Deterrence, Not Retribution: Generic “Punishment” Language at Revocation Does Not, Without More, Establish Plain-Error Reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A)

United States v. Keenan Devron Hunter (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025)

Introduction

In this unpublished, consolidated appeal from the Middle District of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an eight-month imprisonment term followed by two years of supervised release imposed on Keenan Devron Hunter upon revocation of supervised release. The case squarely presents two recurring issues in revocation sentencing:

Whether the district court impermissibly relied on retribution—the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor excluded by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)—such that its revocation sentence constitutes plain error; and
Whether the revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable under the abuse-of-discretion standard.

Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States (145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025)), the Eleventh Circuit clarifies that a sentencing judge’s generic references to “punishment” or “sending a message” at a revocation hearing do not, standing alone, establish “clear or obvious” reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive aims. When the record shows the court tethered its rationale to permissible goals such as specific and general deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation, an appellate plain-error challenge will fail.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Hunter’s revocation sentence. On the first issue, applying plain-error review, the court held it was not “clear or obvious” that the district court relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive purpose (just punishment, seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law). Although the district court used the word “punish” and said it intended to “send a message,” the record demonstrated the court’s true focus was Hunter’s repeated failures to follow rules and the need to deter future violations—permissible considerations under § 3583(e) incorporating § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B)-(D).

On the second issue, the court found the sentence substantively reasonable. The district court considered Hunter’s history of noncompliance, acknowledged mitigating factors (drug addiction, family support, a letter on his behalf), and selected a sentence at the low end of the advisory range (8–14 months) that was well below the statutory maximum. The Eleventh Circuit deferred to the district court’s weighing of factors and affirmed.

Case Background

Hunter pled guilty in 2017 to felon-in-possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)) and received 60 months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release. Near the end of that term, he left a residential reentry center without authorization after refusing to provide a urine sample; he later pled guilty to escape (18 U.S.C. §§ 751(a), 4082(a)) and received 27 months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release. While on release, he tested positive three times for marijuana and once for cocaine. At a joint revocation hearing in both cases, Hunter admitted the violations. The district court calculated an advisory range of 8–14 months’ imprisonment, noted a two-year statutory imprisonment cap and a three-year cap on supervised release, and imposed eight months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release, concurrent in both cases.

The district court’s comments included: (1) concern that prior penalties did not “drive home the importance of following the rules,” (2) a characterization of Hunter’s compliance history as “less than sterling,” (3) statements that the system is “designed to punish,” and (4) an expressed intent to “send a message” about consequences for continued noncompliance. The court also said it had considered “the factors set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3553(a)(1) through (7).”

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025): The Supreme Court clarified that when revoking supervised release under § 3583(e), courts may consider many § 3553(a) factors, but not § 3553(a)(2)(A) (retribution: seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, just punishment). Esteras instructs that it is not error to assess “the nature and circumstances of the offense” for legitimate goals like deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation; what is impermissible is using those facts to justify retribution. Esteras also supplied the plain-error lens for appeals: reversal is unwarranted unless it is “clear or obvious” the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A) “either expressly or by unmistakable implication.”
United States v. Steiger, 107 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2024): Establishes plain-error review for unpreserved sentencing objections.
United States v. Gomez, 955 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020): Confirms § 3583(e)’s incorporation of some § 3553(a) factors and the exclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A), and notes that sentences well below the statutory maximum tend to support reasonableness.
United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2023): Articulates abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness, considering totality of the circumstances and specifying when a sentence is substantively unreasonable (failing to consider relevant factors, giving significant weight to improper ones, or clear error in balancing).
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Reinforces deference to the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2022): Explains reversal for substantive unreasonableness requires a definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): A district court may attach great weight to one factor over others; equal weighting is not required.
United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310 (11th Cir. 2024): A sentencing court need not explicitly address every § 3553(a) factor or every mitigation point; acknowledging consideration of the arguments and the factors suffices.

Legal Reasoning

1) Plain-error challenge to retributive considerations

Under § 3583(e)(3), a district court may revoke supervised release and impose imprisonment after considering specified § 3553(a) factors—but not § 3553(a)(2)(A). The Supreme Court’s Esteras decision frames the test on appeal: the sentence must be affirmed unless it is “clear or obvious” the court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A), expressly or by unmistakable implication.

The panel acknowledged several remarks by the district court referencing “punishment” and “sending a message.” But it held those remarks, viewed in context, did not amount to reliance on retribution. The judge’s focus—repeatedly—was Hunter’s “history of not following the rules,” his “less than sterling” compliance record, and the need to deter future violations. Those are permissible § 3583(e) considerations under § 3553(a)(1) (history and characteristics), (a)(2)(B) (deterrence), (a)(2)(C) (protection of the public), and (a)(2)(D) (treatment and training). The court specifically observed there were no explicit references to § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s triad (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment) and no unmistakable sign that retribution for the underlying offenses drove the revocation sentence.

The court also discounted the boilerplate statement that the district court considered “§ 3553(a)(1) through (7).” While that phrasing literally encompasses § 3553(a)(2)(A), the absence of any specific reliance on retributive goals, combined with the transcript’s deterrence-centered rationale, defeated any claim of “clear or obvious” reliance on the excluded factor. On that record, there was no plain error.

