Deliberate Design May Form Moments Before—But Not At—the Fatal Act; Permissive Malice Inference from Deadly-Weapon Use Reaffirmed

Introduction

In Watts v. State (No. 2023-KA-00893-SCT, decided February 20, 2025), the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Terrance Watts’s conviction for first-degree murder in the shooting death of his half-brother, Jackson firefighter Yancy Williams. The case presents three principal appellate questions:

• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient—and the verdict consistent with the overwhelming weight of the evidence—to support first-degree murder under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(1)(a);
• Whether jury instruction S-4 (defining “deliberate design”)—given without objection—was improper or created reversible conflict with a manslaughter instruction; and
• Whether jury instruction S-2 (allowing the jury to infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon) impermissibly commented on the weight of the evidence.

This opinion is notable for two doctrinal clarifications:

• It explicitly approves deliberate-design language stating that “a deliberate design cannot be formed at the very moment of the fatal act,” thereby avoiding the conflict identified in FEARS v. STATE when a jury is also instructed on heat-of-passion manslaughter.
• It reaffirms that juries may permissively infer malice/deliberate design from intentional use of a deadly weapon, aligning with Mississippi’s model jury instruction and recent authority (Gunn v. State).

Summary of the Opinion

The Court (Randolph, C.J.) affirmed the conviction and life sentence. On sufficiency and weight, the Court held a rational juror could find “deliberate design” beyond a reasonable doubt: although the men tussled earlier, the surveillance video showed no physical struggle at the moment of the shot, Watts admitted he did not feel threatened, and forensic context (a live 9mm round on the driver’s floorboard) supported a reasonable inference that he racked the slide to confirm the handgun’s readiness and then executed a close-range shot to the head. The Court emphasized that the law does not sanction killing in response to mere “horse play.”

Applying plain-error review to S-4 (no trial objection), the Court found no error. The instruction properly stated that deliberate design may form very quickly but “cannot be formed at the very moment of the fatal act,” eliminating the Fears problem associated with “instant-of-killing” language. The ineffective-assistance argument for failing to object to S-4 failed for lack of Strickland prejudice.

As to S-2, the Court reiterated that allowing an inference of malice from the intentional use of a deadly weapon is a proper permissive inference and not an impermissible comment on the evidence—especially where, as here, no evidence of legal justification or necessity was presented. The instruction tracked Mississippi’s Model Jury Instruction.

Factual and Procedural Context

In the late hours of March 22–23, 2020, surveillance video at a Marathon station captured Watts and Williams—both similar in size, Williams visibly intoxicated (later confirmed BAC 0.199)—engaging in animated interaction and brief wrestling. Watts ultimately returned to Williams’s Tahoe, accessed the driver’s side, and, after a brief interval, stepped onto the running board and shot Williams once in the head while Williams stood at the pump. A spent 9mm casing was found next to Williams’s body; a live 9mm round was found on the Tahoe’s driver-side floorboard. Watts drove away but turned himself in that morning, admitting on video that he could have “just fought” but “panicked and … just shot him,” and that he did not see any weapons on Williams, felt unthreatened, and believed Williams “meant no harm.”

A Hinds County jury convicted Watts of first-degree murder. The trial court denied Watts’s motions for directed verdict, JNOV, and new trial. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency/weight of the evidence, S-4’s deliberate-design instruction, and S-2’s malice-inference instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed on all grounds.

Analysis

Statutory Framework: First-Degree Murder by “Deliberate Design”

Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(1)(a) defines first-degree murder as a killing “with deliberate design to effect the death” of the victim or another human being. Mississippi decisions equate “deliberate design,” “premeditated design,” and “malice aforethought,” and they permit the State to prove that mental state through circumstantial evidence—particularly the intentional use and manner of use of a deadly weapon.

