Discretionary Remand Denied After Post-Sentencing Vacatur Where the District Court Already Accounted for the Prior Conviction and Resentencing Would Be Futile

Case: United States v. Kevin Loren Daniels (No. 24-3260) | Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Decided: January 7, 2026

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a “Black Friday” armed robbery of a Columbus, Ohio T-Mobile store. The robber—wearing a black hoodie and blue mask—brandished a gun, forced two employees into a backroom, demanded phones and cash, and sprayed both victims with mace before fleeing. A GPS “bait phone” in the stolen inventory led police to the getaway vehicle; after a chase, officers arrested Kevin Loren Daniels and later recovered a loaded handgun, mace, stolen phones, cash, and clothing matching the robber’s.

A jury convicted Daniels of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)), and felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). The district court imposed 181 months (97 months on robbery/felon-in-possession plus the mandatory-minimum 7 years on § 924(c)).

Daniels raised multiple conviction and sentencing challenges. The Sixth Circuit rejected all and affirmed. Of special precedential interest is the court’s treatment of a later-vacated prior § 924(c) conviction: it held there was no legal error in counting the conviction for criminal history at the time of sentencing, and it declined a discretionary remand even though the conviction was vacated while the appeal was pending.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Miranda waiver: Daniels knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights despite cocaine use and refusal to sign a waiver form.
Right to counsel (substitution): No abuse of discretion in denying a last-minute request for new appointed counsel.
GPS/Google Maps testimony: Even assuming a Rule 16 issue, the district court acted within its remedial discretion by offering a continuance rather than suppression.
Hobbs Act commerce instruction: No plain error; Sixth Circuit authority supports that the government need not prove an “actual effect” on interstate commerce for business robberies, and any intra-circuit tension defeated “clear under current law” review.
Guidelines: Properly applied (i) physical-restraint enhancement for forcing victims at gunpoint into the backroom, and (ii) bodily-injury enhancement for harms from macing.
Criminal history—prior § 924(c): Not an error of law to count a prior conviction that had not yet been vacated; the court declined discretionary remand after the conviction was later vacated via coram nobis.
Criminal history—reckless operation: Any error was harmless because it did not change the criminal-history category.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Custodial interrogation and waiver doctrine

Miranda v. Arizona established the requirement of warnings and waiver before custodial interrogation; the panel treats the case as “rules of the road.”
Moran v. Burbine supplied the two-dimensional framework: waiver must be both voluntary and knowing.
Maryland v. Shatzer reaffirmed waiver’s necessity and the operational mechanics of Miranda protections.
Vega v. Tekoh was cited for the exclusionary consequence in criminal trials when Miranda rules are violated.
Colorado v. Spring and the Sixth Circuit’s Garner v. Mitchell (en banc) constrained what “knowing” means: understanding basic rights and that statements can be used against the suspect, not “every possible consequence.”
Berghuis v. Thompkins governed implied waiver and confirmed that refusal to sign a waiver form does not preclude a valid waiver.
Fare v. Michael C. and Arizona v. Fulminante drove the “totality of the circumstances” analysis.
Sixth Circuit applications to intoxication—including United States v. Montgomery, United States v. Washington (2022 WL 1224553), United States v. Hayek, United States v. Davis (683 F. App’x 480), United States v. Hampton, and United States v. Dunn—supplied the “alert, coherent, and lucid” benchmark.

B. Substitution of appointed counsel

Gideon v. Wainwright established the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants.
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez distinguished the broader autonomy interest in retained counsel from the limits on choice for appointed counsel.
Sixth Circuit standards from United States v. Iles, United States v. Vasquez, United States v. Jennings, United States v. Wells, United States v. Trevino, United States v. Marrero, and United States v. Mack shaped the “good cause” and four-factor inquiry (timing, investigation, severity of conflict, public interest).
Martel v. Clair provided the “interests of justice” lens for substitution decisions (mirrored by 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c)).

