Denial of Improvement Periods Where Parents “Go Through the Motions” Without Accepting Responsibility: Commentary on In re T.G., J.R., and R.G.

I. Introduction

This memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, In re T.G., J.R., and R.G., No. 24-581 (Nov. 4, 2025), addresses a recurring and practically important question in abuse and neglect law: under what circumstances may a circuit court terminate parental rights without first granting a statutory improvement period?

The petitioner father (“A.G.”) appealed a Webster County Circuit Court order terminating his parental rights to three minor children:

• T.G. (12 at the time of initial investigation),
• J.R. (10), and
• R.G. (8).

The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) alleged a broad spectrum of abuse and neglect: extreme household filth and infestation, underfeeding and denial of food, physical abuse, exposure to adult sexual conduct, provision of alcohol to a child, and sexual abuse of J.R. by the father. The father’s principal argument on appeal was narrow: he claimed that the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights without first granting him an improvement period to demonstrate he could correct conditions.

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the circuit court’s determination that (1) there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse could be substantially corrected in the near future, and (2) termination was necessary for the welfare of the children. Central to this holding was the court’s reaffirmation that:

• Compliance with services in form only – “going through the motions” – does not require the grant of an improvement period;
• A parent’s failure to accept responsibility for abuse or neglect can render problems “untreatable” and make an improvement period futile; and
• When the statutory prerequisites are met, courts may terminate parental rights without employing less restrictive alternatives, including foregoing an improvement period altogether.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Initial Petition and Conditions in the Home

On February 7, 2024, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that the father and his wife (mother of R.G. and stepmother to T.G. and J.R.) abused and neglected the children. The triggering event was J.R.’s placement at Highland Hospital, where she disclosed sexual abuse by a noncustodial family member. During a subsequent Child Advocacy Center (CAC) interview, she expanded her disclosures to include serious allegations against the father:

• Physical, verbal, and emotional abuse by the father;
• That the father and his wife engaged in “inappropriate things” (sexual conduct) in front of her;
• That the father drank excessively and drove while intoxicated; and
• That she was underfed and denied food.

CAC interviews with the other children initially yielded more limited information:

• T.G. expressed dislike of the interview and characterized J.R. as making “wild claims.”
• R.G. said he liked living at home but described the home as having “a lot of bugs” and sometimes cockroaches.

A drug screen of the father was positive for MDMA (ecstasy) and ETG, an indicator of recent alcohol use. He denied knowing why those results were positive. DHS workers observed that the parents’ home:

• Had a “terrible smell”;
• Was cluttered and unkempt;
• Contained visible roach feces (though no roaches were seen); and
• Had a dirty kitchen and bathroom, with mold in the shower.

The petition noted a prior abuse and neglect case involving the father and the biological mother of T.G. and J.R., which had been dismissed without adjudication, despite allegations of a home lacking electricity and being “somewhat unkempt.”

Based on this initial evidence, DHS alleged that the father and his wife abused controlled substances, failed to provide a fit and suitable home, and physically abused the children.

B. Preliminary Hearing and Emergency Removal

At the February 14, 2024 preliminary hearing, two DHS workers testified about the state of the home, including that:

• The shower was so filthy that it appeared the children were bathing in the sink; and
• Trash was spread throughout the home.

The court ratified the emergency removal of the children, finding imminent danger to their physical and emotional well-being arising from the parents’ failure to provide a fit, apt, and suitable home.

Meanwhile, the father filed a written “Motion for Improvement Period,” generically requesting a “preadjudicatory, post-adjudicatory or post-dispositional improvement period upon grounds to be presented at the hearing on this motion.”

C. Amended Petition and Additional Disclosures

In March 2024, DHS filed an amended petition following additional CAC interviews conducted after removal. The evidence escalated substantially:

• J.R. now additionally disclosed sexual abuse by the father.
• T.G. reported that:
  • He and J.R. were denied food;
  • The father drank excessively and drove intoxicated;
  • The father called him offensive and derogatory names; and
  • The father and his wife had sex in front of him.
• R.G. reported that:
  • The father gave him alcohol; and
  • T.G. had told him about not receiving food.

DHS now alleged that the father’s parenting was adversely affected by substance use, that he physically abused the children, failed to provide suitable housing, and exposed each child to the abuse of the others.

D. Adjudication

The court held multiple adjudicatory hearings in April 2024. Key evidence included:

• Testimony from the CAC forensic interviewer, who explained that:
  • The second round of interviews occurred after J.R. disclosed sexual abuse; and
  • The children disclosed additional abuse to their foster placement.
• Video recordings of the CAC interviews, played in court and admitted into evidence without objection.

