Direct Contradiction Equals a Nonretroactive “New Rule”: Bedell Not Retroactive on Collateral Review in Kentucky

Introduction

In Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Calvin Andrew McKinney, decided February 20, 2025, the Supreme Court of Kentucky confronted a recurring question in post-conviction jurisprudence: when does a later judicial decision apply retroactively to cases already final on direct appeal? The Court held that BEDELL v. COMmonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1993)—which prohibits imposing a sentence of life plus a term of years under KRS 532.110(1)(c)—announced a “new rule” that does not apply retroactively in collateral proceedings. In doing so, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Warren Circuit Court’s judgment denying relief to Calvin McKinney, who had been sentenced in 1986 to life plus 35 years for the brutal murder and robbery of an 86-year-old widow, Estelle Dixon.

The case is significant for two reasons: first, it clarifies and cements Kentucky’s retroactivity framework for nonconstitutional rules of criminal procedure, aligning it with the federal standard from TEAGUE v. LANE, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and Kentucky’s own decision in LEONARD v. COMmonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). Second, it overrules the Court of Appeals’ contrary view in Meadows v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.3d 701 (Ky. App. 2022), which had treated Bedell as a mere clarification that could be applied retroactively.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court holds that Bedell announced a new, nonconstitutional rule of state criminal procedure because it directly contradicted and expressly overruled RACKLEY v. COMmonwealth, 674 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1984), which had permitted sentences of life plus a term of years in capital cases.
Under Leonard and the Teague framework adopted therein, new rules do not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct appeal in collateral proceedings (e.g., CR 60.02 or RCr 11.42).
Unchanged statutory text does not make a contradictory interpretation a “clarification.” The relevant question is whether the later result was dictated by existing precedent; if it contradicts that precedent, it is a new rule.
The narrow Teague exceptions (for substantive decriminalization and “watershed” procedural rules) do not apply to the sentencing-structure question presented here.
Meadows is overruled to the extent it held that Bedell merely clarified KRS 532.110(1)(c) and could be applied retroactively.
The Court reinstates the Warren Circuit Court’s judgment, leaving McKinney’s sentence of life plus 35 years in place.

Case Background

McKinney, age 17 at the time, pled guilty in 1986 to murder, robbery, burglary, and theft, avoiding the death penalty that the Commonwealth sought. Relying on then-controlling precedent (Rackley), the trial court imposed a lawful sentence of life for murder plus 35 years for the non-homicide offenses, to run consecutively—i.e., life plus 35 years.

Years later, the legal landscape changed. In 1993, Bedell held that KRS 532.110(1)(c) prohibits imposing additional consecutive terms to a life sentence, in capital or non-capital cases, expressly overruling Rackley. In 2019, McKinney sought CR 60.02 relief, urging that Bedell be applied retroactively to invalidate his life-plus-years sentence. The circuit court denied relief; the Court of Appeals reversed based on Meadows. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and now reverses, holding Bedell is not retroactive to cases final before 1993.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

RACKLEY v. COMmonwealth, 674 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1984): Interpreted KRS 532.110(1)(c) to allow the imposition of a sentence of life plus a term of years in capital cases. This was controlling at McKinney’s 1986 sentencing.
BEDELL v. COMmonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1993): Reinterpreted KRS 532.110(1)(c) to bar any sentence of life plus a term of years, capital or non-capital; expressly overruled Rackley. This is the decision McKinney sought to apply retroactively.
TEAGUE v. LANE, 489 U.S. 288 (1989): The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark retroactivity doctrine for federal habeas, holding that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases final on direct review, subject to two narrow exceptions (substantive decriminalization and “watershed” procedures).
LEONARD v. COMmonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009): Kentucky adopts Teague’s retroactivity framework for nonconstitutional state rules. A decision is a “new rule” if its result was not dictated by precedent when the conviction became final; new rules are not retroactive on collateral review. Contradictory decisions are paradigmatic new rules.
SANBORN v. COMMONWEALTH, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998), and MARTIN v. COMmonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006): In Leonard, the Court explained that Martin contradicted Sanborn and thus announced a new rule that could not be retroactively applied on collateral review.
Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. 2018), and SHEPHERD v. COMmonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309 (Ky. 2008): Shepherd was the first judicial interpretation of KRS 640.040(1) and thus a clarification, not a new rule; Phon applied it retroactively. The crucial factor: no prior precedent interpreted the statute differently.
TAYLOR v. LOUISIANA, 419 U.S. 522 (1975): Cited by the Court, through Teague, to illustrate that even when the underlying constitutional text is unchanged, a new interpretation that contradicts prior precedent is a “new rule,” not a clarification.
Meadows v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.3d 701 (Ky. App. 2022): Held that Bedell was a clarification retroactively applicable to collateral review. Overruled here to the extent inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court reaffirms Kentucky’s two-track understanding of retroactivity in collateral proceedings:

New rule (nonretroactive): A decision whose result was not dictated by precedent existing when the conviction became final (including decisions that contradict or overrule precedent) is a new rule and does not apply retroactively in collateral proceedings. This implements Teague as adopted in Leonard.
Clarification (retroactive): A decision that merely clarifies previously unsettled law—typically where it is the first interpretation of a statute and no prior case interpreted the statute differently—can be applied retroactively in collateral proceedings, as in Phon.

