Distinct Harms and Double Counting in Child Pornography Sentencing: A Commentary on United States v. Amy Lynn Cook (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The decision in United States v. Amy Lynn Cook, No. 25‑5186 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025) (not recommended for publication), addresses a recurring and practically important question in federal child‑pornography sentencing: when a defendant sexually exploits an infant or toddler, may a district court apply both (1) the four‑level enhancement for a victim under 12, and (2) the four‑level enhancement for material portraying an infant or toddler, without committing impermissible “double counting” under the Sentencing Guidelines?

The Sixth Circuit answers “yes.” It holds that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) (victim under 12) and § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) (material portraying infant/toddler) punish conceptually distinct harms and therefore may both be applied in the same case without violating the doctrine of impermissible double counting.

Although the opinion is unpublished, it is a detailed application of the Sixth Circuit’s double‑counting jurisprudence and Sentencing Commission history. It consolidates prior circuit and Commission reasoning and will be persuasive authority for sentencing courts within the circuit and beyond.

A. Parties and Posture

• Plaintiff–Appellee: United States of America.
• Defendant–Appellant: Amy Lynn Cook.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, before Judges Nalbandian, Davis, and Hermandorfer.
• Author: Judge Davis.

Cook pleaded guilty to one count of production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The sole preserved appellate issue was whether applying both the “under‑twelve” enhancement and the “infant‑or‑toddler” enhancement amounted to impermissible double counting. The panel affirms the district court’s sentence.

B. Factual Background (Condensed)

Law enforcement, following several cyber‑tips in December 2023, discovered that Cook had uploaded child pornography online. Search warrants for various electronic service providers revealed:

• A video and images of Cook sexually abusing a 9‑month‑old infant she was babysitting, including:
  • Cook touching the child’s genitalia; and
  • Photographs of the child on Cook’s lap touching Cook’s exposed breasts.
• Additional images and videos on Cook’s cell phone involving children aged approximately five to sixteen years.
• Online conversations documenting payments for child‑pornography images, including one transaction where Cook sent 30 images for $60.

Cook admitted she sold sexually explicit content online, including “really young” minors she estimated at ages 10 to 12. The 9‑month‑old victim lived in a neighboring apartment and was in Cook’s care as a babysitter when the abuse occurred.

C. Procedural Background and Sentencing

A federal grand jury indicted Cook on:

• One count of production of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a));
• Three counts of distribution of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2));
• One count of possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)).

Cook entered a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to the production count only. She:

• Waived most appellate rights, but
• Expressly reserved the right to challenge, at sentencing and on appeal, the simultaneous application of:
  • U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) – four‑level increase where the offense involved a minor under 12 (“age enhancement”); and
  • U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) – four‑level increase where the offense involved material portraying an infant or toddler (“infant‑or‑toddler enhancement”).

The Presentence Report (PSR) recommended both enhancements, along with others, and a three‑level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. This produced:

• Total offense level: 43 (the highest on the Guidelines Sentencing Table);
• Criminal history category: I;
• Guidelines range: life imprisonment, capped by the 30‑year statutory maximum for the count of conviction, so effectively 360 months.

The district court overruled Cook’s double‑counting objection, accepted the Guidelines calculation, but varied substantially downward to a 276‑month sentence plus a life term of supervised release. Cook appealed the Guidelines calculation as procedurally unreasonable on the double‑counting ground.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirms the sentence. Applying its two‑step double‑counting framework, the court holds:

1. No double counting occurred. The enhancements under § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) and § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) punish different aspects of the offense:
   • The “under‑twelve” enhancement addresses the general vulnerability of minors under 12.
   • The “infant‑or‑toddler” enhancement addresses the extreme and particular vulnerability associated with infants and toddlers—their size, strength, inability to communicate or walk, and absolute defenselessness.
2. Because there was no double counting in the first place, the court does not reach the second step (whether any double counting would be permissible).

The panel’s reasoning is grounded in:

• Sixth Circuit precedent on double counting and “conceptually distinct harms”;
• An earlier unpublished Sixth Circuit order (United States v. Manigault) addressing the same two Guidelines provisions;
• Persuasive authority from the Ninth and Fifth Circuits (Wright, Jenkins);
• The Sentencing Commission’s 2016 Amendment 801 and the structure of § 2G2.1; and
• The Commission’s commentary that offenses involving sexual abuse of infants/toddlers with penetration or pain are generally sadistic.