Critically, the court “treated the petitioner’s refusal to testify at the hearing as affirmative evidence of his culpability” and ultimately found that the father and his wife:

• Physically abused the children;
• Allowed abuse to occur in the home;
• Failed to maintain a suitable home;
• Failed to provide appropriate food and clothing; and
• Attempted to influence the children to be fearful of Child Protective Services (CPS).

On this basis, the court adjudicated the father as an abusive and neglectful parent.

E. Disposition and Termination

At the August 2024 dispositional hearing, the focus shifted to whether the father:

1. Had corrected, or could correct, the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future; and
2. Should receive an improvement period.

The evidence showed:

• Psychological evaluation. A psychologist testified that:
  • The father portrayed J.R. as “a very problematic child” and denied abuse or neglect;
  • He only acknowledged the poor condition of the home;
  • His prognosis for improved parenting was “extremely poor”;
  • Return of the children would place them at risk of retaliation; and
  • He did not appear willing or able to correct the problems.
• Service provider testimony. A provider reported that:
  • While some progress had been made in cleaning,
  • The father and his wife consistently redirected parenting discussions into blaming J.R.; and
  • They refused to allow her to view their bedroom.
• CPS worker testimony. A CPS worker testified that:
  • The father had been compliant with services (attendance, participation); but
  • An improvement period would “likely be futile” because:
    • The father stated on multiple occasions that he did not want J.R. to return to his care; and
    • He padlocked the bedroom door, preventing inspection.
• Father’s testimony. The father:
  • Confirmed he participated in services;
  • Refused to allow CPS to see the bedroom, calling it his “personal space”; and
  • Denied doing “any of the stuff” for which he had been adjudicated.

The circuit court found that:

• The father had “gone through the motions” but had not benefited from services;
• He persistently refused to accept responsibility; and
• There was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future.

Finding no less restrictive alternative that would adequately protect the children’s welfare, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. The mothers’ rights were also terminated, and the permanency plan was adoption in the children’s current placements.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

On appeal, the father challenged only one aspect of the case: the denial of an improvement period before termination. He did not challenge:

• The adjudication of abuse and neglect;
• The finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction in the near future; or
• The conclusion that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.

Applying the deferential standard for factual findings and de novo review of legal conclusions (from In re Cecil T.), the Supreme Court:

1. Reiterated that all forms of improvement periods (pre-, post-adjudicatory, and post-dispositional) require the parent to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate (W. Va. Code § 49-4-610);
2. Held that the father’s participation in services, without demonstrable benefit or acceptance of responsibility, did not satisfy that standard;
3. Relied on In re Jonathan Michael D. and In re Timber M. to emphasize:
   • Compliance with service “checklists” is not enough, and
   • Refusal to acknowledge the abuse makes the problem “untreatable” and renders an improvement period futile;
4. Concluded that the circuit court correctly found no reasonable likelihood of correction (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)); and
5. Affirmed that termination was proper under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), citing In re Kristin Y., which holds that termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives when the statutory standard is met.

The Supreme Court thus affirmed the September 10, 2024 dispositional order terminating the father’s parental rights.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court begins by restating the familiar standard of review for abuse and neglect appeals:

“On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” (Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T.)

This division is crucial. It means:

• Factual determinations (e.g., whether the father failed to accept responsibility, whether services actually improved parenting) will be upheld unless “clearly erroneous”; and
• The legal meaning and application of statutes (e.g., W. Va. Code §§ 49-4-610, 49-4-604) are reviewed afresh by the Supreme Court.

Because the father did not meaningfully contest key factual findings (e.g., lack of responsibility, poor prognosis, futility of services), the Court had a relatively straightforward path to affirmance.

2. W. Va. Code § 49-4-610: Improvement Periods

The statue governing improvement periods provides, in relevant part, that for:

• Pre-adjudicatory improvement periods (§ 49-4-610(1)(B)),
• Post-adjudicatory improvement periods (§ 49-4-610(2)(B)), and
• Post-dispositional improvement periods (§ 49-4-610(3)(B)),

the moving parent must:

“demonstrate[], by clear and convincing evidence, that [he or she] is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.”

