Disclosing Research Misconduct Findings Is Not a Constitutional Due Process Violation: Commentary on Pichiorri v. Burghes

I. Introduction

This Sixth Circuit opinion, recommended for publication, sits squarely at the intersection of higher education, federally funded biomedical research, and constitutional law. In Flavia Pichiorri v. Arthur Burghes, No. 24‑3918 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), the court addressed whether a former Ohio State University (OSU) researcher could use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the university’s handling and subsequent disclosure of research‑misconduct findings to scientific journals and to her current employer.

Dr. Flavia Pichiorri, a cancer researcher formerly affiliated with OSU and later a professor at City of Hope Medical Center in California, alleged that an OSU investigation into alleged research misconduct was procedurally flawed, substantively wrong, and discriminatorily enforced. After OSU’s committee concluded that she had engaged in research misconduct and communicated its findings to medical journals and to City of Hope, she claimed these disclosures violated her federal due process rights (both procedural and substantive) and equal protection, alongside several state‑law tort and contract theories.

The district court dismissed her complaint, largely on sovereign‑immunity grounds and for failure to state a constitutional claim. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit:

• Affirmed the application of sovereign immunity to OSU’s Board of Trustees and to state‑law claims against OSU officials in their official capacities;
• Held that the plaintiff’s equal‑protection theory was forfeited on appeal; and
• Most significantly, held that the alleged harms—damage to reputation, adverse reactions by third parties, and loss of a prestigious NIH panel appointment—did not amount to a deprivation of “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment and did not “shock the conscience” for substantive due process purposes, even if OSU had violated federal Office of Research Integrity (ORI) confidentiality regulations.

The decision is important for universities, academic medical centers, and litigants in the research‑misconduct space. It clarifies that:

• Defamation‑like harms from research‑misconduct findings and their disclosure typically do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation;
• Violations of ORI’s confidentiality rule (42 C.F.R. § 93.108) do not, by themselves, create a substantive due process claim; and
• The “stigma‑plus” doctrine remains a high bar to plead a liberty interest in reputation‑based procedural due process claims.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

From 2004 to 2016, Dr. Pichiorri was associated with OSU, ultimately becoming an assistant professor in the College of Medicine and working in a cancer research lab led by Dr. Carlo Croce. She coauthored multiple high‑impact manuscripts (“Manuscripts 1, 2, and 5”), which, according to her complaint, were widely cited, replicated by other researchers, and used by OSU for patent applications.

After she left OSU for City of Hope in 2016, anonymous allegations of potential research misconduct were raised (2017–2018) concerning several of these manuscripts. OSU, as a federally funded research institution, convened a College of Medicine Investigation Committee under the framework of the ORI regulations (42 C.F.R. Part 93). Those regulations:

• Define “research misconduct” (fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism) only when committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (42 C.F.R. § 93.103);
• Require a preponderance‑of‑the‑evidence standard; and
• Impose confidentiality requirements during the investigation (42 C.F.R. § 93.108).

Pichiorri cooperated with the investigation, acknowledged certain errors in figures and image data, and submitted corrections and supporting data. She attributed the errors to overwork and inadequate training by OSU, and to missteps by colleagues who generated erroneous data, while denying any intent to deceive.

In 2020, the committee concluded that she (and another female scientist) had committed research misconduct, recommended that she be barred from future OSU employment, and urged journals to retract two manuscripts and correct a third. No male coauthor, including Croce, was found culpable. According to the complaint, OSU’s committee:

• Deviation from ORI standards by using a different, more lenient definition of misconduct;
• Failing to require proof of intent or recklessness;
• Withholding exculpatory evidence; and
• Not applying a preponderance‑of‑the‑evidence standard.

OSU later disseminated its findings—both at the time of the report and again in 2022—to “prestigious journals” and to City of Hope. These communications allegedly:

• Damaged her reputation and standing in the research community;
• Caused “public humiliation and emotional distress”;
• Triggered a City of Hope investigation into her NIH‑funded research, leading to a vaguely described “diminished” role as a senior leader and the resignation of a staff member; and
• Led to her removal from a “coveted” NIH panel on which she had long served and allegedly had “permanent membership.”

B. Procedural History

In 2023, Pichiorri filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio against:

• The Ohio State University Board of Trustees; and
• Eight members of the investigation committee plus a research officer, in their official and (for state claims) personal capacities.

