Discovery Motions and Sanctions Requests Are Not “Legal Actions” Under the Texas Citizens Participation Act

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s consolidated decision in Sadok Ferchichi & Martina Coronado v. Whataburger Restaurants LLC & Crystal Krueger and Haven at Thorpe Lane, LLC v. Jerretta Pate & April Burke squarely addresses a recurring procedural problem: whether discovery motions—specifically, motions to compel and for discovery-related monetary sanctions—are “legal actions” that can themselves be dismissed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).

The Court holds that such motions are not “legal actions” within the meaning of the TCPA. That holding significantly cabins the reach of Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute in the discovery and sanctions context, resolves conflicting appellate authority, and clarifies that the TCPA’s powerful fee-shifting, sanctions, and interlocutory-appeal mechanisms are aimed at substantive claims, not ordinary discovery skirmishes.

At stake was not the underlying merits of a car-accident negligence suit (in Ferchichi) or a student-housing fraud and DTPA case (in Haven), but the definition and scope of a “legal action” under the TCPA, particularly after the Legislature’s 2019 amendments. The decision is therefore primarily procedural and interpretive, yet it has substantial practical consequences for civil litigation statewide.

II. Background of the Consolidated Cases

A. Ferchichi v. Whataburger Restaurants LLC

In Ferchichi, the plaintiffs, Sadok Ferchichi and Martina Coronado, were injured in a motor vehicle collision with a vehicle driven by Whataburger employee Crystal Krueger and owned by Whataburger Restaurants LLC. They sued for negligence.

During discovery, Whataburger obtained surveillance video of the plaintiffs. At mediation, Whataburger’s counsel asked the mediator to convene a joint session to show this video to the plaintiffs as evidence relevant to case value. Ferchichi’s counsel declined the joint session, and Whataburger refused to turn over the video at that time.

Later that day, Ferchichi’s counsel requested the video by email; Whataburger again refused. Ferchichi then filed a motion entitled:

• “Motion to Compel Defendants’ Discovery Responses and for Sanctions.”

The motion alleged discovery abuse in withholding the video until mediation. It requested:

• An order compelling production of the video; and
• Monetary sanctions (attorney’s fees) incurred in having to file the motion.

Whataburger responded with a TCPA motion:

• “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Motion for Monetary Sanctions Pursuant to the TCPA.”

Key points in the Ferchichi TCPA dispute:

• Whataburger limited its TCPA motion to the sanctions portion of the motion to compel.
• It argued that Ferchichi’s sanctions request was “in response to” Whataburger’s exercise of the right to petition, because it arose from Whataburger’s communications in a mediation linked to a judicial proceeding.
• On the very day it filed the TCPA motion, Whataburger sent a link to download the video, hoping to moot the hearing.
• Ferchichi did not withdraw the discovery motion, and the trial court denied Whataburger’s TCPA motion.

On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) reversed. Applying the TCPA’s burden-shifting framework, it held:

• The sanctions portion of the motion was a “legal action” because it requested monetary relief.
• The sanctions request was “in response to” Whataburger’s exercise of the right to petition.
• Ferchichi failed to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of all “elements” of the “claim,” particularly as to the amount of fees incurred.
• The court therefore ordered dismissal of the sanctions “claim” and remanded for an award of Whataburger’s attorney’s fees and consideration of TCPA sanctions against Ferchichi.

The Texas Supreme Court granted review.

B. Haven at Thorpe Lane, LLC v. Pate & Burke

Haven at Thorpe Lane involved a large student-housing complex in San Marcos. Construction delays prevented the complex from opening before the Fall 2019 semester, leaving numerous college students—who had already signed leases—without housing. Many of those students sued Haven for:

• Fraud;
• Violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act; and
• Related misrepresentations about construction progress, move-in dates, and so-called “Move-in Guarantees.”

Amid discovery, Haven concluded that the student plaintiffs had failed to fully produce responsive communications and had spoliated evidence. Haven then issued subpoenas duces tecum to two non-parties:

• Jerretta Pate and April Burke, the mothers of two student plaintiffs (collectively, “the Mothers”).

