Introduction

In a published opinion, the Fourth Circuit vacated a grant of summary judgment that had shielded a county clerk’s office from negligence liability under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA). The case arises from a clerical failure to recall a bench warrant after it had been executed—an omission that led to a second arrest of the same person more than five years later and a three‑day incarceration.

The appellate court’s central holding is doctrinal: immunity for “administrative action or inaction of a legislative, judicial, or quasi‑judicial nature” under S.C. Code § 15‑78‑60(2) attaches only to discretionary acts. Ministerial failures—those mandated by rule or without room for judgment—are not immune under subsection (2). In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit followed the South Carolina Court of Appeals’ view that immunity across the enumerated SCTCA defenses turns on a discretionary/ministerial distinction, unless the statutory text clearly says otherwise.

Parties: Plaintiff–Appellant Tim Landholt sued after his second arrest on an old bench warrant. Defendant–Appellee Jeanette McBride, in her official capacity as Richland County Clerk of Court, asserted SCTCA immunity. Though former deputy clerk Kendall Corley appears in the caption, the appeal targeted only the immunity ruling on the state‑law negligence claims against McBride. The district court had already disposed of a federal § 1983 claim against Corley, which was not challenged on appeal.

Case Background and Procedural History

Facts

• After missing a child‑support contempt hearing, a family court judge issued a bench warrant for Landholt’s arrest; the clerk’s office filed it and forwarded it to the sheriff.
• Within weeks, Landholt appeared in court, was arrested on the warrant, was found in contempt, and paid a $200 fine—resolving the matter judicially.
• The clerk’s office allegedly failed to recall or cancel the executed warrant. Over five years later, deputies arrested Landholt again on that stale warrant. He spent three days in jail.

Procedural Path

• Landholt sued in state court, bringing a § 1983 claim and SCTCA negligence claims. After removal to federal court, the § 1983 claim against Corley failed at summary judgment.
• The district court also granted summary judgment to McBride on the negligence claims, holding that § 15‑78‑60(2) immunized the clerk’s office because the failure to recall a warrant was an administrative act of a judicial or quasi‑judicial nature.
• On appeal, Landholt challenged only the SCTCA immunity ruling in favor of McBride.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment to McBride and remanded. The court held that, under South Carolina law as articulated by the state’s intermediate appellate courts, immunity under S.C. Code § 15‑78‑60(2) applies only to discretionary acts. Merely labeling conduct “administrative” and “judicial or quasi‑judicial” does not suffice; the government must prove the actor faced alternatives and exercised judgment according to accepted professional standards.

The court did not decide whether recalling an executed bench warrant is, in fact, a ministerial duty of the clerk or the court, nor did it determine who bears that legal duty in Richland County’s processes. Those questions—potentially dispositive—were left for the district court on remand. It emphasized that the government, as the party invoking the affirmative defense of immunity, bears the burden of proof.

Analysis

Statutory Framework: The SCTCA and the Discretion/Ministerial Divide

The SCTCA waives sovereign immunity to make governmental entities liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” subject to 40 enumerated immunities. See S.C. Code § 15‑78‑40, § 15‑78‑60. South Carolina courts instruct that those immunities are to be “liberally construed in favor of limiting liability,” and they function as affirmative defenses for which the government bears the burden. See Health Promotion Specialists, LLC v. S.C. Bd. of Dentistry, 743 S.E.2d 808, 814 (S.C. 2013); Steinke v. S.C. Dep’t of Lab., Licensing & Regul., 520 S.E.2d 142, 152 (S.C. 1999).

The immunity at issue—§ 15‑78‑60(2)—covers “administrative action or inaction of a legislative, judicial, or quasi‑judicial nature.” The district court read “administrative” to include non‑discretionary acts. The Fourth Circuit rejected that interpretation, relying on South Carolina intermediate appellate authority that treats immunity throughout § 15‑78‑60 as keyed to whether the act was discretionary rather than ministerial.

