Determining Escheat Rights: Delaware v. New York and the Affirmation of Corporate Domicile as a Secondary Rule

Determining Escheat Rights: Delaware v. New York and the Affirmation of Corporate Domicile as a Secondary Rule

Introduction

The United States Supreme Court case Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490 (1993), addresses a complex interstate dispute over the escheatment of unclaimed securities distributions. This landmark decision clarifies the rules governing which state holds the right to claim abandoned intangible personal property, particularly when the beneficial owners cannot be identified or located. The case emerged from Delaware challenging New York's unilateral actions in escheating funds held by intermediaries, leading to a comprehensive examination of existing precedents and statutory frameworks.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the state in which an intermediary is incorporated holds the primary right to escheat funds belonging to beneficial owners who cannot be identified or located. This decision reaffirmed and clarified prior rulings from TEXAS v. NEW JERSEY (1965) and PENNSYLVANIA v. NEW YORK (1972), establishing that when the primary rule—escheat to the creditor's last known address—fails, the secondary rule delegates escheat rights to the debtor's state of incorporation. The Court reversed the Special Master’s recommendation that favored the state where the securities issuer's principal executive offices were located, emphasizing consistency with established interstate escheat principles.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court heavily relied on established precedents, particularly:

  • TEXAS v. NEW JERSEY, 379 U.S. 674 (1965): Established the primary and secondary rules for interstate escheat disputes, prioritizing the creditor's last known address and then the debtor's state of incorporation.
  • PENNSYLVANIA v. NEW YORK, 407 U.S. 206 (1972): Reaffirmed the Texas decision, applying the same framework to different contexts involving unclaimed funds.
  • Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961) and STANDARD OIL CO. v. NEW JERSEY, 341 U.S. 428 (1951): Provided background on handling of intangible property and interstate disputes.

The Court emphasized consistency with these rulings to maintain legal stability and fairness among states vying for escheat rights.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's reasoning centered on adhering to the structured framework for escheat disputes among states. It delineated three critical steps:

  1. Determine the debtor-creditor relationship as defined by the property-creating law.
  2. Apply the primary rule, awarding escheat to the state of the creditor's last known address.
  3. If the primary rule is inapplicable, apply the secondary rule, granting escheat rights to the debtor's state of incorporation.

In this case, since the beneficial owners could not be identified or located, and Delaware sought to escheat funds that New York had already escheated, the Court affirmed that New York's right to escheat was subordinate to Delaware's based on the intermediary's state of incorporation. The Court rejected the Special Master's alternative proposal that would have shifted secondary escheat rights to the issuer’s principal executive offices, citing inconsistency with prior rulings and introducing unnecessary complexity.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the precedence of corporate domicile over principal executive offices in determining escheat rights, ensuring consistency in how states handle abandoned intangible property. It provides clear guidelines for inter-state disputes, reducing the likelihood of prolonged litigation and promoting equitable distribution of escheated funds. Additionally, it underscores the importance of maintaining accurate debtor-creditor records to facilitate the escheat process, potentially influencing legislative measures to enhance record-keeping requirements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Escheat

Escheat is the legal process by which unclaimed property reverts to the state. This typically occurs when the rightful owner cannot be located after a specified period.

Debtor and Creditor in Escheat Context

- Debtor: The entity obligated to return or distribute the unclaimed funds, in this case, the intermediary holding the securities distributions.
- Creditor: The beneficial owner entitled to the funds, whose last known address determines the primary escheat state.

Primary and Secondary Rules

- Primary Rule: Grants escheat rights to the state where the creditor's last known address is located.
- Secondary Rule: If the primary rule can't be applied (e.g., no address), the right to escheat goes to the debtor's state of incorporation.

Intermediary

An intermediary, such as a bank or broker, holds securities on behalf of beneficial owners. In escheat cases, intermediaries are considered debtors because they have the duty to distribute funds to beneficial owners.

Conclusion

Delaware v. New York solidifies the Supreme Court's stance on the hierarchical application of escheat rights among states, prioritizing creditor residency and corporate domicile over less stable factors like principal executive office location. This decision not only aligns with established legal principles but also enhances the efficiency and fairness of escheat proceedings. By affirming the secondary rule of corporate domicile, the Court ensures that interstate disputes over abandoned intangible property are resolved predictably, minimizing legal uncertainty and promoting interstate cooperation. This judgment underscores the judiciary's role in maintaining equitable state relations and supports the broader framework governing abandoned property.

Case Details

Year: 1993
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

John Paul StevensHarry Andrew BlackmunClarence Thomas

Attorney(S)

Dennis G. Lyons argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs were Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, J. Patrick Hurley, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, and Kent A. Yalowitz. Jerry Bonne, Solicitor General of New York, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were Robert Abrams, Attorney General, and Robert A. Forte, Assistant Attorney General. Bernard Nash argued the cause for intervenors State of Alabama et al. With him on the briefs were Andrew P. Miller, William Bradford Reynolds, Judith E. Schaeffer, Dan Schweitzer, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Thomas F. Gede, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Yeoryios C. Apallas, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Jimmy Evans of Alabama, Charles Cole of Alaska, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Warren Price III of Hawaii, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Bonnie Campbell of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Richard Ieyoub of Louisiana, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Mike Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Marc Racicot of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, John P. Arnold of New Hampshire, Robert J. Del Tufo of New Jersey, Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota, Lee Fisher of Ohio, Susan B. Loving of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, James E. O'Neil of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, R. Paul Van Dam of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, Mario J. Palumbo of West Virginia, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming. James F. Flug, Martin Lobel, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, John Payton, Corporation Counsel of District of Columbia, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Dale A. Comer, Assistant Attorney General, filed briefs for intervenors State of Michigan et al. A brief for intervenors State of Texas et al. was filed by Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Will Pryor, First Assistant Attorney General, Mary R. Keller, Deputy Attorney General, and James A. Thomassen and Jeffrey A. Coryell, Assistant Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, and Gail H. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of Colorado, Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, and Maurice Knaizer, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and William J. Prensky, Assistant Attorney General, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, and Theodore V. Spangler, Jr., and Lawrence G. Sirhall, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Alan Gilbert, Assistant Attorney General, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, and Guru Terath Singh Khalsa, Assistant Attorney General, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, M. Ann Reed, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Douglas A. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Crookham, Attorney General of Oregon, Jack L. Landau, Deputy Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and William R. Cook, Assistant Attorney General, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Ray N. Stevens, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Roland W. Urban, Deputy Attorney General, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Michael W. Catalano, Deputy Attorney General, James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Burneatta Bridge, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, Stephen D. Rosenthal, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Gail Starling Marshall and Mary Yancey Spencer, Deputy Attorneys General, and E. Suzanne Darling, Assistant Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Midwest Securities Trust Co. et al. by Michael Fischer and Ilene Knable Gotts; and for the Securities Industry Association et al. by Judith Welcom.

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