Delaware Supreme Court: 13 Del. C. § 705A Domestic-Violence Custody Presumption Is Inapplicable in Termination-of-Parental-Rights Proceedings

Introduction

In Roy Harris v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families (Del. Supr. Dec. 19, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a Family Court order terminating a father’s parental rights to two minor children. The case arose after the father’s arrest and later guilty pleas to aggregated menacing and endangering the welfare of a child, followed by the Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families (“DSCYF”) taking custody while the father was incarcerated.

The core appellate issue was narrow but consequential: whether the Family Court committed legal error by importing 13 Del. C. § 705A—a custody statute creating a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence—into a termination of parental rights (“TPR”) proceeding under 13 Del. C. § 1103. The Supreme Court held that it may not.

Summary of the Opinion

§ 705A does not apply in TPR proceedings. The Court held that § 705A “deals exclusively with Family Court custody proceedings,” and therefore cannot be used as a decisional framework in termination litigation.
Due process concerns. Applying § 705A in a TPR case improperly shifts burdens and risks forcing a parent to prove “best interests” prematurely, contrary to the statutory two-step TPR analysis and constitutional protections for parental rights.
Remand instruction. The Family Court must reconsider termination “without regard to, or consideration of, § 705A.”
Motions practice. The Court found no abuse of discretion in denying the father’s April 8 reargument/stay motion as moot after the final TPR order, and deemed the post-TPR motion moot in light of reversal and remand.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) DFS v. O'Bryan (statutory scope: Chapter 7A presumption limited to custody)

The Court’s statutory holding rests primarily on DFS v. O'Bryan, 164 A.3d 58 (Del. 2017). There, the Court explained that the “Sex Offenders Act” provisions are part of Subchapter II of Chapter 7A of Title 13, which “deals exclusively with Family Court custody proceedings.” In Harris, the Court treated that reasoning as directly transferable because § 705A is likewise located in Chapter 7A (this time in Subchapter I, the “Child Protection from Domestic Violence Act”).

The key move is structural interpretation: placement in a custody-focused chapter is not incidental; it signals legislative design. Thus, O'Bryan supplied the interpretive template—Chapter 7A presumptions are custody tools, not termination standards.

2) January v. DFS (confirming lack of relevance to TPR)

The Court reinforced its reading with January v. DFS, 91 A.3d 561, 2014 WL 1713085 (Del. Apr. 28, 2014) (TABLE), which stated that a related Chapter 7A definition (13 Del. C. § 703A) “would be relevant” to custody presumptions but “does not have any apparent relevance to termination of parental rights proceedings.” While non-precedential in the same way as a full published opinion, it functioned as persuasive confirmation of the boundary between custody presumptions and termination adjudication.

3) Standards of review: In re Stevens, George v. DSCYF, and Powell v. DSCYF

The Court framed its review using three authorities:

In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18 (Del. 1995): de novo review for legal error and statutory interpretation.
George v. DSCYF, 150 A.3d 768, 2016 WL 6302525 (Del. Oct. 27, 2016) (TABLE): de novo review for constitutional claims.
Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 724 (Del. 2008): abuse-of-discretion review where the correct legal standard is applied.

This matters because Harris is, at bottom, a “wrong legal framework” case: once the Supreme Court concluded § 705A is inapplicable, reversal followed without deference.

4) Due process foundation: In re Heller

The Court anchored the constitutional dimension in In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25 (Del. 1995), which recognizes that natural parents have a “fundamental liberty interest” in the care, custody, and management of their children, and that state interference requires “requisite due process protection.” In Harris, the due process problem was not an evidentiary technicality; it was the risk that a parent could lose parental rights under a burden-shifting presumption designed for an entirely different type of proceeding.

5) The two-step TPR framework: Brock v. DSCYF

The Court relied on Brock v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 781 (Del. 2022), for the governing sequence: (1) the State must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a statutory ground under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a); (2) only then does the court determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether termination is in the child’s best interests (with best interests defined under 13 Del. C. § 722).

That sequencing did real work in Harris: the Family Court’s reliance on § 705A required the father, during the “grounds” stage, to prove an element (“best interests”) that belongs in stage two—and is ordinarily the State’s burden.

6) Mootness/finality: Tyson Foods Inc. v. Aetos Corp.