She asserted:

• Federal claims under § 1983: procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection; and
• State‑law claims: negligence, defamation, invasion of privacy, tortious interference, breach of implied contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud.

She sought only equitable relief (injunctions and related remedies), not damages.

The district court:

1. Held that sovereign immunity barred all claims against the Board and barred state‑law claims against officials in their official capacities;
2. Found some federal claims time‑barred, but then also held that all constitutional claims failed on the merits; and
3. Declined supplemental jurisdiction over the surviving state‑law personal‑capacity claims.

On de novo review, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, focusing on:

• Sovereign immunity; and
• The insufficiency of the due process theories under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Equal protection was not addressed on appeal because the plaintiff did not press the argument in her appellate briefing, resulting in forfeiture.

C. Holdings in Brief

The court made three core determinations:

1. Sovereign Immunity: OSU’s Board of Trustees (as an arm of the State of Ohio) and OSU officials in their official capacities are immune from suit absent an applicable exception. Ex parte Young allows prospective injunctive relief only for alleged violations of federal law; it does not authorize injunctions to enforce state law or state tort duties. Sovereign immunity therefore barred:
• All claims against the OSU Board of Trustees; and
• All state‑law claims against the officials in their official capacities.
2. Procedural Due Process: The plaintiff’s reputation‑based injuries did not satisfy the “stigma‑plus” test. The only plausible “plus” harms alleged—vaguely diminished standing at City of Hope and loss of a single NIH panel seat—did not amount to a deprivation of a state‑recognized right or status.
3. Substantive Due Process: The alleged misconduct by OSU officials—wrongful research‑misconduct findings, defamatory communications to journals and an employer, and alleged violation of ORI’s confidentiality rule—did not “shock the conscience” and did not implicate the limited category of constitutionally protected privacy interests (physical safety or intimate personal/sexual information).

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the federal claims and the associated sovereign‑immunity rulings and left the plaintiff to whatever remedies she might pursue under state law in state court.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

The opinion draws on a familiar but important body of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit authority. Some of the most significant precedents are:

1. Sovereign Immunity and § 1983

• Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996): Reaffirmed that the Constitution protects state sovereign immunity from private suits in federal court unless the State consents or Congress validly abrogates that immunity. Used to frame the basic immunity of Ohio and its instrumentalities.
• Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989): Held that States, state agencies, and state officials in their official capacity are not “persons” under § 1983. This reinforces that suits for damages or retrospective relief against such entities are unavailable under § 1983.
• Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985): Clarified the distinction between official‑capacity and personal‑capacity suits and confirmed that official‑capacity suits are essentially suits against the governmental entity itself. The Sixth Circuit invokes it to treat OSU officials in their official capacities as the State for immunity purposes.
• Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908): The key exception to sovereign immunity that permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal (but not state) law. The court uses it to explain why only the federal constitutional claims, not the state‑law theories, can potentially go forward against officials in their official capacities.
• Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc): Applied Ex parte Young and confirmed that federal courts cannot use that doctrine to enjoin state officials to comply with state law. This is crucial to the court’s refusal to entertain injunctive relief on the state tort and contract claims against OSU officials.
• Hall v. Medical College of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1984): Determined that the Medical College of Ohio, like OSU, is an arm of the state and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. Cited to reinforce that OSU’s Board of Trustees is similarly protected.

2. Jurisdiction and Order of Operations

• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998): Criticized “hypothetical jurisdiction” and held that courts must establish subject‑matter jurisdiction before turning to the merits. The Sixth Circuit flags this to explain why sovereign immunity—treated as jurisdictional—normally must be addressed first.
• Nair v. Oakland County Community Mental Health Authority, 443 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2006) and Russell v. Lundergan‑Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037 (6th Cir. 2015): Together, these cases discuss whether sovereign immunity is a “jurisdictional bar” or an affirmative defense and whether states can waive the order of deciding immunity before the merits. The panel notes the tension but assumes, for simplicity, that immunity comes first and then proceeds to the merits of the surviving claims.

3. Pleading Standards

• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Established the “plausibility” standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions; complaints must plead facts that allow a reasonable inference of liability, not mere conclusions. The court uses Iqbal to emphasize that even accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true, they do not plausibly show a violation of due process.
• Blackwell v. Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479 (6th Cir. 2024): Cited for the proposition that at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage, courts must take well‑pleaded factual allegations as true but need not accept legal conclusions.

