Denial, Noncompliance, and Prior Terminations as Grounds for Immediate Termination of Parental Rights: Commentary on In re J.O.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re J.O., No. 24‑551 (Nov. 4, 2025), affirms the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her infant child, J.O. The case centers on a parent with a recent history of involuntary termination of parental rights, prenatal drug exposure, contested compliance with services, and ongoing denial of responsibility for substance abuse.

The appeal raised two principal issues:

1. Whether the circuit court erred by terminating the mother’s parental rights without first granting her a post‑dispositional improvement period; and
2. Whether termination was improper because it was allegedly not the “least restrictive dispositional alternative.”

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments, emphasizing:

• The mother’s longstanding and repeated noncompliance with services over approximately seventeen months,
• Her prior involuntary terminations only nine months before the child’s birth,
• Her persistent denial of any drug use despite stipulated positive tests and prior proceedings, and
• The statutory standard permitting termination without intervening less restrictive dispositional alternatives once there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be corrected in the near future.

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re J.O. provides a clear and instructive application of West Virginia’s child welfare statutes and existing precedent on when:

• Improvement periods may be denied or not extended; and
• Termination of parental rights is appropriate without resort to guardianship, continued foster care, or other intermediate measures.

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties and Prior History

• Petitioner Mother: M.B., mother of J.O., represented by counsel.
• Child: J.O., an infant, represented by a guardian ad litem.
• Respondent Agency: West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS).
• Child’s Foster Parents: L.A. and M.M., intervenors and current foster placement, represented by counsel.

Critically, M.B.’s parental rights to three older children had been involuntarily terminated approximately nine months before J.O.’s birth. Those prior terminations were based, at least in part, on:

• Substance abuse, and
• Mental health issues.

J.O.’s father also had parental rights to two other children terminated in the previous proceedings, principally due to ongoing substance abuse.

B. The Abuse and Neglect Petition (March 2023)

In March 2023, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging:

• M.B. tested positive for fentanyl and buprenorphine during her pregnancy with J.O.;
• She failed to provide J.O. with necessary food, clothing, supervision, and housing upon birth; and
• Her parental rights to three older children were recently terminated due to substance abuse and mental health concerns.

DHS also alleged that J.O.’s father remained involved in M.B.’s life and potentially resided with her, notwithstanding the prior termination of his parental rights in the earlier case.

C. Preliminary Hearing and Aggravated Circumstances

At an April 2023 preliminary hearing, the circuit court found aggravated circumstances existed because of M.B.’s recent involuntary terminations as to J.O.’s half‑siblings. On this basis, the court:

• Denied M.B.’s motion for services, and
• Denied supervised visitation at that stage.

Under West Virginia law, aggravated circumstances (including prior involuntary termination of parental rights to siblings) can relieve DHS of its usual obligation to make “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal or reunify the family. The case nonetheless proceeded with further motions and eventual provision of services.

D. Motions for Improvement Periods and Adjudication

In May 2023, M.B. filed a handwritten motion “for a hearing,” contesting:

• Any substance use or abuse, and
• Allegations of unsuitable housing.

She asserted she was attending parenting classes and therapy and claimed that:

• Her job exposed her to customers under the influence of drugs,
• Implying possible environmental explanations for positive drug tests.

In July 2023, M.B. moved for a preadjudicatory improvement period, again citing her participation in services.

On July 31, 2023, at the adjudicatory hearing:

• M.B. stipulated that:
  • Her parental rights to three other children had been involuntarily terminated, and
  • She had tested positive for drugs while pregnant with J.O.
• Based on these stipulations, the circuit court adjudicated her as an abusing and neglecting parent as to J.O.

M.B. requested a post‑adjudicatory improvement period. The court did not immediately grant or deny this request; instead, it:

• Held the motion in abeyance, and
• Nonetheless ordered services, including:
  • Random drug screening,
  • Parenting classes, and
  • Supervised visitation.

E. Services, Change of Provider, and Repeated Continuances

In December 2023, following a multidisciplinary team meeting at which compliance concerns were discussed, the court granted a joint motion by DHS and M.B. to change service providers from Liam’s Place to Children’s First.

