Discretion Over Stipulated Adjudications and Mental‑Health–Based Abuse Findings Without Formal Diagnosis: Commentary on In re A.E. and L.J.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re A.E. and L.J., No. 24‑675 (Nov. 25, 2025), affirming the termination of a mother’s parental rights, makes several important clarifications in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence. While formally issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21, the opinion is analytically substantial and will be influential in practice.

At the heart of the case are two themes:

How courts may handle stipulations in child abuse and neglect adjudications under Rule 26 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings; and
What is required to adjudicate abuse/neglect based on a parent’s mental health issues—specifically, whether a formal mental health diagnosis is necessary.

The petitioner mother, E.J., challenged multiple aspects of the proceedings: the refusal to accept her limited stipulation, adjudication on “mental health” grounds without a formal diagnosis, denial of a post‑adjudicatory improvement period, termination of her parental rights, the absence of an updated housing/employment investigation, the weighing of evidence, alleged conflicts of counsel, and the number of continuances granted. The Supreme Court rejected all of these arguments and affirmed.

II. Case Background and Procedural History

A. Facts Giving Rise to the Petition

In January 2022, law enforcement encountered the petitioner and her two children, A.E. and L.J., living out of a vehicle in winter conditions. The children lacked winter clothing, were dirty and foul‑smelling, and one‑year‑old L.J. had a dirty diaper and was covered in feces, causing blistering around his genital area.

When questioned, the petitioner stated that someone was following her, she could not stop the vehicle because they were in danger, and she did not understand why she had been arrested for child neglect, despite explanation. Her behavior was described as abnormal, paranoid, and “out of touch with reality.”

The West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) took emergency custody of the children on January 23, 2022, and obtained ratification under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑303 on January 25, 2022. On January 27, 2022, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that the petitioner was out of touch with reality, placing the children in harm’s way, and reiterating the unsanitary and dangerous conditions in which the children were found.

B. Preliminary Hearing and Psychological Evaluation

At the preliminary hearing (which was continued multiple times, largely at the petitioner’s request), the petitioner raised an alleged conflict involving her court‑appointed counsel’s prior representation of L.J.’s paternal grandmother. Counsel stated that any prior representation was unrelated and not clearly linked to the child’s family. The court found no conflict and allowed counsel to continue.

Evidence presented at the preliminary stage raised concerns about the petitioner’s mental health, leading the circuit court to order a psychological evaluation. The court also found that the circumstances justified emergency removal under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑602, concluding that the children were in imminent danger and should remain in DHS’s temporary custody.

C. Adjudication and Refusal of the Limited Stipulation

At the adjudicatory hearing in January 2023 (which had also been continued several times, mostly at the petitioner’s request), the petitioner tendered a written stipulation. She was willing to admit that:

She lacked adequate housing; and
She was in a “crisis situation” at the time of the events.

However, she refused to make any admissions regarding mental health concerns. She also argued that there was no formal diagnosis yet, so mental health should not be part of adjudication.

The circuit court, emphasizing that the core allegations concerned her mental condition and behavior, refused to accept a partial stipulation that avoided the alleged root cause of the abuse and neglect. It proceeded with a contested adjudication, hearing testimony about her “erratic and irrational behavior,” paranoia that she was being followed, and failure to appreciate the neglect of her children.

The circuit court found that:

The petitioner’s mental health issues were the root cause of the observed symptoms and parenting failures;
Her lack of care resulted in physical harm to L.J.; and
She was an abusing and/or neglecting parent, and both children were abused/neglected children.

The petitioner then requested a post‑adjudicatory improvement period; the court denied the request, chiefly because she refused to acknowledge any mental health problem.

D. Disposition and Termination of Parental Rights

The dispositional hearing, initially begun in June 2023, was repeatedly continued (again, largely at the petitioner’s request) and concluded in April 2024. By that time, the petitioner had been represented by five different attorneys.

At disposition, DHS presented a psychologist who conducted the court‑ordered evaluation. The expert opined that:

The petitioner had a personality disorder with borderline features (based on maladaptive traits);
She consistently deflected responsibility and showed an “appalling lack of concern” for how the children were affected;
She was not forthright during the evaluation; and
She refused to pursue mental health treatment.

