Detention Orders Need Not Address Each Proposed Release Condition When § 3142(g) Factors Are Fully Analyzed: Commentary on United States v. Valle-Acosta (10th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s per curiam decision in United States v. Valle-Acosta, No. 25‑4130 (10th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025), addresses a recurrent and practically important question under the Bail Reform Act: must a district court, when ordering pretrial detention, specifically analyze each release condition proposed by the defendant, or is it sufficient that the court thoroughly apply the statutory factors and explain in general terms why “no condition or combination of conditions” will reasonably assure appearance?

The panel affirms the pretrial detention of Andrew Estefan Valle‑Acosta, who faces a ten‑year mandatory minimum and potential life sentence for fentanyl distribution involving roughly 97,000 pills. The case arises against the background of the statutory presumption of detention for serious drug offenses and prior Tenth Circuit (unpublished) decisions suggesting closer scrutiny of district court detention reasoning. Although designated as an “Order and Judgment” and thus not precedential, the opinion is citable and offers a clear and practical clarification of district courts’ obligations when drafting detention orders.

At its core, the decision establishes a useful principle: where a district court (1) makes adequate written findings, (2) meaningfully addresses each of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and (3) explains why no conditions will reasonably assure appearance, it is not required to separately discuss each specific release condition the defendant proposes. The panel also reaffirms that strong ties abroad, minimal ties to the United States, and substantial sentencing exposure can justify a finding of serious flight risk even in the absence of evidence of current access to cash, false documents, or travel logistics.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Charged Offense

Valle‑Acosta was indicted for possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, triggering the Bail Reform Act’s presumption of detention. The government alleged:

He sold fentanyl to a confidential informant.
At his arrest, he was found with approximately 200 fentanyl pills on his person.
He informed officers that more pills would be located at his residence.
Law enforcement then recovered roughly 97,000 fentanyl pills from that residence.

Because of the drug quantity, the charge carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). Both parties agree that this offense falls within 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A), which creates a rebuttable presumption that no release conditions will reasonably assure appearance and community safety.

B. The Defendant’s Personal Circumstances

The record reflects the following background:

Valle‑Acosta was born in the United States.
At around age five, he moved with his mother and brother to Honduras.
He remained in Honduras until age 18, returning to the United States less than two years before his arrest.
His mother and brother still live in Honduras, and he has “significant and longstanding ties” to them.
He has “a very limited criminal history.”
He enjoys the support of his pregnant girlfriend and her family in the United States.
He lacks a “legitimate work history” in the United States.

C. Proceedings in the District Court

The district judge applied the Bail Reform Act’s framework and ordered pretrial detention based primarily on risk of flight. While there were concerns about danger to the community given the scope of drug activity, the appeal focused solely on flight risk.

The court considered the four statutory factors under § 3142(g):

Nature and circumstances of the offense: The large quantity of fentanyl and the severe penalty (10‑year mandatory minimum, maximum life) weighed in favor of detention, especially because the offense involved controlled substances.
Weight of the evidence: The evidence—sale to an informant, pills on his person, incriminating statement and the large cache at his residence—was characterized as “strong,” again favoring detention.
History and characteristics of the defendant:
- Favorable aspects: limited criminal history; strong support network from his pregnant girlfriend and her family.
- Unfavorable aspects: deep and longstanding ties to Honduras; only brief residence in the United States since returning at 18; close family members still abroad; no legitimate work history in the United States.
- On balance, the court concluded this factor “slightly” favored detention.
Nature and seriousness of the danger posed by release: The judge acknowledged governmental concern that Valle‑Acosta could obtain large quantities of fentanyl if released, though, on appeal, “danger to the community is not an issue.”

Valle‑Acosta proposed a set of release conditions designed to mitigate flight risk:

Reside with his girlfriend’s sister;
Surrender his passport;
Submit to home detention;
Leave the state or country only with prior permission.

The district court concluded that even with such conditions, his strong ties to Honduras, limited U.S. ties, lack of a stable lawful work history, and substantial sentencing exposure created a non‑mitigable risk of flight. It therefore ordered detention.