The Mothers had:

• Complained publicly on social media and to local news about the construction delays; and
• Created a private Facebook group titled “Haven at Thorpe Lane is a Joke!!!” where families exchanged information and criticism of Haven.

The subpoenas required:

• Oral depositions; and
• Production of documents and communications relating to:
  • The litigation;
  • The plaintiffs;
  • Communications with local media and government; and
  • Communications about or within the Facebook group.

Plaintiffs’ counsel accepted service on the Mothers’ behalf. The Mothers did not move to quash the subpoenas, but they produced some documents and withheld others, invoking “associational; privacy” privilege and listing the withheld items on a privilege log.

Believing the responses incomplete, Haven filed a motion to compel production from the Mothers, requesting:

• Overruling of the asserted privileges;
• Full production of unredacted responsive materials;
• A requirement that the Mothers explain the basis for prior redactions; and
• “Reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in obtaining the foregoing relief.”

The Mothers responded with a TCPA motion to dismiss, contending:

• Haven’s real grievance was with their public criticism and organizing activity;
• The motion to compel targeted their speech and associational activity; and
• Thus, the motion to compel (including its request for fees) was a “legal action” based on protected communications.

The trial court denied the TCPA motion. On interlocutory appeal, a divided Third Court of Appeals (Austin) reversed. The majority held:

• Because the motion sought monetary sanctions and was directed at the Mothers (whom the court treated as “new parties”), it was a “filing that adds a claim for relief” and therefore a “legal action” under § 27.001(6)(A).
• The motion was based on or related to the Mothers’ communications (to media, online, etc.), which were TCPA-protected.
• Haven failed to establish a prima facie case for its motion to compel, particularly as to:
  • Proof of valid service of the subpoenas, and
  • Proof that the Mothers actually failed to comply.
• The case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to:
  • Dismiss Haven’s motion to compel;
  • Award the Mothers their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs; and
  • Consider an additional sanctions award under the TCPA.

Justice Baker dissented, arguing:

• A discovery sanction is not a “claim” to which a party is legally entitled; it is a discretionary remedy; and
• Even if the motion were a legal action, it was “in response to” alleged discovery noncompliance, not to the Mothers’ pre-suit speech.

The Supreme Court granted review in Haven and consolidated it for oral argument with Ferchichi, because both turned on the same core question: Is a motion to compel and for sanctions a “legal action” under the TCPA?

III. Summary of the Court’s Opinion

Justice Lehrmann, writing for a unanimous Court, holds:

1. Motions to compel discovery and for discovery-related monetary sanctions are not “legal actions” within the meaning of § 27.001(6) of the TCPA.
2. Because the TCPA only allows dismissal of a “legal action,” the statute simply does not apply to these motions.
3. The trial courts therefore correctly denied the TCPA motions to dismiss in both cases.
4. The contrary judgments of the Fourth and Third Courts of Appeals are reversed, and both matters are remanded to their respective trial courts for further proceedings on the discovery motions in the ordinary course.

The Court does not reach the second step of the TCPA analysis—whether the motions to compel and for sanctions were “based on” or “in response to” the exercise of a protected right—because the threshold requirement of a “legal action” is not satisfied.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The TCPA Framework and the Central Question

The TCPA—Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute—has a dual purpose:

• To “encourage and safeguard” rights to free speech, petition, association, and participation in government; and
• To protect “the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002)

The mechanism is a special motion to dismiss, subject to expedited consideration and interlocutory appeal.

1. The movant must show that the challenged “legal action” is based on or in response to the movant’s exercise of TCPA-protected rights.
2. The nonmovant must then establish, by “clear and specific evidence,” a prima facie case for each essential element of the “claim in question.”
3. If the nonmovant satisfies that burden, the motion must be denied unless the movant proves an affirmative defense or other legal bar that would entitle it to judgment as a matter of law.

If the trial court grants a TCPA motion:

• The movant is entitled to recover court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; and
• The court may impose additional sanctions.