Applying that framework, the Court emphasizes that Bedell is “directly contrary to—and indeed overruled—then-existing precedent” (Rackley). Therefore, Bedell was not dictated by precedent at the time of McKinney’s final conviction and is a new rule. Under Leonard, new rules of nonconstitutional state law do not apply retroactively on collateral review.

The Court also rejects McKinney’s argument that unchanged statutory text compels treating Bedell as a clarification. The key inquiry is not whether the text stayed the same, but whether the later decision was dictated by prior precedent. To illustrate, the Court invokes Teague’s discussion of Taylor: the Sixth Amendment did not change, but a reinterpretation contradicting Taylor would still be a new rule.

Finally, the Court notes that neither of the two narrow Teague exceptions applies: (1) this case does not decriminalize primary conduct or place conduct beyond the State’s power to punish; and (2) no watershed procedural rule is at issue. The question is about the structure of consecutive sentencing with a life term, which is outside those exceptions.

Addressing Conflicting Authority: Meadows Overruled

The Court explains that the Court of Appeals’ decision in Meadows misapplied Phon and failed to grapple with Leonard’s central teaching: when a decision contradicts an earlier controlling case, it is a new rule. Because Bedell expressly overruled Rackley, it cannot be a mere clarification. Meadows is overruled to the extent it held otherwise.

Impact and Implications

Immediate Effects

McKinney’s sentence stands. The Warren Circuit Court’s judgment imposing life plus 35 years is reinstated.
Retroactivity barrier reaffirmed. Defendants whose sentences became final before 1993 cannot rely on Bedell via CR 60.02 or RCr 11.42 to invalidate life-plus-years sentences.
Meadows no longer viable. Post-conviction petitions premised on Meadows’ retroactive application of Bedell will fail.

Broader Doctrinal Significance

Clear retroactivity test in Kentucky. If a later decision contradicts or overrules prior precedent, it is a nonretroactive new rule in collateral proceedings—even if the underlying statute has not changed. Conversely, a first-time interpretation with no contrary precedent is a clarification and can be retroactive.
Finality emphasized. The decision underscores the primacy of finality in criminal judgments and limits retroactive reopening of cases to narrow circumstances.
Sentencing stability. Sentences imposed under Rackley that were final before Bedell will not be disturbed on collateral review based on Bedell. Trial courts, of course, remain bound by Bedell in current and future sentencing.
Beyond KRS 532.110. The principle applies generically to nonconstitutional rules of criminal procedure: an overruling decision is a new rule and nonretroactive on collateral review, unless a Teague exception applies.

Practical Guidance for Practitioners

On collateral attack (CR 60.02/RCr 11.42): Identify whether the precedent you invoke directly contradicted earlier controlling authority. If yes, expect a “new rule” finding and nonretroactivity.
On direct appeal: New decisions generally apply to cases still pending on direct review. Defendants with non-final cases at the time of a new decision like Bedell can seek its benefit.
When invoking “clarification”: Show that the decision is the first interpretation of a statute and that no prior Kentucky case interpreted it differently. Cite Phon/Shepherd.
Evaluate Teague exceptions narrowly: Substantive rulings (e.g., those placing conduct or a class of punishment beyond state power) are rare; “watershed” procedural rules are exceedingly rare. The sentencing-structure at issue here is not within either exception.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Direct appeal vs. collateral attack: A direct appeal challenges the conviction/sentence immediately after judgment. A collateral attack (e.g., RCr 11.42, CR 60.02) is a later proceeding to set aside or correct a judgment after it has become final on direct appeal.
New rule: A judicial decision that was not dictated by existing precedent at the time the defendant’s conviction became final; includes decisions that contradict or overrule prior precedent. New rules are generally not retroactive on collateral review.
Clarification: A decision that explains or interprets the law where no prior controlling case said otherwise—often the first interpretation of a statute. Clarifications can be applied retroactively on collateral review.
Retroactivity (Teague/Leonard): The principle that most new procedural rules do not apply to cases already final on direct review, with two narrow exceptions (substantive decriminalization and “watershed” procedures).
KRS 532.110(1)(c): Kentucky’s consecutive/concurrent sentencing statute. Rackley read it to permit life-plus-years in capital cases; Bedell later read it to forbid any sentence of life plus a term of years and overruled Rackley.
“Life plus a term of years”: A sentencing structure where a defendant is sentenced to life on one count and consecutive fixed terms on others. Under Bedell, such stacking is prohibited; but that prohibition is not retroactive to cases final before 1993.
CR 60.02 and RCr 11.42: Kentucky procedural mechanisms for post-judgment relief. RCr 11.42 addresses constitutional violations; CR 60.02 provides extraordinary relief for specific, narrow reasons. Both are collateral, not direct, remedies.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s opinion in Commonwealth v. McKinney delivers a definitive statement on the retroactivity of state criminal-procedure decisions: when a later decision contradicts and overrules existing precedent, it is a “new rule” and does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct appeal. That result holds even if the underlying statutory text has not changed. Applying that principle, the Court holds that Bedell—which overruled Rackley and forbids life-plus-years sentences—cannot be invoked in collateral proceedings by defendants whose cases became final before 1993. The Court reverses the Court of Appeals, overrules Meadows to the extent inconsistent, and reinstates McKinney’s sentence.

The decision both reinforces finality and offers a clear roadmap: first-time statutory interpretations may be retroactive as clarifications, but decisions that repudiate earlier precedent are new rules that do not reopen final convictions. Kentucky practitioners navigating post-conviction practice now have an unambiguous template for assessing whether a later decision can be applied retroactively.