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Sufficiency and Weight Standards:
  • Green v. State, 269 So.3d 75 (Miss. 2018); Brooks v. State, 203 So.3d 1134 (Miss. 2016): de novo review for sufficiency; evidence viewed in light most favorable to the State.
  • Swanagan v. State, 229 So.3d 698 (Miss. 2017); Fagan v. State, 171 So.3d 496 (Miss. 2015): rational-juror standard for each element beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Owens v. State, 383 So.3d 305 (Miss. 2024); Little v. State, 233 So.3d 288 (Miss. 2017); Lindsey v. State, 212 So.3d 44 (Miss. 2017): abuse-of-discretion review for new-trial motions; reversal only for verdicts so against the overwhelming weight that affirmance would sanction an unconscionable injustice.
• Deliberate Design and Its Temporal Dimension:
  • WINDHAM v. STATE, 602 So.2d 798 (Miss. 1992); JOHNSON v. STATE, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985): “malice aforethought,” “premeditated design,” and “deliberate design” mean the same thing.
  • Abeyta v. State, 137 So.3d 305 (Miss. 2014); WILSON v. STATE, 936 So.2d 357 (Miss. 2007): “deliberate” implies full awareness and generally careful consideration; “design” means to calculate, plan, or contemplate.
  • Holliman v. State, 178 So.3d 689 (Miss. 2015); Jones v. State, 154 So.3d 872 (Miss. 2014); Childs v. State, 133 So.3d 348 (Miss. 2013): deliberate design may be formed very quickly—even moments before the act—and can be inferred from intentional use of an instrument calculated to cause death or serious injury.
  • FEARS v. STATE, 779 So.2d 1125 (Miss. 2000); COOLEY v. STATE, 346 So.2d 912 (Miss. 1977): risk of reversible error if the jury is told deliberate design can arise “at the instant of the killing” when a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction is also given; such wording can confuse the temporal boundary distinguishing murder from manslaughter.
• Jury Instructions: Review and Plain-Error:
  • Quinn v. State, 191 So.3d 1227 (Miss. 2016); Victory v. State, 83 So.3d 370 (Miss. 2012): abuse-of-discretion standard for instruction decisions.
  • Spiers v. State, 361 So.3d 643 (Miss. 2023); Conner v. State, 138 So.3d 143 (Miss. 2014); Grayer v. State, 120 So.3d 964 (Miss. 2013): plain-error review where no objection is made—error must be clear/obvious and outcome-affecting.
  • HOLLY v. STATE, 716 So.2d 979 (Miss. 1998); STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): two-prong ineffective-assistance test (deficient performance and prejudice undermining confidence in the outcome).
• “Deadly Weapon” Malice Inference and Comments on Evidence:
  • Stewart v. State, 378 So.3d 379 (Miss. 2024); Montgomery v. State, 253 So.3d 305 (Miss. 2018); RAYBURN v. STATE, 312 So.2d 454 (Miss. 1975): instructions are reviewed as a whole; no reversible error if they fairly announce the law and cause no injustice.
  • SANDERS v. STATE, 586 So.2d 792 (Miss. 1991); DUCKWORTH v. STATE, 477 So.2d 935 (Miss. 1985): instructions may not single out and comment on the weight of particular evidence.
  • Hendrieth v. State, 230 So.2d 217 (Miss. 1970), quoting Dickins v. State, 208 Miss. 69, 43 So.2d 366 (1949): longstanding principle that malice may be presumed/inferred from a killing with a deadly weapon absent facts showing justification or necessity; the State may receive an instruction stating this principle.
  • Gunn v. State, 374 So.3d 1206 (Miss. 2023): reaffirmation that a permissive inference instruction does not improperly comment on the evidence, especially when read with all instructions; also collects cases endorsing deadly-weapon inferences (Holliman; Anderson v. State, 79 So.3d 501 (Miss. 2012); Carter v. State, 722 So.2d 1258 (Miss. 1998)) and aligns with Mississippi’s model criminal jury instruction (Plain Language Model Jury Instructions § 211) permitting the jury to conclude malice from intentional use of a deadly weapon.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

Viewing the evidence in the State’s favor, the Court concluded a rational juror could find deliberate design beyond a reasonable doubt. Key pillars:

• Intentional use of a deadly weapon at close range to the victim’s head, with no contemporaneous physical struggle;
• Watts’s recorded admissions: he saw no weapon on Williams, felt unthreatened, believed Williams “meant no harm,” and acknowledged he could have “just fought” but chose to shoot;
• Forensic inference from the live 9mm round on the driver’s floorboard that Watts racked the slide—consistent with a conscious act to confirm the firearm’s readiness to fire before shooting; and
• The principle that deliberate design may form very quickly, moments before the act.

