Direct Control of a Known-Contents Container Equals Actual Possession; Broad Discretion to Give Anti-CSI Instructions: Commentary on United States v. Eddings (10th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Eddings is a published decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, affirming a felon-in-possession conviction on two counts. The case is significant for two reasons:

It expressly ties “actual possession” to “direct physical control” and confirms that direct control over a container that the defendant knows contains a firearm suffices to prove actual possession, even if the defendant never touches the firearm itself.
It reaffirms the permissibility of giving an “investigative-techniques” (often called “anti-CSI”) jury instruction even when the defense has not repeatedly demanded specific unutilized forensic or other methods, so long as the instructions as a whole correctly convey the burden of proof.

The defendant, Walter Palmon Eddings, challenged (1) denial of his suppression motion for lack of probable cause, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence on Count One (the rifle in the SUV), (3) the district court’s use of an investigative-techniques instruction, and (4) belatedly in his reply brief, the search of a backpack he was wearing at arrest. The Tenth Circuit (Judge McHugh, joined by Judges Hartz and Eid) affirmed on all points, holding the police had probable cause, the evidence sufficed under both actual and constructive possession theories, the jury instructions were not plain error, and the backpack-search argument was waived.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held:

Probable Cause/Suppression: Crediting the surveillance officer’s testimony (which the district court found reliable), officers had probable cause to arrest Eddings for being a felon in possession after observing him reposition a rifle in a vehicle. Although the defense argued there was no corroborating photo/video at the precise moment, the court found that absence did not contradict the testimony and the conditions (daylight, unobstructed view, binoculars) supported credibility. A newly raised argument that probable cause required evidence Eddings knew the bag contained a firearm was deemed waived; in any event, knowledge could be reasonably inferred from the visible barrel and Eddings’ proximity and handling.
Sufficiency (Count One): The evidence permitted the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Eddings knew the bag contained a rifle. On “actual possession,” the court reiterated that “direct physical control” is the touchstone and held that direct control over a container, when the defendant knows its firearm contents, suffices—no need to handle the firearm itself. “Constructive possession” was also supported by evidence of knowledge, access, and intent to exercise control.
Investigative-Techniques Instruction: Reviewing for plain error, the court approved the instruction given (the same language approved in United States v. Trent) even though defense counsel focused largely on the absence of certain evidence (photos, DNA, fingerprints). The court rejected arguments that such an instruction is proper only when defense repeatedly demands specific techniques, and that pairing it with the Tenth Circuit’s reasonable-doubt instruction (which does not explicitly say “lack of evidence” may create reasonable doubt) misleads jurors. The court noted district courts may, but need not, include language like Cota-Meza’s reminder that jurors can consider investigative omissions when deciding whether the government met its burden.
Backpack Search: The search-incident-to-arrest objection—raised for the first time in the reply brief—was deemed waived. The court declined to reach the merits or potential exceptions like inevitable discovery.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Probable Cause and Suppression