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004): The South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that “the determination of immunity from tort liability turns on the question of whether the acts in question were discretionary rather than ministerial,” even when the asserted defenses included § 15‑78‑60(2). It further explained that discretionary immunity is “contingent on proof that the government entity, faced with alternatives, actually weighed competing considerations and made a conscious choice using accepted professional standards,” quoting Wooten ex rel. Wooten v. SCDOT, 511 S.E.2d 355, 357 (S.C. 1999). Hawkins is pivotal because it groups subsection (2) with other SCTCA immunities and imposes a uniform discretionary requirement.
• Proctor v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 628 S.E.2d 496, 506 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006): Reinforces Hawkins’s view that SCTCA immunity—specifically including subsection (2)—is “discretionary immunity,” not a blanket shield for administrative tasks.
• Wooten ex rel. Wooten v. SCDOT, 511 S.E.2d 355 (S.C. 1999): South Carolina Supreme Court decision articulating the “weighed competing considerations” test for discretionary immunity; the government must show a reasoned choice using accepted professional standards.
• Health Promotion Specialists, 743 S.E.2d at 814, and Steinke, 520 S.E.2d at 152: Clarify principles that immunities are construed to limit liability and that they are affirmative defenses with a government burden of proof.
• Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 517 n.9 (4th Cir. 1991); West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940); Gelin v. Maryland, 132 F.4th 700, 716 (4th Cir. 2025): These cases set the methodological framework for federal courts applying state law. Where a state’s highest court is silent, federal courts defer to intermediate appellate decisions unless persuasive evidence indicates the high court would disagree. The Fourth Circuit applied this approach to follow Hawkins and Proctor.
• DeSoto County v. T.D., 160 So. 3d 1154 (Miss. 2015): The district court had drawn support from Mississippi’s interpretation of a similar statute granting immunity even for ministerial failures to recall warrants. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged this split but declined to follow Mississippi where South Carolina’s intermediate courts say otherwise. The DeSoto dissent, notably, canvassed other jurisdictions treating such failures as ministerial and not immune—an observation the Fourth Circuit found consistent with South Carolina’s own approach.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The court undertook an “Erie” analysis: because the South Carolina Supreme Court has not directly interpreted § 15‑78‑60(2), the Fourth Circuit looked to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Those decisions, particularly Hawkins and Proctor, repeatedly characterize subsection (2) immunity as discretionary immunity and apply the Wooten standard. The opinion emphasized that even though § 15‑78‑60(5) explicitly references discretion, Hawkins nonetheless required proof of discretion under other subsections too (including subsection (2)), effectively harmonizing the SCTCA’s immunity provisions around the discretionary/ministerial distinction unless a particular subsection clearly states otherwise.

With that doctrinal foundation, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in treating the “administrative” label in subsection (2) as a categorical grant of immunity irrespective of discretion. Instead, the government must demonstrate that the challenged act or omission involved the exercise of judgment after weighing alternatives according to professional standards. On this record, there was evidence suggesting that recalling an executed bench warrant was “mandatory” (i.e., ministerial), creating at least a genuine dispute of material fact and precluding summary judgment on immunity.

The court explicitly left unresolved two potentially case‑dispositive questions for remand: (1) whether the duty to recall an executed bench warrant is ministerial; and (2) who bears that duty (the clerk of court or the court itself). Because the parties had not sufficiently developed these issues and the district court had not addressed them, the appellate court declined to decide them in the first instance.

What the Court Did Not Decide

• It did not hold that failure to recall a warrant is ministerial as a matter of law; it held only that subsection (2) immunity requires discretion and that the record did not entitle the clerk to summary judgment on that point.
• It did not resolve whether the clerk or the court has the legal duty to recall an executed bench warrant.
• It did not disturb the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim (which was not challenged on appeal).
• It did not address other defenses, damages caps, causation, or limitations issues under the SCTCA.

Impact and Implications

Immediate Practical Impact

• Higher bar for immunity at summary judgment. Government entities and court clerks in South Carolina must now come forward with concrete evidence of discretionary decision‑making to invoke § 15‑78‑60(2) immunity in federal court. Conclusory labels like “administrative” or “quasi‑judicial” will not suffice.
• Process reforms likely. Clerk’s offices will be incentivized to adopt or document protocols for warrant recall, including clear role assignments, checklists, and audit trails. If recall is mandatory, immunity likely will not attach; if discretion is involved, the office must show the alternatives considered and professional standards applied.
• Litigation posture shifts. Plaintiffs will focus early discovery on whether the task is dictated by mandatory rules (ministerial) and on identifying the correct responsible actor. Defendants will marshal policy manuals, training materials, and testimony showing actual judgment was exercised.

