Introduction

In Maldonado-González v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and held that residents of Morovis, Puerto Rico plausibly alleged a substantive due process violation based on executive-branch “deliberate indifference” to a municipality-wide, years-long lack of potable water. Writing for the court, Judge Rikelman clarified that in non-custodial settings, deliberate indifference can satisfy the “shocks the conscience” requirement, and that physically intrusive government conduct is not a prerequisite to a substantive due process claim. Chief Judge Barron concurred in part and dissented in part, favoring a narrower remand without reaching whether the alleged deliberate indifference is conscience-shocking.

The plaintiffs—Morovis’s mayor, the municipality, and PRASA subscribers—alleged that the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA), its Executive Director, and its regional official knew of sustained service failures after Hurricane María and nevertheless failed to act, even when solutions were simple and within their control (e.g., turning on pumps/generators), and despite repeated entreaties, expert recommendations, and the life-and-health risks of prolonged water deprivation. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding the alleged conduct not conscience-shocking and suggesting the absence of physical invasion distinguished the case from contaminated-water cases. The First Circuit disagreed and remanded.

Summary of the Opinion

• The court held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged executive conduct that may shock the conscience, because a multi-year failure to address known, severe risks from lack of potable water can amount to deliberate indifference in a context where officials had time to deliberate and act.
• The panel expressly rejected the notion that substantive due process requires physically intrusive conduct; non-physical conduct can shock the conscience depending on context.
• The court did not decide whether Puerto Rico law and PRASA regulations create a protected property interest in adequate water service for paying subscribers; that question is reserved for the district court on remand.
• Contract-based theories were affirmed as waived (insufficiently developed on appeal), and any political retaliation theory was also waived (but the sabotage allegations may still inform the deliberate indifference analysis).
• Qualified immunity for PRASA’s Executive Director (sued in her personal capacity) was left for the district court to assess in the first instance.
• Chief Judge Barron concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing the negligence ruling was wrong but would have avoided deciding the conscience-shocking question at this stage.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

The court’s analysis is anchored in a familiar substantive due process framework derived chiefly from County of Sacramento v. Lewis (523 U.S. 833 (1998)). Lewis sets a continuum of culpability—from negligence (never enough) to purpose to harm (most likely sufficient)—with “deliberate indifference” occupying a middle ground that may suffice where officials have time to deliberate.

• County of Sacramento v. Lewis (U.S. 1998): Established that only conduct “so egregious, so outrageous” shocks the conscience; deliberate indifference can suffice where there is time to deliberate; negligence is never enough.
• Rivera v. Rhode Island (1st Cir. 2005): In settings allowing time for reflection, deliberate indifference may shock the conscience.
• Doucette v. Jacobs (1st Cir. 2024): Applied deliberate indifference analysis in a school, non-custodial context; confirms fact-intensive nature of the inquiry.
• González-Fuentes v. Molina (1st Cir. 2010): Restated the conscience-shocking standard; highlighted the separateness of substantive due process from tort law.
• Guertin v. Michigan (6th Cir. 2019): Flint water crisis; found a plausible bodily integrity claim from contaminated water. The First Circuit distinguished the bodily integrity theory while clarifying that non-physical conduct can still be conscience-shocking.
• Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft (U.S. 1978): Recognized utility service as essential to health and safety; used here to underscore gravity of deprivation.
• Pagán v. Calderón (1st Cir. 2006); Amsden v. Moran (1st Cir. 1990): Not every unlawful or poor governmental decision crosses the constitutional threshold; the conduct must transgress basic principles of ordered liberty.
• Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montañez (1st Cir. 2000) and Wadsworth v. Nguyen (1st Cir. 2025): The court notes the evolution of First Circuit doctrine: today, an executive-action substantive due process claim requires both conscience-shocking conduct and deprivation of a protected interest; physical intrusion is not a categorical requirement.
• Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (U.S. 2005); Board of Regents v. Roth (U.S. 1972); Santiago de Castro v. Morales Medina (1st Cir. 1991); Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio (1st Cir. 2000): Clarify that state law may create property interests, but federal law determines whether those interests count for due process purposes; not all state-created interests are protected by substantive due process.
• International sources: U.N. General Assembly Resolution 70/169 and CESCR General Comment No. 15 are cited to underscore the universal importance of water and sanitation; while not binding, they contextualize the risk and gravity of harm.

