Delaware Long-Arm Statute Does Not Reach Out-of-State Insurers for First-Party UIM Claims Based Solely on a Delaware Accident

1. Introduction

James E. Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is a Delaware Supreme Court decision affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction where an out-of-state insured sought first-party underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits in Delaware after being injured in a Delaware automobile accident.

The appellant, James E. Berry, a Maryland resident insured under a Maryland State Farm automobile policy, was injured in Delaware and settled with the tortfeasor’s insurer for its $25,000 limits. With State Farm’s consent to the settlement and acknowledgment of Berry’s ability to pursue UIM benefits, Berry sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in Delaware Superior Court seeking UIM benefits. State Farm moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), provides a statutory basis for specific personal jurisdiction over State Farm for a first-party UIM claim when (i) the accident occurred in Delaware, but (ii) the insurance contract was negotiated and issued in Maryland to a Maryland insured.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal, holding that Delaware’s long-arm statute does not confer specific jurisdiction over State Farm for Berry’s first-party UIM claim. The Court reasoned that:

A first-party UIM claim is fundamentally a contract dispute (insured vs. own insurer), not a tort claim against the tortfeasor.
§ 3104(c)(3) (tortious injury in Delaware caused by an act/omission in Delaware) does not apply because State Farm committed no Delaware tortious act causing the injury; the relevant conduct is alleged nonperformance of a Maryland contract.
Delaware’s “dual jurisdiction” concept under § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) has been applied in product cases and requires injury caused by the “product” introduced into Delaware; an insurance policy is not treated as such a product here, and in any event the policy did not cause Berry’s injury.
Berry’s reliance on § 3104(c)(6) (contract to insure a risk in Delaware) was not preserved below; under Del. Sup. Ct. R. 8, the Court declined to address it.

Because no subsection of § 3104(c) supplied a statutory hook, the Court did not reach the due process analysis.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Two-step jurisdiction framework

The Court reiterated Delaware’s standard two-step analysis: (1) the long-arm statute must authorize jurisdiction; and only then (2) the exercise must comport with due process. This sequencing and methodology track LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., Inc. and Waters v. Deutz Corp..

LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., Inc.: cited for the statutory-then-constitutional structure and (through its discussion and footnote) for the conceptual possibility of “dual jurisdiction” when (c)(4) activity is extensive enough to reach the transactional level of (c)(1) and there is a nexus.
Waters v. Deutz Corp.: similarly cited for the two-step approach and the long-arm-first posture.

2) Standard of review and burden

Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec: cited for de novo review of personal jurisdiction determinations.
AeroGlobal Capital Management, LLC v. Cirrus Industries, Inc.: cited for the proposition that the plaintiff bears the burden to establish a statutory basis for jurisdiction.

3) Delaware cases drawing the liability/first-party jurisdiction line

The Court’s statutory analysis under § 3104(c)(3) was anchored in the distinction between: (i) jurisdiction over a tortfeasor’s insurer that defends/indemnifies Delaware torts, and (ii) jurisdiction over an insured’s own carrier on a first-party benefits contract.

Eaton v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co.: the principal persuasive authority relied upon by the Superior Court and endorsed by the Supreme Court. Eaton held that a UIM claim is not “based” on the accident for jurisdictional purposes; it is based on the insurer’s contractual obligations, and an out-of-state policy has “no germane connection to Delaware” beyond the fortuity of accident location.
Donaldson v. Progressive Advanced Ins. Co., aff’d, Donaldson v. Progressive Advanced Ins. Co.: cited as consistent Delaware authority denying jurisdiction over first-party UIM claims where the accident occurred in Delaware but the contract relationship is out-of-state.
Uribe v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund: cited for the proposition that an out-of-state insurer providing first-party benefits is not subject to Delaware personal jurisdiction merely because the accident occurred in Delaware.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dann: cited to illustrate that Delaware may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state liability insurer tied to a Delaware tortfeasor/accident (a different posture than first-party UIM).
Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Intermodal Transp., Inc.: cited as another example where the insurer-side entity “stepp[ed] into the shoes” of an insurer/tortfeasor for a Delaware accident—again, a liability/defense/indemnity context rather than a first-party benefits dispute.