The key doctrinal move is to treat “under 12” and “infant or toddler” as targeting non‑identical, layered vulnerabilities, rather than as two ways of counting the same age‑based harm.

III. Analysis

A. Standards of Review and the Nature of the Claim

The court situates Cook’s argument within the broader framework of sentencing review:

• A sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. (United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504, 529 (6th Cir. 2022)).
• Procedural reasonableness requires, among other things, a correct Guidelines calculation. (United States v. Presley, 547 F.3d 625, 629–30 (6th Cir. 2008)).
• A challenge to the simultaneous application of Guidelines enhancements is therefore a procedural challenge.
• Overall procedural reasonableness is reviewed for abuse of discretion (United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463, 469, 473 (6th Cir. 2022)), but the interpretation and application of the Guidelines is reviewed de novo, and factual findings for clear error (United States v. Clark, 11 F.4th 491, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2021)).

Here, there is no dispute about the facts (the victim’s age is 9 months). The only question is the legal interaction of two Guidelines provisions. That makes it a pure de novo interpretive issue.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. The Sixth Circuit’s Double‑Counting Framework

The court relies on and synthesizes several Sixth Circuit precedents defining “impermissible double counting” and the test for identifying it:

• United States v. Duke, 870 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2017).
  Duke defines impermissible double counting as occurring when “precisely the same aspect of a defendant’s conduct factors into [her] sentence in two separate ways.” The Cook panel quotes and adopts this formulation.
• United States v. Fleischer, 971 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2020).
  Fleischer emphasizes that not all double counting is impermissible; the mere fact that the same conduct is relevant to more than one enhancement does not automatically invalidate the Guidelines application. There must be improper duplication of the same harm.
• United States v. Hensley, 110 F.4th 900 (6th Cir. 2024).
  Hensley refines the inquiry into whether two provisions address “precisely the same aspect of the conduct.” This is quoted in Cook: if they do not, there is no double counting.
• United States v. Eversole, 487 F.3d 1024 (6th Cir. 2007).
  Eversole supplies a key analytic tool used in Cook: if “separate enhancements penalize distinct aspects of the defendant’s conduct” to punish “conceptually distinct kinds of harm,” there is no double counting at all. Cook’s holding explicitly relies on this “conceptually distinct harms” notion.

Together, these cases establish a two‑step Sixth Circuit approach:

1. Did double counting occur—that is, do both provisions punish the very same aspect of the conduct?
2. If so, is that double counting nonetheless permissible under the Guidelines?

In Cook, the court resolves the case at step one: it finds that § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) and § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) target different harms, so there is no double counting at all.

2. Prior Sixth Circuit Treatment of § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) and § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B)

The panel discusses and aligns with an earlier, unpublished Sixth Circuit order that addressed the same pairing:

• United States v. Manigault, No. 21‑5114, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 21245 (6th Cir. July 16, 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished).
  In Manigault, the defendant—convicted of production and receipt of child pornography—challenged the simultaneous application of the under‑twelve enhancement and the infant‑or‑toddler enhancement, arguing that they duplicated each other. The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, concluding that the sentence was enhanced both because the victim was under 12 and because the victim was a toddler, and that these were distinct considerations.
  
  Manigault articulated two important ideas later echoed in Cook:
  • All toddlers are “necessarily” under 12, but not all under‑12 children are toddlers. That subset status matters.
  • Toddlers (and by analogy infants) have distinct characteristics—“size, strength, communication ability, and ambulatory skills”—that create vulnerabilities above and beyond those of older children under 12.
  Cook cites this reasoning favorably and explicitly agrees with it.
• United States v. Sanderson, No. 21‑5900, 2022 WL 1133114 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2022) (unpublished).
  Sanderson is briefly cited as an example of a case where both § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) and § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) were applied without challenge by the defendants. Although Sanderson does not analyze double counting, the Cook panel notes its existence to show that using both enhancements together has already occurred in Sixth Circuit practice.

Because both Manigault and Cook are “not recommended for publication,” they do not create binding circuit precedent. But Cook’s reasoning reinforces the substantive logic of Manigault and will have persuasive weight within the circuit.