The Court also stressed that the law does not authorize lethal violence in response to “horse play.” On the weight-of-the-evidence challenge, the evidence of deliberate design and the absence of any credible justification defeated the claim that the verdict was an unconscionable injustice.

2) Jury Instruction S-4 (Deliberate Design) and the Fears Problem

Although not objected to at trial (procedural bar), S-4 survived plain-error review. Critically, it stated:

Deliberate design to kill a person may be formed very quickly and perhaps only moments before the act of killing the person. However, a deliberate design cannot be formed at the very moment of the fatal act.

That language aligns with Mississippi precedent allowing quick formation of intent while avoiding the “instant-of-killing” phrasing condemned in Fears when jurors are also instructed on manslaughter. Put differently, the instruction preserved a principled temporal boundary: intent may crystallize moments before—but not at—the fatal instant, leaving room for heat-of-passion scenarios where the design is not antecedently formed.

Note: The opinion contains a sentence stating, “The plain words of instruction S-4 negated the possibility of the jury finding anything other than first degree murder.” Read in context and alongside Fears, this appears to be a drafting slip. The thrust of the Court’s reasoning is that the “cannot be formed at the very moment” clause prevents the very error Fears warned against; it does not compel a first-degree murder verdict. The remainder of the opinion—and the preservation of a manslaughter instruction in the charge—supports that understanding.

As to ineffective assistance for failure to object, the Court held that even assuming deficient performance, Watts could not demonstrate Strickland prejudice given S-4’s correctness and the overall evidence.

3) Jury Instruction S-2 (Permissive Inference of Malice from Deadly Weapon Use)

S-2 provided that if death is inflicted with a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to destroy life or inflict great bodily harm, malice or intent to kill may be inferred. The Court affirmed this as a proper permissive inference instruction, consistent with:

• Hendrieth and Dickins (historical acceptance of deadly-weapon malice inferences absent justification or necessity), and
• Gunn and other modern cases (Holliman, Anderson, Carter) endorsing similar language.

Two points foreclosed Watts’s challenge:

• No evidence supported legal justification or necessity; indeed, Watts’s own statements contradicted justification.
• Read in conjunction with all instructions, S-2 did not single out evidence or direct a verdict; it merely permitted—not required—the jury to draw an inference aligned with common sense and experience. The language mirrors Mississippi’s model instruction (§ 211), reinforcing its propriety.

Key Evidentiary Inference: The “Racked Slide” Theory

A distinctive feature of the Court’s analysis is its reliance on the single live 9mm round found on the driver’s floorboard to infer that Watts, unfamiliar with the weapon, racked the slide to ensure a round was chambered. This inference:

• Anchors the finding that Watts had “full awareness” of his actions and engaged in an intentional sequence preparatory to shooting;
• Transforms the act from a spontaneous outburst to a brief, but purposeful, sequence—fully consistent with “deliberate design formed moments before” under Holliman; and
• Illustrates how forensic details can supply powerful circumstantial proof of mental state.

Standards of Review Reaffirmed

• Sufficiency (de novo): Could a rational juror find each element beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence favorably to the State?
• Weight (abuse of discretion): Is the verdict so contrary to the evidence’s overwhelming weight that affirmance would be an unconscionable injustice?
• Jury instructions (abuse of discretion; plain error if unobjected): Do the instructions, read as a whole, fairly announce the law and avoid injustice? Was any unobjected error plain and outcome-determinative?