D. The Appeal

On appeal, Valle‑Acosta challenged only the detention order, raising two principal arguments:

Procedural attack: The district court allegedly erred by failing to discuss his specific proposed release conditions, purportedly violating 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1), which requires written findings and reasons for detention.
Substantive attack: Even if the order were procedurally adequate, the court allegedly misjudged flight risk because:
- The government never confronted his proposed conditions;
- There was no showing that he had access to cash, false travel documents, or a realistic means of reaching Honduras without a passport;
- The court allegedly underestimated the difficulty of fleeing to Honduras from Utah without documentation.

He also attempted to rely on an FBI report that had not been before the district judge when the detention decision was made. The Tenth Circuit rejected that attempt as inconsistent with basic appellate practice limiting review to the district court record.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the detention order. Its principal conclusions can be summarized as follows:

Standard of review: The panel reviewed factual findings for clear error and the application of law to facts, including the ultimate detention decision, de novo, following United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2003).
Procedural sufficiency of the detention order:
- Section 3142(i)(1) requires that a detention order “include written findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention.”
- The district judge satisfied that requirement by making “relevant factual findings,” addressing each statutory factor under § 3142(g), and explaining why “no conditions could reasonably assure” Valle‑Acosta’s appearance.
- The statute does not require that a district court specifically address each individual release condition proposed by the defendant if the court has otherwise adequately explained its conclusion.
- The panel distinguished earlier unpublished decisions (such as United States v. Campas and United States v. Mobley) which criticized detention orders that failed both to address release conditions and to meaningfully analyze the § 3142(g) factors.
Substantive assessment of flight risk:
- Even accepting that flight to Honduras without a passport would pose “many significant obstacles,” the court held that the incentive to attempt such flight remains “strong” in light of:
  - his “significant and longstanding ties to Honduras,”
  - his “limited time in the United States,”
  - his lack of legitimate employment in the United States, and
  - his substantial sentencing exposure (10‑year minimum to life).
- Those considerations justified the conclusion that no conditions could reasonably assure his future appearance in court.
- The panel rejected the contention that the “history and characteristics” factor favored release, adopting the district court’s view that the foreign ties and minimal U.S. connections outweighed the favorable attributes (limited criminal history and family support in the U.S.).
Record on appeal:
- The panel refused to consider an FBI report not part of the district court record, citing Regan‑Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir. 2008): appellate review is generally limited to the record before the district court.

The detention order was therefore affirmed in full.

IV. Analysis

A. Statutory Framework and the Role of Presumptions

1. The Bail Reform Act’s basic standard

The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, permits pretrial detention only if no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure:

(1) the defendant’s appearance as required; and
(2) the safety of any other person and the community.

Section 3142(g) directs courts to consider four categories of information:

Nature and circumstances of the offense (including whether it involves a controlled substance);
Weight of the evidence (though this is often considered the “least important” factor in some circuits, it still must be weighed);
History and characteristics of the defendant (including ties to the community, employment, family, criminal history, and similar considerations);
Nature and seriousness of the danger posed by release.

2. The rebuttable presumption of detention for serious drug offenses

Section 3142(e)(3)(A) creates a rebuttable presumption of detention upon a showing of probable cause that the defendant committed certain federal drug offenses carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more. Both sides agreed this presumption applied in Valle‑Acosta’s case.

United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1991), long ago clarified the operation of this presumption in the Tenth Circuit:

It shifts to the defendant a burden of production—the defendant must produce “some evidence” to rebut the presumption.
If the defendant meets that burden, the presumption does not disappear; rather, it remains as a factor to be weighed along with the others.
The burden of persuasion—to prove risk of flight or danger warranting detention—always remains with the government.

The government must prove:

Risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence; and
Danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence (though danger was not at issue in this appeal).