3. Sister Circuit Precedent: Age Enhancements and Vulnerability

Cook draws heavily from the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ treatment of overlapping age‑based and vulnerability‑based enhancements:

• United States v. Wright, 373 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2004).
  In Wright, the defendants argued that the vulnerable‑victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 could not be applied “on account of the victims’ infancy” when they had already received the four‑level increase for a victim under 12 in § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument:
  • It held that the “victim‑under‑12 adjustment” does not fully incorporate the victims’ vulnerability.
  • The under‑twelve enhancement does not account for the “especially vulnerable stages of childhood.”
  • Therefore, “considering infancy or the toddler stage as an additional vulnerability” does not double‑count age.
  • It emphasized that traits such as extreme youth, small physical size, inability to communicate, and inability to walk “can exist independently of age,” and are “not the same thing as merely not having ‘attained the age of twelve years.’”
  Cook quotes and adopts this reasoning almost verbatim.
• United States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2013).
  The Fifth Circuit, relying on Wright, held that both the age enhancement and the vulnerable‑victim enhancement could be applied together. Cook cites Jenkins as part of a consensus view that basic age adjustments do not fully subsume heightened vulnerability associated with infancy or toddlerhood.
• United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2014).
  Dowell is acknowledged as the contrary position. The Fourth Circuit had held that the child‑pornography Guidelines already fully accounted for age‑related considerations, and thus an additional vulnerable‑victim enhancement could not be applied.
  
  Cook does not adopt Dowell; rather, it implicitly sides with Wright and Jenkins. It also notes that the Sentencing Commission later intervened (via Amendment 801) in a way that aligns much more with the Wright/Jenkins view than with Dowell.

4. The Sentencing Commission and Amendment 801

The most significant non‑case authority in Cook is the Sentencing Commission’s 2016 Amendment 801 to § 2G2.1, which the panel carefully discusses:

• Before 2016, § 2G2.1(b)(4) contained only the enhancement for “material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.”
• There was a circuit conflict over whether a defendant who received the age enhancement in § 2G2.1(b)(1) could also receive the vulnerable‑victim adjustment in § 3A1.1 when the victim was “extremely young and vulnerable, such as an infant or toddler.”
• To resolve this, Amendment 801:
  • Renumbered the sadistic/masochistic provision as § 2G2.1(b)(4)(A);
  • Added a new infant‑or‑toddler enhancement in § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) for material portraying infants or toddlers; and
  • Added an application note (now comment note 4 to § 2G2.1) stating that the vulnerable‑victim adjustment (§ 3A1.1) should not be used if § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) applies.

This amendment is crucial to the Cook panel’s logic:

• By carving out a separate enhancement specifically for infants/toddlers, the Commission recognized a category of harm not fully addressed by the existing age grid in § 2G2.1(b)(1).
• By prohibiting stacking § 3A1.1 with § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B), the Commission confirmed that § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) itself absorbs the special vulnerability concerns that § 3A1.1 would otherwise capture in infant/toddler cases.
• This, in turn, shows that § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) was created to cover increased vulnerability that the child‑pornography Guidelines had not previously addressed.

Cook leverages Amendment 801 in two ways:

1. To distinguish general age‑based vulnerability (§ 2G2.1(b)(1)) from extreme infant/toddler vulnerability (§ 2G2.1(b)(4)(B)); and
2. To argue that if § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) were read as merely duplicative of § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A), it would be superfluous—a result contrary to interpretive norms and to the Commission’s evident purpose.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Nature of the Two Enhancements

The panel begins by carefully characterizing the scope of each enhancement:

• § 2G2.1(b)(1) – Age enhancement
  
  • § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A): four‑level increase if the offense involved a minor who “had not attained the age of twelve years.”
  • § 2G2.1(b)(1)(B): two‑level increase if the offense involved a minor at least 12 but under 16.
  The panel emphasizes that this subsection is purely age‑specific. All that matters is the victim’s age bracket; the provision does not differentiate within the under‑12 population.
• § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) – Infant‑or‑toddler enhancement
  
  • Four‑level increase when the offense involved “material that portrays infants or toddlers.”
  This enhancement is not located in the “age” subsection; it appears alongside the sadistic‑or‑masochistic conduct provision in § 2G2.1(b)(4), signaling that it is tied at least partly to the heinousness of the conduct, not just chronological age.

