Distinguishing Knowledge of a Lawsuit from Notice of Citation: The Texas Supreme Court Recalibrates Craddock in Default Divorce Cases

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam opinion in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman (No. 24‑0919, Dec. 5, 2025) significantly refines the application of the Craddock doctrine in the context of default divorce judgments and alternative service of process.

The key question was whether Jenna Tabakman, who failed to file an answer before an oral default rendition in a divorce case, was entitled to a new trial under the familiar three‑part test of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939). Both the trial court and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that she had been “consciously indifferent” to the lawsuit and therefore failed the first Craddock element. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:

• Uncontroverted evidence that a defendant did not actually receive citation—especially when service is by alternative means such as posting on a door—negates conscious indifference even if the defendant knew a lawsuit had been filed.
• Jenna also satisfied the second and third Craddock elements: she “set up” a meritorious defense and showed that a new trial would not cause undue delay or injury.

The opinion underscores a crucial doctrinal point: under Texas law, a defendant’s knowledge that a lawsuit exists is not the same as knowledge that the defendant has been served with citation, and the former does not by itself create a duty to answer. This distinction becomes especially important when a default judgment rests on alternative service that, in practice, never reached the defendant.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Marriage and Separation

Jenna and Gary Tabakman were married for thirteen years and had one child. Amid allegations of mistreatment by Gary, Jenna left the marital home and moved in with her parents. Shortly after Jenna’s departure, Gary—who is a lawyer—filed for divorce and informed Jenna that he had done so.

B. Service Attempts and Alternative Service

Jenna testified that:

• She knew Gary had filed for divorce but did not know how to respond.
• She lacked funds to hire a lawyer immediately and was afraid.
• She and her father expected that “divorce papers” would be served on her personally (i.e., hand-delivered).

Despite multiple attempts, the process server was unable to personally serve Jenna. The trial court eventually authorized alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). Acting under that order, the process server posted the citation, petition, and order authorizing alternative service on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ home.

No answer was filed by Jenna within the prescribed period, and Gary moved for a default divorce judgment. At the default hearing, the trial court orally rendered a default judgment in Gary’s favor.

C. Jenna’s Subsequent Appearance and the Default Decree

Unaware of the posting or of the default hearing, Jenna later contacted an attorney after Gary allegedly said he planned to leave with their child and family dog. Within about three weeks:

• Jenna’s attorney filed an answer; and
• Simultaneously filed a motion for new trial invoking Craddock.

Despite these filings, the trial court signed the written default final decree of divorce a few days later, formalizing the oral rendition. On appeal, Jenna did not challenge the trial court’s decision to sign the decree after she had already appeared, and the Supreme Court expressly notes that omission.

D. The Motion for New Trial and Court of Appeals’ Affirmance

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Jenna’s Craddock motion. It expressly found:

1. Jenna had “set up” a meritorious defense (satisfying the second Craddock element), but
2. She was “consciously indifferent” in failing to answer (failing the first element), and
3. She did not establish that granting a new trial would not harm or injure Gary (failing the third element).

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed. Focusing only on the first Craddock element, it reasoned that:

• Jenna’s excuse—ignorance of service and lack of steps to avoid service—was legally insufficient to negate conscious indifference.
• Because Gary had told Jenna about the lawsuit and about ongoing attempts at service, the trial court could legitimately infer that Jenna was indifferent to answering.

The court of appeals separately held that alternative service was validly effected and rejected Jenna’s attack on service. Jenna renewed that challenge in the Supreme Court, but the Court held she had not shown reversible error and declined to elaborate under its recent guidance in Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024).