Evidence also showed:

The petitioner was combative with service providers and made minimal progress in parenting services;
She denied the factual conditions (children covered in feces, dirty, foul‑smelling), characterizing them as exaggerated; and
She continued to assert that people were following and laughing at her because of the case.

The petitioner presented an independent psychological evaluation diagnosing only a mild anxiety disorder. The circuit court found this unpersuasive because it relied solely on the petitioner’s self‑report, without contemporaneous reports from law enforcement or Child Protective Services and without collateral evidence of her behavior at the time of removal.

The court ultimately found that the petitioner:

Suffered from an untreated mental health disorder (unspecified due to lack of candor in evaluations);
Continued to exhibit paranoid, defiant, and erratic behaviors; and
Failed to acknowledge or treat her mental health issues.

Accordingly, under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(d)(3), the court found there was no reasonable likelihood that she could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future, and that termination of her parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare. Her parental rights to both children were terminated.

Permanency plans:

A.E.: Adoption by paternal grandparents (contingent upon the father’s relinquishment);
L.J.: Permanency already achieved; he remained in his father’s care.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed in all respects. The key holdings and clarifications include:

No absolute right to adjudicate by stipulation. Rule 26 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings does not create a right to have a stipulation accepted in lieu of a contested adjudication. The circuit court retains discretion to reject a stipulation—even if it technically contains the Rule 26 elements—where the stipulation omits or minimizes the alleged root causes of abuse and neglect.
Mental‑health‑based adjudication does not require a formal diagnosis. Abuse/neglect may be proven by clear and convincing evidence of conduct and behavior that demonstrate mental health problems impacting parenting. A formal psychiatric label (e.g., a DSM diagnosis) is not required.
Due process and notice satisfied by specific factual allegations, even when framed as mental health concerns. The petition’s allegation that the mother was “out of touch with reality and placing her children in harm’s way,” coupled with detailed description of her behavior and the children’s condition, was sufficiently specific to give notice of mental‑health‑based allegations under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑601(b).
Denial of improvement period where parent refuses to acknowledge mental health problem. Consistent with prior precedent, a parent’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of the central problem (here, mental health issues) makes that problem effectively untreatable and justifies denial of a post‑adjudicatory improvement period.
Termination without less restrictive alternatives upheld. The court endorsed termination of parental rights without resort to less restrictive dispositional alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.
Extensive continuances largely requested by the parent are not a due process violation. Where the continuances serve due process interests (allowing new counsel to prepare, enabling an independent evaluation, etc.) and are generally sought by the parent, the circuit court does not abuse its discretion by granting them.
Appellate practice: inadequately supported assignments of error may be disregarded. The Court reiterated that claims not supported by record citations or legal authority may be ignored under Rule 10(c)(7) and related administrative orders. The Court again declined to recognize ineffective assistance of counsel claims in abuse and neglect proceedings.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Deference to the Fact‑Finder

The Court began by reiterating the well‑established standard:

Findings of fact in abuse and neglect cases are reviewed for clear error;
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This standard arises from syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). The decision also later cites In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025), to reaffirm that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations. That is especially important here, where:

The mother offered a competing psychological evaluation suggesting only mild anxiety;
The circuit court preferred the DHS‑retained expert, due in part to the latter’s use of collateral sources and records.

The Supreme Court refused to second‑guess those credibility determinations, emphasizing the trial court’s institutional advantage in hearing live testimony and weighing conflicting expert opinions.

B. Stipulations and the Limits of Rule 26

1. The Mother’s Argument

The petitioner argued that the circuit court erred by rejecting her stipulation that:

She lacked adequate housing; and
She was in a crisis situation.

She declined to admit any mental health issues, asserting (among other things) that there was no formal diagnosis at the time.

2. Rule 26 Requirements

Rule 26(a) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings provides that a stipulated or uncontested adjudication must include:

Agreed‑upon facts supporting court involvement regarding the respondent’s problems, conduct, or condition; and
A statement of respondent’s problems or deficiencies to be addressed at disposition.