Doctrinal Significance for SCTCA Jurisprudence

• Unifies immunity analysis around discretion. The decision aligns federal SCTCA practice with South Carolina intermediate authority: immunity under § 15‑78‑60(2) is a form of discretionary immunity, notwithstanding the statute’s use of “administrative.”
• Affirmative defense rigor. Reaffirms that the government bears the burden to prove the defense with evidence that a governmental actor weighed alternatives and made a conscious choice under accepted standards (Wooten).
• Erie methodology clarified. The opinion models careful adherence to state intermediate courts (Hawkins, Proctor) absent contrary indications from the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Comparative Perspective

The court acknowledged a split exemplified by Mississippi’s DeSoto County v. T.D., where similar statutory language was read to confer immunity even for ministerial acts. The Fourth Circuit declined that approach, emphasizing fidelity to South Carolina’s own intermediate precedent. The dissent in DeSoto also observed that many jurisdictions treat failure to cancel a warrant as ministerial—an observation consonant with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Discretionary vs. Ministerial Acts
  • Discretionary: Involves judgment, choice among alternatives, and the weighing of competing considerations according to professional standards.
  • Ministerial: Prescribed by law or rule; the official must do it in a prescribed manner without room for judgment.
• Quasi‑Judicial Administrative Action: Non‑judge tasks closely tied to the judicial process (e.g., docketing, issuing or recalling process) performed by judicial branch actors or officers.
• SCTCA § 15‑78‑60(2): Grants immunity for administrative action or inaction of a legislative, judicial, or quasi‑judicial nature—but, per South Carolina intermediate courts (and now this Fourth Circuit decision applying them), only where the action was discretionary.
• Affirmative Defense and Burden of Proof: Immunity must be proven by the government; if evidence shows the act was ministerial or if there is a genuine dispute over the nature of the act, summary judgment is improper.
• Erie Principles: Federal courts applying state law follow state high‑court decisions; if none, they give significant weight to intermediate appellate decisions unless there’s persuasive evidence the state’s highest court would disagree.
• Summary Judgment: Granted only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non‑movant.

Practice Pointers

For Government Entities and Clerks’ Offices

• Map the recall workflow for warrants and identify who must act, when, and how; reduce the workflow to written policy.
• If discretion is truly involved, document the factors considered and the professional standards used in decision‑making.
• Train staff to contemporaneously record recall actions and maintain audit logs to evidence completion.
• Review case management systems to automatically flag warrants for recall upon execution or disposition.

For Plaintiffs’ Counsel

• In discovery, secure deposition testimony and written policies addressing whether recall is “mandatory” and who bears the duty.
• Obtain system logs and communications showing gaps between execution and recall and any intervening notice.
• Anticipate the immunity defense; frame the failure as ministerial and develop evidence negating any discretionary choice.

For Defense Counsel

• Develop a record of discretionary judgment: alternatives considered, risk assessments, and reliance on accepted standards.
• If the clerk is not the legally responsible actor, raise and develop that issue early with supporting authority and evidence.
• Consider whether other SCTCA immunities or defenses apply, and address causation and damages caps where appropriate.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in Landholt v. Corley/McBride brings welcome clarity to a recurring problem in court administration and SCTCA litigation: when does the “administrative” conduct of judicial actors trigger immunity? Answer: only when the government can prove that the act was discretionary, involving a reasoned choice among alternatives guided by professional standards. On this record, where evidence suggests recalling an executed warrant may be mandatory, blanket immunity was improper.

The ruling aligns federal courts with South Carolina’s intermediate appellate decisions and reaffirms key SCTCA tenets: immunities are affirmative defenses, the government bears the proof burden, and summary judgment is inappropriate where material disputes exist about whether an act is discretionary or ministerial. Practically, the decision will prompt courts and clerks to tighten recall procedures and documentation, and it gives plaintiffs a clear pathway to test immunity claims when administrative missteps result in serious deprivations of liberty.

Note: This commentary is for educational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.