Fourth Amendment Framework: A warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause. The court cites Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2008), and Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2012), reaffirming that probable cause exists if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe the arrestee committed an offense. The ultimate probable cause determination is reviewed de novo (United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2004)), but factual/credibility findings are reviewed for clear error (United States v. Zabalza, 346 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Deference to District Court Factfinding: The appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and defers to credibility findings unless clearly erroneous (United States v. Palms, 21 F.4th 689 (10th Cir. 2021)). That posture is dispositive where the district court credited detailed testimony about unobstructed, daylight binoculared surveillance.
Issue Preservation in Suppression: Specific suppression theories not raised below are waived absent good cause (United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984 (10th Cir. 2011)). Eddings’ new “knowledge-of-firearm” probable cause objection arrived too late; the panel nevertheless explained why knowledge was inferable on the facts.
Mens Rea in § 922(g)(1): Citing Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), the court treated “knowledge that the item possessed is a firearm or ammunition” as a necessary element—consistent with reading “knowingly” to cover the nature of the object possessed as well as the defendant’s status.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Standards: Evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the government (United States v. Gallegos, 784 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 2015)); unpreserved sufficiency claims proceed under plain error (United States v. Wyatt, 964 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2020)), though an insufficiency “almost always” satisfies plain error’s four prongs (Gallegos), making the practical review akin to de novo.
Actual Possession: The panel relies on the Tenth Circuit’s formulation that the defining feature is “direct physical control,” citing United States v. Thompson, 133 F.4th 1094, 1098 (10th Cir. 2025). It also cites United States v. Johnson, 46 F.4th 1183 (10th Cir. 2022), which held that knowingly placing a leg over a firearm can constitute actual possession; and United States v. Spence, 721 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2013), where a gun in the defendant’s pocket constituted actual possession. Eddings extends this line by holding that direct control over a container—paired with proof the defendant knew the container held a firearm—can establish actual possession even without touching the firearm.
Constructive Possession: The court reiterates that constructive possession exists when a person, not in actual possession, knowingly has the power and intent to exercise dominion or control over the object (United States v. Little, 829 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2016)). Exclusive control of premises permits inference of knowledge/control; joint occupancy requires a nexus showing knowledge, access, and intent (United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Samora, 954 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Stepp, 89 F.4th 826 (10th Cir. 2023)). The evidence met that standard here.

Jury Instructions: Investigative Techniques and Reasonable Doubt

Instructional Discretion: District courts have “substantial discretion” in formulating instructions, so long as they are correct statements of law and adequately cover the issues (United States v. Vasquez, 985 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1993)). The appellate question is whether the jury was fairly guided (United States v. Hicks, 116 F.4th 1109 (10th Cir. 2024); Brodie v. Gen. Chem. Corp., 112 F.3d 440 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Preservation and Plain Error: Under Rule 30(d) and Tenth Circuit precedent, specific grounds must be raised before the jury retires (United States v. Zapata, 546 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2008)); new appellate arguments are unpreserved (United States v. Walker, 130 F.4th 802 (10th Cir. 2025)). Failure to argue plain error in the opening brief ordinarily waives review (United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019)), though criminal defendants may address plain error in a reply brief after the government raises waiver, if they “run the gauntlet” of the standard (United States v. McBride, 94 F.4th 1036 (10th Cir. 2024); United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 2019)).
Substantive Approval of Anti-CSI Instructions: The Tenth Circuit first approved such an instruction in United States v. Cota-Meza, 367 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2004), where the instruction both told jurors the government need not use all methods and expressly permitted jurors to consider investigative choices in weighing evidence and credibility. In United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 2014), the court approved a shorter form (the one used here) that omits Cota-Meza’s “you may consider investigative omissions” clause. Eddings adheres to Trent and Cota-Meza, and notes similar approvals in other circuits (e.g., 2d, 3d, 4th), while distinguishing the more restrictive approaches in D.C. and Maryland state courts.
Reasonable Doubt Instruction: In United States v. Petty, 856 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2017), the court rejected the contention that the Tenth Circuit pattern reasonable-doubt instruction is defective for omitting an explicit statement that “lack of evidence” may create reasonable doubt; when read as a whole, the instructions adequately convey that principle. Eddings follows Petty and holds that pairing the Trent anti-CSI instruction with the Tenth Circuit reasonable-doubt instruction is not plain error.

Backpack Search and Waiver

Reply-Brief Waiver: Arguments first raised in a reply brief are generally waived (M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753 (10th Cir. 2009)). The court applied that rule to Eddings’ search-incident-to-arrest challenge under United States v. Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2019), and declined to reach inevitable discovery (United States v. Braxton, 61 F.4th 830 (10th Cir. 2023)).

Legal Reasoning

Probable Cause

The probable cause analysis turned on whether the district court clearly erred in crediting Sgt. Andazola’s sworn observations that (1) a bald man walked out of the inn with Eddings carrying a bag visibly protruding with a rifle barrel, (2) the bag was placed in the SUV, and (3) Eddings later picked up and repositioned the rifle in the back seat while cleaning the vehicle. The panel underscored the favorable conditions (sunny, unobstructed, binocular-assisted vantage) and accepted the officer’s explanation for the absence of contemporaneous photographs of the exact moment of handling. That omission did not contradict the core account. Crediting that testimony, the officers had probable cause to arrest a known felon for possession of a firearm.

