injury.
- Stated that she was ready for trial.
- Offered to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default and left attorney’s fees to the trial court’s discretion.
This met her initial burden. Gary’s response—citing general financial burdens and strain on the child from undoing custody and possession orders—did not show prejudice to his ability to present the case on the merits at a new trial, and therefore did not establish “injury” under Craddock.

On this basis, the Court held that all three elements were satisfied and that the trial court was required to grant a new trial.

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1939)

Craddock is the foundational Texas case establishing the three‑part equitable test governing motions for new trial after a no‑answer default judgment:

The failure to answer was not intentional or due to conscious indifference, but the result of accident or mistake.
The defendant sets up a meritorious defense.
The motion is filed at a time when granting a new trial will not cause delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

If all three elements are met, a new trial must be granted. The Court in Tabakman explicitly applies Craddock as developed through subsequent cases and reiterates its mandatory nature once the elements are satisfied.

2. In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024)

Lakeside is cited to reaffirm the overarching policy:

Default judgments are “greatly disfavored” in Texas law.
There is a strong preference that “cases be decided on the merits.”
Where the losing party was absent, concerns include:
- The troubling nature of ex parte proceedings,
- Fairness to the missing party, and
- Risks to judicial integrity when courts render judgments unenlightened by adversarial testing.
Any doubts about a default judgment—not limited to doubts about service—must be resolved against the party who obtained it.

Tabakman is a direct application of this philosophy: in the face of competing narratives and imperfect notice, the Court leans toward allowing the case to be heard on the merits, especially in a family‑law context.

3. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006)

R.R. clarifies the operative test for the first Craddock element:

The defendant meets her burden when her factual assertions, if true, would negate intent or conscious indifference and are not controverted by the plaintiff.
“Not understanding a citation and then doing nothing following service” is not a sufficient excuse.

Tabakman builds on this by:

Reaffirming that the critical inquiry is why the defendant did not appear (citing Fidelity & Guaranty), and
Drawing a line between a defendant who does nothing after actual service and a defendant who never receives or knows of the citation.

4. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006)

Fidelity & Guaranty is quoted for several key propositions:

The central question is: “Why did the defendant not appear?”
“Intent” and “conscious indifference” effectively mean the defendant “knew it was sued but did not care.”
Not receiving suit papers (or losing them under certain circumstances) may be a sufficient excuse.

The Court analogizes Jenna’s situation—non‑receipt of citation through alternative service—to the lost‑citation scenario in Fidelity & Guaranty. Just as people often cannot explain precisely how they lost a document, defendants in alternative service cases may not be able to explain how they failed to see or receive a posting.

5. Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995)

This case is cited to emphasize that:

A failure to answer is not “intentional” merely because it is deliberate.
Conscious indifference requires more than mere negligence.

This supports the Court’s conclusion that Jenna’s conduct—however imperfect—falls short of the “did not care” standard.

6. Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012)

Milestone reiterates that the controlling fact for the first Craddock element is the absence of an intentional failure to answer, “rather than a real excuse for not answering.” Even a weak excuse can suffice so long as it demonstrates some care.

Tabakman invokes this language to underscore that the sufficiency of Jenna’s excuse does not turn on how “good” it is, but on whether it demonstrates that she did not simply disregard the suit.

7. Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012)

In Sutherland, the Court held that forgetting a citation in a stack of papers over the holidays—supported by some explanation—was enough to negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct. The opinion in Tabakman characterizes this as an example of a relatively minimal but sufficient excuse.

The Court then reasons that:

If misplacing papers internally within a business suffices,
Then never receiving suit papers via alternative service that the defendant never saw is, if anything, a stronger excuse.

8. Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992)

This case establishes that a mistake of law can satisfy the first Craddock element. In Tabakman, Jenna mistakenly believed she had to be personally served and did not appreciate that posting on the door pursuant to a court order could suffice. The Court treats that mistaken belief as part of her acceptable excuse.

9. Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990)

Wilson provides a critical rule that underpins the opinion:

“Absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.”

