Discretion over Mandamus: Support Magistrates’ Adjournment Authority under 22 NYCRR 205.43

Introduction

Matter of Santman v. Satterthwaite (2025 NY Slip Op 03196, 238 AD3d 1156) required the Appellate Division, Second Department to decide whether a custodial parent may compel, by way of a writ of mandamus, a Support Magistrate to comply with the scheduling deadlines in Uniform Rules for the Family Court (22 NYCRR) § 205.43(b) and (e). The petitioner, Caroline Santman, argued that the Family Court’s rescheduling of her child-support willfulness hearing violated those rules and sought both rescheduling and attorneys’ fees under the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act. Respondent Nadine J. Satterthwaite (Support Magistrate, Nassau County) maintained that hearing dates are within judicial discretion and thus immune from mandamus review.

Key Issues

Whether mandamus lies to compel a Support Magistrate to meet the 90-day completion and 7-day adjournment limits in 22 NYCRR 205.43.
Whether the petitioner’s claim, rendered moot by the magistrate’s advancement of the date, falls within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception.
Whether Santman qualified as a “prevailing party” eligible for attorneys’ fees under CPLR § 8601.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Department:

Agreed that the case was technically moot but invoked the exception to address a recurrent, statewide issue.
Held that mandamus cannot compel compliance with § 205.43 scheduling deadlines because adjournment decisions are discretionary, not ministerial.
Modified the lower court’s order only to deny mandamus relief on the merits (rather than as academic) and otherwise affirmed dismissal.
Denied attorneys’ fees, finding the petitioner was not a “prevailing party.”

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Matter of Martinez v. DiFiore, 188 AD3d 605 (1st Dep’t 2020) – first New York decision expressly holding that § 205.43 deadlines are not enforceable by mandamus; heavily relied upon for the discretionary nature of adjournments.
Matter of Liu v. Ruiz, 200 AD3d 68 (2d Dep’t 2021) & Matter of Elizabeth C. [Omar C.], 156 AD3d 193 (2d Dep’t 2017) – supplied the framework for the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception.
Matter of Gonzalez v. Village of Port Chester, 109 AD3d 614 (2d Dep’t 2013) – articulated the ministerial vs. discretionary dichotomy central to mandamus analysis.
Matter of Dickson v. NYC Dept. of Buildings, 226 AD3d 1014 (2d Dep’t 2024) – restated limitations on issuing writs of mandamus.
Matter of Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Signor, 5 NY3d 435 (2005) – governing rule for “prevailing party” status under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in four sequential steps:

Mootness determined but exception applied. Because the Support Magistrate moved the hearing forward, the direct relief was granted. Nonetheless, the court found the issue likely to recur, typically immune from appellate review, and raising substantial statewide concerns—thus fitting the three-part Hearst Corp. v. Clyne exception.
Nature of mandamus relief. Mandamus compels only ministerial acts—those with a singular, non-discretionary outcome. Scheduling hearings, however, demands “reasoned judgment” and balances competing factors: counsel’s availability, illness, good cause, court congestion, etc. Under Family Court Act § 435 and § 205.43(c)–(d), magistrates may depart from the nominal 90- and 7-day limits for listed reasons. Therefore, compliance with § 205.43 is not a ministerial duty.
Mandamus unavailable as a matter of law. Even though § 205.43’s language is ostensibly “mandatory,” it does not divest the court of scheduling discretion. The petitioner thus lacked the “clear legal right” required for mandamus, aligning with the First Department’s Martinez approach. Alternate Article 78 avenues—e.g., prohibition for abuse of discretion—remain theoretically open but were not pursued.
No prevailing-party status. Advancing the hearing date voluntarily before the State answered the petition does not establish substantial success on the merits. The petitioner therefore was not entitled to fees under CPLR § 8601(a).

3. Impact of the Decision

Statewide Precedent. The Second Department joins the First Department, closing any split on this issue, and effectively forecloses mandamus as a tool to force Family Courts to honor § 205.43’s time limits.
Practical Litigation Consequences. Custodial parents must now challenge untimely support hearings via (a) an abuse-of-discretion appeal once final orders issue, or (b) other Article 78 grounds (e.g., “arbitrary and capricious”), rather than mandamus.
Institutional Autonomy. The ruling safeguards Family Court flexibility, acknowledging the unpredictable nature of support hearings and resource constraints, while still admonishing courts to strive for timely resolution.
Equal Access to Justice Act Jurisprudence. Re-affirms that a party must secure an enforceable judgment or comparable relief to recover fees; voluntary state action mid-litigation is insufficient.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandamus to Compel: A rare court order directing a public official to perform a purely ministerial duty. Think of it as a legal “command” usable only when the official has zero discretion.
Ministerial vs. Discretionary Acts: Ministerial – one correct action (e.g., issuing a license when statutory criteria are met). Discretionary – requires judgment (e.g., granting an adjournment).
Mootness Doctrine: Courts do not decide academic questions; however, they may hear a moot case if the issue is likely to recur, evade review, and is important.
22 NYCRR § 205.43: A Family Court rule seeking to finish support violation hearings within 90 days and limiting adjournments to 7 days unless “good cause” is shown.
Prevailing Party & Equal Access to Justice Act: A litigant who achieves substantial success against the State can recoup fees, unless the State’s position was “substantially justified.”

Conclusion

Santman v. Satterthwaite cements the principle that while § 205.43 aspires to swift resolution of child-support disputes, its deadlines do not transform scheduling into a ministerial duty susceptible to mandamus. By declaring adjournment decisions inherently discretionary, the Second Department shields judicial officers from coercive scheduling orders yet leaves open traditional appellate review for abuses of that discretion. The decision harmonizes departmental authority, clarifies litigant strategy in Family Court delay disputes, and reinforces the stringent threshold for fee-shifting under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Ultimately, the ruling balances the need for timely child-support adjudication with the practical realities and autonomy of the Family Court system.