Deterrence-Focused Consecutive Revocation Sentences After Esteras: Commentary on United States v. Duprey (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

United States v. Duprey, No. 24-2410 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2025) (summary order), is a nonprecedential but instructive Second Circuit decision addressing the substantive reasonableness of a consecutive sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release. Although the case arises in a relatively routine posture, it is important for how it:

Applies the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), to supervised release revocation sentencing;
Reaffirms that revocation sentences primarily punish breach of the court’s trust, not the new criminal conduct itself;
Endorses the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy favoring consecutive revocation sentences, even when the underlying new offense already carries a substantial prison term;
Illustrates the highly deferential “substantive reasonableness” standard for reviewing revocation sentences on appeal.

The defendant, Jose Duprey (also known as “Red”), appealed the district court’s decision to impose a six-month term of imprisonment consecutive to a 135-month sentence for new federal drug offenses, following the revocation of his supervised release from a prior drug case. He argued that this additional six-month consecutive term was “greater than necessary” to serve the purposes of sentencing and therefore substantively unreasonable.

The Second Circuit rejected this challenge and affirmed, emphasizing the district court’s focus on deterrence and protection of the public, consistent with Esteras and with the statutory framework governing supervised release revocations.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Background and Procedural History

The case involves two successive federal drug prosecutions:

2008 case: Duprey pleaded guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). He received:
- 161 months’ imprisonment; and
- six years of supervised release.
He was released from federal custody in January 2020.
2022 case (while on supervised release): On June 1, 2022, Duprey was indicted for:
- Conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846; and
- Possession with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(i).
He pleaded guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement on February 10, 2023. On September 5, 2024, the district court (Thompson, J., D. Conn.) sentenced him to:
- 135 months’ imprisonment; and
- eight years of supervised release.

Immediately after imposing the 135-month sentence in the 2022 case, the court conducted a proceeding on the supervised release violation stemming from the 2008 conviction. The violation was based on the same drug trafficking conduct underlying the 2022 indictment. Duprey admitted the violation.

For that revocation proceeding:

The advisory Guidelines revocation range was calculated at 33 to 41 months.
However, the statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped the revocation imprisonment term at 24 months.
The government requested a full 24-month consecutive sentence, emphasizing a “tremendous violation of the court’s trust” and Duprey’s return to large-scale drug trafficking.
Duprey argued that any substantial consecutive sentence would be greater than necessary given:
- His existing 135-month sentence for the new offenses; and
- His prior 161-month sentence had been driven by the Career Offender Guidelines and would likely be lower if imposed under current law.

The district court ultimately imposed a six-month prison term, well below both the advisory Guidelines range (33–41 months) and the statutory cap (24 months), and ordered it to run consecutively to the 135-month sentence.

2.2 Issue on Appeal

On appeal, Duprey’s sole argument was that the six-month consecutive sentence for the supervised release violation was substantively unreasonable because it was allegedly “greater than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

2.3 Holding

The Second Circuit affirmed. Applying the deferential substantive reasonableness standard, the court held that:

The district court acted within the broad range of permissible decisions in imposing a six-month consecutive sentence for the supervised release violation;
The sentence was consistent with:
- The Guidelines’ policy recommending consecutive revocation sentences (U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f));
- The Supreme Court’s explanation in Esteras v. United States that, in the revocation context, the relevant “offense” is the original crime of conviction; and
- The revocation sentencing purposes of deterrence and incapacitation, rather than retribution.
The six-month consecutive term was not “so shockingly high” or otherwise unsupportable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

3. Core Legal Questions and the Court’s Answer

3.1 Key Question

Is a six-month consecutive sentence imposed after revoking supervised release substantively unreasonable where:

The defendant has already received a 135-month sentence for new federal drug offenses based on the same conduct;
The Guidelines revocation range was 33–41 months, capped by statute at 24 months; and
The district court emphasized deterrence and public protection as the grounds for the additional consecutive term?