If the motion is frivolous or filed solely to delay, the court may instead award fees to the nonmovant.

Crucially, however, the TCPA applies only to a “legal action”. That term, and how broadly to read it, was the focal point of this decision.

B. The Statutory Definition of “Legal Action”

Section 27.001(6) defines “legal action” as:

“a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief.”

In 2019, the Legislature added an express exclusion:

The term “legal action” does not include “a procedural action taken or motion made in an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.” (§ 27.001(6)(A))

Two interpretive questions arise:

1. How broadly should the catch-all (“any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief”) be read in light of the enumerated terms?
2. What is a “claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief” in the context of the exclusion for procedural motions?

The Court answers these questions through textual analysis and the doctrine of ejusdem generis.

C. Precedents and Doctrines Applied

1. Ejusdem Generis and the Limiting Principle

The Court applies the canon of ejusdem generis, which holds that when general words follow specific ones, the general words are limited to things of the same kind as the specific terms.

Here, the specific terms are:

• “lawsuit,”
• “cause of action,”
• “petition,”
• “complaint,”
• “cross-claim,” and
• “counterclaim.”

All of these are substantive pleadings that:

• commence a civil proceeding, or
• assert, join, or respond to substantive claims for relief between parties.

The catch-all phrase—“any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief”—must be read in light of these specific items. It therefore extends only to pleadings and filings that are like lawsuits, causes of action, and petitions—that is, filings that functionally assert substantive claims for relief, not every incidental request directed to the court.

2. How the Court Understands the Enumerated Terms

Drawing on prior cases and standard definitions, the Court emphasizes:

• A lawsuit is the “judicial proceeding in which parties assert claims for relief.” (citing Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 564 (Tex. 2014))
• A petition (Texas) or a complaint (federal) is the initial pleading that commences suit.
• A counterclaim is an affirmative claim against an opposing party; a cross-claim is one between co-parties concerning the subject of the original action.
• A “cause of action” is the set of facts that must be alleged and proved to obtain relief, i.e., the legal basis for a claim. (citing Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 300–01 (Tex. 2021))

All of these embody or contain substantive “claims for relief,” such as:

• Negligence,
• Fraud,
• Breach of contract,
• DTPA violations, etc.

They are the vehicles through which parties seek to establish liability and obtain remedies on the merits.

3. The 2019 Amendment and “Claims for Relief”

The Court also places weight on the 2019 amendment excluding:

“a procedural action taken or motion made in an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.”

This reinforces that the statute’s focus is on claims, not every procedural skirmish. The Court notes that “claim” can be defined very broadly (any demand for money or remedy), but in context it “especially” refers to “the part of a complaint [or petition] in a civil action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.”

Thus, for TCPA purposes, a “claim for relief” is something akin to:

• A substantive cause of action alleged in a pleading; or
• A new theory or party added via amended pleading.

The Court cites Montelongo v. Abrea, which held that an amended pleading constitutes a new “legal action” to the extent it:

• Adds a new party,
• Pleads new essential facts, or
• Asserts new legal theories with different elements than those previously asserted.

4. Other TCPA and Procedural Precedents

The Court’s analysis is also informed by:

• State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2018)
  The Court held that a statutory petition to remove an elected official under Local Government Code § 87.013 is a “legal action” because it is a statutory remedy: “legal relief in the form of a statutory remedy.” This confirms that “legal relief” includes statutory remedies, not just damages or injunctions.
• Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2018)
  Reiterates that the TCPA creates a special motion to dismiss subject to expedited review, and that the Court interprets the TCPA’s text de novo, applying plain meaning unless that would be absurd.
• City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2008) and City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2003)
  General statutory-interpretation precedents emphasizing plain meaning, context, and overall statutory scheme.
• Misko v. Johns, 575 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied)
  Pre-2019 case holding that a motion for sanctions based on conduct “ancillary to the substantive claims in the case” was not a “legal action.” The Supreme Court’s opinion is largely consistent with this approach.
• Thuesen v. Scott, 667 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, no pet.) and Kinetic Content, LLC v. Dang, 695 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. denied)
  More recent cases holding that motions for sanctions under Rule 13 or Chapter 10 are not “legal actions” because sanctions are discretionary, not rights to which parties are entitled. The Supreme Court’s reasoning aligns with this narrower view.
• KB Home Lone Star Inc. v. Gordon, 629 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.), and the courts of appeals decisions in Ferchichi (698 S.W.3d 297) and Haven (681 S.W.3d 476)
  These decisions treated sanctions motions requesting monetary relief as “legal actions.” The Supreme Court expressly rejects that approach.