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that Jenna was entitled to a new trial under Craddock. The Court held:

1. First Craddock element – no intentional or consciously indifferent failure to answer.
   Jenna’s testimony that she never received the alternative-service citation, combined with a reasonable explanation and corroboration from her father, negated conscious indifference. Alternative service by posting does not, by itself, prove actual notice. Thus, her excuse—if true—was sufficient, and Gary’s evidence did not controvert it.
2. Second element – meritorious defense.
   Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense via a reimbursement claim from the community estate to her separate estate (for funds used as a down payment on the marital home), supported by testimony and documents. At the Craddock stage she need not prove that defense by clear and convincing evidence; it is enough that the defense would be legally viable if proven.
3. Third element – no undue delay or injury.
   Jenna alleged readiness for trial and willingness to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred to obtain the default judgment. This shifted the burden to Gary to show actual prejudice to presentation of his case at a new trial. His generalized claims of financial hardship and strain on the child were legally insufficient under Evans. No injury within the meaning of Craddock was shown.

Accordingly, the Court:

• Granted Jenna’s petition for review without oral argument (Tex. R. App. P. 59.1),
• Reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and
• Remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the merits.

The opinion situates this holding within a broader trend: Texas law “greatly disfavors” default judgments and requires that any doubt surrounding a default judgment—whether about service or other aspects—must be resolved against the party who obtained the default. See In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024).

IV. Legal Framework

A. Default Judgments and Texas Policy

The Court reaffirms that default judgments are “greatly disfavored” and “differ from every other kind [of judgment] in a fundamental way.” Citing Lakeside Resort, the Court emphasizes:

• The adversarial process—“collision of evidence and ideas”—is the best safeguard of accurate, truthful results.
• Ex parte decisions raise concerns about fairness, judicial integrity, and the risk of erroneous judgments backed by state power.
• Default judgments are tolerated only because defendants cannot thwart judicial authority by refusing to appear.
• As a corollary, any doubts about a default judgment, not only doubts about service, must be resolved in favor of setting the default aside.

B. The Craddock Test

Craddock is an equitable doctrine allowing a party who failed to appear to obtain a new trial following a default judgment. The modern articulation of the test, cited from In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006), is:

1. The failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to a mistake or accident;
2. The defendant “sets up” a meritorious defense; and
3. The motion is filed at a time when granting a new trial will not result in delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

If these three requirements are met, the trial court must grant a new trial. The opinion also notes that even when Craddock is not fully satisfied, Rule 320 gives trial courts broad discretion to grant a new trial for “good cause” in light of the special status of default judgments.

C. Service of Process, Citation, and Alternative Service

Several procedural rules and doctrines underpin the Court’s analysis:

• Lawsuit vs. citation.
  • A lawsuit is commenced by filing a petition. Tex. R. Civ. P. 22.
  • A citation is the formal command to the defendant, informing them they have been sued and warning that a default judgment may be taken if they do not answer. Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(c); Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. 2002).
  • Crucially, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not impose any duty to answer absent proper service, waiver, or voluntary appearance. Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1990).
• Alternative service.
  • When personal service is impracticable, Rule 106(b) allows the court to authorize service “in any other manner” reasonably likely to give actual notice (e.g., posting on a door).
  • This method creates proof that service was performed as ordered, but it is not proof that the defendant actually saw or received the papers.
  • State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993), held that such proof of alternative service is “no evidence in the record of when defendant received actual notice.”
• Actual vs. constructive notice.
  • The Court distinguishes between “actual knowledge” (what the defendant truly knew) and “constructive knowledge” (what the law deems them to know because proper procedures were followed).
  • Procedural presumptions (e.g., presumed receipt of mailed items under Rule 21a) are not themselves “evidence” and disappear when there is credible testimony of non-receipt. Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987).

V. Detailed Analysis of the Opinion

A. First Craddock Element: No Intentional or Consciously Indifferent Failure to Answer

1. The Central Question: Why Did the Defendant Not Appear?

The Court reiterates from Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006), that the core inquiry is simple: “Why did the defendant not appear?” The answer drives the assessment of intent and indifference.