3.2 The Court’s Answer

No. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision to impose a six-month consecutive revocation sentence was well within the range of permissible decisions and thus substantively reasonable, particularly given:

The Guidelines policy explicitly favoring consecutive revocation sentences;
The Supreme Court’s clarification in Esteras about the nature and purposes of revocation sentencing;
The substantial downward variance from the advisory Guidelines (33–41 months down to six months); and
The district court’s clear articulation of deterrence—especially specific deterrence—as the principal objective.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1.1 United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2018)

The panel quotes Brooks for the proposition that:

“Sentences for violations of supervised release are reviewed under the same standard as for sentencing generally: whether the sentence imposed is reasonable.”

This establishes that revocation sentences are not a separate species of appellate review; they are judged by the same general “reasonableness” framework governing all federal sentencing, which includes:

Procedural reasonableness (e.g., correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of proper § 3553(a) factors); and
Substantive reasonableness (i.e., whether the sentence is within the broad range of permissible outcomes).

In Duprey, only substantive reasonableness was at issue. Brooks reinforces that this review is limited and deferential.

4.1.2 United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018)

Betts is cited for the proposition that reasonableness review is conducted under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” This means the appellate court:

Does not substitute its own sentencing judgment for that of the district court;
Intervenes only where the sentence falls outside the “range of permissible decisions” given the circumstances.

4.1.3 United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)

Cavera is central in Second Circuit sentencing law. It is cited here for the phrase:

The Court will reverse only in “exceptional cases where the trial court’s sentence ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’”

Cavera frames appellate review as extremely deferential: as long as the district judge considers the proper factors and provides a rational explanation, the sentence will almost always be upheld—even if another judge might have imposed a different sentence.

4.1.4 U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) (Policy Statement on Consecutive Sentences)

The Guidelines’ policy statement governing revocation sentences provides that:

A revocation sentence should be imposed “consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation.”

Although Chapter 7 (Supervised Release and Probation) is formally comprised of “policy statements” rather than binding rules, the Second Circuit consistently treats these as highly persuasive, and district courts are expected at least to consider them.

In Duprey, the court relies on § 7B1.3(f) to reinforce the presumption that a revocation sentence should ordinarily be consecutive, even when the new sentence arises from the same conduct that prompted the revocation.

4.1.5 Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)

The Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras plays a pivotal role. The Second Circuit quotes it for two distinct propositions:

The “offense” in the revocation context:

“In the context of a revocation hearing, the offense is the underlying crime of conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release conditions.”
This conceptualization explains why the Guidelines and courts treat revocation as an additional sanction for the original offense, rather than a new punishment for the same new conduct already prosecuted.
The permissible purposes of revocation sentencing:
The Second Circuit also quotes Esteras for the rule that:
“District courts may not consider the retributive purpose of [section] 3553(a)(2)(A) before revoking supervised release,” but must weigh other “purposes of sentencing,” including “incapacitation” and “deterrence.”
This aligns with the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which omits subsection 3553(a)(2)(A) (just punishment) from the list of factors to be considered when deciding whether to revoke supervised release and how to sentence upon revocation.

Esteras thus confirms that supervised release revocation is not principally about retribution. Instead, revocation sentencing must focus on:

Protecting the public (incapacitation);
Deterring the defendant from further violations (specific deterrence);
Deterring others (general deterrence); and
Addressing breach of the court’s trust.

Duprey shows the Second Circuit putting these Esteras principles into practice.

4.1.6 United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020)

The panel quotes Ramos for the foundational supervised release principle:

“A sentence for a violation of supervised release should primarily sanction the defendant’s breach of trust, not the conduct constituting the violation itself.”

This “breach of trust” rationale is crucial in explaining why an additional revocation sentence is permissible—and generally recommended—even when the defendant has already been sentenced for the underlying new criminal conduct. The revocation sentence addresses a different wrong:

The new criminal judgment punishes the new crime;
The revocation judgment punishes the defendant’s failure to comply with the court’s conditions and the betrayal of trust placed in him upon release.