The dispositional hearing—where the court decides the permanent outcome (reunification, guardianship, or termination)—was continued at least seven times between September 2023 and September 2024. At least four of these continuances were due to DHS’s request to give M.B. additional opportunity to become fully compliant with services.

F. The Dispositional Hearing (September 2024)

At the final dispositional hearing in September 2024, DHS presented testimony from:

• Service providers from Children’s First, and
• The assigned DHS worker.

Key evidence included:

• M.B. failed to comply with requests to make her home safe for a small child;
• J.O.’s biological father—whose rights were previously terminated due to substance abuse—was observed leaving M.B.’s home;
• M.B.’s participation in services was described as “hit or miss”;
• Since January 2024, M.B. missed random drug screens “at least once a week” despite knowing missed screens were treated as positive;
• The DHS worker testified that:
  • M.B.’s noncompliance persisted despite the change in providers;
  • The prior involuntary terminations had been based on the same conditions present in this case:
    • Drug use,
    • Noncompliance with services,
    • Failure to accept responsibility,
    • Mental health concerns, and
    • Failure to document mental health treatment.
  • Despite her stipulations, M.B. repeatedly said she “didn’t do anything wrong.”

M.B. testified in her own defense, claiming:

• She had no contact with J.O.’s biological father;
• She was employed and her home was safe;
• She was receiving mental health counseling on her own initiative;
• She had never used drugs, asserting that:
  • Her positive fentanyl screens were due to workplace exposure at a fast‑food restaurant; and
  • The prior terminations were the fault of the father’s substance abuse, not hers.

The circuit court:

• Rejected M.B.’s explanation for her drug screens as not credible;
• Found she consistently refused or failed to undergo required drug screening;
• Determined she had not corrected the identified concerns during the seventeen months since the petition was filed;
• Found she never accepted responsibility for her conduct; and
• Found she continued to have J.O.’s father in her life.

The court concluded:

• There was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and
• Continuation of the conditions threatened the health, welfare, or life of the child.

Accordingly, the court terminated M.B.’s parental rights. (The father’s rights had been terminated in April 2024.) The permanency plan is adoption by the current foster placement.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

On appeal, M.B. argued:

1. She had significantly corrected the problems that led to the case, and the circuit court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous; and
2. The court should have used a less restrictive alternative to termination, specifically a post‑dispositional improvement period.

The Supreme Court:

• Applied the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard to the circuit court’s factual findings (citing In re Cecil T.), and a de novo standard to legal conclusions;
• Held that the record provided ample support for the circuit court’s findings that M.B.:
  • Failed to comply with services,
  • Failed to consistently drug screen,
  • Did not correct home safety issues,
  • Continued association with the father, and
  • Persistently denied any drug use or responsibility.
• Relied on In re Timber M. and In re Charity H. for the principle that a parent who refuses to acknowledge the existence of the problem renders it effectively untreatable, making an improvement period “an exercise in futility”;
• Determined M.B. failed to meet her burden under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑610(3)(B) to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to participate in an improvement period;
• Invoked Syllabus Point 5 of In re Kristin Y. to reaffirm that termination of parental rights may be employed without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected; and
• Affirmed the termination as being in the child’s best interests under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6).

The decision is unanimous among the participating justices, with the Chief Justice not participating.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Appellate Posture

The Court begins with the familiar standard from Syllabus Point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011):

On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.

This two‑part standard is critical:

• Findings of Fact: The appellate court asks whether the circuit court’s findings are “clearly erroneous,” meaning that although there is evidence to support them, the reviewing court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. It defers heavily to the trial judge’s ability to observe witnesses and assess demeanor.
• Conclusions of Law: Issues such as the correct interpretation of statutes, or the proper legal standard, are reviewed de novo (from scratch), without deference.

In In re J.O., the mother’s primary challenges were factual—claiming that she had corrected conditions and that the record did not support findings of ongoing noncompliance and risk. Under Cecil T., such arguments face a high bar. The Court emphasized that it would not re‑weigh evidence or reassess witness credibility, a point reinforced through citation to a criminal case, State v. Guthrie.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. In re Cecil T. – Standard of Review in Abuse and Neglect Appeals

Cecil T. sets the basic framework for appellate review:

• Abuse and neglect cases involve intense factual disputes, often hinging on credibility, patterns of behavior, and professional evaluations.
• The circuit judge sees the witnesses firsthand; thus, appellate courts rarely disturb factual findings absent clear error.

