Directory Nature of the 48-Hour Pretrial Detention Hearing Rule under Illinois’ Pretrial Fairness Act

Introduction

People v. Cooper (2025 IL 130946) addresses a key procedural question under the recently enacted Pretrial Fairness Act (725 ILCS 5/110-1.5 et seq. (West 2022)): whether the 48-hour timing requirement for a pretrial detention hearing is mandatory—automatically entitling a defendant to release if breached—or directory—subject to later correction without automatic relief. The Supreme Court of Illinois resolved a conflict in the appellate courts by holding that section 110-6.1(c)(2)’s 48-hour rule is directory, not mandatory, and requires prejudice to warrant relief.

In this case, the State of Illinois charged Tyrell Derrious Cooper with multiple felonies, filed a verified petition to deny his pretrial release, and scheduled a detention hearing more than 48 hours after his first appearance. The Fourth District Appellate Court vacated the circuit court’s detention order and ordered Cooper’s release. The Supreme Court granted review to decide the proper construction of the timing provision and the appropriate remedy for noncompliance.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Overstreet, reversed the Fourth District’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court’s order detaining Cooper. The Court held:

• Section 110-6.1(c)(2)’s requirement to hold a pretrial detention hearing within 48 hours of first appearance is directory, not mandatory, because it contains no negative language or prescribed consequence for noncompliance and because a strict mandatory reading would undermine public-safety objectives of the Pretrial Fairness Act.
• As a directory provision, failure to comply with the 48-hour timing requirement does not automatically invalidate the detention hearing or entitle a defendant to release; the moving party must show prejudice from the delay.
• Cooper did not object to the timing of the hearing when it was set, nor did he demonstrate prejudice from the brief delay; accordingly, no remedy was available and his challenge was forfeited.
• The Fourth District’s remedy—vacating the circuit court’s order and remanding for release on conditions—was erroneous.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Lakewood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Department of Health, 2019 IL 124019 The Court reaffirmed the presumption that procedural statutory commands are directory unless negative language or an express consequence for noncompliance requires a mandatory reading.

2. People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507 (2009) The Court explained that a statutory timing requirement is directory unless the provision prescribes a specific consequence for noncompliance or the right it protects would be generally injured by a directory reading.

3. People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43 (2005) Clarified the mandatory-directory distinction: “shall” always indicates an obligatory duty, but the key question is whether failure to comply invalidates the underlying action.

4. People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d 34 (2011) Held that a defendant must show prejudice when relief is sought for noncompliance with a directory timing rule.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeded in three steps:

1. Construction of Section 110-6.1(c)(2)
   The statute directs the court to “immediately hold a hearing” on a petition to deny pretrial release and, if a continuance is granted, to hold the hearing “within 48 hours of the defendant’s first appearance” for serious felonies. It imposes no specific sanction for exceeding 48 hours and contains no negative command (e.g., “no hearing held after 48 hours shall be valid”).
2. Mandatory vs. Directory
   Because section 110-6.1(c)(2) neither prescribes a consequence for non-compliance nor uses negative language to prohibit further action, there is no evidence that the legislature intended to invalidate hearings held after 48 hours. Further, a mandatory interpretation—automatically releasing defendants whenever the timing lapses—would conflict with the Act’s public-safety purpose. Therefore, the provision is deemed directory.
3. Remedy for Noncompliance
   Under governing precedent, a directory rule does not trigger automatic relief; instead, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay to justify relief. Cooper did not allege any prejudice, nor did he contemporaneously object to the afternoon scheduling; thus, no remedy was warranted.

Impact

People v. Cooper settles conflicting appellate decisions and offers clear guidance:

• For Trial Courts: Scheduling technical violations of the 48-hour rule will not automatically doom pretrial detention proceedings, provided defendants can be heard on the merits and no prejudice results.
• For Prosecutors: The timing requirement remains important—courts should endeavor to comply promptly—but minor scheduling delays will not necessarily invalidate detention orders.
• For Defense Counsel: To preserve a timing-based challenge, a defendant must object to the specific 48-hour breach and demonstrate prejudice; a general request for “immediate” hearing is insufficient if the later timing is never challenged.
• For Future Legislation: If the Illinois legislature had intended to compel release for any timing violation, it must explicitly state the sanction or use prohibitory language.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandatory vs. Directory
- A mandatory provision not only requires a certain action, but also invalidates the proceeding or triggers a specific outcome if not followed.
- A directory provision guides procedure but does not nullify the outcome if the timing or steps are imperfectly met; remedy requires proof of prejudice.

48-Hour Timing Rule
- Under 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2), a detention hearing must occur within 48 hours of the defendant’s first appearance when serious charges are filed.
- The rule is designed to protect defendants’ liberty by preventing unreasonably prolonged pretrial detention without review, while also balancing community safety.

Prejudice Requirement
- When a rule is directory, a defendant must show that the delay caused actual harm—e.g., loss of evidence, impaired defense preparation, or other concrete disadvantage—to obtain relief.

Conclusion

In People v. Cooper, the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed that the Pretrial Fairness Act’s 48-hour detention-hearing rule is directory, not mandatory. Absent explicit statutory language prescribing relief or prohibiting post-deadline hearings—and in order to avoid undermining public-safety aims—timing violations alone do not afford automatic release. Instead, defendants must promptly object, preserve the issue, and show prejudice from any delay. This ruling ensures that Illinois courts stay focused on the merits of dangerousness and risk‐of‐flight determinations while encouraging timely hearings.