Tabakman uses this to draw a sharp distinction between:

Knowing a divorce has been filed, and
Receiving a citation that commands the defendant to answer and warns of default.

This is the doctrinal core of the opinion’s most important clarification: knowledge of a lawsuit is not equivalent to knowledge of service for purposes of Craddock.

10. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002)

Sierra Club is cited to explain what a citation is: it is a document directed to the defendant that:

Tells the defendant that she has been sued, and
Commands her to appear and answer.

The Court underscores that the citation contains a specific warning that failure to answer may result in a default judgment. This explains why actual awareness of the citation (as opposed to the petition’s mere filing) is critical to assessing conscious indifference.

11. Alternative Service, Constructive Notice, and Presumptions of Receipt

The Court relies on several authorities to clarify the limited evidentiary consequences of alternative service and mailing presumptions:

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) – Authorizes alternative service (such as posting at a location) when personal service is impracticable.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993) – Alternative service can prove how and when service was executed, but is:
- “No evidence in the record of when defendant received actual notice.”
Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987) – The presumption of receipt from service by mail (Rule 21a) is not evidence and vanishes upon contrary evidence.
Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025) – Distinguishes actual from constructive knowledge of a judgment under Rule 306a (cited analogously for the notice concept).

Drawing on these authorities, the Court holds that:

Proof that the process server posted the citation on the door is evidence that service was executed, not that Jenna actually saw or received the citation.
Accordingly, evidence of properly effected alternative service does not controvert a defendant’s sworn claim of non‑receipt for purposes of the first Craddock element.

12. Meritorious Defense and Injury – Dolgencorp and Evans

On the second and third elements of Craddock, the Court relies on:

Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009) – A defendant “sets up” a meritorious defense by:
- Alleging facts that, if true, constitute a legal defense, and
- Supporting them with affidavits or evidence providing prima facie proof.
The court is not to weigh or resolve conflicting evidence at this stage.
Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994) – Vague assertions of financial harm or general hardship do not establish “injury” under Craddock unless they show that the plaintiff’s ability to present his case on the merits will be prejudiced in a new trial.

The Supreme Court applies these principles to:

Hold that Jenna’s reimbursement claim, supported by testimony and documents, is enough to “set up” a meritorious defense despite conflicting evidence and the high clear‑and‑convincing standard for separate property.
Conclude that Gary’s claims of financial expense and emotional strain on the child do not amount to legal “injury” for Craddock purposes because they do not impair his ability to litigate the merits at a new trial.

13. Family-Law Context – In re Marriage of Williams & In re Marriage of Sandoval

Two recent family‑law precedents play an important supporting role:

In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2022) – Confirms that the Craddock doctrine applies to default judgments in divorce cases.
In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021) – Holds that allowing a party to pursue a separate‑property claim in a new trial generally will not “upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of the community assets.”

In Tabakman, Sandoval supports the conclusion that reopening the property division (for purposes of Jenna’s reimbursement claim) does not inherently injure Gary in the Craddock sense.

14. Procedural Economy and Limited Discussion of Service – Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024)

The Court relies on Walker for its approach to judicial economy, noting that:

As “stewards of scarce judicial resources,” the Court may decline to fully address an issue when:
- No reversible error exists, and
- Further discussion is not important to the jurisprudence of the State.

Here, the Court applies that principle to Jenna’s challenge to the validity of service: it found no reversible error on that point and chose instead to rest the decision entirely on the Craddock analysis.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Reframing the First Craddock Element Around Actual Awareness of Citation

The pivotal move in the Court’s reasoning is distinguishing:

Awareness that a divorce suit was filed, from
Awareness that a citation was served and of its contents and consequences.

The Court emphasizes that:

The filing of a petition starts a lawsuit (Rule 22), but
The citation is the key document that:
- Commands the defendant to answer, and
- Warns that failure to answer may lead to default (Rule 99(c)).

Because “mere knowledge” of a suit does not impose a duty to act absent service, waiver, or citation (Wilson), Jenna’s uncontroverted testimony that she did not receive the citation and was unaware that it had been served is legally significant. Her behavior cannot reasonably be characterized as “knowing she was sued and not caring” when she lacked awareness of the event (service of citation) that would trigger a duty to answer or risk default.