D. Why Discovery Motions and Sanctions Requests Are Not “Legal Actions”

1. Ancillary vs. Substantive: The Nature of Discovery Motions

The Court characterizes motions to compel and for sanctions as:

“based on conduct ancillary to the substantive claims in the case” and unable to “stand on their own.”

They do not assert substantive liability theories; they merely:

• Seek enforcement of discovery rules; and
• Ask the court to exercise discretionary remedial powers (e.g., awarding fees, compelling production).

By contrast, the enumerated items in § 27.001(6) (lawsuit, petition, cause of action, etc.) initiate or amend substantive claims that can independently support final judgment.

2. The Incorrect Focus on Monetary Relief

Both courts of appeals treated the request for attorney’s fees as dispositive, reasoning that any filing seeking monetary relief must be a “legal action.” The Supreme Court rejects this:

• Whether a filing seeks money does not determine its character under the TCPA.
• The proper question is whether the filing asserts a substantive claim for relief—i.e., a “claim” in the sense of a cause of action or equivalent pleading—not merely whether it asks the court to use a procedural or supervisory power (like sanctions) within an existing action.

The Court analogizes to Best v. Harper: just as a removal petition seeks “legal relief” in the form of a statutory remedy, so too do motions to compel seek relief authorized by the rules (e.g., Rule 215). But that shared feature (reliance on law for the remedy) does not mean that all such motions are “legal actions.” It simply shows that the presence or absence of money damages is not the key.

3. The Statutory Context: Discovery Stays and Interlocutory Appeals

The Court also emphasizes that reading “legal action” to cover routine motions to compel and for sanctions would clash with the structure and purpose of the TCPA.

Under the TCPA:

• Filing a TCPA motion stays all discovery, except for limited, court-authorized discovery relevant to the motion. (§§ 27.003(c), 27.006(b))
• An order denying a TCPA motion is immediately appealable, and the appeal stays all trial court proceedings. (§§ 27.008(a), 51.014(a)(12), 51.014(b))

These features are designed to:

• Quickly dispose of meritless lawsuits targeting speech or petition rights; and
• Avoid subjecting defendants to burdensome litigation while the motion is resolved.

If every discovery motion or sanctions request were deemed a “legal action”:

• Parties could repeatedly file TCPA motions in response to almost any discovery dispute featuring speech, petition, or association issues.
• Each such motion would trigger a discovery stay and, upon denial, an interlocutory appeal that stays the entire case.
• Litigation on the underlying, meritorious claims would be interrupted by serial procedural appeals concerning ancillary issues.

The Court concludes that this outcome would subvert the TCPA’s expressly stated purpose of also protecting the right to “file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” It would weaponize the TCPA to delay resolution of substantive claims rather than expedite the resolution of unmeritorious ones.

4. The Role of Sanctions Within the Procedural System

The Court is careful to note that excluding these motions from TCPA coverage does not leave parties unprotected from abusive or retaliatory discovery motions:

• The appropriate response to a meritless motion to compel or for sanctions is to oppose it on the merits and urge the trial court to deny it.
• If the motion is frivolous or made in bad faith, the responding party may itself seek sanctions under Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

The key distinction is that:

• These remedial mechanisms operate within the ordinary course of litigation; and
• They do not trigger the TCPA’s full panoply of specialized procedures (automatic discovery stay, expedited appeal, mandatory fee-shifting) designed for substantive speech-related suits.