4.1.7 United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009)

Rigas is cited for the Second Circuit’s formulation of the high bar for overturning a sentence as substantively unreasonable:

A sentence must be “so shockingly high” or “otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law” that it would “damage the administration of justice.”

By invoking this language, the Duprey panel underscores how extraordinary it would be to treat a modest six-month, below-Guidelines, statutorily permissible sentence as substantively unreasonable.

4.1.8 Statutory Framework: 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(e)(3)

Two key statutes structure the court’s analysis:

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3): authorizes the court to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment, subject to certain statutory maximums depending on the class of the original offense. In Duprey’s case, this cap was 24 months, which limited what could be imposed even though the advisory range was 33–41 months.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): sets out the general sentencing factors. In the revocation context, § 3583(e) directs courts to consider some—but not all—of these factors. Notably:
- § 3553(a)(2)(A) (the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment”) is not referenced in § 3583(e);
- This omission, emphasized and clarified by Esteras, is understood to mean that pure retribution (“just punishment”) is not a proper purpose of revocation sentencing.

4.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.2.1 Standard of Review: Substantive Reasonableness and Abuse of Discretion

The court reiterates the now-familiar two-tier framework:

Sentences, including revocation sentences, are reviewed for reasonableness;
Reasonableness review is conducted under an abuse-of-discretion standard (Betts, Cavera);
The appellate court will interfere only in “exceptional cases” where the sentence cannot be located within the range of permissible outcomes (Cavera).

In practical terms, the question is not “Was this the best or fairest sentence?” but rather “Was this sentence one a reasonable sentencing judge could impose under the circumstances?” Under that standard, a modest six-month consecutive term, far below advisory Guidelines and fully within the statutory maximum, is very unlikely to be invalidated.

4.2.2 Application of Guidelines Policy Favoring Consecutive Revocation Sentences

The court gives significant weight to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), which recommends that revocation sentences run consecutively “whether or not” they are based on the same conduct underlying the new sentence. This is key to rejecting the defendant’s core argument that the 135-month new sentence ought to be sufficient by itself.

By highlighting § 7B1.3(f), the Second Circuit makes clear:

A revocation term is typically expected to be in addition to any sentence for new crimes;
The default structure is consecutive, not concurrent;
A sentencing judge who decides to impose a consecutive revocation term is following, not departing from, the recommended approach.

4.2.3 The Role of Esteras and the Nature of the “Offense”

The panel’s reliance on Esteras serves two important functions:

It explains why the Guidelines’ preference for consecutive revocation sentences makes sense:
- If the “offense” for revocation purposes is the original crime of conviction—not the new violation conduct—then revocation is conceptually a further sanction for that original offense.
- The new sentence for the fresh crime punishes the new offense conduct; the revocation sentence punishes the original offense in light of the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust.
It guards against double-counting retribution:
- Esteras insists that retributive goals—“just punishment,” “seriousness,” “respect for the law”—are not revocation purposes;
- Instead, the focus is on:
  - Deterring the defendant from offending again;
  - Deterring others;
  - Protecting the public.

Thus, when the district court in Duprey imposed a six-month consecutive sentence and justified it by reference to specific and general deterrence and public protection, it was acting in line with Esteras and § 3583(e).

4.2.4 Focus on Deterrence and Incapacitation, Not Retribution

The Second Circuit quotes the district court’s explanation that the sentence was needed:

“To protect the public from further crimes committed by [Duprey]”;
“To deter others from committing the offense [he] committed”; and
To deter him from committing further offenses, with specific deterrence being “the most significant” factor in his case.

This language reflects the permissible purposes under § 3583(e) and Esteras. Importantly, the district court:

Explicitly acknowledged the mitigating effect of:
- The already-lengthy 135-month sentence; and
- Other mitigating factors (not fully elaborated in the summary order but referenced by the court),
Used these considerations to reduce the revocation term dramatically from the 33–41 month advisory range down to six months.

