Delegating Duration:
Texas Treats the Temporal Reach of an Arbitration Agreement as a Delegable Question of Scope

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Abigail Dalila Cerna, as Next Friend of R.W. v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC (No. 24-0273, opinion delivered May 23, 2025) clarifies and sharpens Texas law on a recurring, practical question:

When the parties concede that a valid arbitration agreement was formed, but dispute whether that agreement covers a later event or visit because the contract is silent on duration, is that a question of contract existence for the court, or a question of scope/arbitrability that can be delegated to an arbitrator?

The Court answers: it is a question of scope, not existence. Therefore, if the parties have clearly and unmistakably delegated disputes over scope or arbitrability to the arbitrator, a court must compel arbitration and allow the arbitrator to decide whether the agreement extends to later claims—even when the dispute concerns whether the contract continues to apply to subsequent visits.

This ruling sits at the intersection of:

• Texas’s two-step framework for compelling arbitration (existence vs. scope);
• “Delegation provisions” that assign gateway arbitrability questions to the arbitrator; and
• National arbitration jurisprudence from cases such as Henry Schein, Coinbase v. Suski, and Morgan v. Sundance.

It has concrete implications for:

• Recreational releases and waivers (like trampoline parks and gyms);
• Personal-injury claims involving minors and “next friend” suits; and
• The drafting and litigation of arbitration clauses that are silent on duration but contain robust delegation language.

II. Case Overview

A. Parties and Factual Background

Petitioner. Abigail Dalila Cerna, acting as “next friend” of her minor child R.W. (a procedural mechanism allowing an adult to sue on behalf of a minor).

Respondent. Pearland Urban Air, LLC, operator of Urban Air Trampoline and Adventure Park in Pearland, Texas.

The August visit and release. On August 30, 2020, Cerna and her child visited the Urban Air park. As a condition of entry, Cerna signed a document titled:

“Customer Release, Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, and Indemnification Agreement” (the “August Agreement”).

The August Agreement:

• Released claims against Urban Air and related entities in exchange for entry to the Pearland location “or any other premises owned or operated by Urban Air wherever located”; and
• Contained a broad arbitration clause requiring that any “Dispute” be resolved in binding arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Commercial Industry Arbitration Rules.

Critically, the arbitration clause expressly covered disputes concerning:

“the scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement.”

No express duration. Nowhere did the August Agreement state how long it would last or whether it would apply to future visits.

The November visit and injury. On November 21, 2020—roughly three months later—Cerna and her child returned to the Pearland Urban Air park. They did not sign any new release or agreement. During that second visit, Cerna alleges that R.W. was seriously injured when he cut his foot while jumping on a trampoline.

B. Procedural History

1. Trial court. Cerna sued Urban Air for her child’s injuries from the November visit. Urban Air moved to compel arbitration based on the August Agreement, arguing that:
   • The August Agreement was valid and binding; and
   • The claims “arise out of” activity at its premises, thus falling within the arbitration clause.
   Cerna responded that the August Agreement could not apply to the November visit because there was no indication it was intended to cover later visits; therefore, as to the November visit, no arbitration agreement existed. The trial court denied Urban Air’s motion.
2. Court of Appeals (14th District, Houston).
   • Held the August Agreement was a valid contract binding Cerna and her child.
   • Characterized Cerna’s argument as a scope challenge—whether the August Agreement extended to the November visit—rather than an existence (formation) challenge.
   • Concluded that because the August Agreement clearly delegated scope/arbitrability disputes to the arbitrator, the trial court erred by refusing to compel arbitration.
3. Supreme Court of Texas. Granted review and affirmed the court of appeals, holding that:
   • Cerna’s challenge concerns the scope of an admittedly valid arbitration agreement;
   • The August Agreement’s delegation clause is “clear and unmistakable”; and
   • Thus, an arbitrator—not the court—must decide whether the November-visit claims fall within the agreement.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Framing the Legal Question

The Court restates Texas’s two-step inquiry when a party moves to compel arbitration:

1. Existence/Validity. Is there a valid arbitration agreement?
2. Scope. Do the claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope?

Parties may, however, agree that an arbitrator will decide the second question—scope or “arbitrability”—via a “delegation provision.” Courts enforce such delegations only when they “clearly and unmistakably” assign those gateway questions to the arbitrator.

Here, the key dispute is whether the question—“Does the August Agreement apply to the November visit?”—is:

• a matter of existence (whether an arbitration agreement exists at all for the November visit, which courts must decide), or
• a matter of scope (whether the existing arbitration agreement covers these particular claims, which can be delegated to the arbitrator).