Here, Jenna’s explanation was:

• She believed she would be served personally (a mistaken assumption about the law).
• She did not evade service and had no knowledge of any successful service attempt.
• She never saw the citation posted on her parents’ door.
• Her father, who was present at the home and aware of construction and security procedures, likewise never saw any posted documents and was never notified by the security guard of a process server.
• Once she learned there had been a default, she promptly hired counsel, who filed an answer and Craddock motion before the written decree was signed.

2. What Counts as “Intentional” or “Conscious Indifference”?

The Court draws heavily on prior cases to reiterate that:

• A failure to answer is not intentional merely because the act of not filing is deliberate. Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Const. Co., 913 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. 1995).
• “Conscious indifference” is more than negligence; it means the defendant knew about the suit and simply did not care. Fidelity & Guaranty, 186 S.W.3d at 576.
• The critical fact is the absence of an intentional failure, not the presence of a “good” excuse. Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. 2012).
• “Some excuse, although not necessarily a good one, will suffice to show that a defendant’s failure to file an answer was not because the defendant did not care.” Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 755 (Tex. 2012).

Applying these principles, the Court holds that Jenna’s explanation easily qualifies as “some excuse”—a combination of mistake of law (expecting only personal service) and lack of actual notice of alternative service.

3. Mistake of Law as an Excuse

The Court explicitly notes that a mistake of law can satisfy the first Craddock element. It cites Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992), where a misunderstanding of legal requirements was accepted as negating conscious indifference. Jenna’s assumption that service must be personal was incorrect—because Rule 106(b) allows other methods—but her legal misunderstanding is still a valid component of her excuse.

4. Non-Receipt of Suit Papers: Extending Prior Precedent

The Court analogizes Jenna’s situation to prior cases where defendants:

• Did not recall being served, or
• Misplaced the suit papers after service.

Those cases include:

• Sutherland: citation left in a stack of papers on a desk and forgotten over the holiday season. Excuse held sufficient to negate conscious indifference.
• Milestone Operating: similar reasoning emphasizing that an imperfect excuse suffices.
• Fidelity & Guaranty: loss of citation; Court observed that people often cannot explain how something became lost and that an assertion like “I did not get the suit papers” is typically sufficient if supported by some explanation.

The Court explains that the same logic applies “with greater force” when the defendant never received the citation at all because service was by posting or another indirect method. As in Fidelity & Guaranty, defendants often will not know what happened to the posted documents; what matters is a credible explanation by those most likely to have seen them, combined with timely action once the default is discovered.

Jenna’s father provided that corroboration:

• He described ongoing construction at his house, creating the possibility that workers could have removed or disturbed posted papers.
• He explained the gated community’s security practices and testified that he was never informed by security of a process server.
• He testified he never saw anything posted on the door that day, and no one brought any such documents to him.

Combined with Jenna’s own testimony and prompt filing after learning of the default, this evidence satisfies the first prong as a matter of law.

5. Knowledge of the Lawsuit vs. Knowledge of Service

A central error identified in the court of appeals’ analysis is its failure to distinguish:

• Awareness that a lawsuit is pending; and
• Awareness that one has been served with citation (and thereby faces an imminent risk of default).

The Court draws on Wilson v. Dunn and Sierra Club to reaffirm:

• Filing a petition commences a lawsuit (Rule 22).
• Citation is the formal command to answer and the vehicle by which default warning is transmitted (Rule 99(c)).
• Absent service, waiver, or voluntary appearance, mere knowledge that a suit has been filed does not impose any duty to act.

Thus, even if:

• Gary told Jenna that he had filed a divorce petition; and
• She knew generally that a lawsuit existed and that a process server was looking for her,

she still had no legal duty to answer until she was served with citation or otherwise gained actual notice of service. Not receiving the posted citation—even after knowing that a case exists—can fully excuse a failure to answer.

6. Was Jenna’s Excuse “Controverted”?

Under In re R.R., a defendant satisfies the first Craddock element when:

1. The factual assertions, if true, negate intent or conscious indifference; and
2. Those assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff.