2. Evaluating Jenna’s Excuse

Jenna’s explanation consists of several components:

She expected and waited for personal service.
She did not attempt to evade service.
She had no recollection of being approached personally or finding documents left at her parents’ house.
She had no knowledge of any posting on the door.
Upon learning that a default had been orally rendered, she promptly retained counsel and filed an answer—before the written decree was signed.

Her father corroborated this account by:

Describing construction work at the house at the relevant time.
Testifying that the community’s security officer would have notified him of visitors but did not do so for any process server.
Stating that he neither saw any posting on the door nor received any documents from the construction crew.

Applying its prior holdings, the Court concludes:

This is “some excuse,” even if imperfect.
It negates intentional or consciously indifferent behavior because it shows she did not disregard the suit; she simply never received the key notice (citation).
Her mistaken legal assumption (that she must be served personally) is also a valid part of her excuse under Bank One.

3. Why Gary’s Evidence Did Not “Controvert” Jenna’s Excuse

To defeat the first Craddock element, Gary had to controvert Jenna’s factual assertions. He attempted to do so by:

Showing that alternative service was properly executed (posting on the door), and
Testifying that he had told Jenna about:
- the divorce proceeding,
- a process server, and
- “the citation of service.”

The Supreme Court rejects this as insufficient controversion:

Proper execution of alternative service under Rule 106(b) is, by definition, a means of providing constructive notice, not proof of actual receipt. Under Costley, it is “no evidence” of when (or whether) the defendant actually became aware of the suit papers.
The process server’s testimony confirmed that she never saw Jenna.
Gary’s generalized statements about talking to Jenna about “the citation of service” lacked crucial details:
- When did these conversations occur in relation to the alternative service?
- What exactly was said that would show Jenna understood that citation had already been validly served?

Given this, the Court finds that:

Gary did not produce specific, competent evidence showing that Jenna actually knew citation had been served or had received the suit papers.
Therefore, he did not controvert her excuse under R.R., and Jenna’s account must be taken as sufficient for the first Craddock element.

4. Meritorious Defense – Reimbursement Claim

On the second Craddock element, the Court takes care to distinguish:

What is required to “set up” a meritorious defense at the new‑trial stage, versus
What is required to win on that defense at trial.

Jenna asserted that:

Separate property funds (her separate estate) were used as a down payment on the marital home.
This gives rise to a reimbursement claim from the community estate to her separate estate.
She supported this with documentary and testimonial evidence.

Gary argued that:

Jenna had not overcome the community‑property presumption (Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003) by clear and convincing evidence.

The Court holds that Gary is imposing the trial standard prematurely. Under Dolgencorp, Jenna needed only:

To allege facts which, if true, constitute a legal defense (here, a legally recognized reimbursement claim), and
To support those allegations with prima facie evidence.

Because those conditions were met, the trial court’s own explicit finding of a “meritorious defense” was correct, and the second Craddock element was satisfied.

5. No Undue Delay or Injury – Burden Shifting and Insufficient Proof of Prejudice

For the third Craddock element, the Court emphasizes a two‑step burden structure:

The defendant must:
- Allege that granting a new trial will not cause delay or injury, and
- Offer reasonably tailored conditions (e.g., readiness for trial, payment of costs) to mitigate any potential harm.
Once that is done, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a new trial would prejudice him in presenting his case on the merits.

Jenna met her initial burden by:

Alleging no delay or injury.
Stating she was ready for trial.
Offering to pay reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default, and accepting the trial court’s discretion over attorney’s fees.

Gary’s response emphasized:

Financial harm from managing the community estate and selling the marital home.
Potential emotional strain on the child from modifying the standard possession order and custody provisions.

The Court, drawing on Evans and Sandoval, concludes that:

These concerns, while real, do not amount to legally cognizable “injury” under Craddock because they:
- Do not show that Gary would be disadvantaged in marshalling evidence or presenting arguments at trial.
- Reflect the ordinary burdens of litigation, not unique prejudice.
Moreover, under Sandoval, allowing a spouse to litigate a separate‑property or reimbursement claim on remand will generally not upset the essential structure of the divorce or custody decree.