2) Substantive reasonableness

Applying abuse-of-discretion review and considering the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded the eight-month term followed by two years of supervised release was substantively reasonable. The district court:

accurately recited an 8–14 month advisory range and the applicable statutory caps;
addressed Hunter’s violations and history of noncompliance;
acknowledged mitigation (drug addiction, family support, a letter on his behalf); and
selected the bottom of the advisory range and a supervised-release term below the maximum available.

The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that district courts need not give equal weight to every factor and have discretion to assign great weight to recidivism and deterrence. The fact that the sentence was well below the statutory maximum further supported its reasonableness.

What This Opinion Adds

While unpublished, the opinion is a clear application of Esteras in the supervised-release context and supplies two practical clarifications for district courts and litigants:

Generic “punishment” and “send a message” phrasing, without more, will not be equated with forbidden retributive reasoning under § 3553(a)(2)(A) if the record shows the court’s rationale is deterrence- and compliance-driven.
A rote reference to having considered “§ 3553(a)(1) through (7)”—although imperfect in revocation cases—does not by itself establish reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) sufficient to meet the stringent plain-error standard.

Impact and Practical Implications

For District Judges

Revocation rationales should be grounded in the permissible § 3553(a) purposes incorporated by § 3583(e): deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation, along with the nature and circumstances of the violation and the defendant’s history and characteristics.
Careful phrasing matters. To avoid later disputes, it is best to explicitly anchor comments to deterrence and compliance, rather than to the need for “just punishment” or to “promote respect for the law,” which belong to § 3553(a)(2)(A) and are excluded at revocation.
Boilerplate recitations that the court considered “§ 3553(a)(1)–(7)” can invite unnecessary appellate arguments. More precise statements—acknowledging consideration of the “applicable § 3553(a) factors under § 3583(e)”—are cleaner.

For Defense Counsel

Preserve the issue. If the court’s comments arguably invoke retribution (e.g., “just punishment,” “respect for the law”), object and ask the court to clarify that it is relying on deterrence or other permissible § 3583(e) goals. Preservation avoids the demanding plain-error standard.
Context is critical. When challenging a sentence on appeal, identify concrete ties to § 3553(a)(2)(A) rather than relying on isolated words like “punish.” Show that, in context, the court’s reasoning targeted retribution for the underlying offense, not deterrence of violations.
Mitigation still matters. The panel noted the court considered addiction, family support, and letters. Build a robust mitigation record and propose concrete treatment and compliance plans to align with § 3553(a)(2)(D).

For Prosecutors

Tie arguments to deterrence and compliance. Emphasize history of noncompliance, need to deter future violations, and public safety—each firmly within § 3583(e).
Address boilerplate. When the court uses broad § 3553 phrasing, consider inviting a clarifying statement that the court is not relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A) in revocation.

Broader Jurisprudential Effects

This decision operationalizes Esteras in the Eleventh Circuit: the core inquiry is whether the record shows actual reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A), not whether the judge used certain words. The focus remains on the purpose behind the sentence.
Because the decision is unpublished, it is persuasive rather than binding. Still, it offers a practical template for district courts’ articulation of revocation rationales and for appellate review in future cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Plain error: If a defendant did not object in the district court, an appellate court will reverse only if there is an error that is clear or obvious, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness or integrity of proceedings. Here, the question was whether it was clear or obvious the judge actually relied on an excluded factor.
Abuse of discretion (substantive reasonableness): A deferential standard looking at the totality of the circumstances. A sentence is reversed only if the appellate court has a firm conviction that the district judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the proper factors.
§ 3583(e) vs. § 3553(a)(2)(A): When revoking supervised release under § 3583(e), courts may consider many § 3553(a) factors (e.g., deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation, and the defendant’s history and characteristics), but not retribution (the need for just punishment, seriousness of the offense, or promoting respect for the law).
Deterrence vs. retribution: Deterrence aims to prevent future misconduct (specific to the defendant or general to others). Retribution is about punishment to reflect the seriousness of the offense. At revocation, deterrence is permitted; retribution is not.
Advisory ranges at revocation: The “Guidelines” ranges cited in revocation are advisory policy statements (Chapter 7) and are not binding, but courts routinely consider them. Sentences within or at the low end of the range generally support reasonableness.

Conclusion

United States v. Hunter reinforces, in concrete terms, the line drawn by § 3583(e) and Esteras: revocation sentencing may not rest on retribution, but courts may consider deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation, the defendant’s history and characteristics, and the nature and circumstances of the violation conduct for those permitted ends. On appellate review, generic references to “punishment” or a desire to “send a message” will not, without more, establish the “clear or obvious” reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) needed to prevail under plain-error review.

The opinion also underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s deferential approach to substantive reasonableness. Where the district court recognizes the advisory range, considers both aggravating and mitigating facts, and ties its sentence to permissible statutory goals, an in-range, below-maximum revocation sentence will ordinarily stand.

Key takeaway: At supervised-release revocation, what matters is not the presence of words like “punish” in isolation, but the sentencing purpose those words reflect. If the record shows a deterrence- and compliance-centered rationale, appellate courts will affirm.

Deterrence, Not Retribution: Generic “Punishment” Language at Revocation Does Not, Without More, Establish Plain-Error Reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) — United States v. Hunter (11th Cir. 2025)