Direct Evidence as a Bar to Georgia’s Circumstantial Evidence Rule and Strict Enforcement of Appellate Abandonment: Commentary on Montgomery v. State

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Montgomery v. State, S25A1395 (Dec. 9, 2025), furnishes a concise but important reaffirmation of two recurring principles in Georgia criminal law:

• Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence statute, OCGA § 24-14-6, does not apply when the State presents any direct evidence of guilt, and
• Enumerated errors on appeal are deemed abandoned under Supreme Court Rule 22 if they are not supported by argument and citation to authority.

Christie Montgomery was convicted of malice murder and related offenses arising from the shooting death of Justice Jackson outside a DeKalb County apartment. On appeal, she challenged the sufficiency of the evidence under OCGA § 24-14-6 and argued the trial court should have granted a mistrial based on juror misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that:

• OCGA § 24-14-6 is inapplicable because the State offered direct eyewitness testimony that Montgomery shot the victim, and
• The juror-misconduct-based mistrial claim was abandoned under Supreme Court Rule 22 because Montgomery’s brief offered no argument or authority on that point.

While the opinion is brief, it has practical significance in clarifying the threshold for invoking Georgia’s circumstantial evidence rule and in underscoring the rigor with which Georgia’s appellate courts enforce briefing rules.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Living Arrangements and Tensions

In 2018, Montgomery lived in a DeKalb County apartment with her son. She allowed Chelsea Hughes, Hughes’s infant son, and Justice Jackson (Hughes’s boyfriend) to stay in the bedroom of her apartment. The arrangement was informal: Hughes would pay “fifty to [a] hundred dollars a week, whatever [she] could afford.” Jackson often stayed there with Hughes.

The infant son, though initially present, had been sent to Mississippi about a week before the shooting.

2.2 Events on the Night of the Shooting

On the night of May 17, 2018, several key events unfolded:

• Montgomery left the apartment around 11 p.m. with her son to pick up an acquaintance, Walter Pless, who called saying it was an emergency. When she left, no one else was in the apartment.
• Hughes, working an evening shift at a restaurant, was picked up by Jackson after her shift. They went to Montgomery’s apartment sometime around midnight.
• Hughes stayed awake to eat while Jackson slept. During this period, Josh O’Cain, a friend of Jackson’s who had introduced Hughes to Montgomery, arrived and was let in by Hughes. She then went to bed.

Later, Montgomery returned with several people, including Pless. Hughes awoke to loud banging on the bedroom door. Montgomery was yelling that someone had stolen her marijuana (Montgomery later testified $30 had been stolen). Jackson and Hughes came into the living room to find Montgomery with “four or five other people” engaged in a heated argument about who stole the marijuana.

Montgomery then declared she no longer wanted a thief in her house and announced that everyone had to leave. She also evicted Hughes and Jackson from the bedroom, cutting off their access to the space they had been allowed to use. As Hughes gathered her belongings to leave, she testified that she saw Montgomery holding a gun.

2.3 The Shooting Outside the Apartment

After Hughes and Jackson carried their belongings to Hughes’s car, Hughes realized she had left her phone in the apartment. She went back upstairs and, again, saw Montgomery with a gun in hand. While Hughes searched for the phone, the others inside continued arguing. Montgomery then said “eff this” and stepped outside.

Shortly thereafter, Hughes heard a gunshot followed by additional shots. She did not see the shooter, though she testified that there had been a man wearing a hoodie standing outside in front of Jackson and O’Cain. In her first statement to the police, Hughes identified this hooded man as the shooter, but at trial she maintained that she did not see who fired the shots.

O’Cain, however, testified that he was outside with Jackson when he saw Montgomery emerge, raise a gun, and shoot Jackson. This testimony constitutes the core direct evidence on which the Supreme Court relied.

After the shots, Montgomery returned inside and pushed Hughes out of the apartment. Hughes went to Jackson, who told her he had “been hit,” and tried unsuccessfully to help him reach the car before he collapsed. Hughes sought help by knocking on multiple doors until emergency responders arrived.

2.4 Physical and Forensic Evidence

Law enforcement recovered:

• A black Taurus 9mm pistol near Jackson’s body, which Hughes claimed as her gun.
• Six cartridge casings matching Hughes’s gun, plus ammunition in Hughes’s car.
• A 9mm JAG Luger +P cartridge casing in Montgomery’s car, but no firearm there.

Montgomery testified that she owned a Ruger 9mm handgun, which she carried in her car and stored under the mattress in the living room. She said that after returning from picking up Pless, she placed that gun back under the mattress.

