Denial of Summary Judgment Is No Shield from Post-Trial Sanctions – The Seventh Circuit’s Clarification of Continuing Rule 11 and § 1927 Duties in Robert Fletcher v. Peter Doig

Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Robert Fletcher and Bartlow Gallery v. Peter Doig (Nos. 23-2364 & 16-3508, decided 29 July 2025) delivers a forceful reminder that litigants and their counsel must continually reassess the factual and legal basis of their claims. Even when a case survives summary judgment, the duty under Federal Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to maintain only well-supported contentions persists through trial and beyond. The ruling affirms nearly $2.5 million in sanctions against attorney William F. Zieske (and his clients) for pressing a provenance suit over a painting despite mounting evidence that renowned artist Peter Doig was not its author.

The appellate panel – Judges Brennan, Kirsch, and opinion author Judge Lee – uses the dispute to crystallize two principal teachings:

The denial of summary judgment, which obliges the court to credit a non-movant’s version of disputed facts, does not immunize the case from later sanctions once the record develops and the evidence proving the claim evaporates.
Under § 1927, an attorney’s ability to pay is irrelevant; sanctions are calibrated to the loss caused by the unreasonable proliferation of litigation, not the lawyer’s pocketbook.

Summary of the Judgment

After an eight-day bench trial, the district court found conclusively that the desert-landscape painting in question was created by Peter Edward Doige, an inmate at Thunder Bay Correctional Center in the 1970s, and not by celebrated artist Peter Doig. Post-judgment, Doig moved for sanctions under Rule 11 and § 1927, contending that plaintiffs and counsel knew or should have known – at least by May 7 2014 – that their attribution claim was meritless.

The district court agreed, holding Fletcher, Bartlow, and Zieske jointly and severally liable for $2,525,958.35 in fees and costs incurred after May 7 2014. On appeal, Zieske argued that sanctions were inconsistent with the earlier summary-judgment denial, that the court should have considered his inability to pay, and that the fee calculation was presumptively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit rejected each contention and affirmed the entire award.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) – established that courts must view facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant on summary judgment. The panel contrasts this deferential Rule 56 standard with the objective inquiry under Rule 11.
Hill v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987) – cited for condemning the “ostrich-like” refusal to examine available evidence. The district court relied on this to critique plaintiffs’ failure to contact witnesses who could negate their story.
Shales v. Gen. Chauffeurs … Local 330, 557 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2009) – precedent that an attorney’s inability to pay is irrelevant under § 1927. It foreclosed Zieske’s plea for a reduced award.
LeBeau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford, 799 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1986); Lemaster v. United States, 891 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1989); Calloway v. Marvel Ent., 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988) – invoked by Zieske in arguing that surviving summary judgment shields parties from sanctions. The panel distinguished them, noting their explicit caveats or differing procedural contexts.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) – governs fee petitions; the court reiterated that the fee applicant bears the initial burden, which defendants satisfied with detailed billing records.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit anchored its reasoning in the distinct purposes and timing of the relevant rules:

Rule 56 (summary judgment) asks if a jury could find for the non-movant assuming favorable inferences; hence, self-serving affidavits may suffice.
Rule 11(b) demands that factual contentions already have, or will likely have after discovery, evidentiary support. The duty is ongoing: when new information shows a claim lacks merit, counsel must withdraw or correct it.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 targets unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings, focusing on objective unreasonableness after “appropriate inquiry.”

Recognizing these differences, the court held it is not logically inconsistent for a claim to survive summary judgment yet later be deemed frivolous when additional evidence is unearthed. The decisive moment, in the district court’s view, arrived on 7 May 2014 when:

Defendants had produced prison, university, union, and family records pointing unambiguously to Doige rather than Doig;
Zieske conceded he could not secure contrary testimony from Doige’s mother;
Plaintiffs possessed no independent evidence corroborating their theory, yet refused to pause or abandon the action.

“By at least May 7 2014 … it should have become indisputably clear to Plaintiffs and Zieske that their claims stood no chance of success.” – District Court

3. Impact of the Decision

The ruling’s effects will resonate across civil litigation, especially in high-stakes commercial, intellectual-property, and defamation contexts where parties sometimes “weaponize” litigation pressure.

Clarification of Post-Summary-Judgment Duties – Counsel must re-evaluate claims as discovery unfolds. A denial of summary judgment confers no safe harbor; persisting in a meritless suit may incur heavy sanctions.
Ability-to-Pay Irrelevant under § 1927 – The court affirms a bright-line rule in the Seventh Circuit: financial hardship does not mitigate § 1927 liability. Attorneys should purchase liability coverage or structure engagements with this risk in mind.
Joint and Several Liability – By making clients and counsel jointly liable, the ruling fosters alignment: both parties must monitor the reasonableness of continuing litigation.
Fee-Shifting Precision – Trial courts are encouraged to time-stamp when litigation crosses from colorable to frivolous and to limit fee awards accordingly, here starting 7 May 2014.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11 Sanctions – A penalty (monetary or otherwise) imposed when filings are frivolous, legally unreasonable, or presented for an improper purpose. The duty is continuous; lawyers must withdraw claims once they know they lack merit.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 – A statute allowing courts to make attorneys (not clients) pay opposing counsel’s costs when they unreasonably multiply proceedings, even without subjective bad faith, if the lawyer’s actions are objectively unreasonable.
Joint and Several Liability – Each liable party (here, clients and attorney) is responsible for the entire judgment; the prevailing party can collect the full amount from any one of them.
Denial of Summary Judgment – A procedural ruling that factual disputes require trial. It does not validate the ultimate correctness of the claim, nor does it preclude later findings that the claim was baseless once discovery is complete.

Conclusion

Fletcher v. Doig cements a vital precedent in the Seventh Circuit: a litigant’s and lawyer’s duty to ensure factual and legal support for their contentions persists throughout the life of the case, and a summary-judgment win is no shield against later sanctions. The court’s refusal to temper § 1927 sanctions based on ability to pay underscores that the rule is compensatory and deterrent, not punitive based on means. Counsel must therefore:

Continuously evaluate evidence as it emerges;
Withdraw or amend claims when their foundation erodes;
Document investigative steps to demonstrate objective reasonableness;
Advise clients candidly about the mounting risk of sanctions when doubts surface.

By affirming a multi-million-dollar award, the Seventh Circuit sends an unequivocal message: persisting in a groundless narrative – however sincerely begun – can exact a ruinous financial toll. The decision will likely enter civil-procedure casebooks as the modern touchstone on the interplay between summary judgment and post-trial sanctions, shaping litigation strategy in federal courts nationwide.