C. Discovery remedies under Rule 16

United States v. Maples was central: suppression is “undesirable,” typically reserved for bad faith or incurable prejudice; continuance or other tailored remedies are favored.
Procedural preservation and standards of review were framed by United States v. Holt and United States v. Lester (forfeiture/specificity), with general discovery discretion noted via United States v. Sanders (en banc) and United States v. Jordan.

D. Hobbs Act commerce element and plain-error review

Taylor v. United States and Gonzales v. Raich anchored the broad Commerce Clause aggregation principle; this supported the Sixth Circuit’s recurring “de minimis connection” approach.
Sixth Circuit Hobbs Act authorities—United States v. Watkins, United States v. Peete, United States v. Wang, United States v. Vichitvongsa, and United States v. DiCarlantonio—supplied competing phrasing (“actual effect” vs. “realistic probability”), and the panel leveraged that tension to reject “plain” error.
Plain-error framing relied on United States v. Olano, as applied through Sixth Circuit cases including United States v. Howard and United States v. Robinson.
Constructive amendment principles were tied to United States v. Davis (970 F.3d 650).

E. Sentencing guidelines enhancements

Physical restraint: United States v. Coleman controlled (gunpoint movement qualifies), reinforced by United States v. Howell, United States v. Montgomery (748 F. App’x 668), United States v. Perry, United States v. Smith-Hodges, and United States v. Hill. Daniels’ contrary reliance on United States v. Ziesel was rejected as factually distinguishable.
The panel also highlighted an inter-circuit split via the Second Circuit’s United States v. Taylor (961 F.3d 68) and noted the Sentencing Commission’s 2025 amendment (requiring “physical contact or confinement”) but treated it as nonretroactive.
Bodily injury: Sixth Circuit examples included United States v. Muhammad, United States v. Person, United States v. Davenport, United States v. Jones, United States v. Austin, United States v. Jackson, United States v. Carroll, United States v. Faulkner, plus pepper-spray analogies in United States v. Melton and United States v. Mosley. Other circuits’ macing/pepper-spray decisions—United States v. Lancaster (4th Cir.), United States v. Harris (3d Cir.), United States v. Maiden and United States v. Robinson (7th Cir.), United States v. Alisic (9th Cir.), and United States v. King (10th Cir.)—were used to show the injury inquiry is fact-specific.

F. Criminal history, collateral attack limits, and discretionary remand

The “no collateral attacks at sentencing” rule was grounded in guideline commentary (U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.6) and Sixth Circuit precedent: United States v. Aguilar-Diaz, United States v. Lalonde, and United States v. Bonds.
The underlying invalidity of Daniels’ old § 924(c) predicate was contextualized through United States v. Davis (588 U.S. 445) and the Sixth Circuit’s Wallace v. United States.
Post-sentencing vacatur and remand discretion: the court discussed United States v. Farley and framed remand power under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 using United States v. Grant, United States v. Campbell, and United States v. Ralston, with additional cross-circuit support noted (e.g., United States v. Martinez, United States v. Claybron, United States v. Gonzalez-Valencia).
The concurrence/dissent emphasized efficiency rationales from United States v. Cox and cited United States v. Hoey and United States v. Martinez to support remand when a sentence rests on a now-invalidated conviction.
The panel’s “but-for charging” discussion referenced United States v. Richardson (aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery as § 924(c) predicate) and invoked Dean v. United States on how § 924(c) counts can influence sentencing on companion counts.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Miranda waiver despite cocaine use and refusal to sign

The court applied the Moran v. Burbine framework and found both voluntariness (no coercion or deception) and knowingness (clear advisement, acknowledgment of understanding, and conduct consistent with waiver). Intoxication was treated as a circumstance, not a categorical bar, following United States v. Montgomery and related cases: the key is whether the suspect remained coherent and lucid. The refusal to sign the form was neutralized by Berghuis v. Thompkins, which permits implied waiver by answering questions after warnings.

B. Substitution of counsel: “good cause” and timing dominate

Under United States v. Vasquez and the four-factor line of cases (including United States v. Wells and United States v. Trevino), the panel credited the lateness of the request (days before trial), the court’s inquiry (allowing Daniels to articulate concerns), the absence of a total communication breakdown preventing an adequate defense, and the public interest in avoiding delay—especially where Daniels had already received one substitution earlier.