Gary argued that Jenna’s denial of service was “conclusory” and that proper alternative service was proven. The Supreme Court rejects this as a misunderstanding of how alternative service interacts with Craddock:

• Proof that service was executed in accordance with an alternative-service order shows that service was done properly from a procedural standpoint.
• It does not establish that the defendant actually received or saw the papers (State Farm Fire & Casualty).
• The process server in this case testified she never saw Jenna and had no evidence that Jenna ever became aware of the posted citation.

The Court further clarifies that general statements that Gary spoke with Jenna about “the divorce proceeding,” “a process server,” and “the citation of service” do not show that she actually knew service had been successfully effected—nor when such conversations occurred relative to the posting. The record contained no clear testimony that Jenna had actual notice of the posting before default.

Accordingly, Gary’s evidence did not meaningfully “controvert” Jenna’s claim that she never received the citation. Because her excuse, if true, negated conscious indifference and remained uncontroverted, the first Craddock element was established as a matter of law.

B. Second Craddock Element: Setting Up a Meritorious Defense

1. The “Set Up” Standard

Under Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009), a defendant satisfies the second Craddock element by:

• Alleging facts which, if true, would constitute a valid legal defense; and
• Supporting those allegations with affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof of the defense.

The Court stresses that:

• The defendant need not show that the defense will probably prevail at a new trial.
• Contradictory evidence from the plaintiff is irrelevant at this stage—the focus is solely on whether the defendant’s own showing clears the low “set up” threshold.

2. Jenna’s Reimbursement / Separate-Property Claim

Jenna asserted, among other defenses, that:

• Funds from her separate estate were used as a down payment on the marital residence; and
• She was therefore entitled to reimbursement from the community estate to her separate estate.

She supported this with testimony and documentary evidence. Gary responded by invoking the strong presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property, which may be overcome only by “clear and convincing” evidence of separate character. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003.

The Supreme Court rejects Gary’s position as demanding too much too soon. The issue at this procedural stage is not who will ultimately win on the characterization of the property, but whether Jenna has:

• Alleged a legally valid form of relief (reimbursement to separate estate); and
• Provided enough evidence to show that the defense is not fictional or frivolous.

Because she did so, the Court agrees with the trial court’s initial finding: Jenna successfully “set up” a meritorious defense under the second Craddock element.

C. Third Craddock Element: No Undue Delay or Injury

1. Burden Shifting and Type of “Injury” Required

The third element requires a showing that granting a new trial will not cause “delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.” Under Dolgencorp, this operates in two phases:

1. The defendant satisfies an initial burden by:
   • Alleging that granting a new trial will not injure the plaintiff; and
   • Offering to reimburse costs or otherwise mitigate prejudice (e.g., paying attorney’s fees for obtaining the default).
2. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show actual injury that would result from a new trial.

In Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994), the Court held that generalized assertions of financial burden or inconvenience are insufficient. The relevant injury is prejudice to the presentation of the merits at the new trial (for example, lost evidence or unavailable witnesses).

2. Jenna’s Showing

Jenna’s motion asserted:

• That granting a new trial would not result in undue delay or injury.
• That she was ready for trial.
• That she agreed to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default judgment.
• That she recognized the trial court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees related to the motion for new trial.

This was sufficient to meet her initial burden and shift the burden to Gary.

3. Gary’s Claimed Injuries and Why They Fall Short

Gary pointed to:

• Attorney’s fees and management costs related to the community estate and sale of the marital home; and
• His belief that upsetting the default decree’s possession and custody provisions would “put a lot of strain” on their child.

The Supreme Court holds that these asserted harms:

• Do not show how Gary’s ability to present his case on the merits would be impaired; and
• Amount to general financial and emotional burdens, which Evans deems insufficient to establish “injury” for Craddock purposes.

The Court also notes Jenna’s reliance on In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021), where it recognized that allowing a party to litigate a separate-property claim in a new trial does not “upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of the community assets.” In other words, the core aspects of the divorce can remain intact or be reconfigured without special prejudice to the movant for default.