4. Procedural Due Process and the “Stigma‑Plus” Doctrine

• Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976): The foundational case holding that reputation alone is not a “liberty” interest protected by the Due Process Clause and that a plaintiff must show an alteration of a “right or status previously recognized by state law” in addition to reputational harm. This is the source of the “stigma‑plus” framework.
• Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991): Reaffirmed that constitutional protection for reputation alone is unavailable even if the defendant acts with malice. The plaintiff must show a more tangible deprivation, typically in the context of government employment (e.g., discharge). Siegert is central to the court’s conclusion that loss of reputation and future employment prospects is insufficient.
• American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999): Highlighted that not every state‑created interest counts as a liberty or property interest for due process purposes. Used here to reinforce the narrow scope of constitutional liberty interests.
• Various circuit and Sixth Circuit cases (Segler v. City of Detroit, 2024 WL 5135735; Murtha v. Rossford Exempted Village Schools, 2021 WL 4950238; Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353 (6th Cir. 1993)) are cited to illustrate applications of the stigma‑plus test, especially in public‑employment and access‑to‑public‑facility contexts.

5. Substantive Due Process and “Shocks the Conscience”

• County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998): Defined substantive due process protection against “the most egregious official conduct” that “shocks the conscience.” The opinion emphasizes that this is a very high threshold.
• Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992): Warned courts against transforming the Due Process Clause into a generalized guarantor of governmental responsibilities and tort duties. Cited to justify refusing to constitutionalize defamation or regulatory violations by OSU.
• Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986): Held that mere negligence by government officials does not violate due process. Reinforces that mere regulatory noncompliance and negligent error are not substantive due process matters.
• Department of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899 (2024): Reaffirmed that some liberty interests are protected from government deprivation regardless of procedures used (core substantive due process), but under very narrow and historically grounded categories.
• Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2000): Observed that it would be “odd” for “liberty” to have radically different meanings in procedural versus substantive due process analyses. The Sixth Circuit uses this reasoning to stress that the failure to state a procedural liberty interest strongly cuts against a substantive one.

6. Constitutional Privacy and Information Disclosure

• Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2008): Limited informational privacy under substantive due process to circumstances where disclosure could lead to bodily harm or involves extremely personal, humiliating information. Used to hold that research‑misconduct information is not constitutionally sensitive in this way.
• Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998): Found a constitutional privacy interest where disclosure of undercover officers’ personal data endangered them. Serves as an example of privacy tied to physical harm.
• Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998): Found a privacy right in preventing public disclosure of the intimate details of a rape. Highlighted as an example of “sexual, personal, and humiliating” information at the core of informational privacy. Contrasted with the professional‑misconduct information at issue here.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Sovereign Immunity and the Scope of the Case

The court begins by delineating which defendants and claims can even be heard. It applies settled law to hold:

• OSU’s Board of Trustees is an “arm of the state” of Ohio, enjoying sovereign immunity from suits in federal court absent waiver or valid congressional abrogation.
• Officials sued in their official capacities are treated as the State itself for immunity purposes.
• Section 1983 does not authorize suits against States or state officials in their official capacities for damages, as they are not “persons” under the statute.
• Ex parte Young permits only prospective relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law—not to enforce state‑law duties or to remedy past harm.

Because the plaintiff sought equitable relief only, Ex parte Young is theoretically available for the federal constitutional claims against the individual OSU officials in their official capacities. However:

• All claims against the Board of Trustees are barred absolutely by sovereign immunity; and
• All state‑law claims against OSU officials in their official capacities are barred because Ex parte Young cannot be used to enforce state law.

The one novel argument the plaintiff attempted—asserting that OSU and its officials acted as an “arm of the federal government” because of federal funding and ORI regulation—was not raised below and is thus forfeited on appeal. The court declines to consider that theory, leaving intact the conventional view that state universities remain arms of the state even when heavily federally funded and regulated.

2. Procedural Due Process: The “Stigma‑Plus” Framework

The heart of the case is whether the plaintiff has alleged a protectable “liberty” interest under procedural due process. The court focuses on the “reputation‑plus” or “stigma‑plus” doctrine derived from Paul v. Davis and Siegert v. Gilley.

Key elements:

• No liberty interest in reputation alone: Even if a state official makes false and damaging accusations, the Due Process Clause is not triggered by pure defamation. Reputation as such is not constitutionally protected.
• “Plus” requirement: The plaintiff must show defamation plus some alteration or extinguishment of a more concrete legal right or status recognized by state law—for example, termination from public employment coupled with stigmatizing charges.