B. Holding

The Court holds:

Given the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, the question of the agreement’s duration—whether it covers a subsequent visit—is a question of scope, not existence. Because the August Agreement clearly delegates scope/arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, the trial court was required to compel arbitration.

The Court therefore:

• Affirms the court of appeals’ judgment; and
• Remands to the trial court to issue an order compelling arbitration.

Importantly, the Court expressly declines to decide whether the August Agreement in fact covers the November visit; that question is left for the arbitrator.

C. Key Rule Articulated

The core doctrinal rule emerging from this opinion can be stated as:

When parties concede that a valid arbitration agreement exists and binds them, a dispute about whether that agreement extends to later events or visits—where the agreement is silent on duration—is a challenge to the agreement’s scope, not its existence. If the agreement clearly and unmistakably delegates scope/arbitrability disputes to the arbitrator, a court must compel arbitration and may not decide that durational question itself.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Legal Framework: Existence vs. Scope and Delegation Provisions

1. The two-step test for compelling arbitration

The opinion relies on the now-settled two-step framework articulated in prior Texas cases like In re Rubiola and In re FirstMerit Bank:

1. Step One – Existence/Validity. The movant must show a valid arbitration agreement. Courts decide:
   • Whether a contract was formed (offer, acceptance, consideration);
   • Whether the parties are bound (including non-signatory doctrines); and
   • Whether the agreement remains in existence (e.g., not superseded by a later contract).
2. Step Two – Scope. Once a valid agreement exists, courts determine whether the claims at issue fall within its scope—unless the parties have clearly and unmistakably delegated this question to the arbitrator.

This framework is grounded both in the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), each of which requires courts to be satisfied that an agreement to arbitrate has been made before compelling arbitration.

2. Delegation provisions and “questions of arbitrability”

The Court reiterates that parties can contractually agree to have an arbitrator decide “questions of arbitrability”—gateway issues that courts ordinarily decide, such as:

• Whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy; and
• Sometimes, issues about the validity of the arbitration clause itself in a given context (e.g., unconscionability, illegality), so long as the delegation is clear.

Citing recent Texas precedent (TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, and Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero), the Court reaffirms:

• Delegation provisions will be enforced if they “clearly and unmistakably” assign arbitrability questions to the arbitrator.
• The parties’ incorporation of AAA rules that empower arbitrators to decide their own jurisdiction reinforces such delegations, but here the language is already explicit (“scope, arbitrability, or validity”).
• Once a valid delegation exists, courts are stripped of authority to decide arbitrability questions falling within the delegation.

B. Distinguishing Existence from Scope

1. What counts as a challenge to existence?

The Court surveys examples of “existence” challenges, which courts must decide:

• Formation disputes. Whether the parties ever agreed to arbitrate at all—e.g., lack of assent, lack of capacity, fraud in the factum, or missing essential terms. (J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster)
• Non-signatory issues. When a signatory seeks to compel a nonsignatory, courts must decide whether any legal theory (such as assumption, estoppel, agency, or third-party beneficiary) creates an agreement between them. (G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP)
• Superseding agreements. If the parties later enter a new contract that may replace or modify the earlier arbitration agreement, courts must decide whether the original arbitration clause “still exists at all.” (Transcor Astra Group S.A. v. Petrobras America Inc., adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski)

In each of these situations, the question is whether there is any arbitration agreement that binds the parties concerning the dispute—not merely how far it reaches.

2. What counts as a challenge to scope?

In contrast, a scope challenge accepts that:

• a valid arbitration agreement was formed, and
• the parties are bound by it,

but contends that the particular claims at issue are not covered. Examples include:

• Arguments that the dispute arises out of a separate transaction not covered by the agreement;
• Contentions that the contract contains a carve-out (e.g., for certain kinds of disputes, as in Wagner v. Apache Corp.); or
• Disputes over whether the clause covers statutory or tort claims not expressly mentioned.

Such disputes are classic questions of arbitrability that, under a clear delegation provision, must be decided by the arbitrator.

3. TotalEnergies and the “relabeling” problem

The Court leans heavily on its recent decision in TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, where a party tried to argue that an arbitration agreement did not “exist as to the claims it has asserted in this suit”—essentially relabeling a scope challenge as an existence challenge.