Thus, the Court concludes Jenna established the third Craddock element, and Gary failed to carry his responsive burden of showing actual injury.

D. Trial Court Discretion and Rule 320

While not central to the outcome, the Court reiterates that Rule 320 authorizes granting a new trial for “good cause” even if Craddock is not fully satisfied, especially given that default judgments are disfavored. This reinforces that:

• Craddock sets a minimum threshold for a defaulting defendant to force a new trial.
• Trial courts remain free to grant new trials more readily, in the interest of justice, when equitable considerations warrant.

Here, however, the Court goes further and holds that all three Craddock elements were satisfied as a matter of law, leaving the trial court no discretion to deny the motion.

E. Disposition of Service-Attack Issue

Jenna also challenged the underlying validity of alternative service. The Court of appeals rejected that challenge, and the Supreme Court, invoking Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, concludes that further discussion of the service issue would not “add to the State’s jurisprudence” and that there is no reversible error.

This posture is noteworthy:

• It indicates the Court was content to assume (or accept) that service was technically proper but nonetheless allow relief under Craddock because Jenna lacked actual notice.
• It underscores the opinion’s central theme: even with procedurally valid service, lack of actual receipt can justify setting aside a default judgment under Craddock, especially in the context of alternative service.

VI. Key Precedents and Their Influence

A. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. (1939)

Craddock established the three‑part test that balances:

• The need to enforce procedural rules and finality; against
• The imperative of fair trials on the merits when a defaulting party’s failure to appear is not intentional or indifferent.

The present decision adheres to Craddock but pushes its application in a direction that strongly favors litigants who credibly assert lack of actual notice.

B. In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC (2024)

Lakeside Resort re-emphasized:

• Default judgments are “greatly disfavored.”
• The adversarial process is vital to the integrity of judicial outcomes.
• Any doubts about a default judgment must be resolved against the party who obtained it.

Tabakman operationalizes these principles in a common but sensitive context (divorce, custody, and property division), favoring substance over procedural technicality when actual notice is absent.

C. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Drewery Construction Co. (2006)

This decision shapes the first Craddock element:

• Poses the central question: “Why did the defendant not appear?”
• Recognizes that “I didn’t get the suit papers” is often a sufficient answer when supported by explanation from the person most likely to have seen them.
• Clarifies that misplacing or losing papers can be an adequate excuse.

Tabakman treats “never receiving the posted citation” as functionally equivalent to “losing” or misplacing papers—a natural extension of Fidelity & Guaranty to the context of alternative service.

D. Sutherland v. Spencer, Milestone Operating, and In re R.R.

These cases collectively:

• Lower the bar for what constitutes an adequate excuse under Craddock (“some excuse, although not necessarily a good one”).
• Clarify that simple mistakes, oversight, or forgetfulness—when credibly explained—can negate conscious indifference.

In Tabakman, the Court treats Jenna’s non‑receipt of posted citation (confirmed by her father’s testimony and the absence of contradictory evidence) as comfortably within this forgiving framework.

E. Service and Notice Cases: Wilson v. Dunn, Sierra Club, Costley, Cliff v. Huggins, and Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley

These precedents provide the conceptual backbone for the Court’s distinction between knowledge of a lawsuit and notice of citation, as well as between constructive and actual notice:

• Wilson v. Dunn: Mere knowledge that a suit exists, absent proper service or appearance, imposes no duty to answer.
• Sierra Club: Outlines the role of the citation as the formal notice commanding appearance and warning of default.
• State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley: Alternative service proves how service was carried out, not when or whether the defendant received actual notice.
• Cliff v. Huggins: Presumptions of receipt (e.g., under Rule 21a) are non-evidentiary and vanish upon credible testimony of non-receipt.
• Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley (2025): Distinguishes actual from constructive knowledge in the context of Rule 306a notice of judgment, mirroring the Court’s approach here to actual vs. constructive service notice.