The court reviews the plaintiff’s allegations and finds several potential “plus” theories, each of which fails:

1. Loss of OSU employment or employment prospects: Because she left OSU on good terms in 2016—before any allegations or findings of misconduct—she cannot claim a liberty interest based on being fired or constructively discharged by OSU. And while the committee recommended she be barred from future OSU employment, she did not rely on this as her “plus” theory on appeal, and any such argument is deemed forfeited.
2. Adverse effects at City of Hope: She alleges that OSU’s disclosures caused City of Hope to open an investigation, which “diminished” her role as a senior leader and led a staff member to resign. The court finds this insufficiently concrete and too vague:
• She does not allege termination, demotion, suspension, or other clear adverse employment actions;
• The “diminished role” is not specified as a change in title, pay, tenure, or employment status; and
• Another person’s resignation does not alter her legal rights or status.

The court analogizes to other circuit cases that show even significant temporary changes in duties or minor disciplinary actions may not qualify as a “plus.” The opinion characterizes her allegations as amounting to harm to “future employment opportunities,” which Siegert squarely held is not enough.

3. Loss of NIH panel membership: She also alleges removal from a “coveted” NIH panel with “permanent membership.” The court compares this to the loss of a single government contract and notes that several circuits have held such singular losses insufficient for stigma‑plus:
   • There is no allegation that she is barred from competing for other comparable panels or opportunities;
   • The complaint lacks details about the panel’s nature, selection procedures, term, compensation (if any), and whether membership was legally protected or purely discretionary; and
   • Without concrete facts, the court cannot plausibly infer a change in a state‑recognized legal status or right.

An unresolved doctrinal question in the stigma‑plus caselaw is whether the same governmental actor must both stigmatize and inflict the “plus” injury, or whether the “plus” may be inflicted by third parties reacting to government defamation. The Sixth Circuit notes:

• It has previously “left open” that question (Segler);
• Other circuits are split (e.g., First Circuit versus Second Circuit); but
• The court again sidesteps the issue because, even assuming third‑party harm could qualify, the plaintiff’s alleged injuries do not meet the threshold “plus” requirement.

Thus, the procedural due process claim fails at the very first step: there is no cognizable liberty interest at stake.

3. Substantive Due Process: No “Conscience‑Shocking” Behavior

The plaintiff also pleads a substantive due process theory, arguing that OSU’s continued disclosure of the misconduct findings—two years after the investigation concluded and in violation of ORI’s confidentiality rule—was arbitrary, malicious, and conscience‑shocking.

The court applies the familiar two‑part structure of modern substantive due process:

1. Identify a protected interest: Some interests (e.g., bodily integrity, certain family relationships) are protected from government interference regardless of procedure. The court notes that if reputational interests do not qualify for procedural protection, they are even less likely to be protected substantively. The Third Circuit’s caution in Boyanowski—that “liberty” should not mean one thing for procedural and another for substantive claims—guides the court’s reluctance to recognize a liberty interest here.
2. Assess “conscience‑shocking” conduct: Even if a protected interest is assumed, substantive due process bars only “the most egregious” official conduct—examples include brutal physical abuse or forced stomach pumping to obtain evidence (Rochin v. California, as discussed in Lewis). Routine or even negligent maladministration of regulatory schemes, and garden‑variety defamation, are not constitutionally shocking.

On this framework, the court reasons:

• Defamation is not conscience‑shocking: The allegations—false statements about research misconduct harming the plaintiff’s reputation and career—fit squarely within the domain of traditional defamation. The Supreme Court has refused to convert the Due Process Clause into a “font of tort law” (Paul, Daniels, Collins), and malice alone does not elevate defamation to a constitutional wrong (Siegert).
• ORI confidentiality rules do not equate to constitutional privacy: The plaintiff argues that breaches of 42 C.F.R. § 93.108(b) (requiring confidentiality of records that identify subjects of an investigation) are constitutionally significant. The court responds that substantive due process informational privacy is far narrower:
  • It protects against disclosures that could lead to bodily harm (e.g., undercover officers’ personal data in Kallstrom); or
  • Disclosures of intensely intimate and humiliating details (e.g., graphic sexual assault details in Bloch).
  Research‑misconduct findings, by comparison, involve professional performance and ethics—not bodily safety or intimate personal details. Hence, a breach of ORI’s confidentiality rule, even if it occurred, does not implicate constitutional privacy.
• No constitutionalization of regulatory violations: Even assuming OSU violated ORI’s standards regarding proof, burden, or confidentiality, such regulatory violations are not self‑executing constitutional claims. Administrative law and grant conditions may provide remedies in other forums, but the federal Constitution does not guarantee perfect compliance with every federal regulation.