The father’s motion generically requested any type of improvement period “upon grounds to be presented later.” The Supreme Court emphasized that:

• The statutory burden rests squarely on the parent;
• The standard is clear and convincing evidence, a higher civil standard; and
• “Full participation” is both qualitative and quantitative: it is not enough to show attendance; the parent must show realistic likelihood of meaningful change.

This decision reinforces that improvement periods are discretionary tools, not automatic entitlements, even for parents who attend services.

3. W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d): “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction

Section 49-4-604(d) defines “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected” as a situation in which:

“the abusing adult … [has] demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.”

The Supreme Court applied this definition to the father’s case, concluding that:

• His denial of abuse;
• His attribution of blame entirely to J.R.;
• His refusal to permit bedroom inspection despite serious sexual abuse allegations; and
• His poor prognosis for parenting as per the psychologist

collectively demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the underlying problems, even with services. This dovetails with the Court’s reliance on Timber M. and Charity H. (discussed below).

4. W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)

The dispositional statute, § 49-4-604(c)(6), authorizes termination of parental rights when:

1. There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
2. Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

Syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.) restates a core West Virginia rule:

“Termination of parental rights … may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood … that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”

In In re T.G., J.R., and R.G., the Supreme Court explicitly invokes this principle: once the circuit court concluded that the father’s problems were not likely to be corrected and that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare (findings not challenged on appeal), it was under no obligation to first try less restrictive options such as an improvement period, conditional custody, or supervised visitation.

5. In re Jonathan Michael D., 194 W. Va. 20, 459 S.E.2d 131 (1995) and Peggy F.

The Court quotes Jonathan Michael D., which in turn quotes W. Va. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Peggy F.:

“it is possible for an individual to show ‘compliance with specific aspects of the case plan’ while failing ‘to improve … the overall attitude and approach to parenting.’”

This line is central to the Court’s rejection of the father’s argument. His evidence of cooperation – attending services, engaging with providers, cleaning parts of the home – did not translate into:

• Changed parenting attitudes;
• Acceptance of wrongdoing; or
• Safer emotional or physical conditions for the children.

The Court aligns “going through the motions” with mere formal compliance devoid of substantive change. That distinction is a longstanding feature of West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence.

6. In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) and In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004)

The Court highlights and quotes a key principle from these cases:

A parent’s failure to accept responsibility for abuse “results in making the problem untreatable and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child[ren]’s expense.”

By invoking Timber M. and Charity H., the Court underscores that:

• Denial of responsibility is not a mere “attitude problem” – it goes to the treatability of the underlying issues;
• An improvement period is designed for parents willing to change; and
• When denial persists despite services, additional time is likely to exacerbate insecurity and instability for the children, with little chance of meaningful parental improvement.

In the present case, the father never moved beyond denial. His narrative consistently:

• Minimized home conditions (only acknowledging messiness);
• Blamed J.R. for the family’s problems; and
• Denied every substantive allegation of abuse or neglect, even after being adjudicated.

Under Timber M. and Charity H., the circuit court and Supreme Court were entitled to treat this posture as making an improvement period futile.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Burden and Standard for Improvement Periods

The Court’s reasoning follows a structured path grounded in the explicit statutory scheme of W. Va. Code § 49-4-610:

1. The father moved for an improvement period, but his motion was generic and not supported by a developed plan or explicit showing of likely benefit.
2. Under § 49-4-610, the parent bears the burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she is likely to fully participate in an improvement period.
3. “Full participation” entails more than formal enrollment in services – it includes:
   • Acceptance of the problems;
   • Honest engagement with service goals; and
   • Concrete behavioral change.
4. Where, as here, the circuit court finds that the parent has only “gone through the motions” and failed to benefit, the statutory threshold is not met.

The Supreme Court relies heavily on the circuit court’s factual findings, especially the psychologist’s “extremely poor” prognosis and the father’s continued denial of wrongdoing. Given the deferential standard of review, the Court concludes that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing an improvement period.

2. Interaction Between “Compliance” and “Benefit”

An important sub-theme is the court’s distinction between:

• Compliance: showing up for services, permitting some home inspections, engaging in limited cleaning; and
• Benefit: internalizing and acting upon lessons about safe parenting, accepting responsibility, and making durable changes.

This decision reinforces an established rule:

A parent cannot force an improvement period – or block termination – merely by attending services, if the underlying problems remain substantially unchanged.

By describing the father as having “gone through the motions,” the circuit court and Supreme Court signal that participation is necessary but not sufficient; what matters is whether services are effective in reducing risk to the child.