In TotalEnergies, the Court warned against collapsing the existence and scope inquiries:

• A party cannot concede the existence of a valid arbitration clause and then say it “does not exist” merely because the party believes its particular claims are outside that clause.
• Once formation and binding effect are conceded, disputes about whether claims “arise out of” the agreement are scope disputes, which can be delegated.

The present opinion treats Cerna’s argument the same way: she concedes the August Agreement is valid and binding for the August visit, but argues that it does not “exist for the November visit.” The Court finds this to be the same relabeling maneuver rejected in TotalEnergies.

C. Applying the Framework to Cerna’s Argument

1. What Cerna concedes—and what she disputes

Before the Supreme Court, Cerna:

• Does not dispute that the August Agreement was validly formed;
• Does not dispute that it binds her and her child, at least as to the August visit; and
• Does not claim that a later, superseding agreement was executed (e.g., a distinct contract for the November visit that replaced or modified the August Agreement).

Instead, she argues:

• The August Agreement lacks any durational language; and
• Urban Air produced no agreement specific to the November visit; thus
• There is no arbitration agreement for the November visit, so the court should treat the November visit as though it stands alone without any arbitration agreement.

2. The Court’s characterization: this is a scope question

The Court rejects Cerna’s framing as an “existence” problem and instead characterizes it as a classic scope question:

Cerna questions the extent of the agreement’s applicability—that is, whether it exists as to the claims she has asserted in this suit.

In the Court’s view:

• There is an existing, valid arbitration agreement (the August Agreement).
• The parties’ controversy is whether that existing agreement extends to a later event that occurred during a second visit.
• That controversy is about which claims are arbitrable under the existing agreement—the very definition of a scope dispute.

Therefore, under TotalEnergies and RSL Funding, the matter is properly subject to a delegation clause if one exists and is clear.

D. The Delegation Clause in the August Agreement

1. Language of the clause

The August Agreement’s arbitration provision is broad and explicit. It requires arbitration of any dispute or claim “arising out of or relating to”:

• the Agreement itself;
• its breach;
• the premises;
• the activities;
• property damage or personal injury (including death); and, critically,
• “the scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement.”

Those disputes are to be:

• Brought in the parties’ individual capacities (no class actions); and
• “Settled by binding arbitration” before a single arbitrator administered by the AAA under its Commercial Industry Arbitration Rules in effect when the demand is filed.

2. Why this is a “clear and unmistakable” delegation

The Court notes that Texas has already held that similar language is a clear and unmistakable delegation of arbitrability questions to the arbitrator. In Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero, the arbitration clause stated:

“Arbitration shall be the sole forum to determine the validity, scope and breadth of this Agreement.”

The Court held that such language unambiguously delegates questions of scope and validity to the arbitrator. The clause in Cerna’s case is materially similar, expressly covering “the scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement.”

Thus, once existence is established (and it is conceded here), the agreement divests courts of power to decide:

• whether the August Agreement applies to the November visit;
• whether the release or waiver covers the particular injury facts; or
• more broadly, how far in time or subject-matter the agreement extends.

All of those issues are for the arbitrator to decide under the parties’ contract.

E. Guardrails Against Overreach: Clear Delegation and Superseding Contracts

1. The “clear and unmistakable” standard

The Court emphasizes that the “clear and unmistakable” standard functions as a significant safeguard:

• Parties are not lightly presumed to have given up their right to a judicial decision on arbitrability.
• Vague or general language about arbitration is not enough to shift gateway questions; the clause must be explicit or incorporate rules that unmistakably do so.

Here, the explicit reference to disputes about “scope, arbitrability, or validity” easily satisfies that standard.

2. Superseding or conflicting agreements: Transcor Astra and Coinbase

The Court acknowledges that there are situations where courts must still decide arbitrability-type issues, even when an earlier contract contains a delegation clause—namely, when a later contract creates a genuine question about whether the earlier arbitration agreement continues to exist.

It cites:

• Transcor Astra Group S.A. v. Petrobras America Inc. (Tex. 2022): Courts must decide if a later settlement agreement terminated an earlier arbitration agreement.
• Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski (U.S. 2024): When parties have two contracts, one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration and another (later) contract sending them to court, a court must decide which contract governs. To do otherwise “would impermissibly elevate a delegation provision over other forms of contract.”

These cases show that:

• If there is a colorable argument that the arbitration agreement no longer exists—because a later contract superseded it—courts must resolve that existence issue.
• Delegation provisions cannot bootstrap themselves; they cannot decide whether they still exist when their very existence is in doubt due to later, conflicting agreements.