In In re J.O., this precedent effectively insulates the circuit court’s factual findings from reversal so long as they are supported by the record:

• The mother’s claims that she corrected conditions,
• Her assertions of sobriety, and
• Her denials of continued association with the father,

were all rejected at the trial level. The Supreme Court, applying Cecil T., declined to disturb those rulings.

2. State v. Guthrie – Deference to Trial Court on Credibility

The Court cites footnote 9 of State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995), for a general principle:

An appellate court may not decide the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence as that is the exclusive function and task of the trier of fact.

Although Guthrie is a criminal case, its articulation of the division of roles between trial and appellate courts applies across civil contexts. In In re J.O., this principle underpins the Supreme Court’s refusal to second‑guess:

• The circuit court’s rejection of M.B.’s claim that fentanyl exposure came from her fast‑food employment; and
• Its finding that she continued to have contact with the father despite her denials.

This reinforces for litigants that factual disputes over “who to believe” are almost always resolved at the circuit court level.

3. In re Timber M. and In re Charity H. – “Failure to Acknowledge” Doctrine

The Court quotes In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), which in turn quoted In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004):

“Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect . . . results in making the problem untreatable and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility.”

This doctrine plays a central role in In re J.O.. The Supreme Court notes that:

• M.B. stipulated to testing positive for fentanyl and buprenorphine at adjudication,
• Yet throughout the case she repeatedly denied ever using drugs,
• Claimed environmental exposure to justify positive tests, and
• Blamed prior terminations solely on the father.

Under Timber M. and Charity H., such denial is not a neutral fact; it is affirmative evidence that the problem cannot be effectively treated because:

• Effective treatment typically requires acknowledgment and insight; and
• If a parent refuses to accept that a problem exists, they are less likely to comply meaningfully with services or sustained change.

The Court uses this doctrine to support:

• The finding that there was no reasonable likelihood M.B. would substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future; and
• The conclusion that granting an improvement period (pre‑ or post‑dispositional) would have been futile.

4. In re Kristin Y. – Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

The Court cites Syllabus Point 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011):

“Termination of parental rights . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”

This is directly responsive to M.B.’s argument that a less restrictive disposition (i.e., an improvement period or continued temporary arrangement) should have been used. Kristin Y. affirms:

• There is no requirement to step down through every possible dispositional option;
• Once the statutory findings are made—no reasonable likelihood of correction and necessity of termination for the child’s welfare—termination is legally permissible and may be appropriate.

5. Statutory Framework: W. Va. Code §§ 49‑4‑610 and 49‑4‑604

a. Improvement Periods – W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑610(3)(B)

The Court quotes W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑610(3)(B), which provides that a court may grant a post‑adjudicatory improvement period only when the parent:

“demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that [they are] likely to fully participate in the improvement period.”

Key points:

• No automatic right: Improvement periods are discretionary. They are not guaranteed simply because a parent asks for them.
• Burden on the parent: The parent must present strong, credible proof—more than simple assertions—that they will comply.
• History of compliance matters: Past failure to participate in services is strong evidence against granting a new improvement period.

In In re J.O.:

• M.B. had access to services for roughly seventeen months;
• She was “never fully compliant” with those services, even after changing providers;
• The court never formally granted her requested post‑adjudicatory improvement period, precisely due to pervasive noncompliance.

The Supreme Court holds that, under § 49‑4‑610(3)(B), M.B. plainly failed to carry her burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to fully participate in an improvement period—post‑adjudicatory or post‑dispositional.

b. Dispositions, Including Termination – W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6)

W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) authorizes termination of parental rights where:

• There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future, and
• Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

Section 49‑4‑604 also explains what “no reasonable likelihood” means. One important indicator is where a parent:

• Has not followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.

