Direct-Admission Retaliation Standard Under § 1981: El Chaar v. NYU College of Dentistry

Introduction

In El Chaar v. New York University College of Dentistry (2d Cir. 2025), Dr. Edgard El Chaar, a Lebanese‐born faculty member, sued NYU alleging racial discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. After derogatory comments spanned years, Dr. El Chaar filed an internal discrimination complaint in August 2017. He later sought appointment as Interim Chair (fall 2018) and Permanent Chair (2020) of the Department of Periodontology. NYU appointed others to both posts. The Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to NYU on all federal counts and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state and city claims. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that Dr. El Chaar had direct evidence of retaliation for the Interim Chair appointment but lacked pretext evidence for the Permanent Chair decision.

Summary of the Judgment

Hostile Work Environment – Affirmed: Dr. El Chaar’s § 1981 hostile environment claim was time‐barred because all actionable incidents predated October 6, 2017, and no discrete act during the limitations period was shown.
Retaliation – Interim Chair – Vacated: The Court found Dr. El Chaar produced direct evidence—NYU’s Dean admitted he declined to appoint El Chaar “because of your complaint to OEO”—sufficient to raise a triable retaliation issue without McDonnell Douglas burden shifting.
Retaliation – Permanent Chair – Affirmed: Even assuming a prima facie case, NYU’s legitimate, non‐retaliatory explanation (preferential qualifications, tenure status, consensus building) was unchallenged by any admissible evidence of pretext.
State and city law claims were not reinstated upon remand.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Morgan (536 U.S. 101, 2002): Hostile work environment claims accrue at each discriminatory act; continuing‐violation doctrine requires at least one act within the limitations period.
Byrne v. Rutledge (623 F.3d 46, 2010): Summary judgment review standard in the Second Circuit.
Banks v. General Motors (81 F.4th 242, 2023): Four-year statute of limitations for § 1981 claims.
Fincher v. DTCC (604 F.3d 712, 2010): Employer’s investigatory failures alone do not create a hostile work environment absent effects on employment terms.
Snell v. Suffolk County (782 F.2d 1094, 1986): Employer liability for inadequate remedial responses under hostile workplace jurisprudence.
Littlejohn v. City of New York (795 F.3d 297, 2015): McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in § 1981 retaliation cases.
Zann Kwan v. Andalex (737 F.3d 834, 2013): Plaintiff’s burden to prove but-for causation once employer articulates non-retaliatory reasons.
Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care (163 F.3d 684, 1998): Passing over an employee for promotion can constitute an adverse action in § 1981 retaliation.
Bellamy v. City of New York (914 F.3d 727, 2019): A plaintiff’s own testimony can supply direct evidence of retaliatory intent.

Legal Reasoning

1. Hostile Work Environment. Under Morgan, hostile‐environment claims involve repeated conduct and may survive if one act occurs within the statutory period. Dr. El Chaar identified no actionable discrimination after October 6, 2017; his July 2019 letter did not recount discrete harassing acts, and alleged investigative delays or lackluster trainings do not themselves alter employment conditions (Fincher).

2. Retaliation – Interim Chair. Showing direct evidence, Dr. El Chaar bypassed McDonnell Douglas by relying on Dean Bertolami’s explicit admission—“we’re not appointing you because of your complaint”—which establishes a genuine factual dispute on causation (Bellamy).

3. Retaliation – Permanent Chair. Even had a prima facie case been made, NYU offered uncontradicted, legitimate reasons: preference for a tenured full professor who demonstrated consensus‐building skills and superior academic credentials. Survey feedback labeling El Chaar “divisive,” “narcissistic,” and lacking tenure track support that rationale. No evidence of pretext—no showing that protected activity, rather than qualifications, drove the hire.

Impact

• Direct-Admission Evidence: Affirms that an employer decision‐maker’s candid admission of retaliatory motive is direct evidence under § 1981, sufficient to defeat summary judgment without McDonnell Douglas. • Continuing Violation Limits: Reinforces strict application of Morgan’s continuing‐violation doctrine to § 1981 hostile‐environment claims. • Hiring Process Scrutiny: Clarifies that legitimate, well‐documented hiring criteria and broad faculty surveys are not pretextual merely because surveys yield mixed results influenced in part by individuals previously complained about. • Guides employers on documenting non‐retaliatory promotion decisions and conducting trainings/investigations that tangibly address discrimination rather than mere formality.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 1981 Retaliation: Prohibits retaliation against individuals who complain of racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, including employment.
Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence: Direct evidence: statements by the decision‐maker admitting discriminatory intent. Circumstantial evidence: indirect proof requiring McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting (prima facie, employer’s reason, pretext).
Prima Facie Case (McDonnell Douglas): To establish retaliation circumstantially, a plaintiff must show (1) they engaged in protected activity, (2) suffered an adverse action, and (3) a causal link between the two. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason, and back to the plaintiff to demonstrate pretext.
Continuing Violation Doctrine: Applies to hostile work environment claims: discrete acts before the statute-of-limitations cutoff can qualify if part of the same unlawful practice and at least one act is timely.
Summary Judgment Standard: Viewed in the light most favorable to the non‐moving party, summary judgment is appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find for the non‐movant on a material fact (Byrne v. Rutledge).

Conclusion

El Chaar v. NYU College of Dentistry crystallizes two key principles in § 1981 jurisprudence. First, a decision‐maker’s explicit admission of retaliatory motive constitutes direct evidence sufficient to overcome summary judgment on a retaliation claim. Second, § 1981 hostile work environment claims remain strictly subject to the continuing‐violation doctrine. Employers confronting similar disputes should carefully document non-retaliatory rationales for adverse employment decisions and ensure that remedial investigations and trainings effectively address, rather than merely acknowledge, earlier discrimination complaints.