Thus, the third Craddock element was also met.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Default Judgment

A default judgment happens when:

A defendant is properly served with citation,
Fails to file an answer by the deadline, and
The plaintiff proves up his case without an adversarial appearance by the defendant.

In a no‑answer default (as here), the defendant has not filed any answer at all before the default is taken.

2. The Craddock Test

The Craddock test is a three‑part standard for setting aside a no‑answer default judgment by motion for new trial:

No Intentional or Indifferent Failure
The defendant must show that her failure to answer was the result of a mistake or accident, not an intentional or “don’t care” attitude.
Meritorious Defense
She must show that she has a plausible legal defense supported by some evidence—enough that, if proved at trial, it could change the outcome.
No Undue Delay or Injury
She must show that reopening the case will not overly delay the proceedings or cause unfair prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present his case.

If all three are met, the trial court must grant a new trial.

3. “Conscious Indifference”

“Conscious indifference” is more than simple negligence or oversight. In this context, it essentially means:

The defendant knew she had been sued and that she needed to respond, but simply did not care enough to do so.

By contrast, when a defendant:

Is mistaken about how service works, or
Never actually receives the citation, or
Promptly responds upon learning of the default,

those facts usually negate conscious indifference.

4. Alternative Service

Normally, a process server must personally serve the defendant with citation and petition. If that proves impracticable, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) allows the court to authorize alternative service, such as:

Leaving the documents with someone else at the usual place of abode, or
Posting them on the front door.

Alternative service is valid if performed as ordered, but it provides only constructive notice—it does not guarantee the defendant actually saw the papers. That distinction is critical in Tabakman.

5. Actual vs. Constructive Notice

Actual notice – The person actually knows the fact in question (e.g., actually sees the citation or reads it).
Constructive notice – The law treats the person as having notice because reasonable steps were taken to notify them, even if they did not actually see the notice (e.g., posting on the door following court approval).

In Tabakman, the Court holds that:

Alternative service shows constructive notice, sufficient for validity of service, but
It is not evidence that Jenna had actual notice of the citation for purposes of assessing her mental state under Craddock.

6. “Meritorious Defense”

A meritorious defense is not a guaranteed winner. It is simply:

A legally viable defense that could change the outcome if proven, and
Supported by some credible evidence at the motion stage.

For example, here:

Claiming a right to reimbursement for separate property funds used for the down payment on the marital residence is a recognized defense to the property division.
Jenna produced enough evidence to show the claim is not frivolous.

7. “Injury” and “Delay” under Craddock

“Injury” in this context does not mean any inconvenience or expense. Rather, it describes:

Prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to fairly present his case at a new trial.

Examples of possible injury (in the abstract) might include:

Loss of critical evidence or witnesses that cannot be recovered.
Some unique strategic or evidentiary disadvantage that did not exist at the time of the default.

General litigation costs, the emotional strain of prolonged proceedings, or the need to revisit custody schedules are not sufficient, standing alone, to constitute injury under Craddock.

8. Community Property, Separate Property, and Reimbursement

Community property – Property acquired during marriage, presumed to be owned jointly unless proved otherwise.
Separate property – Property owned before marriage or acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; or recovery for personal injuries (with some exceptions).
Reimbursement claim – When one estate (community or separate) is used to benefit another (e.g., separate funds used to buy or improve community property), the contributing estate may have a claim for reimbursement.

Jenna’s reimbursement claim for separate funds used as down payment on the home is a classic example of this doctrine.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Strengthening Protections for Defendants in Alternative-Service Cases

The opinion will have substantial ramifications for civil defendants who were:

Served by alternative means, and
Later defaulted without actual awareness of the citation.