GBI firearms expert Noah Burdick testified:

• He explained differences between revolvers and semi-automatic pistols.
• The bullet that killed Jackson and the casing from Montgomery’s car did not match Hughes’s Taurus pistol.
• The bullet bore markings consistent with having been fired from a range of possible firearms, including a Ruger-type gun.

Thus, the forensic evidence:

• Undermined the theory that Hughes’s gun fired the fatal shot, and
• Was consistent with a weapon similar to the Ruger 9mm Montgomery admitted owning.

2.5 Indictment, Trial, and Sentencing

The crimes occurred May 17, 2018. A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Montgomery in August 2018 on:

• Malice murder,
• Felony murder,
• Aggravated assault, and
• Possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

She was reindicted on the same counts in January 2019. Trial took place in March 2022. The jury found Montgomery guilty on all counts. The trial court imposed:

• Life imprisonment for malice murder, plus
• Five consecutive years for the firearm possession offense.

As a matter of Georgia law:

• The felony murder conviction was vacated as a matter of law (because it was based on the same underlying homicide as the malice murder), and
• The aggravated assault count merged into the malice murder conviction for sentencing.

Montgomery filed a motion for new trial, later amended, which the trial court denied. She appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The case was docketed to the Court’s August 2025 term and decided on the briefs without oral argument.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

Justice Pinson, writing for a unanimous court, resolved two discrete issues:

1. Sufficiency of the evidence under OCGA § 24-14-6.
   • OCGA § 24-14-6 requires that in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, the evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant’s guilt.
   • The Court held that this statute does not apply if the State has presented any direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
   • Because O’Cain testified that he saw Montgomery raise a gun and shoot Jackson, this eyewitness account constituted direct evidence of guilt, rendering § 24-14-6 inapplicable.
   • Montgomery did not assert a separate general sufficiency challenge under the federal constitutional standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and the Court noted that omission expressly.
2. Juror misconduct and mistrial.
   • At trial, a juror admitted having conducted “research” on guns and bullet calibers. The trial court denied Montgomery’s motion for mistrial, excused the juror, seated an alternate, and instructed the jury to restart deliberations.
   • On appeal, Montgomery enumerated this as error but failed to make any argument or cite authority in support.
   • Invoking Supreme Court Rule 22(1) and citing French v. State, 321 Ga. 665 (2025), the Court treated this claim as abandoned and refused to consider it.

The Court therefore affirmed Montgomery’s convictions and sentence. All Justices concurred.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Framing of the Issues on Appeal

Montgomery’s appeal was narrowly framed. She:

• Challenged sufficiency only through the lens of OCGA § 24-14-6 (the circumstantial evidence statute), and
• Raised a juror misconduct/mistrial issue without substantive briefing.

She did not raise:

• A standard federal due process sufficiency challenge under Jackson v. Virginia, or
• Any other constitutional or evidentiary issues regarding the eyewitness testimony or forensic evidence.

This constrained posture shaped the opinion: the Court did not evaluate whether any rational juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it only asked whether OCGA § 24-14-6 applied, and whether the juror-misconduct claim was preserved.

4.2 Circumstantial Evidence Statute and the Direct Evidence Exception

4.2.1 The Statutory Framework: OCGA § 24-14-6

OCGA § 24-14-6 provides (paraphrased in the opinion) that when a conviction rests on circumstantial evidence:

In practice, this creates a heightened sufficiency requirement in cases that are purely circumstantial. In such cases, the appellate court does two things:

• Views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and
• Considers whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable theory consistent with innocence.

However, Georgia courts have repeatedly held that § 24-14-6 applies only when all of the evidence of guilt is circumstantial.

4.2.2 Brown v. State: How to Review Circumstantial Evidence Cases

The Court cites Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902 (2011), for the method of reviewing § 24-14-6 claims:

• The appellate court still views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict.”
• Whether the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis save guilt is typically a jury question; appellate courts defer heavily to the jury’s resolution unless the evidence is so weak that no rational juror could reject the alternative hypothesis as unreasonable.

In Montgomery, however, the Court never reached this stage of analysis because it concluded § 24-14-6 simply did not apply.

4.2.3 Jackson v. State and the Direct Evidence Threshold

The Court relies explicitly on Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626 (2021), for the proposition that:

The key doctrinal point from Jackson v. State is that a case ceases to be “based on circumstantial evidence” within the meaning of § 24-14-6 as soon as there is at least one piece of direct evidence tying the defendant to the crime. It does not matter that:

• The bulk of the State’s case is circumstantial, or
• The direct evidence is contested, impeached, or arguably weak.