The Second Circuit treats this measured approach as a model of proper revocation sentencing:

Identify the legitimate revocation purposes (deterrence, public safety);
Recognize the already-imposed punishment for the new offense; and
Craft a modest, additional consecutive term that is “sufficient but not greater than necessary” to achieve deterrence and respond to breach of trust.

4.2.5 The “Sufficient but Not Greater Than Necessary” Requirement

The district court expressly invoked the core § 3553(a) command—that the sentence be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the relevant purposes. While the summary order does not quote the district court at length, it emphasizes that:

The court carefully weighed:
- The need for specific deterrence in light of Duprey’s return to similar, large-scale drug trafficking while on supervision; and
- Mitigating circumstances, including the existing 135-month term.
On that basis, a short six-month consecutive term was selected as the minimally sufficient sanction for the breach of trust.

The Second Circuit effectively concludes that this balancing exercise is precisely what § 3553(a) and § 3583(e) require—and it will not second-guess how much weight the district judge gave each factor.

4.2.6 Why the Sentence Was Not “Shockingly High”

Against the backdrop of the Rigas standard, the panel finds it impossible to deem a six-month revocation sentence “shockingly high” or “unsupportable as a matter of law,” especially where:

It is far below the advisory Guidelines range (33–41 months);
It is one-quarter of the statutory maximum (24 months) under § 3583(e)(3);
It responds to serious conduct: resuming distribution of kilogram-level narcotics while on supervised release for nearly identical drug offenses; and
It is carefully justified in terms of specific deterrence and public protection.

Thus, under established Second Circuit standards, the sentence plainly falls within the range of permissible decisions.

4.3 Impact and Significance

4.3.1 Confirming Post-Esteras Revocation Practice

Although Duprey is a summary order without precedential effect, it offers a practical demonstration of how the Second Circuit expects district courts to sentence after Esteras:

Revocation sentences must be justified on deterrence and incapacitation, not retribution;
The court should articulate its focus on specific and general deterrence and public protection;
The district judge may, and often should, account for the existing punishment imposed in the new case in calibrating the revocation term—but this does not preclude imposing an additional consecutive sentence.

4.3.2 Strengthening the Consecutive-Sentence Norm for Revocations

By favorably invoking U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) and affirming a consecutive term under circumstances where the defendant was already facing 135 months in prison, the Second Circuit reinforces the norm that:

Revocation sentences will ordinarily be consecutive, not concurrent;
Arguments that a long underlying sentence alone makes any additional sanction “greater than necessary” face an uphill battle; and
The breach-of-trust rationale continues to justify an independent, additional term of incarceration.

4.3.3 Deference to District Courts on Degree of Sanction

Duprey underscores the breadth of discretion district judges retain in setting the degree of revocation punishment:

Here, the government requested 24 months consecutive;
The Guidelines advised 33–41 months (but capped at 24 months by statute);
The district court chose six months.

The Second Circuit did not question the district court’s substantial downward variance; it simply confirmed that this exercise of discretion was rational and therefore insulated from appellate interference. The case thus illustrates:

Appellate courts are not likely to upset revocation sentences so long as:
- The correct framework is applied; and
- The judge explains why the sentence is sufficient but not excessive for deterrence and public protection.

4.3.4 Practical Lessons for Future Cases

For practitioners, Duprey signals:

For prosecutors and probation:
- Consecutive revocation sentences remain well-supported by Guidelines policy and case law;
- Emphasizing breach of trust, specific deterrence, and the risk of recidivism can justify a meaningful consecutive term even when a large new sentence has already been imposed.
For defense counsel:
- Attacks on substantive reasonableness are difficult, particularly where the revocation sentence is below Guidelines and within the statutory maximum;
- Arguments focused solely on the length of the underlying new sentence are unlikely to suffice; counsel must grapple directly with the breach-of-trust rationale and propose alternatives that still credibly serve specific deterrence and public protection (for example, additional supervised release conditions instead of or in addition to imprisonment).