Tabakman synthesizes these strands to hold that alternative service cannot, standing alone, be treated as proof that the defendant had actual notice, or as automatic “controversion” of a credible non‑receipt claim.

F. Dolgencorp, Evans, and In re Marriage of Sandoval

On the second and third Craddock elements, the Court applies:

• Dolgencorp: Articulates the “set up” standard for meritorious defenses and the burden-shifting framework for delay/injury.
• Evans: Holds that generalized claims of financial or administrative hardship do not amount to “injury” unless they impair the merits presentation at a new trial.
• Sandoval: Confirms that new trials to resolve separate-property issues need not and typically do not undermine the fundamental divorce, custody, and support framework.

These precedents firmly support the Court’s conclusion that Jenna satisfied the second and third Craddock elements.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Default Judgment

A default judgment is entered when a defendant fails to respond to a lawsuit (typically by not filing an answer by the deadline). The court may then decide the case based solely on the plaintiff’s pleadings and evidence, without hearing from the defendant.

B. Service of Process and Citation

• Service of process is the formal delivery of court documents (usually the petition and citation) to the defendant, giving them notice of the lawsuit and an opportunity to respond.
• The citation itself is a document from the clerk directed to the defendant stating that:
  • A lawsuit has been filed against them; and
  • They must file a written answer by a certain date or risk default.

C. Alternative Service

When personal delivery of the citation is impracticable, a court may authorize “alternative service” under Rule 106(b), such as:

• Leaving a copy with someone at the defendant’s residence; or
• Posting a copy on the front door.

This method is legally valid, but the defendant may in fact never see the papers (e.g., if a third party removes them). Tabakman holds that such non‑receipt, if credibly shown, can justify setting aside a default under Craddock.

D. “Conscious Indifference”

Conscious indifference means essentially: “I knew there was a suit and I knew I needed to act, but I didn’t care.” It is more serious than simple carelessness or misunderstanding. In this context:

• Forgetting, misplacing, misreading, or never receiving papers is normally not “conscious indifference” if genuinely explained.
• A defendant who never receives the citation at all cannot be said to have “chosen” not to respond to it.

E. “Setting Up” a Meritorious Defense

To “set up” a meritorious defense, a defaulting defendant does not need to prove the defense is more likely than not to succeed. Instead, they must:

• Describe a defense which, if proven at trial, would defeat some or all of the plaintiff’s claim; and
• Provide some supporting evidence (e.g., affidavit or documents) showing the defense is real, not fabricated after the fact.

F. “Delay” or “Injury” to the Plaintiff

For Craddock purposes, “injury” means prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to try the case fairly, such as:

• Key witnesses becoming unavailable; or
• Crucial records being lost due to the delay.

Ordinary burdens—additional attorney’s fees, the inconvenience of having to litigate again, or general emotional strain—typically do not count as “injury” sufficient to defeat a new trial motion, especially if the defendant offers to reimburse reasonable costs caused by the default.

G. Separate vs. Community Property and Reimbursement

• Texas presumes that all property acquired during marriage is community property. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003.
• A spouse can overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence that certain property (or funds) are separate, such as:
  • Property owned before marriage;
  • Gifts or inheritances to one spouse; or
  • Recoveries for personal injuries.
• If a spouse’s separate property is used to benefit the community (e.g., paying a down payment on the marital home), that spouse may have a reimbursement claim from the community estate back to their separate estate.

In Tabakman, Jenna claimed such a reimbursement. Whether she will ultimately prove it is a merits question; for Craddock purposes her evidence sufficed to “set up” the defense.