Once direct evidence exists, the special circumstantial evidence rule is off the table; the usual sufficiency standard governs (if properly invoked).

4.2.4 Douglas v. State and the Characterization of Eyewitness Testimony

The Court also cites Douglas v. State, 321 Ga. 739 (2025). Although the opinion does not quote Douglas, its role is clear: it confirms that eyewitness identification of the defendant as the shooter is classic direct evidence.

In Montgomery, O’Cain testified that:

Because this testimony, if believed, directly asserts that Montgomery committed the actus reus of the crime, it is direct evidence. The jury does not have to infer from other facts who fired the gun; the witness claims to have seen it. This is precisely the kind of evidence that removes a case from § 24-14-6’s ambit.

4.2.5 Application to Montgomery’s Case

The Court’s reasoning can be distilled as follows:

1. Classify the evidence.
   • There is substantial circumstantial evidence against Montgomery (her possession of a Ruger-type 9mm, her being armed and angry, forensic linkage possibilities).
   • There is also direct evidence: O’Cain’s eyewitness account of Montgomery shooting Jackson.
2. Apply the rule from Jackson v. State.
   • Because there is at least one piece of direct evidence of guilt, the case is not “based on circumstantial evidence” within the meaning of OCGA § 24-14-6.
3. Conclude inapplicability of § 24-14-6.
   • Therefore, Montgomery cannot invoke § 24-14-6’s “exclude every other reasonable hypothesis” requirement.
   • Her statutory sufficiency claim fails at the threshold.

Notably, the Court does not:

• Weigh O’Cain’s credibility,
• Resolve any tension between Hughes’s initial police statement about the hooded man and her trial testimony, or
• Engage the ballistics uncertainties in detail.

Under Georgia appellate practice, those matters of credibility and evidentiary weight are for the jury, not the appellate court, assuming a proper sufficiency standard is even before the Court.

4.2.6 Absence of a Jackson v. Virginia Claim

The Court notes in a footnote that:

This is significant. A Jackson v. Virginia claim would ask whether, on the entire record, any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That is a different—and broader—constitutional standard than the narrower statutory rule of § 24-14-6.

By limiting her sufficiency argument to § 24-14-6, Montgomery:

• Forced the Court to focus solely on whether that statute applied (it did not), and
• Foreclosed a more holistic review of the evidence under the ordinary due process standard.

The opinion thus implicitly serves as a cautionary signal to defense counsel: failing to plead both statutory and constitutional sufficiency grounds can sharply limit appellate review.

4.3 Juror Misconduct, Mistrial, and Appellate Abandonment

4.3.1 Juror’s Outside Research and Trial Court’s Response

During jury deliberations, a juror acknowledged having conducted independent “research” on guns and bullet calibers—an obvious violation of the rule that jurors decide cases only on evidence introduced in court.

The trial court conducted an inquiry:

• The remaining jurors testified that this juror’s research did not affect their deliberations.
• The court denied the motion for mistrial.
• Instead, the court:
  • Dismissed the juror who had done the “research,”
  • Seated an alternate juror, and
  • Instructed the jury to restart deliberations.

This is a common remedial pattern in jury-misconduct situations: remove the offending juror, cure any possible taint by starting deliberations over, and proceed with the reconstituted jury.

4.3.2 Supreme Court Rule 22 and Abandonment

On appeal, Montgomery asserted that the trial court erred in denying her mistrial motion. However, crucially:

Supreme Court Rule 22(1) provides (in substance) that enumerations of error must be supported by argument and citation of authority. A bare enumeration, without developed briefing, is treated as abandoned.

The Court applies Rule 22(1), citing French v. State, 321 Ga. 665 (2025), which likewise enforced abandonment where a party failed to meaningfully brief an issue.

Accordingly, the Court:

• Does not reach the merits of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial, and
• Dismisses the claim as abandoned.

4.3.3 Practical Consequences

The result is doctrinally important for two reasons:

1. Strict enforcement of briefing rules.
   The Court underscores that it will not rescue poorly briefed claims. Even potentially serious issues—like juror misconduct involving outside research—will not be considered if counsel does not develop the argument.
2. No new law on juror misconduct remedies.
   Because the claim was abandoned, the opinion does not analyze:
   • Whether the juror’s “research” created a presumption of prejudice,
   • Whether the trial court’s questioning of the jurors was adequate, or
   • Whether replacing the juror and restarting deliberations was sufficient to cure any prejudice.
   Thus, Montgomery adds nothing substantive to Georgia’s juror-misconduct jurisprudence; its contribution is procedural, reinforcing Rule 22.