C. Rule 16 and Google Maps: remedy choice over suppression

Without definitively deciding whether entering GPS coordinates into Google Maps is a “scientific test or experiment,” the court held the remedy was well within discretion. Leaning on United States v. Maples, it emphasized that suppression is disfavored absent bad faith or incurable prejudice, and that an offered continuance can cure surprise. The defense declined a continuance and cross-examined effectively, undercutting any claim of prejudice.

D. Hobbs Act “actual effect” instruction: plain-error defeat through intra-circuit tension

The panel treated the claim as forfeited and analyzed it through United States v. Olano and Sixth Circuit instructional plain-error formulations (including United States v. Robinson). It then relied on the Sixth Circuit’s repeated statements (e.g., United States v. Peete, United States v. Watkins, United States v. Wang) that business robberies need only a “de minimis connection” and a “realistic probability,” not proof of an “actual effect.” Although Daniels pointed to the pattern instruction commentary citing United States v. DiCarlantonio for an “actual effect” requirement, the panel found (i) later authority and Supreme Court aggregation logic in Taylor v. United States favored the “realistic probability” view, and (ii) in any event, the very inconsistency meant any error was not “clear under current law,” defeating plain-error relief.

E. Sentencing enhancements: forced movement at gunpoint and injury from mace

For physical restraint, the court applied the Sixth Circuit’s broad reading from United States v. Coleman: gunpoint compulsion moving victims from one location to another is enough. It distinguished United States v. Ziesel (unarmed, mere order to get down) and acknowledged—but did not adopt—the Second Circuit’s narrower rule from United States v. Taylor, noting the Sentencing Commission’s 2025 amendment but treating it as not yet retroactive.

For bodily injury, the court applied the guideline definition (painful and obvious or ordinarily prompting medical attention) and held that direct facial macing producing burning pain for hours and paramedic treatment satisfied the standard. The panel treated United States v. Lancaster as consistent because it turned on shorter, “momentary” effects; here, the effects persisted.

F. Criminal history and post-sentencing vacatur: legality vs. discretionary remand

Legality: The court held it was not legal error to assign three criminal-history points for a prior § 924(c) conviction that, at the time of sentencing, had not “been reversed or vacated” or “ruled constitutionally invalid in a prior case,” invoking U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.6 and Sixth Circuit “no collateral attack at sentencing” precedents (United States v. Aguilar-Diaz, United States v. Lalonde, United States v. Bonds). The later coram nobis vacatur did not retroactively convert a correct-at-the-time guideline calculation into legal error on direct review.

Discretionary remand (key development): Even while recognizing discretionary remand authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 and acknowledging United States v. Farley (remand after a conviction was overturned during appeal), the panel refused remand as a matter of discretion. It offered two central “futility/efficiency” rationales:

The district court had already treated the prior § 924(c) as effectively suspect by declining to impose the 25-year mandatory minimum and instead using the 7-year minimum—an 18-year reduction—while still counting it for criminal history as a partial compromise.
The court emphasized that the underlying prior robbery conduct was real and serious, and it suggested that alternative charging (aiding and abetting rather than conspiracy) could have produced a still-valid § 924(c) predicate under United States v. Richardson; it also noted how the old sentencing structure may have depressed the Hobbs Act sentence length in a way that would otherwise have generated similar criminal-history points, citing Dean v. United States.

The concurrence/dissent by Judge White agreed there was no legal error but would have remanded under § 2106 for the pragmatic reason articulated in United States v. Cox: resolving the consequences of a vacated conviction on direct appeal can conserve resources and avoid later postconviction litigation. The majority’s refusal thus marks an important boundary: discretionary remand is not automatic upon post-sentencing vacatur; it may be denied where the record shows resentencing would not change the result and the district court already accounted for the development.

