Director-Approved Language Determines Insurers’ Compliance with ORS 746.290(2)

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Bellshaw v. Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, 373 Or 307 (2025). The case arises from a putative class action in which the plaintiff, Steven Bellshaw, alleged that Farmers issued a statutorily required notice with incomplete content. The core issue was how to interpret the notice requirement in ORS 746.290(2): Must an insurer independently ensure that its policy insert recites all of the statutory subsections of ORS 746.280, or does compliance turn solely on whether the insurer used language “approved by the director” of the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS)?

Parties and procedural posture:

Respondent on Review: Steven Bellshaw, individually and on behalf of similarly situated policyholders.
Petitioner on Review: Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, insurer.
The circuit court granted summary judgment to Bellshaw and awarded statutory penalties under ORS 746.300. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review.

2. Summary of the Judgment

By a majority opinion authored by Justice Garrett, the Supreme Court reversed in part. The Court held that under ORS 746.290(2) an insurer’s only obligation as to the content of the required policy insert is to use “clear and conspicuous language approved by the director.” Whether the director-approved language omits some statutory provisions is immaterial to an insurer’s liability. Accordingly, a private plaintiff cannot prevail merely by showing that an approved notice lacks certain subsections of ORS 746.280. Instead, liability turns exclusively on whether the insurer in fact used language approved by the director. The Supreme Court:

Reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to Bellshaw;
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with the rule that director approval is determinative of compliance under ORS 746.290(2).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 372 Or 225 (2024) – Summarized the summary-judgment standard and the limited factual dispute in Bellshaw.
ORS 731.240(1) – Provided a parallel administrative remedy for challenging director action.
ORS 742.003 – Described DCBS form preapproval process, relevant to insurer submissions of notice inserts after 2015.
ORS 174.010, ORS 174.020 – Articulated the cardinal principles of statutory construction in Oregon.
State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 (2009) – Confirmed that legislative intent emanates first from text and context, then history if necessary.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s interpretation unfolded in three steps:

Textual ambiguity: ORS 746.290(2) requires that a motor-vehicle policy be “accompanied by a statement in clear and conspicuous language approved by the director of (a) the rights and responsibilities of the insured … and (b) the provisions of ORS 746.280.” The statute does not expressly say whether the approval requirement attaches equally to both (a) and (b), nor does it expressly impose independent content obligations on the insurer.
Legislative history resolves ambiguity: The Court reviewed the 1977 House Judiciary Committee hearing transcripts. Witnesses from the auto-body and insurance industries testified that insurers feared uncertainty as to what content would satisfy the new notice requirement. In response, the committee added “approved by the commissioner” (now “director”) to ensure that use of director-approved language would insulate insurers from collateral attacks on notice adequacy. That history confirms that the legislature intended to allow insurers to rely exclusively on director approval to satisfy content obligations.
Doctrine of reliance: Because insurers are regulated entities that operate under DCBS oversight, the director’s approval of a notice form relieves insurers of further inquiry into adequacy. Post-approval liability for content omissions would defeat the very certainty the legislature sought to provide.

3.3 Impact

The decision has immediate and prospective effects:

Insurer certainty: Motor-vehicle insurers may protect themselves against private-action damages under ORS 746.300 by using only DCBS-approved notice language, even if that language omits certain statutory subsections.
DCBS role enhanced: The ruling affirms that DCBS preapproval of forms—whether bulletins, rulemaking, or the post-2015 form-filing process—determines compliance with ORS 746.290(2).
Judicial review focused: Future challenges to the adequacy of notices must proceed, if at all, under ORS 731.240 (administrative appeals of director action) or ORS 183.400 (rule-making review), rather than via private ERISA-style suits against insurers.
Consumer protection tension: Although the choice-of-shop statutes reflect strong legislative concern for consumer notice, this decision shifts primary enforcement of notice-content adequacy to the administrative arena, potentially narrowing private-action remedies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Choice-of-shop law (ORS 746.280): Prohibits insurers from forcing insureds to use particular repair shops and requires clear notice of that right.
Notice requirement (ORS 746.290(2)): At policy issuance or renewal, insurers must enclose a separate insert stating:
- (a) insureds’ rights and responsibilities when submitting a claim; and
- (b) the full provisions of ORS 746.280.
Director approval: DCBS must preapprove the exact wording of that separate insert so that insurers can avoid liability by using it “as is.”
Statutory damages (ORS 746.300): Authorizes an insured to recover “actual damages or $100, whichever is greater, for each violation” of the notice provision.
Summary judgment: Disposes of a case when no genuine issue of material fact exists; here, the sole issue was statutory interpretation.

5. Conclusion

Bellshaw v. Farmers establishes a clear rule: Under ORS 746.290(2), an insurer’s compliance with the content requirement for choice-of-shop notices hinges solely on use of language the DCBS director has approved. Private plaintiffs may no longer prevail on challenges to omitted statutory subsections so long as the notice derives from director-approved text. The decision vindicates the legislature’s intent to give insurers certainty in a heavily regulated field and to channel content-adequacy disputes into the administrative process. Going forward, insurers will routinely rely on form-filing preapproval, and insureds seeking to challenge notice accuracy must look to administrative appeals rather than private-action litigation.