Rule 26(b) adds that before accepting a stipulation, the court must determine that:

The stipulation meets the purposes of the rules and controlling statutes; and
It is in the best interests of the child.

3. The Court’s Clarification: No Right to Have a Stipulation Accepted

The Supreme Court held that Rule 26 does not entitle a parent to compel the court to accept a stipulation simply because it formally complies with these requirements. The circuit court retains discretion to:

Accept the stipulation;
Reject it; or
Require a more complete stipulation that captures the core alleged problems.

Here, the trial court viewed the mental health allegations as the root cause of the neglect (the mother being “out of touch with reality,” paranoia, and irrational behavior leading directly to neglectful conditions). A stipulation that ignored those core allegations would:

Fail to fully inform the court of the issues that needed to be addressed; and
Potentially undercut the statutory purpose of securing a comprehensive and accurate adjudication of the factual and causal basis for state intervention.

Therefore, the circuit court lawfully exercised its discretion in refusing to accept the partial stipulation and proceeding with a contested adjudicatory hearing.

Doctrinal significance: This decision reinforces that stipulations in child abuse and neglect cases are a tool of case management and due process, not a right. Parents cannot plead around the central issues (for example, mental health, substance abuse, or domestic violence) by offering narrow stipulations that omit the very conditions the petition alleges as core dangers.

C. Mental Health, Specificity of Allegations, and Due Process

1. Statutory Requirement of Specific Conduct

Under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑601(b), an abuse and neglect petition must set forth the specific conduct of the parent that constitutes abuse or neglect. This requirement serves due process by affording the parent:

Notice of why state intervention and possible termination are being sought; and
An opportunity to contest the allegations effectively.

The Court cited In re Samantha M., 205 W. Va. 383, 518 S.E.2d 387 (1999), which emphasizes that petitions must be sufficiently specific to inform the parent of the nature of the charges.

2. Adequacy of the Petition’s Mental Health Allegations

The petitioner argued that:

Mental health allegations were not formally stated in the petition; and
She therefore lacked notice and was denied due process.

The Court rejected this characterization, pointing out that the petition explicitly alleged that she was:

“Out of touch with reality;” and
“Placing her children in harm’s way,”

and described in detail:

Her paranoia (that someone was following her);
Her refusal or inability to understand the reason for her arrest; and
The unsanitary and dangerous condition of the children.

These allegations, the Court concluded, did identify specific conduct—abnormal, irrational, and paranoid behavior—that created a risk of harm to the children and clearly raised mental health as an issue. She was also aware of the mental health aspect, as she attempted to stipulate to some facts from the petition while refusing to acknowledge any mental health component.

Thus, there was no due process violation in allowing evidence and adjudication on the basis of mental health concerns.

3. No Requirement for a Formal Mental Health Diagnosis

A particularly important doctrinal point emerges here: the Court emphasized that West Virginia law does not require a formal mental health diagnosis (e.g., a specific DSM‑5 disorder) to find abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence when mental health is the core concern. The Court stated:

We have never held that a formal diagnosis is necessary to prove that conditions of abuse and neglect caused by mental health issues exist by clear and convincing evidence.

Instead, the DHS may rely on:

Testimony of lay witnesses regarding the parent’s behavior;
Law enforcement observations;
Child Protective Services reports; and
Expert psychological or psychiatric testimony (if available, but not mandatory).

In this case, multiple witnesses testified to the mother’s erratic, irrational, and paranoid behavior. This, coupled with the condition of the children, was sufficient clear and convincing evidence that mental health problems were impairing her parenting.

Impact: This is a significant clarification. It prevents parents from defeating abuse/neglect allegations simply because no formal psychiatric label has been assigned at a particular stage of the case. It aligns the law with practical reality: dangerous parenting conduct can be proven through behavior and its consequences, even if clinicians do not or cannot agree on a precise diagnosis.

D. Improvement Periods and the Requirement to Acknowledge the Problem

1. Statutory Standard

Under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610(2)(B), a parent seeking a post‑adjudicatory improvement period must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that they are likely to fully participate in the improvement period.