In sum, the substantive due process claim is rejected because:

• No constitutionally protected “liberty” or privacy interest is implicated; and
• The alleged conduct—wrongful research‑misconduct findings and improper disclosure—does not remotely resemble the extreme, brutal, or shockingly arbitrary behavior that substantive due process targets.

4. Equal Protection and Forfeiture

Although the complaint contained an equal‑protection theory (notably, that the committee found two women but no men responsible for misconduct), the opinion does not reach the merits. The critical point is procedural:

• The district court found the equal‑protection claim defective on the merits;
• On appeal, the plaintiff did not actually argue that this finding was wrong; and
• Under Sixth Circuit precedent (Blick v. Ann Arbor Public School District, 105 F.4th 868 (6th Cir. 2024)), failing to brief an issue means it is forfeited.

Therefore, the equal‑protection theory simply drops out of the case.

C. Impact and Implications

1. For Universities and Research Institutions

The decision will be of particular interest to universities, medical schools, and research institutions that conduct ORI‑governed investigations. Key implications:

• Constitutional risk from reporting misconduct is limited: When institutions, acting under ORI regulations, communicate findings of research misconduct to journals, employers, NIH, or other stakeholders, such actions—by themselves—are unlikely to support federal due process claims, so long as:
  • The alleged harms are reputational and career‑related; and
  • No government employment or clearly defined legal status is directly revoked by the same state actor in a way that meets the stigma‑plus standard.
• Regulatory compliance remains important, but not constitutionally mandated: Violations of ORI’s confidentiality requirements or definitional standards may still have serious consequences:
  • Administrative sanctions from ORI or funding agencies;
  • Contractual or policy‑based claims; and
  • State‑law tort claims (e.g., defamation, invasion of privacy, negligent investigation).
  But this opinion makes clear that such violations, without more, generally do not rise to the level of constitutional wrongs.
• Need for careful separation of state and federal theories: Institutions should recognize that:
  • Federal courts are reluctant to police research integrity via § 1983; and
  • Most real litigation risk remains in state courts under defamation, contract, and employment law, rather than in federal constitutional litigation.

2. For Researchers and Faculty

From the perspective of individual scientists and academics:

• § 1983 is a narrow avenue of relief: Faculty and researchers dissatisfied with the fairness of a university’s misconduct process or its disclosure practices should not assume that § 1983 offers a remedy. Unless:
  • They are current employees (or job applicants) of a public institution; and
  • They can tie alleged defamation directly to a formal, concrete adverse employment action (termination, demotion, disqualification from government benefits, etc.),
  a stigma‑plus procedural due process claim will be difficult to sustain.
• Substantive due process is even narrower: Claims that a committee “fabricated” evidence, used unfair procedures, or violated internal or federal rules—even maliciously—will almost always be characterized as, at most, torts or contract breaches, not substantive due process violations.
• State law remains primary: The court’s analysis implicitly directs aggrieved researchers toward:
  • Internal university grievance and appeal processes;
  • Administrative complaints to ORI or funding agencies; and
  • State‑court suits for defamation, breach of contract (including implied contractual rights from faculty handbooks), and related torts.

3. Doctrinal Clarifications

Although the opinion does not radically reshape doctrine, it clarifies or reinforces several points:

• Heightened threshold for the “plus” component: Minor, poorly defined changes in workplace role, the departure of colleagues, and loss of a single professional appointment (like an NIH panel seat) are not enough, without more factual detail, to amount to alteration of a legal “right or status.” This tightening will make stigma‑plus pleading more demanding.
• Liberty is coherent across procedural and substantive due process: The court emphasizes the logical link: if an interest (like reputation) is not even sufficient to trigger procedural protections, it is unlikely to support a substantive due process claim either. This promotes consistency in interpreting “liberty” across doctrinal subfields.
• ORI confidentiality is not a constitutional privacy right: By squarely holding that disclosures of research‑misconduct findings do not fit within the narrow realm of informational privacy protected under substantive due process, the court delineates a clear boundary between regulatory confidentiality and constitutional privacy.
• Federalism and remedial structure: The opinion carefully avoids turning federal constitutional law into a general supervisory regime over university research investigations. It channels grievances into state law and federal administrative processes, respecting federalism and congressional choices about enforcement mechanisms under grant‑related regulations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Sovereign Immunity and Ex parte Young

Sovereign immunity means that States and their arms (like state universities) cannot be sued in federal court by private individuals unless:

• The State consents; or
• Congress clearly and validly removes that immunity under a constitutional power (for example, sometimes under the Fourteenth Amendment).