In Cerna’s case, however, there is no asserted later contract. The only agreement in play is the August Agreement. Thus, the only real question is whether that already-existing agreement covers the November visit—a question of scope.

3. Henry Schein and the demise of the “wholly groundless” exception

Urban Air’s position arguably relies on Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., where the U.S. Supreme Court:

• Rejected the judicially-created “wholly groundless” exception to delegation provisions.
• Held that when an agreement clearly delegates arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, courts must respect that choice, even if the court believes the demand for arbitration is wholly groundless.

The Texas Supreme Court notes Henry Schein’s reasoning and applies it: once the parties have clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of arbitrability, courts cannot carve out an exception simply because:

• They think the claim is obviously outside the scope; or
• They are skeptical that the agreement extends over time to later visits.

Those are merits questions for the arbitrator under the delegation agreement.

4. Morgan v. Sundance and “no special treatment” for arbitration

The Court briefly invokes Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that arbitration contracts should be treated like any other contract—no extra hurdles, but also no special favors.

Here, that principle works in arbitration’s favor: once parties have agreed to a delegation clause, courts must enforce it “just as [they] would [enforce] any other” contract term, without grafting on arbitration-specific doctrines like the defunct “wholly groundless” exception.

F. The Court’s Response to Cerna’s “Perpetual Delegation” Concern

Cerna argues that under the court of appeals’ (and Urban Air’s) approach, once parties sign a contract containing a delegation clause, disputes will be sent to arbitration “in perpetuity and without judicial inquiry,” as long as that agreement can be invoked.

The Supreme Court answers this concern in several ways:

1. Existence remains a judicial gatekeeper. Courts still must:
   • Ensure an arbitration agreement was formed;
   • Determine whether the parties before the court are bound;
   • Resolve any claim that the agreement has been superseded or terminated by a later contract; and
   • Apply the “clear and unmistakable” standard to delegation clauses.
   Only after clearing those hurdles does delegation truly operate.
2. Frivolous scope claims are handled by arbitrators, not courts. If a party seeks to compel arbitration of a dispute “wholly outside” the agreement, the arbitrator has authority under the delegation provision to decide:
   • That the claims are not arbitrable; and
   • Potentially, that the demand was frivolous, with any attendant cost or fee consequences under arbitral rules.
3. Parties can always draft clearer limits. Contracting parties remain free to:
   • State that the agreement applies only to a particular visit or time period;
   • Limit arbitration to specific categories of disputes; or
   • Exclude arbitrability questions from delegation if they wish.
   The Court simply enforces what these parties chose here: a broad, undated clause and a broad delegation.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Texas Arbitration Precedents

• In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2011).
  Source of the standard two-prong test: (1) valid arbitration clause, and (2) claims fall within its scope. The Cerna opinion begins its doctrinal explanation with Rubiola’s formulation.
• In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
  Early articulation that once an agreement is established, courts must then determine whether the arbitration agreement covers the nonmovant’s claims. Cerna builds on this by explaining that this second-step question can itself be delegated to an arbitrator.
• J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003).
  Provides the framework for applying ordinary contract-law principles to determine the formation and enforceability of arbitration agreements. Cerna references it in explaining how courts resolve true existence/formation challenges.
• In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. 2009).
  Clarifies that courts must decide challenges “to the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate.” This supports the Court’s insistence that there is a bright line between existence (for courts) and scope/arbitrability (potentially for arbitrators).
• G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. 2015).
  Cited for the proposition that questions about compelling nonsignatories are existence questions. Helps define the category of disputes that courts must always resolve.
• Transcor Astra Group S.A. v. Petrobras America Inc., 650 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2022).
  Held that when parties later enter another agreement, courts must decide whether the earlier agreement—and its arbitration clause—“still exists at all.” Cerna uses Transcor Astra (and its adoption by the U.S. Supreme Court in Coinbase) as the counterpoint to its own holding: only when a later contract calls the very existence of the earlier arbitration agreement into question does arbitrability return to the courts.
• Robinson v. Home Owners Mgmt. Enters., Inc., 590 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2019).
  Clarifies what counts as a “question of arbitrability” subject to the clear-and-unmistakable standard: basically, (1) existence of a valid arbitration agreement and (2) whether a clause applies to a particular controversy. Cerna invokes Robinson to situate duration/scope disputes firmly in that second category.
• RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. 2018).
  Held that once a party concedes the existence of an agreement containing a delegation clause, an arbitrator—not the court—must decide scope questions. Cerna relies on this to say that because Cerna concedes formation and binding effect of the August Agreement, she is subject to its delegation clause.
• Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. 2021).
  Example of a classic scope dispute (involving a carve-out for third-party claims) where the parties agreed a valid arbitration agreement existed. Cited to illustrate what “scope” disputes look like.
• TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. 2023).
  A central precedent. It:
  • Refined the distinction between existence and scope;
  • Rejected the attempt to relabel scope disputes as existence disputes by arguing an agreement does not “exist as to” certain claims; and
  • Confirmed that where a clear delegation clause exists, arbitrators decide whether the parties’ dispute must be arbitrated.
  Cerna extends these principles to duration of the agreement, treating it as another facet of scope.
• Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero, 642 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2022).
  Confirmed that contractual language assigning to arbitration the “validity, scope and breadth” of the agreement is a clear and unmistakable delegation clause. Cerna analogizes the language in the August Agreement to this.

