Denial of USCIS Adjustment of Status as an Unreviewable “Judgment” under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

Introduction

The Second Circuit’s decision in Xia v. Bondi clarifies that denials of adjustment‐of‐status applications issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are “judgments” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and thus immune from district‐court review. Plaintiff‐Appellant Suqin Xia, a Chinese national who has lived in the United States unlawfully for over thirty years, filed a Form I-485 application under 8 U.S.C. §1255 seeking discretionary adjustment to lawful permanent residence. USCIS denied her application on discretionary grounds. Xia then sued in federal district court under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but the court dismissed her complaint for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction, relying on §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the jurisdictional bar applies equally to USCIS decisions made outside removal proceedings.

Summary of the Judgment

In a unanimous opinion authored by Circuit Judge Nardini, the court:

Held that §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s prohibition on district‐court review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” 8 U.S.C. §1255 extends to USCIS denials of adjustment of status.
Relied on the plain text of the statute—specifically the words “any” and “regardless”—and on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022), which interprets “judgment” broadly.
Rejected Xia’s arguments that the bar reaches only immigration‐court decisions or only discretionary rulings, emphasizing that §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) covers all “judgments” under §1255, whether discretionary or statutory, and whether in removal proceedings or not.
Concluded that no district‐court challenge to USCIS’s discretionary denial was permissible, and therefore affirmed the dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court examined both Second Circuit and Supreme Court authorities:

Wallace v. Gonzales (463 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2006)) and Guyadin v. Gonzales (449 F.3d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 2006)): Established that denials of adjustment of status by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) are unreviewable “judgments” under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Patel v. Garland (596 U.S. 328 (2022)): Interpreted the term “judgment” broadly to include credibility determinations and factual findings in removal proceedings, and confirmed that §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies “regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings.”
INS v. St. Cyr (533 U.S. 289 (2001)): Highlighted the context in which Congress amended §1252 post‐St. Cyr to preserve review of legal and constitutional questions while extending the 1252(a)(2)(B) bar to judgments outside removal proceedings.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning turned on three key principles:

Plain Text and Structure: Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes review of “any judgment” under §1255. The modifier “any” is expansive, and the phrase “regardless of whether the judgment … is made in removal proceedings” unambiguously sweeps in USCIS decisions issued outside that context.
Exclusivity of USCIS Authority: By regulation, USCIS—and not an immigration court—has exclusive jurisdiction over stand-alone adjustment applications (8 C.F.R. §245.2(a)(1)), so the only “judgments” that could fall outside removal proceedings are those made by USCIS.
Supreme Court Guidance in Patel: The Patel Court expressly characterized judgments under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) as inclusive of any and all decisions—factual or legal—concerning relief under §1255. The opinion anticipated that its interpretation might bar review of USCIS denials and deemed that consequence “consistent with Congress’ choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of discretionary relief.”

Impact

This decision reinforces a nationwide consensus among circuits that district courts lack jurisdiction to review USCIS denials of adjustment of status. Potential consequences include:

Removal of any district‐court avenue for aliens to challenge discretionary adjustment denials by USCIS, forcing them to pursue relief only through removal‐proceeding petitions for review in the courts of appeals.
Limitation of judicial oversight over discretionary exercises by USCIS, potentially reducing procedural checks on agency decision‐making in the immigration context.
Encouragement for practitioners and petitioners to raise all legal and constitutional challenges during removal proceedings, where only then can questions of law survive under §1252(a)(2)(D).
Reinforcement of the statutory design favoring speed and finality in agency determinations on discretionary immigration relief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjustment of Status (8 U.S.C. §1255): A process by which certain noncitizens already in the United States request to change their status to lawful permanent residence without leaving the country.
“Judgment” in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i): Any authoritative decision—legal or factual—about granting or denying specified forms of relief, including adjustment of status.
Jurisdictional Bar: A statutory rule that prohibits federal district courts from reviewing certain agency or immigration‐court decisions.
Mandamus Act & APA: Mechanisms by which plaintiffs typically seek to compel agency action (Mandamus) or challenge agency decisions as unlawful or arbitrary (APA).
Removal Proceedings vs. Stand-Alone Applications: Removal proceedings occur when an alien is formally placed in deportation court; stand-alone applications (such as many adjustment petitions) are adjudicated exclusively by USCIS outside those proceedings.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit in Xia v. Bondi has definitively extended the unreviewability rule of 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to USCIS denials of adjustment of status. By applying the plain meaning of “any judgment” and respecting Congress’s explicit instruction that the bar applies “regardless of whether” a decision arises in removal proceedings, the court has closed off district‐court review of such denials. This holding underscores the narrow windows for judicial oversight of discretionary immigration relief and channels future litigants into the statutory framework devised by Congress and interpreted by the Supreme Court in Patel.