In Valle‑Acosta’s case, there is no detailed discussion of whether and how he rebutted the presumption; the court appears to assume either that he did not overcome it or that, even if rebutted, the presumption remained a powerful factor favoring detention. Either way, the presumption’s presence, combined with the circumstances, tilted heavily toward detention.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1991)

The panel cites Stricklin for two critical propositions:

The defendant’s burden in rebutting the presumption is one of production (“some evidence”), not persuasion.
Even after rebuttal, the presumption persists as a factor to be weighed, and the government retains the burden of persuasion “regarding the defendant’s risk of flight and danger to the community.”

Stricklin functions here as a doctrinal anchor, reminding both district courts and litigants that the presumption is neither irrebuttable nor illusory. It shapes the overall context: Valle‑Acosta starts from a significantly disadvantaged position because of the nature of the offense and potential punishment, and he must present credible evidence to move the needle.

2. United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2003)

Cisneros serves two roles:

It sets the standard of appellate review:
- Factual findings are reviewed for clear error—a highly deferential standard.
- The application of law to the facts, including the ultimate detention decision, is reviewed de novo.
It reiterates that the government must prove risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence.

These standards mattered here because the appeal was essentially a challenge both to the sufficiency of the district court’s factual reasoning (ties to Honduras, ties to the U.S., sentencing exposure) and to its legal conclusion that such facts justified detention.

3. United States v. Campas, No. 24‑4003, 2024 WL 687716 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 2024) (unpublished)

In Campas, the Tenth Circuit criticized a district court for an inadequate detention explanation. Though unpublished, it had been cited by defendants to argue that district courts must specifically address proposed release conditions.

Valle‑Acosta invoked Campas to claim that the failure to expressly discuss his proposed conditions (home detention, passport surrender, restricted travel, etc.) mandated a remand. The panel, with some care, distinguished Campas:

In Campas, the district court also failed to meaningfully address the § 3142(g) factors.
Here, by contrast, the district judge did address each statutory factor and explained, in a reasoned manner, why no conditions would reasonably assure appearance.

Thus, rather than following Campas as a broad requirement to “discuss all conditions,” the panel reads it more narrowly: where both the § 3142(g) analysis and any consideration of conditions are perfunctory or missing, the order is insufficient. But where the statutory factors are properly and thoroughly analyzed, the statute does not further require a condition‑by‑condition discussion.

4. United States v. Mobley, 720 F. App’x 441 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished)

Mobley is similar to Campas and is used by the panel as an example of a case where the district court did not adequately engage the statutory factors. In those circumstances, the failure to discuss conditions is part of a larger deficiency. Again, the panel emphasizes:

“Those cases offer no support for the idea that a district court must address specific release conditions when it has already adequately addressed the § 3142(g) factors and explained why no conditions could reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance.”

5. Regan‑Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 2008)

This civil case is cited to reaffirm a fundamental appellate principle:

“We generally limit our review on appeal to the record that was before the district court when it made its decision.”

By invoking Regan‑Touhy, the panel makes clear that Valle‑Acosta’s attempt to rely on a post hoc FBI report is improper. Detention appeals, like other appeals, must rise or fall on the record below. This preserves the integrity of the adversarial process and the trial court’s role as the primary fact‑finder.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. What § 3142(i)(1) requires of detention orders

Section 3142(i)(1) requires:

a detention order must “include written findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention.”

The Tenth Circuit construed that requirement pragmatically:

The district court’s order did:
- Make specific factual findings about the offense, the evidence, and the defendant’s background;
- Address each of the four § 3142(g) factors;
- Explain why, in light of those factors, “no release conditions could reasonably assure” appearance.
The order did not:
- Expressly mention each proposed release condition, nor explain why each was inadequate.

The panel held that the statute demands the former, not the latter. In other words, the Act requires reasoned explanation; it does not mandate a condition‑by‑condition rebuttal of every defense proposal when the court has otherwise thoroughly applied § 3142(g).

This is the central doctrinal refinement in the case: a sufficient detention order is one that is analytically complete at the level of statutory factors and overall justification, not necessarily exhaustive in itemizing and rejecting each proposed condition.