2. Conceptually Distinct Harms

Applying the Eversole framework, the court asks whether these two provisions punish “conceptually distinct kinds of harm” or the same aspect of the offense.

The answer, for the court, is clear:

• The age‑twelve enhancement addresses the general vulnerability of prepubescent children—minors who, by virtue of being under 12, are less capable of resisting, less mature, and more easily harmed.
• The infant‑or‑toddler enhancement addresses the extreme vulnerability and absolute defenselessness of infants and toddlers:
  • Unlike older preteens, infants and toddlers may be unable to walk, talk, or meaningfully communicate what is happening.
  • Their physical size and strength render them wholly incapable of resistance.
  • They depend entirely on caregivers (often, as here, the abuser) for protection and survival.

Therefore, the enhancements respond to different layers of harm:

The age‑twelve enhancement targets the general vulnerability of minors under that age. The infant‑or‑toddler enhancement, on the other hand, targets vulnerabilities distinct to infants and toddlers. In doing so, it addresses the absolute defenselessness of this separate group of victims.

Because each enhancement addresses a distinct aggravating feature of the offense—(1) child is very young; and (2) child is at the most defenseless stage of life—there is no improper overlap.

3. Avoiding Superfluity and Reading the Guideline as a Whole

The court underscores a structural and purposive point: if § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) were read to displace or substitute for § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) in infant/toddler cases, it would effectively have no independent impact:

• All infants and toddlers are necessarily under 12.
• If, whenever (b)(4)(B) applies, (b)(1)(A) must drop out to avoid “double counting,” then in practice:
  • There would be no net additional penalty for targeting infants/toddlers compared to other under‑12 victims.
  • § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) would become redundant with respect to age.

The court views this as contrary to the Commission’s manifest purpose in 2016: to make offenses involving infants/toddlers punishable more harshly than offenses involving older children, precisely because they are “even more serious” (in the district court’s phrase, which the panel effectively endorses).

Further, the placement of § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) next to the sadistic/masochistic enhancement—not near the age enhancement—signals that the Commission is emphasizing the depravity and extremity of offenses involving very young children. That structural context supports reading (b)(4)(B) as serving a distinct purpose.

4. The Role of the Commission’s Commentary

The Commission’s commentary and background to Amendment 801 bolster the panel’s conclusion:

• The Commission noted “near‑universal circuit agreement” that depictions of sexual abuse of infants/toddlers involving penetration or pain “portray sadistic conduct.”
• By placing the infant‑or‑toddler language in § 2G2.1(b)(4) with the sadistic/masochistic prong and by barring the vulnerable‑victim enhancement in such cases, the Commission:
  • Confirmed that the increased vulnerability of infants/toddlers was not yet fully addressed by the Guidelines and needed a specific provision.
  • Intended (b)(4)(B) to occupy the field of age‑related extreme vulnerability in this subset of cases, replacing the need to resort to § 3A1.1.

Cook reads this history as strong evidence that (b)(4)(B) is meant to work in addition to (b)(1)(A), not as a functional substitute. This is precisely the kind of context courts use to determine whether multiple enhancements are targeting the same aspect of conduct.

5. Disposition of the Double‑Counting Argument

Applying its two‑step framework, the Sixth Circuit concludes:

1. No double counting occurred. Because the enhancements punish conceptually distinct harms (general pre‑teen vulnerability vs. especially extreme infant/toddler vulnerability), the same “aspect” of the conduct is not being counted twice.
2. No need to reach permissibility. Once the court finds no double counting at all, it does not need to consider the second step—whether double counting, if present, would be permissible. The panel cites United States v. Pagan, No. 24‑4102, 2025 WL 2939513, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2025), for the proposition that courts can stop the analysis once they determine that the first question is answered in the negative.

The result is that the district court properly applied both § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) and § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B), and there was no procedural error in the Guidelines calculation. The sentence is therefore affirmed.