On the procedural side, the Court cited Tyson Foods Inc. v. Aetos Corp., 809 A.2d 575 (Del. 2002), for finality principles: once a final judgment enters, earlier interlocutory rulings achieve finality through incorporation, and review is obtained via appeal from the final order. Applied here, the father’s April 8 motion to reargue prior stay denials was mooted by the issuance of the final TPR order; the proper vehicle was a direct appeal.

Legal Reasoning

A. Statutory boundary: custody presumptions vs. termination adjudication

The Court’s statutory holding is categorical: § 705A is a custody statute and does not govern TPR. It reached this by (i) reading § 705A within the architecture of Chapter 7A (custody-focused protective presumptions), and (ii) applying the Court’s own interpretive statement from DFS v. O'Bryan to the domestic-violence presumption in Subchapter I.

The practical significance is that a court cannot treat Chapter 7A as a general “domestic violence disqualification rule” applicable whenever parenting is at issue. Termination requires adherence to the specific grounds and structure of § 1103 and § 722.

B. Due process and burden-shifting: why importing § 705A distorts TPR’s two-step test

The Court identified a concrete constitutional hazard: § 705A creates a rebuttable presumption that requires the alleged perpetrator, to overcome it, to demonstrate (among other things) “that giving custodial or residential responsibilities” is in the child’s best interests (§ 705A(c)(3)).

In a custody dispute, requiring a parent to rebut a presumption about custody/residence is conceptually consistent with custody adjudication. In a TPR case, however, the statute’s “best interests” rebuttal element collides with Brock’s mandated sequence: the “best interests” inquiry comes only after the State first proves a termination ground under § 1103(a), by clear and convincing evidence.

Here, DSCYF proceeded under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5) (failure to plan). The Family Court, in evaluating whether the father complied with his case plan’s domestic-violence component, required him to overcome § 705A’s presumption—including by proving best interests—during stage one. The Supreme Court deemed that a misplacement of burden and sequencing that raises due process concerns given the fundamental liberty interest at stake.

C. Remedy: clean remand without § 705A

Because the legal framework was erroneous, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with a pointed directive: the Family Court must decide termination “without regard to, or consideration of, § 705A.” Notably, the Court did not decide whether the evidence could support termination under the correct standard; it required a redo under the proper framework.

Impact

Bright-line constraint on trial courts. Delaware Family Court judges may not use 13 Del. C. § 705A (or, by strong implication, other Chapter 7A presumptions) as a substitute analytical tool in TPR litigation. Termination decisions must track § 1103 and § 722.
Burden discipline in “failure to plan” cases. In practice, “failure to plan” often overlaps with domestic-violence concerns. Harris instructs that those concerns must be addressed through the case plan compliance and statutory-ground proof—without converting the inquiry into an early “best interests” rebuttal exercise imposed on the parent.
Likely appellate leverage in future cases. Any TPR order that quotes, relies upon, or functionally applies § 705A’s presumption framework is now vulnerable on de novo review as legal error, especially where it affects sequencing or burdens of proof.
Separation of custody and termination doctrines. The decision reinforces that custody standards (including protective presumptions) cannot be casually imported into termination proceedings simply because both involve parenting.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Termination of parental rights (TPR): A proceeding that permanently ends the legal parent-child relationship. It is more severe than custody changes because it can eliminate all parental rights and duties.
Rebuttable presumption: A legal starting point that assumes something is true (here, that a domestic-violence perpetrator should not get custody), unless the affected party produces sufficient evidence to overcome it.
Two-step TPR analysis: Step 1: the State must prove a statutory ground for termination under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a) (by clear and convincing evidence). Step 2: only then does the court decide whether termination is in the child’s best interests under 13 Del. C. § 722.
Clear and convincing evidence: A high civil standard of proof—more demanding than “more likely than not,” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
De novo review vs. abuse of discretion: “De novo” means the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court on legal/constitutional issues. “Abuse of discretion” is deferential and applies when the correct law was used but the trial court’s decision is challenged as unreasonable.
Mootness and final judgment: Once a final order resolves the case, earlier interim disputes (like requests to pause the case) are typically reviewed through appeal of the final order; separate reconsideration motions may become moot.

Conclusion

Roy Harris v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families establishes a clear rule: 13 Del. C. § 705A’s domestic-violence custody presumption cannot be applied in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. The decision is significant not only as statutory interpretation of Chapter 7A’s limited scope, but also as a due process safeguard: it prevents burden-shifting and premature “best interests” adjudication during the statutory-ground phase of a TPR case. Going forward, Delaware courts must keep custody presumptions and termination standards analytically distinct and must follow the two-step structure required by § 1103 and § 722.