3. Non-Acceptance of Responsibility as Core Evidence of Futility

The father’s steadfast denial is treated as central, not peripheral. The Court explicitly notes that:

• The father “refused to accept responsibility at any point in the case”;
• He blamed J.R. for all problems; and
• He expressly denied doing “any of the stuff” he was adjudicated of.

Under Timber M. and Charity H., such denial:

• Makes the underlying problem “untreatable”;
• Renders further services and time an “exercise in futility”; and
• Therefore, undermines the statutory predicate for any improvement period.

Thus, the Court does not frame the denial as merely aggravating; it sees denial as determinative in evaluating the viability of an improvement period.

4. The Adjudicatory Record: Refusal to Testify and CAC Evidence

While the appeal centers on disposition, several adjudicatory aspects contribute indirectly to the Court’s disposition analysis:

• Refusal to testify. The circuit court treated the father’s refusal to testify as “affirmative evidence of his culpability.” In civil proceedings, including abuse and neglect cases, courts may draw adverse inferences from a party’s silence – a principle rooted in cases like Baxter v. Palmigiano, although not cited here. The Supreme Court does not analyze this point, but its inclusion underscores the robustness of the evidence against the father.
• CAC interviews and lack of appellate record. The CAC videos were admitted without objection. On appeal, the father did not include the recordings in the appendix record. As a practical matter, this leaves the Supreme Court with the lower court’s description and findings, and appellate courts routinely presume circuit court rulings are correct when the record is incomplete. It strengthens the presumption in favor of the adjudication and the notion that the risk to the children was severe and well-documented.

This rich evidentiary backdrop made it easier for the Supreme Court to accept the circuit court’s conclusion that improvement periods and lesser alternatives were not adequate.

5. Welfare of the Child and Permanency

W. Va. Code § 49-4-604 balances:

• Parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children; and
• The state’s compelling interest in children’s safety and permanency.

Here, the children had already been removed; disclosures of severe abuse had been made from the relative safety of foster care; and professional assessments pointed toward continued risk and retaliatory behavior if the children were returned. The court favored:

• Prompt permanency (through adoption in current placements);
• Over prolonged uncertainty through an improvement period unlikely to succeed.

Because the father did not contest the “necessary for the welfare of the children” finding, the Supreme Court treated termination as the natural consequence of the statutory and factual framework.

C. Impact on Future Cases and Practice

1. Reinforcing the High Bar for Improvement Periods in Serious Abuse Cases

This decision reinforces several practical rules for future abuse and neglect litigation in West Virginia:

• Improvement periods are not automatic. Courts are not required to offer “one last chance” when evidence suggests that the parent:
  • Refuses to accept responsibility;
  • Shows only superficial engagement with services; or
  • Has a poor prognosis according to credible professional evaluations.
• Denial can be dispositive. Continuing denial of abuse or neglect – especially in the face of detailed disclosures and professional evaluation – may itself justify denying an improvement period as an exercise in futility.
• “Going through the motions” is insufficient. Parents (and their counsel) must understand that:
  • Attendance at services,
  • Token home cleaning, and
  • Minimal cooperation with CPS
  will not defeat termination if they do not translate into safe, stable, and accountable parenting.

2. Strategy for Parents’ Counsel

While not advisory to individual parties, this decision implies key strategic considerations:

• Build a robust record for improvement. If seeking an improvement period, counsel should:
  • Document not just compliance, but measurable change (attitude, interactions, home safety);
  • Encourage clients to seriously address allegations and accept responsibility where warranted; and
  • Present a concrete, tailored plan that shows how the improvement period will address identified risks.
• Address denial directly. When a parent insists on total denial, the case becomes difficult under Timber M. and Charity H.. Counsel must anticipate that courts will interpret entrenched denial as evidence of “untreatability.”
• Preserve and include key evidence on appeal. The omission of CAC recordings from the appendix here left the appellate court with a one-sided record. Ensuring that all central evidence is in the appellate record is critical if a parent intends to challenge adjudicatory findings or the gravity of conditions.

3. Guidance for DHS and Guardians ad Litem

For DHS and children’s guardians ad litem, the decision offers supportive precedent for:

• Arguing futility of improvement periods where:
  • Psychological evaluations forecast poor prognosis;
  • Parents persistently deny clearly documented abuse or neglect; or
  • Parents blame the child victim for the family’s problems.
• Seeking direct termination where the statutory criteria of § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d) are convincingly met, without undertaking multiple or prolonged improvement periods.