2) Legal Reasoning

a) Executive vs. Legislative Action

The claim targets executive conduct—specific acts and omissions by PRASA officials—rather than a generally applicable legislative policy. For executive action, plaintiffs must allege: (i) deprivation of a life, liberty, or property interest; and (ii) executive conduct that shocks the conscience (Clark v. Boscher).

b) Shocks-the-Conscience and Deliberate Indifference

The district court dismissed on the premise that plaintiffs alleged at most negligence and emphasized the lack of a “physical invasion.” The First Circuit reversed, explaining:

• Deliberate indifference can shock the conscience outside custodial settings when officials have time to reflect yet disregard known, substantial risks (Lewis; Rivera; Doucette).
• Physical intrusion is not required. Non-physical abuses (e.g., corruption, discriminatory animus) can shock the conscience. The district court improperly merged the separate inquiries of “conscience-shocking conduct” and “deprivation” and misread Guertin as erecting a physical-invasion requirement.

Applying these principles, the court held plaintiffs plausibly alleged deliberate indifference that can shock the conscience, given:

• The crisis persisted for years; PRASA officials had ample time and repeated notice.
• Some fixes were simple and within PRASA’s control (e.g., turning on generators and pumps), yet not undertaken.
• PRASA was the sole water provider, magnifying the risk to health and sanitation, especially for vulnerable populations (elderly, people with illnesses, children).
• Allegations that someone had intentionally shut down key equipment—and that the regional official failed to investigate—further color the indifference.

The court emphasized that not every utility interruption is conscience-shocking; the inquiry is fact-intensive. Here, years of inaction in the face of severe, known risks and feasible mitigation measures plausibly crosses the constitutional line.

c) Property Interest Question Reserved

Plaintiffs claim a protected property interest in adequate water service grounded in Puerto Rico law and PRASA regulations. The First Circuit left this question to the district court, cautioning that not every state-created entitlement supports a substantive due process claim. Plaintiffs’ contract theory was deemed waived on appeal; any property interest must arise from law or regulations, not merely from contract.

d) Qualified Immunity Reserved

The court declined to resolve qualified immunity for PRASA’s Executive Director at this stage and remanded for the district court to assess in the first instance, particularly because the existence and contours of any protected property interest remain unsettled.

e) Waiver Rulings

• Political retaliation: Any First Amendment theory was waived on appeal. Still, the factual allegations of sabotage—assumed true at this stage—may inform the deliberate indifference analysis.
• Contract-based property interest: Waived for purposes of substantive due process; plaintiffs did not develop the argument sufficiently.

3) The Concurring/Dissenting Opinion

Chief Judge Barron agreed the negligence ruling was error but would not reach whether the alleged deliberate indifference is conscience-shocking. He advocated remanding for the district court to address that novel constitutional question in the first instance, potentially with a historical analysis informed by Lewis’s suggestion that history may guide the conscience-shocking inquiry. He noted the property-interest question could independently dispose of the case, making it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue now.

4) Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

a) Substantive Due Process in Essential Utility Contexts

This decision meaningfully clarifies that in the First Circuit, deliberate indifference to a prolonged, known deprivation of essential services like potable water can, in appropriate circumstances, shock the conscience—even absent physical intrusion or custodial control. Agencies and public utilities should expect that:

• Long-term, known service failures with serious health implications, coupled with unexplained inaction, can move a case beyond tort into constitutional territory at the pleading stage.
• Allegations of easily implemented fixes being ignored will weigh strongly toward a finding of deliberate indifference.
• Non-physical misconduct remains actionable if the context and harms are sufficiently egregious.

b) Property-Interest Litigation to Come

The remand for determining whether Puerto Rico law creates a protected property interest in adequate water service for paying PRASA subscribers is pivotal. Outcomes could vary:

• If a protected property interest is found, plaintiffs’ revived substantive due process claim can proceed to merits and immunity determinations.
• If no such interest exists for substantive due process purposes, dismissal may still follow notwithstanding the conscience-shocking analysis.