In In re J.O., the Supreme Court endorses the circuit court’s findings that:

• M.B. did not follow through with rehabilitative services designed to remedy the problems;
• Her noncompliance and denial of responsibility persisted even after extensive time and a change in providers; and
• Continuation of the situation posed a threat to J.O.’s health, welfare, or life.

Consequently, the statutory criteria of § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) were satisfied, supporting termination.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Depth

1. Evaluating “Correction of Conditions” Over Time

The Supreme Court’s analysis looks holistically at M.B.’s conduct over:

• The prior abuse and neglect case (involving three older children); and
• The seventeen months of the present case.

The Court notes:

• M.B. had received similar services in the prior case;
• Despite this, she tested positive for fentanyl and buprenorphine during the pregnancy and at delivery with J.O.;
• Even after DHS continued to provide services in the current case, her participation was only partial and inconsistent.

Thus, even assuming some positive steps (employment, claimed counseling, some clean drug tests), the overall pattern—including:

• Persistent missed screens,
• Failure to resolve home safety issues, and
• Undisputed prior terminations for the same type of problems

supported the finding that she had not “substantially” corrected the underlying conditions.

2. The Role of Credibility and Denial of Drug Use

The circuit court found M.B.’s explanation that she was exposed to fentanyl at work (rather than using it) not credible. The Supreme Court declined to disturb this finding, citing Guthrie on deference to trial‑level credibility determinations.

This is not a minor point: by rejecting her explanation and emphasizing her stipulation to positive tests, the Court underscores that:

• Parents cannot expect to both:
  • Stipulate to drug use (or positive tests) for procedural reasons at adjudication, and
  • Deny drug use entirely at disposition without consequence.

The Court uses the Timber M./Charity H. doctrine to turn M.B.’s ongoing denial into affirmative evidence that:

• The problem is “untreatable” in practical terms; and
• Improvement periods or further services are unlikely to yield genuine change.

3. Missed Drug Screens as Presumptively Positive

Service providers testified that M.B. missed at least one random drug screen per week between January and September 2024, with each missed screen treated as presumptively positive. The Supreme Court accepts this practice and folds it into the overall assessment of noncompliance.

This is legally significant because M.B. argued that she had “passed every drug screen she has taken” since the provider change. The Court reframes the issue:

• The question is not whether she passed the tests she chose to take,
• But whether she complied with the entire testing regimen, including:
  • Calling in, and
  • Submitting to screens whenever requested.

By relying on the presumption that a missed screen equals a positive result, the Court treats her behavior as ongoing, unexplained noncompliance with a key rehabilitative tool—supporting the conclusion that she had not achieved sobriety or was not transparent enough to show it.

4. Home Safety and Association with the Father

The Court supports the circuit court’s findings that:

• M.B. did not correct home safety issues flagged by service providers, and
• She continued to have contact with J.O.’s father.

The presence of the father in her home is particularly important because:

• His parental rights had been terminated for ongoing substance abuse; and
• His presence undermines the notion that the child’s environment would be safe or stable.

This illustrates that the “conditions of abuse and neglect” are not confined solely to a parent’s personal drug use, but extend to:

• The overall environment,
• Influence of other adults, and
• Whether the parent creates a safe physical and relational space for the child.

5. Denial of Post‑Dispositional Improvement Period

M.B. argued that termination was premature because the circuit court could have granted a post‑dispositional improvement period rather than ending her rights. The Supreme Court rejects this argument for two core reasons:

1. Failure to satisfy the statutory burden.
   Under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑610(3)(B), M.B. bore the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to participate in an improvement period. Her seventeen months of incomplete compliance, missed drug screens, and denial of drug use were inconsistent with that standard.
2. Futility due to repeated opportunities and noncompliance.
   The circuit court effectively gave M.B. multiple “second chances” through repeated continuances and even a change in service providers. Despite these accommodations, the pattern did not materially change. Under Timber M. and Charity H., further improvement periods would have been futile.

The Supreme Court notes that the circuit court never granted her motion for a post‑adjudicatory improvement period, precisely because of “pervasive noncompliance.” This forecloses the claim that she was somehow entitled to yet another structured period of services at the dispositional stage.

6. Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

Finally, the Court addresses M.B.’s “least restrictive alternative” argument. West Virginia’s dispositional scheme generally contemplates that courts should choose the disposition that:

• Protects the child’s welfare while
• Least intrusively interferes with the parent‑child relationship.

However, In re Kristin Y. makes clear that:

• Once the statutory standard is met (no reasonable likelihood of correction and necessity for child’s welfare),
• The court is not required to experiment with guardianships, extended temporary placements, or additional improvement periods.

The Supreme Court explicitly states that, because the circuit court correctly found:

• No reasonable likelihood that the conditions can be corrected in the near future; and
• Termination was necessary for the child’s welfare,

under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) and Kristin Y., immediate termination was permissible and appropriate. The argument for incremental, less restrictive steps fails.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Improvement Period”

An improvement period in West Virginia abuse and neglect law is a court‑ordered, time‑limited window during which:

• The parent is given a structured plan and services to correct the conditions that led to the filing of the petition; and
• The court monitors compliance and progress.

Types relevant here:

• Preadjudicatory improvement period: Before the court formally adjudicates abuse or neglect.
• Post‑adjudicatory improvement period: After adjudication but before disposition.
• Post‑dispositional improvement period: After a dispositional order in certain circumstances.

Crucially:

• Improvement periods are not automatic—they are discretionary;
• Parents must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate, not merely express willingness;
• Repeated prior failures to comply with services make further improvement periods less likely.

2. “Aggravated Circumstances”

“Aggravated circumstances” is a statutory term referring to situations where child welfare agencies may be relieved of the duty to provide “reasonable efforts” toward reunification. One of those circumstances is:

• A parent’s previous involuntary termination of parental rights to another child.

In In re J.O.:

• The circuit court found aggravated circumstances at the preliminary stage because M.B.’s rights to three older children had been involuntarily terminated only nine months earlier;
• This justified the initial denial of services and supervised visitation at that early stage.

Even so, the court and DHS later elected to provide services. The finding of aggravated circumstances did not preclude services; it simply removed the requirement that DHS provide them.

3. “No Reasonable Likelihood That Conditions Can Be Substantially Corrected”

This statutory phrase is pivotal and somewhat technical. It means:

• Given the parent’s demonstrated behavior—including response to services—there is no realistic basis to believe that the problems causing harm to the child will be corrected in the near future.

Courts look to:

• Patterns of noncompliance,
• Failure to follow treatment recommendations,
• Ongoing denial of responsibility, and
• Whether time and services have led to substantial change, not just minor or cosmetic improvements.

In In re J.O., the seventeen‑month timeline and the repeated failures—despite services in two separate abuse and neglect cases—convinced the court that no reasonable likelihood of correction existed.

4. “Least Restrictive Dispositional Alternative”

The concept of the “least restrictive alternative” in child welfare refers to a general preference for dispositions that:

• Protect the child’s best interests,
• While imposing the minimal necessary intrusion on parental rights.

Examples of more and less restrictive dispositions:

• Less restrictive: Family case plans, improvement periods, in‑home services, temporary custody to another parent or relative, guardianship without termination.
• Most restrictive: Termination of parental rights.

However, once statutory conditions for termination are met, West Virginia law—as reaffirmed in Kristin Y. and applied in In re J.O.—does not require courts to move step‑by‑step through every option. If:

• There is no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future; and
• Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare,

the court may lawfully choose termination even if other lesser options are theoretically available.

5. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a high civil evidentiary standard, more demanding than a “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not), but less stringent than “beyond a reasonable doubt” used in criminal cases.

To obtain an improvement period, a parent must present evidence that:

• Is highly and substantially more likely to be true than not; and
• Persuades the court that the parent is genuinely likely to fully participate in and benefit from the improvement period.

M.B.’s history of noncompliance, repeated missed drug screens, adverse inferences drawn from her denials, and failure to correct living conditions collectively undermined any claim that she met this demanding standard.

E. Impact and Future Implications

1. Continued Emphasis on Prior Terminations and Recidivism

In re J.O. reinforces that recent prior involuntary terminations weigh heavily in assessing:

• Whether an improvement period is appropriate;
• Whether aggravated circumstances exist (relieving DHS from certain obligations); and
• Whether there is any reasonable likelihood of correcting conditions.