3.3 Impact

A. Discretionary remand after vacatur is narrowed by “futility” considerations

The most consequential aspect is the majority’s refusal to remand despite a post-sentencing coram nobis vacatur of a prior conviction that affected the guideline range. While United States v. Farley suggested remand can be appropriate for efficiency, Daniels emphasizes that the Sixth Circuit may deny remand where:

the district court expressly anticipated the prior conviction’s instability and adjusted sentencing accordingly, and
the appellate court is convinced the district court would impose the same sentence upon resentencing.

Practically, defendants seeking a discretionary remand in similar circumstances should expect heightened focus on record indications of whether the sentencing judge would change course. Prosecutors, conversely, can use Daniels to argue that remand is unwarranted when the sentencing rationale is robustly independent of the disputed criminal-history increment.

B. Hobbs Act instruction disputes remain difficult on plain-error review

By spotlighting tension between United States v. DiCarlantonio and later “realistic probability” decisions (e.g., United States v. Watkins), the opinion signals that Hobbs Act commerce-element challenges are unlikely to succeed without a preserved objection. The panel effectively uses intra-circuit inconsistency as a shield against “plainness.”

C. Sentencing enhancements reaffirm broad Sixth Circuit approaches (for now)

The opinion reinforces the circuit’s broad “physical restraint” rule under United States v. Coleman (movement at gunpoint), while acknowledging the Sentencing Commission’s 2025 amendment that moves toward a narrower “contact or confinement” standard. Until retroactivity is resolved, Daniels preserves higher exposure for robbery defendants sentenced under earlier manuals.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Miranda waiver (knowing vs. voluntary): “Voluntary” asks whether police coerced or tricked the suspect. “Knowing” asks whether the suspect understood basic rights (silence, counsel, stopping questioning) and that statements can be used in court. Intoxication matters only if it actually undermines understanding.

Plain-error review: If the defendant did not object at trial, an appellate court will reverse only for an obvious (“clear under current law”) error that seriously affects fairness. Conflicting precedent often defeats the “obvious” requirement.

Hobbs Act commerce element (“de minimis”): For robberies of businesses, the government usually needs only a minimal, realistic potential effect on interstate commerce (e.g., the business buys goods from out of state). The debate here was whether a completed robbery requires proof of an “actual effect.”

Constructive amendment: Happens when jury instructions effectively let the jury convict for a different crime than the grand jury charged. Daniels argued the instruction turned a completed robbery charge into an attempt-like standard; the court rejected that framing (especially under plain-error review).

Guidelines “physical restraint” enhancement: In the Sixth Circuit (under older guideline language), forcing victims at gunpoint to move locations can count as “physical restraint,” even without tying them up.

“Bodily injury” enhancement: Covers significant pain or obvious injury, or injury for which one would ordinarily seek medical attention; it is less than “serious bodily injury,” which involves extreme pain or protracted impairment or interventions like hospitalization.

Collateral attack at sentencing: Generally, you cannot use a new sentencing hearing to argue an old conviction was invalid. The conviction must already have been vacated or declared invalid in proceedings about that conviction.

Coram nobis: A rare mechanism to vacate a conviction after the sentence is fully served, used to correct fundamental errors when ordinary habeas relief is unavailable.

Discretionary remand under 28 U.S.C. § 2106: Even without legal error, an appellate court can remand “as may be just.” Daniels underscores that the court may refuse if resentencing would be a foregone conclusion.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Kevin Loren Daniels is a wide-ranging affirmance covering Miranda waiver, substitution of counsel, discovery remedies, Hobbs Act commerce instructions under plain-error review, and multiple guideline issues. Its most significant doctrinal contribution lies in its handling of a prior conviction vacated during appeal: the court reaffirmed that sentencing courts may count then-valid prior convictions for criminal history, rejected attempts to litigate their invalidity at sentencing, and—critically—declined discretionary remand after vacatur where the sentencing record convinced the panel that resentencing would not change the result and the district court had already effectively accounted for the conviction’s instability. Judge White’s partial dissent highlights an ongoing institutional tension: efficiency-driven remands to reflect post-sentencing legal developments versus appellate confidence that remand would be futile.