The First Circuit’s reminder that substantive due process does not embrace all state-created interests signals a narrow path forward: plaintiffs must tie their entitlement to law or regulation in a way that rises to constitutional protection, not merely to contractual expectations.

C) Qualified Immunity and “Clearly Established” Law

On remand, officials sued in their personal capacities will likely argue that, at the time of the alleged conduct, it was not “clearly established” in the First Circuit that deliberate indifference to municipal water deprivation infringed a substantive due process right. The court’s present clarification may shape that debate, but the “clearly established” analysis is time-specific and may consider differences between contaminated water (bodily integrity) and service deprivation (property interest).

d) Institutional and Policy Implications

• Disaster resilience and infrastructure management: Utilities should implement documented protocols for crisis response, preventive maintenance, and transparent investigation of service failures.
• Customer protections: Failure to provide alternative water or to adjust billing during systemic outages may compound constitutional exposure.
• Training and oversight: Supervisory failures—including ignoring sabotage allegations—can figure prominently in deliberate indifference analysis.
• Litigation posture: Public corporations and agencies should prepare robust records of remedial efforts and risk assessments, especially where they are sole providers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantive due process: Protects against certain egregious government actions regardless of procedure. For executive actions, a plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a protected life/liberty/property interest and (2) conduct that “shocks the conscience.”
• Shocks the conscience: A high bar; the conduct must be so egregious and outrageous that it violates fundamental notions of fairness. Negligence is never enough; intent to harm almost always is. In between, deliberate indifference can suffice where officials have time to deliberate but ignore known, serious risks.
• Deliberate indifference: The official actually knows of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards it. It is more culpable than negligence, less than purpose to harm. It is fact-dependent and context-sensitive.
• Executive vs. legislative action: Executive action involves particularized decisions or conduct by officials; legislative action involves generally applicable policies or statutes. Different standards apply; this case involves executive action.
• Property interest: The Constitution does not create property interests; state law or regulations do. Federal constitutional law determines whether a state-created interest qualifies for due process protection. Not all such interests are protected by substantive due process.
• Qualified immunity: Shields officials from damages unless they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the conduct. It is assessed right- and time-specifically.

Conclusion

Maldonado-González establishes an important doctrinal clarification in the First Circuit: in non-custodial settings, sustained, knowing nonresponse to a municipality-wide water crisis—where fixes were feasible and the risks to life and health obvious—can plausibly constitute conscience-shocking deliberate indifference for substantive due process purposes, even absent physical intrusion. The decision corrects the district court’s focus on “physical invasion” and reaffirms that the shocks-the-conscience inquiry is fact-intensive and context-driven.

The decision does not resolve whether Puerto Rico law creates a protected property interest in adequate water service for PRASA subscribers—a potentially dispositive question on remand—and it leaves qualified immunity and other immunities to the district court. Still, the ruling places public utilities and executive officials on notice: the constitutional line can be crossed by prolonged indifference to essential human needs when the government is uniquely positioned to act and fails to do so. The case thus charts a careful path between tort and constitutional law, underscored by the essential nature of water and the heightened responsibility of a sole provider faced with a community’s basic survival needs.

Case Snapshot

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Date: October 24, 2025
• Panel: Chief Judge Barron; Judges Thompson and Rikelman (opinion by Judge Rikelman; Barron concurring in part and dissenting in part)
• Holding: Vacated dismissal; plaintiffs plausibly alleged conscience-shocking deliberate indifference; remanded for determination of protected property interest and for qualified immunity analysis.