5. Footnote Clarification: Procedural Motions Can Sometimes Be “Legal Actions”

In a notable footnote, the Court clarifies that it is not holding that a procedural motion can never be a legal action. Indeed, the statute’s exception (for motions that “do not amend or add a claim”) logically implies that some procedural mechanisms can:

• Effectively add a claim; or
• Operate as a vehicle for asserting a substantive right.

Examples (not exhaustive, and not expressly adjudicated here) include:

• A third-party petition (brought via a “motion” or pleading) that brings in a new party to share liability; or
• A plea in intervention asserting affirmative claims, which functions like a plaintiff’s petition against existing parties.

Thus, the Court leaves room for future cases in which a “motion” is in substance a claim-adding pleading. But pure discovery-enforcement motions and sanctions requests do not qualify.

E. Impact and Implications

1. Resolution of Appellate Conflict

The opinion resolves a substantial split among Texas courts of appeals:

• Now rejected: Decisions holding that Rule 13 or Chapter 10 sanctions motions, or motions to compel with requests for fees, are “legal actions” merely because they seek monetary relief or sanctions.
• Now endorsed: The narrower view that such motions are procedural, ancillary mechanisms that do not assert independent claims for relief and therefore fall outside the TCPA unless they themselves amend or add a substantive claim.

In practice, this:

• Reverses the Fourth Court’s decision in Ferchichi and the Third Court’s decision in Haven;
• Signals disapproval of cases like KB Home Lone Star v. Gordon that treated sanctions requests as legal actions; and
• Aligns statewide doctrine more closely with decisions like Thuesen, Kinetic Content, and Misko.

2. Limits on TCPA Use in Discovery and Sanctions Disputes

Going forward:

• Parties cannot invoke the TCPA to dismiss motions to compel discovery, even when those motions concern communications or speech.
• They likewise cannot use the TCPA to dismiss requests for discovery-related monetary sanctions (attorney’s fees, costs) against them, including when the motions target alleged litigation conduct tied to speech or petitioning activity.
• Non-parties, such as subpoenaed witnesses or participants in online groups, cannot rely on the TCPA to block motions to compel compliance or to obtain sanctions-based fee awards in that context.

Instead, those disputes will proceed:

• Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (e.g., Rules 176, 192–215); and
• Subject to traditional appellate review after final judgment or via extraordinary writs where appropriate, not via automatic interlocutory appeal under the TCPA.

3. Preservation of the TCPA’s Core Anti-SLAPP Function

The ruling preserves the TCPA’s focus where it belongs: on substantive civil actions—lawsuits and claims that seek to hold defendants liable (often in damages) for speech, petitioning, or associational activity.

By excluding routine procedural motions from TCPA coverage, the Court:

• Prevents the TCPA from becoming a “super-sanctions” mechanism in discovery disputes;
• Protects the ability of plaintiffs and defendants alike to pursue genuine claims and defenses without repeated anti-SLAPP interruptions; and
• Provides clearer guidance to trial courts on when the TCPA is—and is not—properly invoked.

4. Practical Litigation Consequences

For litigators, the case holds several concrete lessons:

• Do not file TCPA motions against ordinary discovery motions or sanctions requests.
  Such motions are now clearly outside the statute’s reach, absent unusual circumstances where the motion itself adds a substantive claim.
• Be precise in identifying the challenged “legal action.”
  The TCPA still applies to petitions, counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party petitions, and interventions asserting substantive claims—even if they arise during ongoing litigation.
• Use traditional sanctions tools for abusive discovery tactics.
  Rule 13, Chapter 10, and Rule 215 remain available to address frivolous or bad-faith motions, including those filed for harassment or to chill speech. But success under those provisions will not open the door to TCPA fee-shifting or interlocutory appeals.
• Expect fewer TCPA-based delays in active litigation.
  Because parties can no longer halt a case via a TCPA interlocutory appeal over discovery motions, core claims should move forward with fewer anti-SLAPP-induced stays.

F. Explanation of Complex Concepts

1. The Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) and “Anti-SLAPP”

The TCPA is Texas’s version of an “anti-SLAPP” law. “SLAPP” stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation: a lawsuit filed not so much to win on the merits, but to silence or punish a person’s speech, petitioning, or associational activity by burdening them with litigation.