B. U.S. Supreme Court Precedents

• Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63 (2019).
  Eliminated the “wholly groundless” exception and reinforced that when a delegation exists, courts must send arbitrability issues to arbitration even if they believe arbitration is obviously unavailable. Cerna applies this logic by refusing to create a similar exception for duration questions.
• Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
  Distinguished “questions of arbitrability” from procedural questions (like time limits). Cited indirectly via Robinson, to explain the limited but important category of gateway issues that require clear delegation.
• Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143 (2024).
  Adopted Texas’s approach in Transcor Astra: when two contracts conflict about who decides arbitrability, a court must decide which contract controls. Cerna uses Coinbase to emphasize that existence questions triggered by multiple contracts still belong to courts.
• Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022).
  Held that courts must not create arbitration-specific doctrines, such as requiring a showing of prejudice to find waiver. Cited here for the general principle that courts must enforce arbitration agreements like any other contract, which in this context means rigorously enforcing delegation provisions.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Next Friend”

A minor generally lacks legal capacity to sue in their own name. A “next friend” is an adult (often a parent) who brings a lawsuit on the minor’s behalf. The next friend is a procedural representative; the substantive rights belong to the child.

B. “Arbitrability” and “Delegation Provisions”

• Arbitrability. A shorthand term for whether a dispute is subject to arbitration under the parties’ agreement. It includes:
  • Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists; and
  • Whether that agreement covers the particular claims at issue.
• Delegation provision. A clause in an arbitration agreement in which the parties agree that the arbitrator, rather than a court, will decide some or all questions of arbitrability—including, often, disputes over the scope, applicability, or validity of the arbitration clause itself.

Because courts normally decide arbitrability, a delegation clause must be “clear and unmistakable” to shift that power to the arbitrator.

C. “Scope” vs. “Existence” of an Arbitration Agreement

• Existence challenge. Claims that:
  • No agreement was ever formed (e.g., no assent, forgery);
  • The parties before the court were never bound (non-signatory issues); or
  • A later contract terminated or superseded the earlier arbitration agreement.
  Courts must decide these issues.
• Scope challenge. Accepts that:
  • An agreement exists and binds the parties;
  but argues that:
  • These particular claims are not covered (e.g., they arise from a different transaction, fall within a carve-out, or occur outside the agreement’s temporal or subject-matter “reach”).
  These issues can be delegated to an arbitrator by contract.

Cerna’s key holding is that the duration of the agreement—whether it covers later visits—fits into the “scope” category when formation is conceded and no later contract is alleged.

D. Texas Arbitration Act vs. Federal Arbitration Act

The opinion briefly references an issue raised in the court of appeals about whether the Texas Arbitration Act required attorneys to sign the agreement for it to be enforceable in a personal-injury context. The court of appeals majority treated that question as delegated; the concurring justice suggested it implicated formation, but that the FAA governed instead.

The Supreme Court sidesteps this issue, noting that Cerna did not raise it before the Court. Practically, this leaves unresolved at the Supreme Court level the precise interaction between the TAA’s attorney-signature requirement and delegation clauses in similar consumer/personal-injury settings, particularly where the FAA might apply due to interstate commerce.

VII. Practical Impact and Future Implications

A. For Drafters of Releases and Waivers (Especially Recreation Facilities)

Facilities like trampoline parks, gyms, rock-climbing centers, and other recreational operators commonly use:

• Release and assumption-of-risk agreements; and
• Arbitration clauses with class-action waivers.

