Discretionary Revocation of Visa Petitions Immune from Judicial Review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Fourth Circuit’s decision in MD Islam v. Director of USCIS, No. 24-1086 (4th Cir. June 2, 2025). The plaintiff, MD Shiful Islam (“MD”), a Bangladeshi citizen, challenged the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services’ (“USCIS”) revocation of his approved I-140 immigrant petition—filed by his employer, Island Subway—without providing MD direct notice or an opportunity to respond. MD’s consequent denial of his I-485 adjustment of status application prompted him to seek injunctive relief in federal district court, asserting statutory and procedural due process claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that discretionary revocation decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 are shielded from judicial review—even when procedural or constitutional due process claims are asserted.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit’s unanimous unpublished opinion, authored by Judge Gregory, confirms two core holdings:

1. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1155, the Secretary of Homeland Security has plenary, discretionary authority to revoke approved visa petitions at any time for “good and sufficient cause.”
2. The jurisdiction-stripping mandate of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars federal courts from reviewing “any decision or action” committed to the Secretary’s discretion, including procedural due process challenges to revocations of I-140 petitions.

Because MD’s claims—both statutory and constitutional—targeted USCIS’s discretionary revocation action, the court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Fourth Circuit relied on a line of binding and persuasive authorities:

• Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6 (2024): The Supreme Court held that § 1155’s revocation provision is a “quintessential grant of discretion” to the Secretary and thus falls within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s bar on judicial review.
• Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, 955 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2020): This court previously affirmed that § 1155 confers discretionary revocation authority and that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes review of both statutory and constitutional challenges to visa revocations.
• Lee v. USCIS, 592 F.3d 612 (4th Cir. 2010): The court explained that constitutional and legal issues related to adjustment of status must be raised in removal proceedings; absent such proceedings, no judicial review is available.
• Roland v. USCIS, 850 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2017): This decision reaffirmed that procedural and constitutional challenges to USCIS determinations are subject to the INA’s channeling provisions.

These authorities establish that even constitutional due process claims are subsumed by the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping language if they challenge a discretionary revocation decision under § 1155.

Legal Reasoning

The court began with the text and structure of the INA:

• Section 1155 grants the Secretary unfettered discretion to revoke petition approvals “for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.”
• Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review … any decision or action of … the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified … to be in the discretion of” that official.

Reading § 1155 and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) together, the court concluded Congress plainly intended to foreclose judicial oversight of revocation decisions. The Fourth Circuit applied the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review” but held it overcome by clear congressional intent to preclude review of discretionary actions. The court also reinforced that the procedural-due-process challenge is a “constitutional right,” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2024), yet still barred under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), per Polfliet’s express holding that procedural claims are encompassed by the jurisdictional bar.

Impact

This decision has several important consequences:

• It cements the understanding that discretionary revocation of I-140 petitions is beyond federal-court scrutiny, even where beneficiaries assert due process violations.
• It underscores the limits on procedural challenges to agency action: if an action is discretionary by statute, procedural-due-process claims cannot circumvent jurisdictional bars.
• Practitioners must focus on removal-proceeding venues for systemic challenges to USCIS procedures or seek legislative change, since agency self-regulation and internal appeals will govern challenge mechanisms.
• Immigration beneficiaries should ensure their employers (petitioners) receive timely notices, as agency regulations require notice to petitioners—and the beneficiary’s remedy depends on the petitioner’s ability to appeal internally or administratively.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Jurisdiction-stripping: A statute may limit or “strip” courts of authority to hear certain challenges. Here, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over any “decision or action” by USCIS that is “in the discretion” of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

I-140 Immigrant Petition: Employers file Form I-140 to sponsor foreign workers for lawful permanent residence. Approval of an I-140 is a prerequisite for an individual’s I-485 adjustment of status application.

Notice of Intent to Revoke (NOIR): Under 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b), USCIS must issue a NOIR to the petitioner when it intends to revoke a visa petition. The petitioner may respond before a final revocation, but beneficiaries do not directly receive those notices under current regulations.

Procedural Due Process: The constitutional guarantee that the government must follow fair procedures before depriving someone of a protected interest (e.g., property, liberty). Even though it is a constitutional claim, it cannot be reviewed here because the underlying action is discretionary and jurisdiction is barred.

Conclusion

MD Islam v. Director of USCIS reaffirms that discretionary revocations of approved visa petitions under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 are unreviewable by federal courts under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), even when petition beneficiaries assert procedural due process claims. The decision consolidates Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, leaving beneficiaries with limited recourse outside petitioners’ internal appeals and mandating careful attention to petitioners’ receipt of USCIS notices. In the broader legal context, it underscores Congress’s clear intent to allocate immigration adjudications to the political branches and tightly circumscribe judicial intervention in discretionary visa determinations.