“A Special Class that Should Be Treated Differently”: The Connecticut Supreme Court Re-aligns Equal-Protection Doctrine for Insanity Acquittees – State v. Foster, 353 Conn. 1 (2025)

1. Introduction

State v. Foster is the Connecticut Supreme Court’s most far-reaching insanity-acquittee decision since State v. Dyous (2012). Delivered on 19 August 2025, the Court:

• Rejected a federal equal-protection challenge to General Statutes §17a-593 (c) by holding that insanity acquittees who have reached the end of their initial term remain not “similarly situated” to civilly committed inmates.
• Clarified that public-safety primacy in §17a-593 (g) is constitutionally sound even after an acquittee’s maximum-term expiration (State v. Metz had left this open).
• Upheld the trial court’s extension of Franklin Foster’s commitment based on clear-and-convincing evidence of continuing dangerousness.

The ruling cements a distinct constitutional lane for Connecticut’s insanity acquittees, influencing recommitment practice, defense strategy, and likely legislative reform.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Facts. Foster, diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and borderline intellectual functioning, was acquitted by reason of insanity in 2003 for violent offences against schoolchildren. His ten-year commitment to the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) was repeatedly extended. In 2018 he obtained conditional release into the community. One year later the State petitioned for continued commitment under §17a-593 (c).

Trial & Appellate History. The Superior Court denied Foster’s motion to dismiss (equal-protection claim) and extended commitment two years; the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certification on (i) equal protection; (ii) sufficiency of the dangerousness finding; and (iii) which level of scrutiny would apply if equal protection was implicated.

Holdings.

1. Equal-Protection Threshold. Insanity acquittees whose initial term has expired are not similarly situated to civilly committed inmates because an acquittee’s commitment is tethered to a prior criminal act legally linked to mental illness, whereas a prison inmate’s later civil commitment is not.
2. Burden of Proof Unaffected. Metz remains intact (state must prove mental illness & dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence), but similarity in burden does not create similarity in constitutional status.
3. Dangerousness Finding. The trial court’s reliance on index-offence violence, episodic non-compliance, and expert concerns about decompensation—despite Foster’s community progress—was not clearly erroneous.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) – Supreme Court dictum that insanity acquittees are a “special class” anchors Foster’s dis-similarity analysis.
• State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400 (1994) – Created the post-max-term clear-and-convincing burden. Foster distinguishes, observing Metz was statutory-construction; not equal-protection.
• State v. Dyous, 307 Conn. 299 (2012) – Assumed similarity without deciding; Foster resolves the assumption.
• State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508 (2004) – Used rational-basis review; Foster narrows by eliminating threshold similarity.
• Federal & sister-state cases: Glatz v. Kort (10th Cir. 1986); Ernst J. v. Stone (2d Cir. 2006) – also held no similarity; gave persuasive support.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Threshold inquiry. Equal-protection review begins by identifying comparators. “Apples to apples” means factual—not merely statutory—equivalence.
2. Key distinctions.
   • Acquittee’s mental illness is proved to have caused a crime; civil committee’s is not.
   • Acquittee’s presumption of dangerousness may ebb post-term (Metz), but criminal-act linkage persists.
   • Policy mandates differ: PSRB statutes elevate public safety; civil system prioritises liberty/least-restrictive care.
3. Therefore, no similarity → no scrutiny tier. Without a comparison class, the equal-protection claim ends. (Had there been similarity, Court hinted rational-basis would apply, consistent with Long.)
4. Dangerousness analysis.
   • Clear & convincing standard met through multi-factor review: violent index offences; history of impulsive, gender-directed misconduct; expert reservations; conditional-release supports.
   • Court stresses predictive, societal nature of “dangerousness”; imminence ≠ immediacy.
   • One-year community success deemed too short to override decades of monitored risk.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Litigation Strategy. Defense counsel can no longer rely on the “similarly situated” premise to trigger intermediate scrutiny; future equal-protection challenges will be foreclosed unless a new comparator is advanced.
• Legislative Landscape. Decision validates 2022 amendment adding acquittee well-being as secondary concern. Legislators may now revisit conditional-release durations, community-based supports, or redefine maximum commitment ceilings.
• Clinical / PSRB Practice. Emphasises documentation of how external supports contribute to stability; clinicians must anticipate trial courts’ focus on what happens if supports vanish.
• Precedential Weight. First Connecticut case to decide (not assume) dis-similarity; persuasive for other jurisdictions interpreting similar recommitment schemes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Insanity Acquittee. A defendant found “not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.” They are committed for treatment, not punishment.
• Civilly Committed Inmate. A prisoner who, while incarcerated, develops a psychiatric disability serious enough for civil commitment separate from the crime.
• Similarly Situated. Legal test asking whether two groups are so alike in relevant facts that treating them differently would trigger equal-protection scrutiny.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence. Mid-level proof—more than “preponderance” but less than “beyond reasonable doubt.”
• Conditional Release. Statutory mechanism allowing an acquittee to live in the community under strict treatment/supervision conditions while remaining under PSRB jurisdiction.
• Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB). Connecticut’s multi-disciplinary body supervising insanity acquittees, with authority over confinement, conditional release, and reporting to courts.
• Dangerousness. A predictive legal judgment of risk of imminent physical injury to self or others; “imminent” means realistic and significant, not necessarily immediate.

5. Conclusion

State v. Foster definitively answers a long-lingering constitutional question: even after their maximum term expires, insanity acquittees are constitutionally distinct from civilly committed inmates. The decision tightens the equal-protection framework, reinforces public-safety primacy in recommitment hearings, and signals rigorous judicial scrutiny of discharge readiness where community stability rests heavily on mandated supports. For courts, clinicians, lawyers, and policymakers, Foster recalibrates the balance between liberty and security in Connecticut’s forensic mental-health system.