The Court’s reliance on a combination of:

• Professional evaluation,
• Service provider testimony, and
• CPS testimony about lack of real change

also illustrates the importance of well-developed and consistent professional evidence at disposition.

4. Children’s Disclosures and the Role of CAC Interviews

Though not the focus of the legal holding, the case underscores the significance of CAC interviews:

• They provided detailed disclosures that substantially broadened the case beyond initial neglect concerns;
• The second round of interviews was prompted by disclosures in foster care, showing how removal can free children to speak;
• Admission of the recordings without objection meant that these statements formed a central part of the evidentiary foundation.

Future litigants should expect that detailed, corroborated CAC interviews can be determinative both at adjudication and in shaping dispositional options.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Improvement Period”

An improvement period is a statutorily authorized timeframe during which an abusive or neglectful parent is given a structured opportunity to:

• Engage in services (e.g., parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, therapy);
• Demonstrate change; and
• Regain or preserve parental rights if conditions are corrected.

Key points:

• It is not automatic; the parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate and benefit.
• Circuit courts have discretion to grant or deny improvement periods.
• Improvement periods must be meaningful for the child – they are not granted simply to prolong parental rights.

2. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

“Clear and convincing” is a higher civil burden than “preponderance of the evidence.” It requires evidence that is highly and substantially more probable to be true than not. In practical terms:

• The parent must do more than show a possibility of success;
• The evidence should give the court a firm belief that the parent will fully engage and improve.

3. “No Reasonable Likelihood … Can Be Substantially Corrected”

This statutory phrase (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)) does not require absolute certainty that the parent will never improve. Instead, it focuses on:

• The foreseeable near future; and
• Whether the parent has shown the ability to solve the problems with or without help.

If, after services and evaluations, the parent still shows:

• Denial of responsibility;
• Lack of insight into the impact on the child; or
• Persistent risky behaviors;

the court can find that there is no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future.

4. “Going Through the Motions”

This phrase, used by the circuit court, means:

• Formally engaging in services (attending sessions, responding to check-ins),
• While failing to internalize lessons or make substantive changes in behavior.

A parent may have perfect attendance but:

• Still deny all wrongdoing;
• Continue dangerous conduct (e.g., substance abuse, unsafe home); and
• Refuse to cooperate fully with safety checks (e.g., padlocking rooms).

Courts may regard such participation as insufficient to justify an improvement period or to prevent termination.

5. Adverse Inference from Refusal to Testify (in Civil Proceedings)

In criminal cases, defendants have a constitutional right not to testify without having that silence used against them. In civil cases, including abuse and neglect proceedings, judges may draw:

• An adverse inference from a party’s refusal to testify on relevant matters.

Here, the circuit court treated the father’s refusal to testify at adjudication as “affirmative evidence of culpability.” While not extensively analyzed by the Supreme Court, this illustrates that in civil protection proceedings, silence can carry evidentiary consequences.

V. Conclusion

In re T.G., J.R., and R.G. does not create a brand-new doctrinal rule, but it powerfully reaffirms and clarifies several important principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect law:

1. Improvement periods are discretionary and conditioned on genuine potential for change. A parent must show by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate and benefit from the improvement period, not simply attend services.
2. Mere “compliance” with services is insufficient. Courts distinguish between formal participation and substantive improvement in the “attitude and approach to parenting,” as emphasized in Jonathan Michael D. and Peggy F.
3. Denial of responsibility can render problems “untreatable.” Under Timber M. and Charity H., entrenched denial of abuse or neglect, particularly in the face of serious, corroborated disclosures and professional evaluations, justifies refusal of an improvement period as an unnecessary and harmful delay.
4. Termination without less restrictive alternatives is permissible. Consistent with Kristin Y. and § 49-4-604(c)(6), once there is no reasonable likelihood of correction and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, courts may terminate parental rights without attempting further improvement periods or conditional placements.
5. Children’s safety and permanency remain paramount. Despite the fundamental nature of parental rights, the Court’s analysis keeps the focus on:
   • The severity of the abuse and neglect,
   • The risk of retaliation and ongoing harm, and
   • The need for stable, permanent placements.

As a memorandum decision, In re T.G., J.R., and R.G. is part of the Court’s ongoing effort to consistently apply statutory standards to recurring factual patterns in child protection cases. Its main contribution lies in sharpening the practical line between:

• Parents who are truly engaged in change and may merit an improvement period; and
• Parents who are “going through the motions” without insight or accountability, for whom improvement periods are properly denied and timely termination is appropriate.