2. Why the district court’s analysis was not “summary”

Valle‑Acosta argued that the district judge had “summarily” concluded that no conditions would assure his appearance. The panel rejects this characterization as inconsistent with the record. The district court relied on:

Strong and longstanding ties to Honduras (where his mother and brother still reside);
His limited time in the United States since returning at 18;
His lack of legitimate U.S. work history, implying little economic or professional anchoring;
His substantial sentencing exposure (10‑year mandatory minimum and potential life term), which creates a powerful incentive to flee.

Given these articulated reasons, the panel finds the analysis sufficiently detailed and grounded in specific facts. This meets § 3142(i)(1)’s requirements.

3. Flight risk: incentive, opportunity, and reasonable assurance

The central substantive issue is whether the government proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no set of conditions could reasonably assure Valle‑Acosta’s appearance.

The defense emphasized the lack of evidence that he:

Had access to significant cash or resources;
Possessed or could obtain false travel documents;
Had a concrete, realistic plan for reaching Honduras without a passport.

The panel acknowledged that “flight to Honduras without a passport would entail many significant obstacles.” Yet it concluded that the incentive to attempt flight remained “strong” because:

He faces a very long potential sentence if convicted;
He has deep, enduring family ties in Honduras, offering both a potential refuge and a motive;
His ties to the United States are relatively weak and recent, and he lacks lawful employment anchoring him here.

Taken together, these circumstances allow a rational inference that no reasonable set of conditions—house arrest, passport surrender, third‑party supervision—would reduce flight risk to an acceptable level under the “reasonable assurance” standard. That standard does not demand certainty of non‑flight; it demands a level of assurance that is reasonable in light of the defendant’s incentives and capabilities.

The panel thus confirms a key point: a court may find a serious risk of flight even in the absence of evidence that the defendant has immediate access to money or fraudulent documents, if the combination of foreign ties and sentencing exposure makes flight a substantially attractive and plausible option.

4. Weighing “history and characteristics” under § 3142(g)(3)

The “history and characteristics” factor is often central in close cases. Here, the district court acknowledged that some features of Valle‑Acosta’s profile aided his cause:

Very limited criminal history;
Support from a pregnant girlfriend and her family in the United States.

Nevertheless, the court found that these were outweighed by:

His formative years and most of his life spent in Honduras;
Family remaining in Honduras with whom he maintains close relationships;
His relatively recent return to the United States;
His lack of legitimate employment here.

The Tenth Circuit agreed that, on balance, this factor “slightly” favored detention. That conclusion reflects a broader institutional reality: while supportive family and minimal criminal history help, they may be insufficient to overcome substantial foreign ties and an enormous sentencing incentive in serious drug‑trafficking cases.

D. Impact and Likely Future Significance

1. Clarifying district courts’ drafting obligations

The most immediate impact of Valle‑Acosta is at the level of detention‑order drafting. Within the Tenth Circuit, district judges now have clear, persuasive authority for the proposition that:

They must provide written findings and a reasoned explanation tracking § 3142(g);
They are not obligated to:
- list each release condition suggested by the defense, or
- engage in individualized written discussion of each such condition,
if their analysis already explains why “no condition or combination of conditions” will reasonably assure appearance (or safety).

This reduces litigation pressure on trial judges to produce exhaustive, condition‑by‑condition opinions in every detention case, so long as the statutory factors are thoroughly and transparently addressed.

2. Guidance for defense counsel

For defense counsel, Valle‑Acosta sends several practical signals:

Merely proposing a detailed set of stringent conditions (ankle monitors, passport surrender, home detention) will not automatically require a written, individualized response if the court’s broader analysis is adequate.
Attacks on detention orders must focus not just on the absence of discussion of specific conditions, but on whether the overall § 3142(g) analysis is incomplete or unsupported by the record.
In cases involving long sentences and strong foreign ties, counsel must marshal evidence that substantially anchors the client in the United States (employment, long‑standing residence, property, community connections, etc.) to counter the presumption and the perceived risk of flight.