More broadly, the case confirms that after Esteras, supervised release revocation remains a robust tool for responding to serious violations, particularly repeat criminal conduct of the same kind that prompted the original conviction.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 What Is “Revocation of Supervised Release”?

After serving a prison term in federal court, many defendants serve a period of supervised release, during which they must comply with specific conditions (e.g., no new crimes, reporting to a probation officer, drug testing, etc.).

If a defendant violates these conditions—especially by committing a new crime—the court can:

Revoke supervised release; and
Impose an additional term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

That revocation sentence is separate from any new sentence imposed for the new crime.

5.2 What Does “Consecutive” vs. “Concurrent” Mean?

Consecutive sentences run one after the other. For example, a 135-month sentence plus a 6-month consecutive sentence means the defendant must serve 141 months total (subject to good-time rules and other adjustments).
Concurrent sentences run at the same time. A 135-month sentence and a 6-month concurrent sentence would effectively produce a total of 135 months.

In the revocation context, the Guidelines and case law generally favor consecutive terms to recognize that supervised release violations are a distinct wrong—namely, breaching the court’s trust.

5.3 What Is “Substantive Reasonableness”?

Federal appellate courts review sentences for two kinds of reasonableness:

Procedural reasonableness: Did the judge correctly calculate the Guidelines range and consider the appropriate statutory factors?
Substantive reasonableness: Is the sentence too severe or too lenient in light of the facts and the § 3553(a) purposes of sentencing?

A sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is:

“So shockingly high” or low; or
Otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law;

that it would “damage the administration of justice.” This is a very demanding standard for a defendant to meet.

5.4 What Is the “Breach of Trust” Concept?

When a court places someone on supervised release, it effectively trusts the defendant to obey the law and comply with conditions while living in the community. If the defendant seriously violates those terms—especially by committing a new crime—the defendant:

Not only breaks the law again; but
Also breaks the court’s trust.

Revocation sentences are designed primarily to punish that breach of trust, not the new conduct itself (which is punished by the new criminal sentence). This is why the court can lawfully impose an additional revocation sentence even when the new conduct has already been prosecuted and sentenced.

5.5 Why Can’t Courts Rely on Retribution in Revocation Sentencing?

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), when imposing a sentence after revoking supervised release, the court must consider several § 3553(a) factors—but notably, it does not list § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers:

“The need for the sentence imposed—to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”

As Esteras confirms, this means that retributive goals—punishing the offense purely because it is morally blameworthy—do not drive revocation sentencing. Instead, the court must focus on:

Deterring the defendant and others;
Protecting the public;
Rehabilitative and practical considerations (e.g., training, medical care).

In Duprey, the district court and the Second Circuit adhered to this framework by centering the analysis on specific and general deterrence and public safety.

6. Conclusion

United States v. Duprey is a concise but instructive post-Esteras decision illustrating how the Second Circuit expects district courts to handle supervised release revocation sentencing:

Revocation sentences are reviewed under the same deferential substantive reasonableness standard as other federal sentences;
The Guidelines policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) continues to support consecutive revocation sentences, even where the new offenses arise from the same conduct;
Esteras shapes both the conceptualization of the “offense” in the revocation setting (the underlying crime of conviction) and the permissible purposes for revocation sentencing (deterrence and incapacitation, not pure retribution);
Revocation sentences should primarily address breach of trust, rather than duplicate punishment for the new crime;
A modest, well-justified, below-Guidelines consecutive revocation term—such as the six-month sentence in Duprey—will virtually never be found substantively unreasonable on appeal.

Though designated as a summary order without precedential effect, Duprey offers a clear roadmap for lower courts and litigants: after Esteras, revocation sentencing must be framed around deterrence, public protection, and breach of trust, and district courts enjoy broad discretion to impose short, consecutive terms calibrated to those goals, even where a substantial new sentence has already been imposed.