Here, the very short interval—nine months between prior termination and J.O.’s birth—paired with similar issues (drug use, mental health, noncompliance) created a powerful presumption that circumstances had not materially changed.

2. Denial and Minimization as Independent Risk Factors

The decision underscores that denial and minimization of substance abuse and responsibility are “risk factors” in their own right. Drawing on Timber M. and Charity H., the Court reiterates:

• Failure to acknowledge basic allegations of abuse and neglect makes the problem “untreatable” in practical terms;
• Improvement periods are unlikely to succeed when parents refuse to accept the existence of the issues they must address.

Parents and counsel should recognize that candid acknowledgment of problems, coupled with documented participation in treatment, is often a prerequisite for meaningful consideration of reunification.

3. Practical Treatment of Missed Drug Screens

The Court’s acceptance of the practice that missed drug screens are treated as positive has concrete implications:

• Parents cannot selectively participate in drug testing and then rely only on the tests they passed.
• Counsel must warn clients that missing screens—even for work or logistical reasons—will likely be interpreted as an adverse factor unless clearly explained and documented.

4. Improvement Periods: Services vs. Formal Designation

An important nuance in In re J.O. is that:

• The circuit court did not formally grant a post‑adjudicatory improvement period;
• Yet it nonetheless ordered services very similar to those typically provided within an improvement period, and even changed providers upon DHS’s and M.B.’s joint motion.

This demonstrates that:

• Circuit courts may extend services and opportunities for change even without entering a formal improvement‑period order; and
• Parents cannot claim entitlement to a post‑dispositional improvement period merely because they received services informally—especially if they failed to comply with them.

5. Least Restrictive Alternative Arguments Narrowed

The Court’s reliance on Kristin Y. effectively narrows the practical impact of “least restrictive alternative” arguments. In abuse and neglect litigation:

• Once a circuit court makes supported findings of:
  • No reasonable likelihood of correction, and
  • Necessity of termination for the child’s welfare,
• An appeal asserting that the court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives will often fail—absent a showing that the statutory findings themselves are unsupported.

This promotes timely permanency for children, particularly where prior cases and repeated services have already been tried without lasting success.

6. Memorandum Decision as Application, Not New Doctrine

As a memorandum decision, In re J.O. does not introduce new doctrinal “syllabus points.” Instead, it:

• Applies settled principles from Cecil T., Guthrie, Timber M., Charity H., and Kristin Y. to a specific factual scenario; and
• Provides practical guidance on how those principles are operationalized.

It will be most influential as persuasive authority illustrating:

• How repeated noncompliance and denial justify denying improvement periods; and
• How quickly (within less than two years after prior terminations) termination may be reaffirmed when conditions persist.

V. Conclusion

In re J.O. is an important reaffirmation of West Virginia’s child welfare principles regarding:

• The centrality of acknowledgment and accountability in abuse and neglect cases;
• The discretionary nature of improvement periods, and the high burden parents bear to obtain them under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑610;
• The operation of W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6), permitting termination of parental rights where:
  • There is no reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected in the near future, and
  • Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare;
• The authority of courts, under In re Kristin Y., to terminate parental rights without resorting to less restrictive alternatives once that statutory standard is met.

Factually, the case underscores that:

• Recent prior terminations,
• Prenatal drug exposure,
• Persistent noncompliance with services,
• Ongoing contact with a previously unfit parent, and
• Continued denial of substance abuse

are a potent combination that will almost certainly support findings of “no reasonable likelihood of correction” and justify termination.

From a broader perspective, In re J.O. illustrates the judiciary’s emphasis on:

• Permanency for children,
• Recognition that repeated cycles of services without candor or meaningful change are not in a child’s best interests, and
• The limited role of appellate courts in re‑evaluating credibility and factual detail in abuse and neglect proceedings.

The decision thus serves as a clear, if sobering, reminder that in West Virginia’s child protection system, pattern matters: history of noncompliance and denial, particularly after prior involuntary terminations, can quickly lead to the permanent severance of parental rights when the child’s welfare so requires.