2. The “Acknowledgment” Doctrine

The Court applied a well‑established principle: a parent must acknowledge the existence of the core problem to meaningfully participate in services. The Court quoted In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), which in turn quoted In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004):

Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem . . . results in making the problem untreatable and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.

The petitioner consistently:

Denied having any mental health issues;
Refused to accept that her conduct constituted neglect; and
Characterized the allegations as exaggerated or fabricated.

Because she refused to acknowledge the central problem identified by the court—her mental health—the Court concluded that she could not realistically benefit from an improvement period. It cited In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002), for the proposition that a circuit court may deny an improvement period when “no improvement is likely.”

Practical takeaway: This decision reinforces that improvement periods are not automatic or merely procedural. They are contingent on the parent’s willingness to recognize and address the conduct or conditions that led to the petition. Persistent denial—especially in the face of credible evidence—strongly supports denial of an improvement period.

E. Disposition: “No Reasonable Likelihood of Substantial Correction” and Termination

1. Statutory Framework

West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(d)(3) provides that there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected when:

The abusing parent . . . [has] not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.

Section 49‑4‑604(c)(6) authorizes termination of parental rights upon such a finding, when necessary for the welfare of the child.

2. Application to the Mother’s Conduct

The petitioner argued that she had stable housing and employment and therefore could correct the conditions. The Court found this argument unpersuasive because:

The core problem was mental health and resultant parenting behavior—not housing or employment per se;
She had refused mental health treatment, denying any problem existed;
She remained combative with service providers and made little or no progress in parenting education; and
She exhibited ongoing paranoia and irrational beliefs during the proceedings (e.g., that people were following and laughing at her).

Thus, the circuit court had ample evidence that:

She had not responded to or fully participated in rehabilitative efforts;
There was no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future; and
Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.

3. Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

The Court, citing syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), and syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), reaffirmed that:

Termination of parental rights may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future and when termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

Because the record supported the no‑reasonable‑likelihood finding, the circuit court was not required to pursue lesser alternatives (e.g., long‑term foster care, legal guardianship) before terminating parental rights.

F. Emergency Custody, Procedural Complaints, and Appellate Practice

1. Emergency Custody Under § 49‑4‑303 vs. § 49‑4‑301

The petitioner attacked the emergency removal by citing West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑301, which governs when law enforcement may obtain custody of an abused or neglected child. But the record showed that DHS—not law enforcement—took emergency custody under § 49‑4‑303, which allows DHS to assume custody when:

The child is in an emergency situation constituting an imminent danger to physical well‑being; or
There is probable cause to believe the child will suffer additional abuse or neglect.

DHS then properly applied for ratification, which the court granted. Because the petitioner attacked the wrong statutory mechanism, her argument failed as a matter of law.

2. Claims of Lack of Counsel and Missing Transcripts

The petitioner argued that:

She lacked counsel at the preliminary hearing; and
Certain transcripts were not preserved.

The Court rejected these claims as contrary to the record:

The initial preliminary hearing was continued so that counsel could be appointed; when the hearing was ultimately held, she had appointed counsel and a guardian ad litem.
Her own supplemented appendix contained the supposedly missing transcripts.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

The petitioner also asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court reiterated that it has never recognized such a claim in the abuse and neglect context, citing In re B.S.-1, No. 23‑252, 2024 WL 2206172 (W. Va. May 13, 2024) (memorandum decision), and again declined to address the issue.

This continues a consistent line of decisions in which the Court has refused to import the criminal‑law ineffective assistance doctrine into the civil child‑welfare sphere, at least as a cognizable claim on direct appeal.

4. Appellate Briefing Requirements: Rule 10(c)(7) and the 2012 Administrative Order

The Court declined to address certain assignments of error because:

They lacked citation to the appendix record; and/or
They lacked citation to controlling or relevant legal authority.

Invoking Rule 10(c)(7) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and a December 10, 2012 Administrative Order (Re: Filings That Do Not Comply With the Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Court reminded litigants that:

Arguments unsupported by specific record citations or legal authority may be disregarded;
Non‑compliant briefs may result in sanctions, including refusal to consider the case or dismissal.