4.4 Precedents Cited and Their Role

4.4.1 Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902 (2011)

Brown is cited for the standard of review in circumstantial-evidence cases:

• Appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
• The question whether the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis except guilt is primarily for the jury.

Influence on Montgomery: Brown frames the general approach to § 24-14-6, but the Court in Montgomery stops short of applying that approach because Jackson v. State precludes § 24-14-6 when direct evidence exists.

4.4.2 Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626 (2021)

Jackson v. State is the key authority for the rule that:

Influence on Montgomery: Jackson provides the controlling framework: once O’Cain’s testimony is classified as direct evidence, § 24-14-6 cannot be invoked. The entire statutory sufficiency argument in Montgomery collapses under this rule.

4.4.3 Douglas v. State, 321 Ga. 739 (2025)

Although the opinion does not explicate Douglas, the Court cites it immediately after describing O’Cain’s eyewitness account. Douglas appears to confirm that eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter is direct evidence of guilt.

Influence on Montgomery: Douglas supports the classification of O’Cain’s testimony as direct evidence, anchoring the inapplicability of § 24-14-6.

4.4.4 French v. State, 321 Ga. 665 (2025)

French v. State is cited in connection with Supreme Court Rule 22(1), for the proposition that:

Influence on Montgomery: French supplies contemporary authority for applying Rule 22’s abandonment doctrine. The Court uses it to justify declining to address the mistrial claim.

5. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence

• Direct evidence proves a fact without requiring the factfinder to draw an inference. Example:
  • An eyewitness testifies, “I saw the defendant shoot the victim.”
• Circumstantial evidence requires an inference to connect it to the ultimate fact. Example:
  • The defendant’s fingerprints on the gun; ballistics showing the bullet came from a gun type the defendant owns; the defendant fleeing the scene.

In Montgomery:

• O’Cain’s eyewitness testimony is direct evidence.
• GBI ballistics, the 9mm casing in Montgomery’s car, and Montgomery’s angry confrontation are circumstantial evidence.

Under Georgia law, the presence of any direct evidence removes the case from OCGA § 24-14-6’s special circumstantial-evidence rule.

5.2 OCGA § 24-14-6’s “Every Other Reasonable Hypothesis” Requirement

When applicable, § 24-14-6 demands that:

• The circumstantial evidence must not only be consistent with guilt but must also be inconsistent with any other reasonable explanation.

For example, if the only evidence is that the defendant’s car was seen near the crime scene, that might support multiple reasonable hypotheses—innocent presence vs. involvement in the crime. In such a purely circumstantial case, a conviction could fail under § 24-14-6 if an innocent hypothesis remains reasonable.

In Montgomery, however, the Court does not apply this requirement because the case is not purely circumstantial.

5.3 Sufficiency of Evidence Under Jackson v. Virginia

Separate from OCGA § 24-14-6, the federal due process standard from Jackson v. Virginia asks:

This standard applies in all criminal convictions as a constitutional minimum, whereas § 24-14-6 is an additional, state-specific rule applicable only in purely circumstantial evidence cases.

In Montgomery, the Court does not conduct a Jackson v. Virginia analysis because Montgomery did not raise that claim.

5.4 Malice Murder, Felony Murder, Merger, and Automatic Vacatur

• Malice murder in Georgia generally refers to an unlawful killing with malice aforethought (either express or implied).
• Felony murder refers to a killing, irrespective of malice, that occurs during the commission or attempted commission of certain felonies.
• When a defendant is convicted of both malice murder and felony murder for the same homicide, Georgia law provides that the felony murder conviction is vacated as a matter of law—only one murder conviction can stand for a single death.
• Merger occurs when a lesser offense (e.g., aggravated assault as the underlying felony) merges into the greater offense (malice murder) for sentencing.

In Montgomery:

• The felony murder count was vacated as a matter of law.
• The aggravated assault merged with the malice murder conviction.

5.5 Motion for Mistrial and Juror Misconduct

A motion for mistrial asks the trial court to halt the trial and, typically, require a new trial because something has occurred that allegedly prevents a fair verdict—such as prejudicial statements, prosecutorial misconduct, or juror misconduct.

Here, the alleged misconduct was a juror’s independent “research” on guns and caliber—information outside the evidentiary record. Jurors are strictly prohibited from relying on extraneous information; their duty is to consider only what is presented in court and admitted into evidence.

Trial courts have broad discretion to:

• Investigate the nature and scope of the misconduct,
• Determine whether it is likely to have influenced the verdict, and
• Select an appropriate remedy (dismissal of a juror, curative instructions, or in extreme cases, a mistrial).