The TCPA allows a defendant (or other responding party) to:

• Seek early dismissal of such suits;
• Obtain mandatory fee-shifting (their attorney’s fees) if they win; and
• Potentially obtain additional sanctions against the plaintiff.

At the same time, the statute is designed not to block meritorious lawsuits. Thus the requirement that the plaintiff (or nonmovant) be allowed to make a prima facie evidentiary showing on each essential element of the claim.

2. “Legal Action” vs. “Procedural Motion”

In TCPA terminology:

• A “legal action” is essentially a claim for relief—the kind of pleading (petition, complaint, counterclaim, etc.) by which a plaintiff or cross-claimant sues someone and seeks a remedy that could be embodied in a judgment.
• A “procedural motion” (e.g., motion to compel discovery, motion to quash, motion for protective order) is part of the litigation machinery; it does not independently seek to establish liability or a standalone right to relief, even though it may ask the court to exercise authority (such as compelling production or awarding fees).

The 2019 TCPA amendment codifies that distinction by excluding procedural motions that do not “amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.”

3. Prima Facie Case

A prima facie case is the minimum quantum of evidence that, if believed, would support each essential element of a claim. Under the TCPA:

• The nonmovant must offer “clear and specific evidence” for each element, but
• The court does not weigh credibility or resolve conflicts; it asks only whether the evidence, taken as true, would permit a reasonable factfinder to find for the claimant.

In Ferchichi and Haven, the courts of appeals tried to apply this standard to the “claims” purportedly embedded in the sanctions requests. The Supreme Court holds that those “claims” were not TCPA claims at all because the underlying motions were not “legal actions.”

4. Interlocutory Appeal

An interlocutory appeal is an appeal taken before final judgment, usually from specific types of orders authorized by statute. Under the TCPA:

• Orders denying TCPA motions to dismiss are immediately appealable; and
• Filing such an appeal stays all trial-court proceedings until the appeal is resolved.

This tool is powerful—but the Court emphasizes it must not be extended to routine procedural disputes such as discovery motions, or litigation would grind to a halt.

5. Discovery Sanctions and Discretion

“Sanctions” in this context are penalties or remedial orders imposed by a court to address litigation misconduct or rule violations. They can include:

• Monetary awards (e.g., opponent’s attorney’s fees),
• Evidence or issue preclusion,
• Striking pleadings, or even
• Dismissing claims in extreme cases.

However:

• Sanctions are typically discretionary—parties do not have a vested substantive “right” to them;
• The court decides whether, and to what extent, to impose them based on the facts and governing rules (e.g., Rule 215, Rule 13, Chapter 10).

This discretionary, remedial character is another reason why sanctions requests do not fit comfortably within the TCPA’s notion of a “claim for relief.”

V. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in the consolidated Ferchichi and Haven cases establishes a clear, important precedent:

Motions to compel discovery and for discovery-related sanctions, including requests for attorney’s fees, are not “legal actions” under the TCPA and therefore cannot be dismissed under that statute.

By applying textual analysis, the ejusdem generis canon, and careful attention to statutory purpose and structure, the Court:

• Confines “legal action” to lawsuits and functionally similar pleadings that assert substantive claims for relief;
• Excludes procedural motions that do not add or amend such claims, even when those motions seek monetary relief;
• Prevents the TCPA from being misused as a tactical weapon in discovery disputes; and
• Reinforces the statute’s dual aim of protecting both speech/petition rights and the right to pursue meritorious civil claims.

In doctrinal terms, the opinion harmonizes conflicting appellate decisions, clarifies how the 2019 amendments affect the definition of “legal action,” and preserves the TCPA’s anti-SLAPP core while preventing its overextension into routine procedural skirmishes. In practical terms, it restores discovery and sanctions practice in Texas civil litigation to the ordinary rules and remedies, free from the distorting effects of serial TCPA motions and interlocutory appeals over ancillary disputes.