This aspect of the decision has practical importance for appellate practitioners: even in high‑stakes abuse and neglect cases, the Court expects rigorous adherence to briefing rules.

G. Continuances and Due Process

The petitioner argued that the numerous continuances violated procedural rules and her due process rights. The record showed, however, that:

Most continuances were granted at her request (e.g., to obtain new counsel, to receive an independent psychological evaluation, to allow counsel to prepare);
The court’s reasons for granting continuances were consistent with due process (ensuring adequate representation and opportunity to present evidence); and
The continuances did not result from any “unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness” by the court.

Relying on In re B.S.-S., No. 24‑338, 2025 WL 2202437 (W. Va. July 30, 2025) (memorandum decision), which quoted In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996), the Court reiterated that an abuse of discretion in granting or denying continuances is found only where the court’s decision reflects an arbitrary insistence on speed in the face of a justifiable request for delay. That standard was plainly not met here.

In fact, the Court’s analysis suggests that the circuit court bent over backwards to protect the petitioner’s due process rights, even at the cost of a protracted timeline, by:

Permitting her to change counsel multiple times;
Allowing an independent psychological evaluation and time to obtain the results; and
Granting continuances to allow new counsel to become familiar with the record.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The memorandum decision weaves together several strands of existing case law:

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) – Provides the standard of review: clear error for factual findings; de novo for legal conclusions.
In re Samantha M., 205 W. Va. 383, 518 S.E.2d 387 (1999) – Emphasizes the petition’s duty to specify the conduct alleged to constitute abuse or neglect, ensuring adequate notice.
In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) and In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) – Establish the principle that failure to acknowledge a problem makes it untreatable and renders an improvement period futile.
In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002) – Confirms that circuit courts may deny an improvement period where no improvement is likely.
In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) and In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) – Allow termination of parental rights without intermediate, less restrictive alternatives once there is no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.
In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025) – Emphasizes that the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility on appeal.
In re B.S.-1, No. 23‑252, 2024 WL 2206172 (W. Va. May 13, 2024) (memorandum decision) – Recently reiterated that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable in abuse and neglect appeals.
In re B.S.-S., No. 24‑338, 2025 WL 2202437 (W. Va. July 30, 2025) (memorandum decision) and In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996) – Clarify the standard for reviewing continuance decisions: an abuse of discretion occurs only when a court unreasonably insists on speed despite a justified request for delay.

In re A.E. and L.J. does not dramatically alter these doctrines but applies them in a focused way to mental‑health‑based abuse and neglect allegations and to the procedural tool of adjudicatory stipulations. The main incremental development is the explicit clarification that:

No formal mental health diagnosis is required to find clear and convincing evidence of mental‑health‑driven neglect; and
Rule 26 does not create a parental right to dictate the scope of a stipulation, especially when that would avoid addressing the petition’s core allegations.

VI. Complex Concepts Explained

A. Adjudication vs. Disposition

Adjudication – The stage at which the court determines whether abuse or neglect has occurred and whether the child is an abused or neglected child under the statutes. This is where the evidence about the underlying events (e.g., unsanitary conditions, parental behavior) is weighed and findings are made.
Disposition – The stage at which the court decides what to do in light of the adjudicatory findings: e.g., improvement period, termination of parental rights, guardianship, reunification with conditions, etc.

B. Improvement Period

An “improvement period” is a court‑authorized span of time during which the parent is provided with services and opportunities (counseling, parenting classes, treatment) aimed at correcting the conditions that led to the abuse/neglect finding. It is not automatic and is granted only when the court is convinced that:

The parent recognizes the problem; and
The parent is likely to fully participate and benefit from services.

C. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

“Clear and convincing evidence” is an intermediate standard of proof (higher than preponderance of the evidence, lower than beyond a reasonable doubt). It requires that the evidence produce in the fact‑finder’s mind a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the allegations. In child abuse and neglect cases, it is the standard required to support adjudications and dispositional orders like termination of parental rights.