D. Impact and Implications

1. Practical Effect on Sentencing Within the Sixth Circuit

Although Cook is unpublished, its reasoning is likely to guide district courts in the Sixth Circuit:

• In cases involving production of child pornography where the victim is an infant or toddler, probation officers and sentencing judges can confidently apply both:
  • The four‑level under‑12 enhancement; and
  • The four‑level infant‑or‑toddler enhancement.
• This stacking of enhancements is harsh in practice:
  • Each four‑level increase significantly increases the advisory Guidelines range.
  • When combined with other enhancements common in child‑pornography production cases (e.g., for distribution, sadistic conduct, use of a computer, number of images), the total offense level often reaches the top of the Guidelines table (level 43), as in Cook’s case.

Even if courts continue to vary downward from these high ranges—particularly in light of critiques that child‑pornography Guidelines are overly severe—Cook confirms that the starting point will typically reflect the combined effect of multiple overlapping enhancements in infant/toddler cases.

2. Clarification of the Double‑Counting Doctrine

Doctrinally, Cook reinforces several points about double counting:

• The focus is on whether two enhancements address the same aspect or harm, not merely whether they are triggered by overlapping facts (here, the victim’s age).
• Age can matter in different ways:
  • Broad chronological categories (e.g., under 12); and
  • Specific developmental stages (e.g., infancy, toddlerhood) that carry unique vulnerabilities beyond age alone.
• Courts will look to:
  • The text of the Guidelines;
  • The structure and placement of enhancements;
  • The Commission’s commentary and amendment history; and
  • Prior circuit interpretations to determine whether enhancements are conceptually distinct.

The opinion therefore contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how to analyze overlapping enhancements: the presence of factual overlap (the victim’s age) is not enough; there must be functional, conceptual overlap in the nature of the harm.

3. Relationship to Broader Debates on Child‑Pornography Guidelines

Federal courts have long criticized the child‑pornography Guidelines as harsh, highly additive, and insufficiently empirical. Cook does not question that broader framework; instead, it accepts the Commission’s policy choice to treat infant/toddler cases as especially egregious.

At the same time, the district court’s substantial downward variance (from 360 months to 276 months) illustrates an important tension:

• The Guidelines in infant/toddler exploitation cases routinely generate maximum offense levels and statutory caps.
• District judges often employ their discretion to impose somewhat lower sentences, yet still very lengthy ones.

Cook thus reinforces the idea that:

• The Guidelines provide a high baseline for infant/toddler exploitation; but
• Judges retain discretion—via § 3553(a)—to adjust based on individualized circumstances.

4. Guidance on the Use of the Vulnerable‑Victim Enhancement

By leaning on Amendment 801, Cook offers implicit guidance about the use of the vulnerable‑victim enhancement (§ 3A1.1) in child‑pornography cases involving very young victims:

• If § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) applies (infant/toddler material), § 3A1.1 should not be applied on the same infant/toddler vulnerability basis, per the application note.
• But the age‑twelve enhancement can still be applied with (b)(4)(B), because they address different levels of vulnerability and different aspects of harm.

This is a concrete example of how the Commission can reallocate certain aggravating factors from a generic Chapter 3 adjustment (vulnerable victim) into a more specific Chapter 2 offense‑specific enhancement, and how courts are expected to adjust their double‑counting analysis accordingly.

5. Persuasive Value Beyond the Sixth Circuit

Nationally, Cook will be persuasive in ongoing debates about overlapping enhancements in sexual‑offense Guidelines. It:

• Reinforces the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ view that infant/toddler extreme vulnerability can be layered on top of general age‑based vulnerability without double counting.
• Aligns with the Sentencing Commission’s post‑Amendment‑801 design, making it more difficult for courts to follow Dowell’s restrictive approach to age‑plus‑vulnerability enhancements in similar contexts.

Other circuits examining similar questions—whether under § 2G2.1 or in analogous contexts (e.g., physical abuse of infants)—may cite Cook’s structured reliance on conceptual distinctness and Commission history.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. The Sentencing Guidelines and “Offense Levels”

The United States Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rules that help federal judges determine recommended sentencing ranges. In brief:

• Each offense starts with a base offense level.
• Various enhancements (or reductions) add or subtract levels based on specific factors:
  • Victim’s age;
  • Use of a computer;
  • Number of images;
  • Acceptance of responsibility, etc.
• The final total offense level, combined with the defendant’s criminal history category, yields an advisory imprisonment range in months.