3. Implications for defendants with foreign ties

The decision also illustrates how heavily courts may weigh:

Long‑standing residence abroad;
Close family abroad;
Short or recent connection to the United States; and
Severe potential punishment

in the flight‑risk calculus. It underscores that foreign ties are not merely neutral background facts; they can be decisive, particularly for serious narcotics charges carrying lengthy mandatory minimums.

Defendants with similar profiles (U.S. citizens or non‑citizens who spent most of their lives abroad and maintain extensive foreign family or community ties) may face substantial headwinds in obtaining release, especially when charged with high‑penalty drug offenses.

4. Limited precedential weight but practical persuasive value

Formally, this “Order and Judgment” is:

“not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel”;
but “may be cited for its persuasive value” under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

In practice, district courts in the Tenth Circuit often look to such unpublished opinions for guidance, particularly in recurring procedural contexts like detention. Thus, while Valle‑Acosta does not formally “bind” future panels, it will likely be followed unless a subsequent published opinion adopts a different approach.

E. Simplifying Key Concepts and Terminology

1. “Rebuttable presumption” of detention

A “rebuttable presumption” means:

The law assumes something is true (here: that no conditions will assure appearance and safety) once certain facts are established (probable cause that the defendant committed a qualifying drug offense).
The defendant can introduce evidence to counter that assumption (for example, long‑term stable residence, employment, lack of prior failures to appear, etc.).
If the defendant does so, the presumption does not simply vanish; it remains a weight on the scale that the judge considers along with all other evidence.

2. “Burden of production” vs. “burden of persuasion”

Burden of production:
- The obligation to come forward with some evidence on a point.
- In this context, the defendant must produce “some evidence” that he is not a flight risk or danger, to counter the presumption.
Burden of persuasion:
- The obligation to convince the court that a fact is more likely than not (or, under some standards, highly probable).
- Under the Bail Reform Act, the government always retains the burden to persuade the court that detention is warranted (for flight, by a preponderance of the evidence).

3. “Preponderance of the evidence”

This is a common civil and procedural standard. It means:

Something is more likely than not true—over 50% probability.

For flight risk, the government does not need to prove that the defendant will flee; it must show it is more likely than not that no conditions will reasonably assure appearance.

4. “Reasonably assure” vs. guarantee

The Bail Reform Act speaks in terms of “reasonably assure,” not guarantee. Absolute guarantees are rarely possible. The question is whether, in light of the defendant’s circumstances:

The proposed conditions make it reasonably likely that he will appear in court when required; or
Residual risk remains too high, given the stakes and incentives, even with strict conditions.

5. “Order and Judgment” and nonprecedential decisions

An “Order and Judgment” in the Tenth Circuit is:

Typically unpublished;
Formally nonbinding as precedent on future panels, except in limited doctrinal contexts;
Nonetheless citable and often followed as persuasive authority, especially in routine or recurring issues like pretrial detention.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Valle‑Acosta contributes a clear, practical clarification to federal pretrial detention law in the Tenth Circuit. Within the framework of the Bail Reform Act, it holds that:

A detention order satisfies 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1) when it:
- includes specific written findings of fact,
- meaningfully addresses each § 3142(g) factor, and
- articulates why no conditions will reasonably assure appearance (or safety).
In such a case, the district court need not separately analyze and reject every individual release condition proposed by the defendant.
Substantial foreign ties, minimal domestic anchors, and severe sentencing exposure can justify a finding of non‑mitigable flight risk even absent evidence of ready access to money or travel documents.
On appeal, review is confined to the district court record; new evidence (such as a later FBI report) cannot retroactively reshape the detention analysis.

Although nonprecedential, the decision will likely carry considerable persuasive weight in future detention litigation. It reinforces that pretrial detention must be grounded in a careful, factor‑by‑factor analysis, but it does not impose a hyper‑formalistic requirement that judges respond, in writing, to every condition a defendant can imagine. In cases involving significant foreign ties and high drug‑trafficking penalties, defendants and counsel should take note: the combination of deep ties abroad and severe potential punishment may be sufficient to sustain detention, even when strict, well‑crafted release conditions are proposed.