D. “No Reasonable Likelihood of Substantial Correction”

This statutory phrase asks a forward‑looking question: based on the parent’s conduct and response to services, is it reasonably likely that the parent can correct the conditions of abuse or neglect in the near future? Factors include:

Participation in services;
Honesty and cooperation with providers;
Insight into the harm caused;
Demonstrated behavioral change.

If the court concludes that the answer is “no,” and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, it may terminate parental rights.

E. Mental Health and Abuse/Neglect

Mental health problems by themselves do not automatically constitute abuse or neglect. The critical issue is whether the parent’s mental health condition—diagnosed or not:

Impedes safe and minimally adequate parenting;
Exposes the child to actual harm or imminent danger; or
Remains untreated or unacknowledged in a way that makes remediation unlikely.

In In re A.E. and L.J., the mother’s paranoia, irrationality, and refusal to seek treatment directly resulted in neglectful living conditions and physical harm to at least one child. That nexus, not the mere existence of mental illness, justified the abuse/neglect findings.

VII. Likely Impact of the Decision

A. On Mental‑Health‑Related Abuse and Neglect Cases

This decision will likely have a substantial impact on cases where mental health is a central issue:

Evidence strategy: DHS and guardians ad litem may feel more confident relying on detailed lay observations of parental behavior and its impact on children, even if a precise diagnosis has not yet been rendered.
Parents’ litigation strategy: Parents may be less able to argue that the absence of a formal diagnosis defeats DHS’s case. Instead, they may need to address the specific behaviors and their consequences directly.
Service planning: Courts may more readily require mental health evaluations and treatment as central components of family case plans, even where diagnostic labels are disputed.

B. On the Use of Stipulations

The clarification that trial courts can refuse stipulations that omit core issues will:

Discourage attempts to “cabin” adjudications to narrow issues (e.g., housing) when the petition alleges broader problems (e.g., mental health, substance use, domestic violence);
Encourage more comprehensive stipulations that acknowledge the central concerns; and
Reinforce judicial responsibility to ensure that adjudications capture the full scope of the conditions that threaten the child.

C. On Improvement Periods

The decision reinforces a longstanding but often contested principle: acknowledgment is a precondition to meaningful rehabilitation. Parents who categorically deny proven mental health, substance abuse, or other core issues will continue to face:

Denial of improvement periods; and
Accelerated movement toward termination when children’s safety and permanency demands it.

D. On Appellate Practice and Procedure

Practically, the decision:

Serves as a cautionary example of how the Court will treat inadequately briefed assignments of error—by simply disregarding them;
Reiterates that ineffective assistance claims remain outside the scope of recognized abuse and neglect appellate issues; and
Shows that prolonged proceedings caused primarily by a parent’s own requests for continuances will not, without more, be deemed due process violations.

VIII. Conclusion

In re A.E. and L.J. is a significant memorandum decision in West Virginia’s child welfare jurisprudence. It clarifies that:

Parents have no absolute right to adjudication by stipulation, especially when they seek to exclude the petition’s core allegations (here, serious mental health concerns);
Mental‑health‑based abuse and neglect findings can rest on clear and convincing evidence of behavior and its impact on children, without a formal mental health diagnosis;
A parent’s refusal to acknowledge central problems justifies both denial of an improvement period and a finding of no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction; and
Termination of parental rights is appropriate, without intermediate alternatives, when statutory criteria are met and necessary for the children’s welfare.

The decision also reaffirms important procedural principles: the necessity of specific, well‑supported appellate arguments; the limited scope for raising ineffective assistance claims in this context; and broad trial‑court discretion in managing continuances to safeguard due process.

Taken together, these holdings underscore the Court’s twin commitments to protecting children’s safety and permanency, and to ensuring that abuse and neglect proceedings remain grounded in clear, behavior‑based evidence and sound procedural safeguards. For practitioners, In re A.E. and L.J. offers a clear roadmap for litigating mental‑health‑driven abuse and neglect cases and for advising clients about the critical importance of acknowledging and addressing the conditions that bring their families before the court.