In Cook’s case:

• Multiple enhancements produced a total offense level of 43.
• Offense level 43 equates to life on the Guidelines Sentencing Table.
• Because the statutory maximum for her offense is 30 years, her effective range was capped at 360 months.

2. Double Counting Under the Guidelines

“Double counting” refers to penalizing the same aspect of the defendant’s conduct more than once through multiple enhancements. It becomes impermissible when:

• Two enhancements address the exact same feature of the offense; and
• The Guidelines or case law indicate that this overlap is not intended or allowed.

However, it is not

• To increase a sentence based on related but distinct aspects of the offense (e.g., one enhancement for the amount of loss, another for sophisticated means in a fraud case).
• To apply enhancements that are triggered by overlapping facts, if they target different harms or purposes.

In Cook, the key was distinguishing:

• “Under 12” – a broad age category; from
• “Infant or toddler” – a specific developmental stage marked by particular vulnerabilities and absolute dependence.

3. Under‑Twelve Enhancement vs. Infant‑or‑Toddler Enhancement

Under‑twelve enhancement – § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A):

• Applies if the victim is any age under 12 (from birth up to just before the 12th birthday).
• Reflects that younger victims, as a class, are more vulnerable and exploitation of them is more serious.

Infant‑or‑toddler enhancement – § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B):

• Applies if the material portrays an infant or toddler.
• Targets a narrower subgroup of under‑12 victims at the most defenseless stages of childhood.
• Captures features not shared by all under‑12 victims, such as inability to walk, talk, resist, or meaningfully report the abuse.

Both enhancements increase the offense level by four, but for different reasons.

4. The Vulnerable‑Victim Enhancement (§ 3A1.1) and Amendment 801

The vulnerable‑victim enhancement (§ 3A1.1) generally adds levels if the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was unusually vulnerable (e.g., due to age, physical or mental condition).

Before Amendment 801, courts disagreed on whether a defendant could:

• Receive an age enhancement under § 2G2.1 (e.g., under 12); and
• Also receive the vulnerable‑victim enhancement under § 3A1.1, based on the victim’s infancy or toddler status.

In 2016, Amendment 801:

• Introduced the infant‑or‑toddler specific enhancement in § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B); and
• Directed that § 3A1.1 not be applied when § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) applies, in order to avoid double counting the same vulnerability.

That is why, in Cook, the court allows stacking § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) (age) and § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) (infant/toddler vulnerability), but would not allow stacking § 3A1.1 on top of § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) on the same vulnerability basis.

5. Published vs. Unpublished (Not Recommended for Publication)

In the federal courts of appeals, many opinions are designated as:

• Published (precedential): Binding on later panels of that circuit (subject to en banc or Supreme Court review).
• Unpublished / Not Recommended for Publication: Generally not binding precedent but can be cited as persuasive authority under local rules.

Cook, like Manigault, is “not recommended for publication.” That means:

• District courts are not formally bound to follow it; but
• Its reasoning will likely be given considerable weight, especially given its careful engagement with Commission materials and prior circuit precedent.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Amy Lynn Cook is a significant, if unpublished, clarification of how the Sixth Circuit views the interaction between the under‑twelve enhancement and the infant‑or‑toddler enhancement in child‑pornography production cases.

The central holding is that applying both U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) and § 2G2.1(b)(4)(B) does not constitute impermissible double counting because:

• The under‑twelve enhancement captures the general vulnerability of preteen victims; and
• The infant‑or‑toddler enhancement captures the extraordinary vulnerability and absolute defenselessness of the very youngest victims, reflecting a separate and heightened tier of harm and depravity.

The court’s analysis is rooted in:

• Its own double‑counting jurisprudence emphasizing conceptually distinct harms;
• Prior Sixth Circuit and sister‑circuit decisions on age and vulnerability;
• The Sentencing Commission’s explicit resolution of the age/vulnerability overlap in Amendment 801; and
• Structural cues within § 2G2.1 itself.

In practical terms, Cook confirms that, in the Sixth Circuit, defendants who sexually exploit infants or toddlers for production of child pornography will face cumulative enhancements reflecting both their victims’ youth and their victims’ uniquely powerless condition. The opinion thus reinforces the Guidelines’ design to mark such offenses as among the most egregious within the already severe category of child‑exploitation crimes.