Impact and Practical Implications

For Trial Judges and Instruction Drafting

• Deliberate-design definitions should include the clarifying clause: “cannot be formed at the very moment of the fatal act.” This formulation is expressly approved and avoids the Fears conflict when manslaughter is also instructed.
• Deadly-weapon malice-inference instructions using “may infer” language remain proper, especially when consistent with Mississippi’s model instruction and where the record lacks evidence of justification or necessity.
• Ensure instructions are evaluated as a cohesive set; avoid language that implies mandatory presumptions or comments on weight.

For Prosecutors

• Video evidence and small forensic details (e.g., a single live round) can be compelling circumstantial evidence of “deliberate design.” Develop and argue the logical sequence of actions that demonstrate awareness and planning.
• Request the model “may infer” instruction on malice from deadly-weapon use; cite Gunn and this case to meet anticipated defense objections.
• Where the defense hints at provocation or heat-of-passion, emphasize temporal separation between any earlier tussling and the fatal act, and the absence of immediate threat.

For Defense Counsel

• Object contemporaneously to instructions to preserve appellate review; absent an objection, review will be for plain error only.
• To blunt the deadly-weapon inference, present concrete evidence of justification, necessity, or legally adequate provocation. Mere “horse play” or generalized aggression will not suffice.
• Exercise caution with client statements; admissions that the victim “meant no harm” and that the defendant “panicked” but was unthreatened directly undercut heat-of-passion or self-defense theories.

Broader Doctrinal Trajectory

• This opinion consolidates Mississippi’s alignment with permissive, not mandatory, inferences to avoid due-process concerns, while preserving the State’s ability to prove intent circumstantially.
• It provides a clean, court-approved template for deliberate-design instructions that faithfully tracks the delicate line between murder and manslaughter when events unfold rapidly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Deliberate Design/Malice Aforethought: The mental state for murder; includes an intent to kill formed with awareness and contemplation. It can form quickly—moments before the act—but not at the exact instant of the fatal blow/shot.
• Permissive Inference vs. Mandatory Presumption: A permissive inference allows, but does not require, the jury to conclude a fact (e.g., malice) from another fact (e.g., use of a deadly weapon). A mandatory presumption would force the conclusion and is generally improper. S-2 is permissive.
• Sufficiency vs. Weight of the Evidence: Sufficiency asks whether the State proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt; weight asks whether the verdict, even if supported by some evidence, is so contrary to the bulk of the evidence that it would be unjust to let it stand.
• Plain Error: An appellate safety valve for unobjected errors that are clear and outcome-affecting. Rarely granted in instruction cases where language tracks long-approved formulations.
• Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter: A killing in a state of violent emotion due to adequate provocation, before a reasonable cooling time, without malice. The “cannot be formed at the very moment” clause guards the conceptual boundary by preventing juries from collapsing instantaneous reactions into deliberate design.
• “Horse Play” and Provocation: Minor tussling or non-deadly provocation does not authorize lethal force. Absent credible evidence of imminent threat or necessity, self-defense and manslaughter mitigations falter.

Conclusion

Watts v. State affirms a first-degree murder conviction on a succinct, coherent evidentiary narrative: surveillance footage, a single ejected live round, and the defendant’s own statements coalesced to show a quickly formed, but deliberate, intent to kill. On jury instructions, the Court delivers clear guidance. First, deliberate design may form moments before—but not at—the fatal instant; instruction language to that effect is proper and avoids the Fears conflict with manslaughter instructions. Second, a “may infer” malice instruction from deadly-weapon use remains textbook Mississippi law when justification or necessity is absent and the language hews to the model.

The decision’s practical significance is twofold: it endorses precise instruction drafting that preserves the murder/manslaughter boundary and it underscores how modest forensic details can establish the deliberation element. Going forward, courts and litigants have a clarified, court-sanctioned roadmap for charging juries on deliberate design and malice inferences in homicide cases.

Case: Terrance Watts v. State of Mississippi, 2023-KA-00893-SCT (Miss. Feb. 20, 2025). Opinion by Randolph, C.J. Judgment affirmed. All Justices concurred.