Although Eddings newly argued on appeal that probable cause required evidence he knew the bag held a firearm, the panel deemed that suppression theory waived under Burke. In the alternative, the court explained that knowledge was reasonably inferable: the rifle barrel was exposed; the companion held the barrel; the bag was placed in the back seat; Eddings closely interacted with and moved the bag; and the rifle and bag were later recovered from the same location. Those facts supported a reasonable inference of knowledge at the time of handling.

Sufficiency: Knowledge, Actual Possession, Constructive Possession

On sufficiency for Count One, the court again found ample evidence of knowledge for the reasons above. The more consequential doctrinal move concerns “actual possession.” Emphasizing that the “defining feature” remains direct physical control, the court held that direct control of a container—combined with proof that the defendant knew the container held a firearm—suffices for actual possession. This extends earlier holdings that one can actually possess a firearm without grasping it (for example, by pinning it with one’s body or wearing it in a pocket). In Eddings, the jury could reasonably conclude that by picking up and repositioning the bag known to contain a rifle, Eddings exercised direct physical control over the firearm within it.

The court also held that the same evidence satisfied constructive possession in a jointly occupied vehicle. With knowledge established, the act of handling and then riding in the front passenger seat in the same SUV supported a nexus showing access and intent to exercise control—sufficient to uphold the verdict on that alternative theory as well.

Investigative-Techniques Instruction and Reasonable Doubt

On jury instructions, preservation issues narrowed review to plain error. Eddings advanced two interrelated claims: (1) the so-called anti-CSI instruction should be confined to scenarios where defense counsel repeatedly argues the government failed to employ particular techniques, and (2) pairing that instruction with the Tenth Circuit’s pattern reasonable-doubt instruction (which does not explicitly mention that “lack of evidence” can establish reasonable doubt) misleads jurors about how to treat investigative omissions.

The panel rejected both arguments. First, no binding federal authority imposes a “repetition” or “specific-techniques-only” threshold. The record also showed that defense counsel did more than criticize results—he insinuated the government should have used DNA/fingerprint testing, employed or recorded radio traffic, or captured better images. Those trial dynamics fit squarely within Trent and Cota-Meza, where anti-CSI instructions were approved as accurate statements of law that do not deprive the defense of arguing that investigative omissions matter.

Second, relying on Petty, the panel held that the reasonable-doubt instruction is not misleading simply because it lacks a “lack of evidence” clause. When the instructions as a whole repeatedly place the burden on the government, make clear the defendant need not present evidence, and direct jurors to base the verdict on the evidence, a reasonable juror will understand that a lack of evidence may create reasonable doubt. Although the panel invited district courts to consider including Cota-Meza-style language affirming that jurors may consider investigative omissions, it held that such language is not required—and that using the Trent instruction together with the Tenth Circuit’s reasonable-doubt instruction is not plain error.

Backpack Search and Appellate Waiver

Finally, the court enforced ordinary waiver rules for issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, declining to address whether the backpack search was a valid search incident to arrest under Knapp or whether an exception like inevitable discovery (as in Braxton) might apply. This aspect of the opinion is a sharp reminder about preservation and briefing discipline.