Key drafting lessons from Cerna:

• Delegation language is powerful. Explicitly delegating disputes regarding the “scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration agreement will likely send most threshold fights to arbitration in Texas, so long as formation is not seriously disputed.
• Silence on duration will often be resolved by arbitrators, not courts. If the agreement is silent as to whether it applies to future visits, and there is a clear delegation clause, arbitrators—not courts—will decide whether injuries on subsequent visits fall within the agreement.
• Consider stating duration expressly. To reduce uncertainty and litigation:
  • Specify whether the agreement applies to “this visit only,” “this visit and all future visits,” or “for a period of X years.”
  • Clarify whether repeated entries or events are separately governed.
• Multi-location coverage can be broadened. The August Agreement here covered the Pearland location “or any other premises owned or operated by Urban Air wherever located,” signaling that such multi-site provisions are recognized and can be enforced as written, subject to arbitrators' application.

B. For Litigators Seeking to Compel or Resist Arbitration

When moving to compel arbitration in Texas:

• Focus first on existence (formation, parties bound) and highlight:
  • Signatures, assent mechanisms (e.g., clickwrap), and consideration;
  • Any language incorporating AAA rules and explicit delegation clauses.
• If a delegation clause exists:
  • Frame opposing arguments about subject-matter, temporal reach, or carve-outs as scope disputes that the arbitrator must decide;
  • Cite TotalEnergies and Cerna to show courts cannot repackage scope as existence.

When resisting arbitration:

• To keep disputes in court, structure arguments as existence/formation challenges when supported by the facts:
  • No assent (e.g., forged signature, lack of notice);
  • No authority (e.g., parent lacked authority to bind child to arbitration under specific state-law doctrines, where applicable);
  • Superseding or conflicting subsequent agreements (Transcor Astra, Coinbase);
  • Noncompliance with statutory formation requirements (e.g., if TAA attorney-signature rules apply and FAA preemption does not).
• Be cautious in arguing that an agreement does not “exist as to” particular claims if you concede the agreement exists generally; Cerna and TotalEnergies strongly cut against that framing.

C. For Minors’ Claims and “Next Friend” Litigation

Although the opinion focuses on arbitrability and not on substantive enforceability of releases against minors, it has indirect implications:

• Parents often sign releases and arbitration agreements on behalf of their children in recreational settings.
• Disputes over whether a parent can bind a minor to arbitration may be framed as:
  • Formation/capacity issues (existence, for courts); or
  • Scope/validity issues (potentially for arbitrators if delegated).

Cerna does not squarely resolve the enforceability of such agreements against minors under Texas law, but it signals that:

• When the validity of the agreement as to the child is not challenged at the formation level, and a delegation exists, arbitrators may be the ones to decide child-specific defenses (unconscionability, public policy, etc.).

D. Broader Arbitration Law Trajectory

Structurally, Cerna fits within a broader national trend:

• Courts sharply distinguishing formation/existence (judicial) from scope/arbitrability (potentially arbitral);
• Rigid enforcement of delegation clauses (Henry Schein); and
• Recognition that multiple, conflicting contracts about arbitration require judicial resolution (Coinbase).

In Texas specifically, Cerna:

• Extends the existence/scope framework into the realm of temporal reach of arbitration agreements;
• Clarifies that duration of an admittedly valid agreement—absent competing contracts—is part of scope; and
• Reinforces Texas’s reputation as a jurisdiction that enforces arbitration and delegation clauses as written, subject to carefully limited judicial gatekeeping on formation and supersession.

VIII. Conclusion

Cerna v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC cements an important doctrinal point in Texas arbitration law:

Once a valid arbitration agreement is conceded to exist and bind the parties, disputes about how far that agreement extends—even over time to later visits—are questions of scope, not existence. If the parties have clearly delegated scope and arbitrability disputes to the arbitrator, courts must compel arbitration and may not decide those issues themselves.

The decision:

• Reaffirms the two-step existence/scope framework and guards against attempts to relabel scope disputes as existence challenges;
• Applies and extends recent precedents (TotalEnergies, RSL Funding, Baby Dolls) and harmonizes Texas law with U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Henry Schein, Coinbase, Morgan v. Sundance);
• Provides clear guidance that the temporal duration of an arbitration agreement, where formation is not in dispute and no superseding contract exists, is itself a scope/arbitrability question that can be—and here was—delegated to the arbitrator; and
• Signals to drafters and litigators that clear delegation language significantly channels threshold disputes away from courts and into arbitration, while leaving courts as guardians of contract existence, formation, and supersession.

In the broader landscape, Cerna underscores a consistent message: arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract. When parties clearly agree that arbitrators, not judges, will decide how far their agreement reaches, Texas courts will hold them to that bargain.