Because the claim was deemed abandoned on appeal, the Supreme Court did not analyze whether the trial court’s chosen remedy—dismissing the juror, seating an alternate, and restarting deliberations—sufficiently cured any potential prejudice.

5.6 Abandonment of Claims on Appeal (Supreme Court Rule 22)

Supreme Court Rule 22(1) essentially requires that:

• Enumerations of error must be supported by citations to the record, relevant legal authority, and meaningful argument.

Failure to do so typically results in the Court treating the issue as abandoned. An appellant cannot merely list an error; it must be explained and supported.

In Montgomery, the Court applied Rule 22(1) to hold that the juror-misconduct/mistrial claim was abandoned because Montgomery:

• Did not offer any argument, and
• Did not cite any legal authority in support of that enumeration.

6. Potential Impact and Practical Implications

6.1 Clarifying the Reach of OCGA § 24-14-6

Montgomery reinforces and applies a clear rule for Georgia practitioners:

• If there is any direct evidence of guilt—no matter how much circumstantial evidence also exists—§ 24-14-6’s “every other reasonable hypothesis” requirement is unavailable.

Implications:

• For defense counsel: Efforts to frame a case as “circumstantial” will fail if even one witness directly implicates the defendant. Counsel must be prepared to challenge:
  • Credibility of direct witnesses,
  • Reliability (e.g., conditions of observation, bias), and
  • Consistency with other evidence—but through ordinary sufficiency or evidentiary arguments, not § 24-14-6.
• For prosecutors: Securing even a single eyewitness who directly testifies to the defendant’s commission of the crime can insulate a conviction from § 24-14-6 challenges, although it remains subject to the general sufficiency standard.
• For trial judges: Requests for § 24-14-6 jury instructions in mixed direct-and-circumstantial cases should be carefully scrutinized in light of Jackson and its application here.

6.2 Appellate Practice: The Importance of Thorough Briefing

The strict application of Rule 22 in Montgomery sends a strong signal:

• Appellate courts will not salvage underdeveloped arguments.
• Serious issues—such as the integrity of the jury’s deliberative process—can be lost entirely if not adequately briefed.

Practitioners must:

• Explicitly frame both statutory and constitutional sufficiency challenges when appropriate, and
• Fully brief any allegation of trial court error, especially weighty ones like mistrial denials on juror misconduct grounds.

6.3 No Expansion, but Consolidation, of Juror Misconduct Doctrine

Because the juror misconduct claim was abandoned, Montgomery does not expand or refine the standards for when juror misconduct requires a mistrial. However, it:

• Demonstrates a common remedial strategy (dismissal of the offending juror, substitution of an alternate, and restarting deliberations), and
• Leaves untouched existing jurisprudence that trial courts have considerable discretion in dealing with such issues.

6.4 Evidentiary Lessons from the Facts

Although the Court did not conduct a full sufficiency analysis, the facts illustrate how Georgia juries and courts often handle conflicting evidence:

• Hughes’s initial identification of a hooded man as the shooter vs. her later testimony that she didn’t see the shooter.
• The presence of Hughes’s gun at the scene but forensic evidence indicating it was not the murder weapon.
• The existence of a 9mm Ruger-type weapon owned by Montgomery and forensic consistency with that type of gun.

These conflicts are left to the jury’s fact-finding role, and, absent a preserved sufficiency challenge under Jackson v. Virginia, the appellate court will not second-guess those determinations.

7. Conclusion

Montgomery v. State is not a sweeping doctrinal shift, but it crystallizes two crucial points in Georgia criminal practice:

1. Direct evidence forecloses reliance on OCGA § 24-14-6.
   As reaffirmed through Jackson v. State and applied here, the presence of any direct evidence of guilt, such as an eyewitness account, renders Georgia’s circumstantial evidence statute inapplicable. Defendants cannot invoke the “every other reasonable hypothesis” standard in such mixed-evidence cases.
2. Appellate abandonment is strictly enforced.
   Under Supreme Court Rule 22, issues raised without supporting argument or authority are treated as abandoned. In Montgomery, this meant that a potentially weighty claim—juror misconduct involving outside research—received no appellate scrutiny.

The decision thus serves as both a doctrinal reaffirmation and a practical guidepost. Substantively, it clarifies when the circumstantial evidence rule can be invoked. Procedurally, it underscores the necessity for careful, thorough appellate briefing, particularly in serious cases like malice murder, where the stakes are life, liberty, and the integrity of the criminal justice process.