Impact

Actual Possession—Container Theory Clarified: The decision meaningfully clarifies that in the Tenth Circuit, “actual possession” encompasses direct physical control over a container whose firearm contents are known to the defendant. Prosecutors now have a stronger footing to argue actual possession where a defendant handles a bag, case, or box that the evidence shows he knew contained a gun. Defense counsel should be prepared to contest knowledge-of-contents and argue the absence of direct physical control in ambiguous handling scenarios.
Probable Cause Based on Single-Officer Observation: The court’s deference to the district court’s credibility findings—especially where surveillance conditions favored observation—reconfirms that the absence of corroborating imagery does not defeat probable cause if the testimony is coherent, specific, and plausible. For law enforcement, thorough articulation of vantage points, environmental conditions, and a forthright explanation for missed photographs can be dispositive.
Anti-CSI Instruction—Breadth and Best Practices: District courts in the Tenth Circuit retain wide discretion to give an investigative-techniques instruction even where the defense merely emphasizes evidentiary gaps rather than loudly demanding specific unutilized techniques. At the same time, the court’s suggestion to consider adding a Cota-Meza-style clause gives trial judges a best-practice roadmap to avoid any implication that omissions are irrelevant. Prosecutors seeking the instruction should ensure the remainder of the charge robustly states the government’s burden; defense counsel should make precise, preserved objections if the instruction risks confusing the jury about how to weigh investigative omissions.
Reasonable Doubt Instruction—No “Lack of Evidence” Clause Required: Pairing the Tenth Circuit’s pattern reasonable-doubt instruction with an anti-CSI instruction is not error per se. Practitioners should still request clarifying language if the defense hinges on investigative omissions, but Eddings forecloses a per se challenge.
Preservation and Appellate Strategy: Eddings underscores rigorous preservation requirements for suppression theories and instruction objections. New suppression theories are waived absent good cause; arguments first raised in a reply brief are ordinarily deemed waived. Defense counsel should build a clean record on all suppression theories (including knowledge components) and specify each instructional objection before the jury retires.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable belief, based on facts known to officers at the time, that a person committed a crime. It’s not proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it’s a practical, common-sense judgment under the circumstances.
Actual Possession: Having direct physical control over the object. You need not literally grasp the firearm; if you knowingly exercise control over a container holding the firearm, that can count.
Constructive Possession: Even without physically holding something, you “possess” it if you know about it and intend to—and can—control it. In shared spaces (like cars with multiple occupants), the government must show a “nexus”: knowledge, access, and intent to control, beyond mere presence.
Investigative-Techniques (Anti-CSI) Instruction: A judicial reminder that the government is not required to use every possible investigative method (like DNA testing or certain surveillance tools). It does not forbid jurors from considering investigative gaps; it simply frames the issue against an assumption that missing forensic bells and whistles automatically doom the case.
Reasonable Doubt: The government must prove guilt to a very high degree of certainty. The Tenth Circuit’s pattern instruction does not have to say “lack of evidence can be reasonable doubt,” because, read as a whole, it already implies that if the government hasn’t met its burden with the evidence it has, the jury must acquit.
Waiver vs. Forfeiture: Failing to raise a specific argument in the trial court typically waives it (especially in suppression contexts), and raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief on appeal is generally too late. Courts will rarely excuse those defaults.

Conclusion

United States v. Eddings is a precedential Tenth Circuit decision that makes two doctrinal contributions. First, it solidifies a practical, evidence-based rule for “actual possession”: direct physical control over a container whose firearm contents the defendant knows about is enough—even without touching the gun. This clarification will matter in prosecutions involving bags, cases, or compartments and aligns with the Circuit’s emphasis on “direct physical control” rather than literal handling.

Second, Eddings confirms that trial courts retain broad discretion to give an anti-CSI instruction when the defense highlights investigative limitations, without imposing a threshold requirement that the defense demand specific unutilized techniques. The court rejected a categorical conflict between that instruction and the Tenth Circuit’s reasonable-doubt charge, while sensibly encouraging—but not requiring—judges to add language reminding jurors they may consider investigative omissions when assessing whether the government met its burden.

Practically, the decision reinforces the importance of meticulous suppression and instructional preservation, and it illustrates how appellate courts balance deference to district court credibility determinations with clear legal standards for probable cause, sufficiency, and jury guidance. For prosecutors and law enforcement, Eddings validates arrests and convictions built on credible surveillance testimony and clarifies proof theories for possession. For defense counsel, it flags knowledge-of-contents as a critical battleground in container cases, underscores the need for early, specific suppression theories, and provides a roadmap for targeted, preserved objections to anti-CSI instructions when investigative omissions are central to the defense.