State officials sued in their official capacities are treated as if the State itself is the defendant. Thus, sovereign immunity usually shields them too.

Ex parte Young is a judge‑made exception that allows individuals to sue state officials in federal court for prospective injunctive relief (e.g., “stop enforcing this unconstitutional statute”) when the officials are allegedly violating federal law. Crucially:

• It does not permit suits to enforce state law; and
• It does not authorize damages for past harm.

B. Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause says that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” It has two main aspects:

• Procedural due process: Focuses on how the government acts. If the State is going to take away life, liberty, or property, it must use fair procedures—usually notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
• Substantive due process: Focuses on what the government is doing. Some government actions are so fundamentally unfair or arbitrary they are forbidden regardless of procedure—such as invasive forced medical procedures or extreme brutalization by officials. Only a narrow set of deeply rooted rights (like bodily integrity, some family rights, and certain intimate decisions) fall under this protection.

C. The “Stigma‑Plus” Test

Under procedural due process, there is:

• No constitutional right to be free from defamation by the government; but
• There may be a right to a hearing when:
  • The government says something stigmatizing about you (e.g., calls you a thief, fraud, or criminal); and
  • At the same time, changes a concrete legal right or status (e.g., fires you from a public job, bars you from entering public property, or revokes a government license).

This is the “stigma‑plus” doctrine. “Stigma” is the reputational harm; the “plus” is the loss of a legal right or status.

D. “Shocks the Conscience” and Substantive Due Process

To bring a substantive due process claim against executive officials (like university administrators), a plaintiff must show conduct so outrageous that it “shocks the conscience.” Examples historically include:

• Violent or brutal physical abuse by government agents;
• Forced medical procedures for evidentiary purposes; or
• Deliberate indifference to serious risks of bodily harm in extreme circumstances.

Mere negligence, bureaucratic unfairness, defamation, or even ordinary malicious conduct typically do not meet this standard. Those are usually remedied through torts, contracts, or administrative law—not constitutional litigation.

E. ORI Research Misconduct Rules

The Office of Research Integrity (ORI), part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, oversees research integrity in Public Health Service‑funded research. Its regulations (42 C.F.R. Part 93):

• Define “research misconduct” as fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in research, proposals, or reports, committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly;
• Require institutions to investigate allegations using a preponderance‑of‑the‑evidence standard;
• Emphasize that “honest error” or differences of scientific opinion are not misconduct; and
• Require confidentiality of records or evidence that could identify respondents, except as required by law or otherwise permitted by the regulations.

However, as this decision confirms, those regulations do not themselves create constitutional rights. Violation of ORI rules may matter for funding and administrative remedies, but it does not automatically amount to a due process violation.

V. Conclusion

Pichiorri v. Burghes is a careful application of established doctrines to a rapidly expanding context: research‑misconduct investigations at public universities. The Sixth Circuit:

• Reaffirms the robust protection of state sovereign immunity and the narrowness of Ex parte Young;
• Applies and tightens the “stigma‑plus” framework, clarifying that:
  • Reputational harm alone is never a liberty interest; and
  • Vague or modest career setbacks and the loss of a single professional appointment do not, without substantial factual detail, constitute a deprivation of a state‑recognized right or status.
• Maintains a strict view of substantive due process, refusing to constitutionalize:
  • Defamation‑like injuries; or
  • Alleged violations of ORI’s confidentiality and misconduct standards.

For researchers and institutions, the opinion underscores that the primary legal risks of research‑misconduct proceedings lie in state law and administrative regimes, not in constitutional torts. While it leaves room for robust state‑law challenges to allegedly unfair investigations and disclosures, it firmly closes the door on using the Fourteenth Amendment as a general oversight mechanism for research‑integrity disputes.

In the broader legal context, Pichiorri serves as a precedent that:

• Confirms the limited role of federal due process in reputation‑based claims;
• Clarifies that ORI confidentiality rules do not equate to constitutional privacy rights; and
• Encourages litigants and courts to maintain a clear boundary between constitutional law and state tort and contract law in the academic‑research domain.