VIII. Practical Implications and Future Impact

A. For Defendants and Defense Counsel

• Document non‑receipt and confusion early. If a client learns a default judgment has been taken, counsel should immediately:
  • Ask detailed questions about what, if anything, was received.
  • Gather affidavits from those most likely to have seen the papers (household members, office staff, property managers, security personnel, etc.).
  • Explain and document any circumstances (construction, mail issues, workplace closures) that might explain non‑receipt.
• Move quickly. Prompt filing of an answer and a Craddock motion remains critical to showing lack of indifference and minimizing claims of delay or prejudice.
• Do not concede conscious indifference because the client “knew about the suit.” After Tabakman, it is clear that knowledge of the lawsuit alone does not defeat Craddock if there was no actual notice of successful service.

B. For Plaintiffs and Their Counsel

• Alternative service is not bulletproof. Although alternative service may be valid from a jurisdictional standpoint, it does not immunize a default from being set aside if the defendant credibly denies actual receipt.
• Consider steps to bolster actual notice. Where feasible, plaintiffs might:
  • Use methods likely to reach the defendant (e.g., follow‑up mail, email where authorized, or personal delivery attempts even after an alternative service order), and
  • Document any conversations indicating the defendant actually saw or received the citation.
• Prepare to meet the third Craddock element. Plaintiffs opposing new trials should be ready to show specific prejudice to their ability to try the case, not merely the inconvenience or cost of starting over.

C. For Trial Courts

• Distinguish lawsuit awareness from service awareness. Courts should not infer conscious indifference merely because the defendant knew a suit was filed or that “someone was trying to serve them.” The focus must be on actual notice of successful service or receipt of citation.
• Treat alternative service evidence carefully. A return of service showing posting or substitute service demonstrates compliance with the order, but it is not “evidence” that the defendant actually saw or read the citation. If credible testimony of non‑receipt is offered and not effectively contradicted, the first Craddock element is satisfied.
• Remember the low bar for “some excuse.” Courts should err on the side of granting new trials when the excuse credibly negates an attitude of indifference, consistent with the policy disfavoring defaults.

D. Specific Impact on Family-Law Practice

Because family-law cases frequently involve default divorces (particularly where one spouse is less resourced or more transient), Tabakman may meaningfully change litigation dynamics:

• More defaults will be set aside. Where a spouse plausibly denies receiving alternative-service postings and moves quickly for relief, courts are likely compelled to grant new trials.
• Strategic considerations for property and custody. Counsel must recognize that a default decree—especially one involving significant property allocations or custody determinations—may have a short shelf life if Craddock is promptly and credibly invoked.
• Limited reliance on finality of default decrees. Parties who secure favorable terms by default should be advised that those terms may not be secure until the window for a Craddock challenge passes or such a challenge is resolved.

E. Broader Doctrinal Direction

Tabakman, together with Lakeside Resort and Red Bluff, reflects a broader trend in the Supreme Court of Texas:

• Insisting on clear distinctions between technical/procedural compliance and actual notice or knowledge;
• Requiring that defaults give way readily to trials on the merits when actual notice is credibly disputed; and
• Framing Craddock as robustly protective of defendants, especially in sensitive contexts like family law where substantive rights and long‑term consequences are at stake.

IX. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman clarifies and strengthens an important principle in Texas default-judgment jurisprudence: it is actual notice of citation, not mere awareness that a lawsuit exists, that matters for the first Craddock element. When a defendant credibly testifies that she never received an alternative-service citation—and that testimony is corroborated and uncontroverted—the law treats her failure to answer as excused, not as intentional or indifferent.

The Court’s reasoning:

• Extends prior holdings that misplacing or forgetting suit papers can negate conscious indifference to the context of non‑receipt under alternative service.
• Confirms that the “meritorious defense” requirement imposes only a prima facie burden at the Craddock stage, not a full merits showing.
• Reiterates that “injury” under the third element means tangible prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to litigate the case on the merits, not general inconvenience or financial cost.

Within the broader legal landscape, Tabakman reinforces Texas’s strong preference for resolving disputes on their merits and its deep skepticism toward default judgments entered without true adversarial engagement. It serves as a clear signal that, particularly in family-law cases and where alternative service is used, courts must scrutinize claims of actual notice with care and err on the side of providing litigants their day in court.