Key impacts include:

Defendants can more confidently argue that non‑receipt of citation in an alternative‑service context, coupled with a prompt response upon learning of the judgment, satisfies the first Craddock element.
Trial courts must distinguish between:
- Evidence that service was technically proper, and
- Evidence that the defendant actually knew of the citation.
Merely proving valid alternative service will not be enough to defeat a defendant’s sworn claim of non‑receipt in the Craddock context.

B. Clarification for Family-Law Practice

For family‑law practitioners, Tabakman has several notable effects:

It underscores that divorce judgments by default are subject to the same robust Craddock protections as other civil cases.
It signals that courts will be wary of enforcing default divorces where:
- One party had no actual opportunity to litigate property division or reimbursement claims, and
- The absence may have stemmed from non‑receipt of alternative service.
It encourages plaintiffs’ counsel to:
- Ensure and document actual notice as much as possible even when technically sufficient alternative service is used, and
- Recognize that a default decree may be vulnerable if the other spouse had no actual awareness of the citation.

C. Recalibrating the “Conscious Indifference” Lens

The opinion refines Texas law on conscious indifference by anchoring it firmly to the defendant’s actual awareness of citation. Implications include:

Defendants who know about a lawsuit but never receive citation may still satisfy the first Craddock element, especially if they:
- Hold a plausible (even mistaken) belief that they will be personally served, and
- Promptly engage once they learn a default has been rendered.
Courts must be cautious not to infer conscious indifference solely from:
- Knowledge that a petition was filed, or
- Vague evidence that service efforts were being made.

D. Burden of Showing “Injury” in Default Divorce Contexts

The Court’s application of the third Craddock element has particular significance in family law:

Allegations that a child may experience “strain” from adjusting to new orders are, by themselves, insufficient to establish injury; courts will presume children benefit from determinations made after full adversarial process.
Financial costs of litigation and property management are viewed as ordinary incidents of litigation, not “injury” under Craddock unless tied to a specific evidentiary or trial disadvantage.
Sandoval and Tabakman collectively send a message that reopening property issues—especially where separate‑property or reimbursement rights are alleged—will usually not constitute injury to the non‑defaulting spouse.

E. Judicial Economy and the Role of Craddock Alongside Valid Service

Finally, the Court’s choice not to reach the service‑validity issue underscores two structural points:

Even when service is valid and the judgment is not void, a default judgment may still be set aside on equitable grounds under Craddock.
Trial courts retain broad discretion to grant new trials for “good cause” under Rule 320, even beyond Craddock, especially in light of the disfavored status of default judgments (Lakeside).

VII. Conclusion

Tabakman v. Tabakman is a consequential addition to Texas default‑judgment jurisprudence. It does not rewrite the Craddock test, but it meaningfully refines its application in three key ways:

First Element – Knowledge of Lawsuit vs. Knowledge of Citation.
The Court unequivocally holds that:
- “Mere knowledge” of a pending suit does not equate to a duty to answer, and
- It is actual notice of citation—not just the existence of a lawsuit—that is central to evaluating intent and conscious indifference.
Alternative service proves that citation was posted; it does not, by itself, prove that the defendant saw it. Non‑receipt of citation, corroborated by reasonable explanation, will frequently satisfy the first Craddock element.
Second Element – Low Threshold for “Setting Up” a Meritorious Defense.
The Court reaffirms that a defendant need only present a plausible legal defense supported by prima facie evidence. In property‑division disputes, reimbursement and separate‑property claims, if supported, will usually suffice.
Third Element – Narrow View of “Injury.”
The Court reinforces that injury must mean prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present his case on the merits, not general burdens of litigation, financial cost, or abstract emotional strain.

In practical terms, Tabakman strengthens safeguards against unfair default judgments—particularly in sensitive family‑law matters—and requires trial courts to focus on the defendant’s actual awareness of citation when evaluating conscious indifference. It also signals to litigants that while alternative service remains a valid and necessary tool, its use does not insulate default judgments from equitable relief where actual notice is genuinely lacking.

By reversing the denial of a new trial and remanding for full adversarial proceedings, the Supreme Court of Texas underscores its deep commitment to the principle that, whenever reasonably possible, cases should be decided on their merits, not on procedural missteps magnified by technical service rules.