Discretionary Limits and Jurisdictional Boundaries for §237(a)(1)(H) Fraud Waivers in Mangroo v. U.S. Attorney General

Introduction

In Rohan Mangroo v. U.S. Attorney General (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted two core questions:

Whether the court may review a discretionary denial of a fraud-based inadmissibility waiver under INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).
Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) properly construed a party’s motion as one for reconsideration, rather than reopening, when no new evidence was offered.

The petitioner, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, admitted that he had fraudulently married a U.S. citizen to secure permanent residence and later sought naturalization. After admitting the fraud to immigration authorities, he faced removal and applied for a discretionary waiver under § 237(a)(1)(H). The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA denied relief, and the petitioner appealed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit held:

The court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of a § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver except for constitutional or pure questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), (D).
The petitioner failed to exhaust before the BIA his claim that the IJ applied an “extreme hardship” standard instead of the proper balancing test from Matter of Tijam.
The BIA correctly recharacterized the petitioner’s post-decision filings as a motion for reconsideration, not reopening, because no new, previously unavailable evidence was offered.

As a result, the court dismissed in part and denied in part the petitions for review.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Matter of Tijam, 22 I. & N. Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) – established the balancing framework for § 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waivers: adverse factors (nature of fraud, perjury, recency) vs. positive equities (long residence, family hardship, employment, community ties).
INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) & § 242(a)(2)(D) (8 U.S.C. § 1252) – define jurisdictional limits on reviewing discretionary immigration decisions and preserve review of constitutional and pure legal questions.
Alvarez Acosta v. U.S. Attorney General, 524 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2008) – court held that disagreement with a discretionary weighing of factors is not reviewable absent a legal or constitutional claim.
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023) – clarified that the exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule but must be enforced when invoked by the government.
Makir-Marwil v. U.S. Attorney General, 681 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2012) – confirmed jurisdiction to review whether the proper legal standard was applied in a waiver case.
Ponce Flores v. U.S. Attorney General, 64 F.4th 1208 (11th Cir. 2023) – held that jurisdiction over motions to reopen is stripped when based on discretionary rulings unless a legal question is raised.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning unfolded in three stages:

Discretionary Waiver Nonreviewability: INA § 237(a)(1)(H) expressly places the fraud-based waiver “in the discretion of the Attorney General.” Under § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), the court cannot review a discretionary denial unless it raises a constitutional question or pure question of law. Mangroo’s disagreement with how the IJ balanced Tijam factors was a “garden-variety” abuse-of-discretion claim, not a legal question.
Exhaustion of Legal Standard Claim: The petitioner argued that the IJ applied an “extreme hardship” standard rather than the Tijam balancing test. Although § 242(a)(2)(D) would permit review of a legal standard, Mangroo never raised that issue before the BIA. Under Santos-Zacaria, the court enforces exhaustion when the government invokes it; thus that claim was forfeited.
Motion to Reopen vs. Reconsider: A motion to reopen requires new, previously unavailable evidence (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)); a motion to reconsider challenges legal or factual errors in the original decision and must be filed within 30 days (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)). Mangroo’s filing restated alleged IJ errors and attached forms that were based on preexisting facts (his U.S.-citizen daughter). The BIA correctly treated it as an untimely motion for reconsideration.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies and reinforces important boundaries in immigration jurisprudence:

Courts will not second-guess the discretionary balance of Tijam factors in § 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waiver cases.
Claimants must exhaust any challenges to the legal standard or procedures before the BIA to preserve review.
Motions to reopen will be strictly parsed: new relief options that could have been asserted earlier do not qualify as new evidence.
Agencies and practitioners should ensure all potential forms of relief are timely pursued in initial proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

INA § 237(a)(1)(H) Waiver: A discretionary power to forgive fraud-based inadmissibility for aliens who are close relatives of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.
Tijam Balancing Test: A checklist weighing “adverse factors” (e.g., marriage fraud, perjury) against “positive factors” (e.g., long U.S. residence, family hardship).
Motion to Reopen vs. Motion to Reconsider:
- Reopen: Introduces new evidence unavailable at the time of the hearing (90-day deadline).
- Reconsider: Argues legal or factual errors in the decision (30-day deadline).
Jurisdictional Bars: Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, courts generally cannot review discretionary immigration decisions—only constitutional claims and pure questions of law.
Exhaustion of Remedies: Petitioners must present all issues to the BIA before asking the federal courts to review them.

Conclusion

Mangroo v. U.S. Attorney General reaffirms that:

Fraud waivers under INA § 237(a)(1)(H) are entrusted entirely to agency discretion and largely beyond judicial second-guessing.
Pleading and procedural requirements—exhaustion, timely motions, correct motion type—are strictly enforced.
Practitioners must comprehensively present all waivers, petitions, and evidentiary bases during initial proceedings to avoid irreversible procedural forfeitures.

In the broader legal context, Mangroo cements the principle that immigration relief hinges not only on equitable merits but equally on procedural rigor and respect for congressional jurisdictional limits.