4) “Dual jurisdiction” product-introduction line of cases

Berry invoked a “dual jurisdiction” theory, combining § 3104(c)(1) and § 3104(c)(4), pointing to State Farm’s broader Delaware business presence and nationwide coverage. The Court rejected extending this doctrine from products to insurance contracts and also found the “injury caused by the product” requirement unsatisfied.

The Court’s discussion situates “dual jurisdiction” in the product stream-of-commerce setting reflected in: Robert Bosch LLC v. Alberee Prods., Inc., Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, Graphics Props. Holdings, Inc. v. ASUS Computer Int'l, Belden Technologies, Inc. v. LS Corp., Power Integrations, Inc. v. BCD Semiconductor Corp., Wright v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., Boone v. Oy Partek Ab, Diaz Cardona v. Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd., and LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., Inc. (as a conceptual touchstone).

Critically, the Court leaned on Boone v. Oy Partek Ab for the requirement that intent to serve the Delaware market must result in product introduction into Delaware and the plaintiff’s injury must be caused by that product—an element not met where the injury is caused by a negligent driver and the insurance policy is implicated only as a post-accident indemnity mechanism.

5) Preservation and appellate limits

The Court invoked Del. Sup. Ct. R. 8 to decline review of Berry’s newly emphasized § 3104(c)(6) theory, holding it was not fairly presented below and no exceptional circumstances justified consideration.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The case is decided at step one: no statutory hook, no due process inquiry

Following LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., Inc. and Waters v. Deutz Corp., the Court halted the analysis once it concluded § 3104(c) did not confer jurisdiction. This is doctrinally important: Delaware courts will not “bootstrap” jurisdiction through fairness or foreseeability arguments if the long-arm statute’s text and interpreted categories are not met.

2) § 3104(c)(3): “tortious injury in Delaware” does not convert a UIM contract claim into a tort claim

Berry’s main statutory theory rested on the accident being a Delaware tortious injury and the idea that State Farm “stands in the shoes” of the tortfeasor. The Court rejected this reframing because:

The tortfeasor’s liability was resolved by settlement; what remains is whether State Farm must pay additional sums under the policy.
That dispute is about the insurer’s performance under a Maryland contract, not about conduct in Delaware that caused the injury.
“Standing in the shoes” may justify jurisdiction in liability contexts (defense/indemnity tied to the Delaware tortfeasor), but it does not transform a first-party UIM claim into a Delaware tort claim.

By characterizing the cause of action as a first-party contract dispute, the Court effectively treated the place of injury as jurisdictionally incidental when the defendant’s relevant conduct and obligations are contractually rooted elsewhere.

3) “Dual jurisdiction” under § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) is confined to product-type cases and still requires causation by the introduced item

Berry argued that State Farm’s general business in Delaware plus its issuance of nationwide policies should support jurisdiction. The Court’s response had two layers:

Doctrinal confinement: Delaware’s “dual jurisdiction” approach has been applied to manufactured products (wiper blades, monitors, tablets, cables, chips, drugs, asbestos, nail guns, roofing materials). The Court declined to treat an insurance policy as a comparable “product” sent into Delaware.
Failure of the injury-by-product prong: Even assuming arguendo an intent-to-serve-market showing, Berry could not show the required nexus because the policy did not cause the accident; the negligent driver did. The policy becomes relevant only after the accident as a potential source of payment.

This reasoning clarifies that “intent” or “nationwide coverage” does not substitute for the statute’s demanded connection between Delaware-directed activity and the plaintiff’s injury.

4) § 3104(c)(6): potentially relevant in theory, but waived in this appeal

Berry attempted to invoke § 3104(c)(6) on appeal, arguing the policy insured risks to be performed within Delaware because it covered accidents nationwide (including Delaware). The Court did not decide whether § 3104(c)(6) could apply on these facts; it held only that the argument was not preserved in the Superior Court and therefore was not reviewable under Del. Sup. Ct. R. 8.

Practically, the waiver holding leaves open future litigation over how § 3104(c)(6) applies (if at all) to nationwide automobile coverage where the insured is out-of-state, while still firmly resolving that (c)(3) and the product-based dual jurisdiction theory do not carry first-party UIM cases like this one.

C. Impact

1) Jurisdictional forum for first-party UIM claims is driven by the insurance contract’s locus, not the accident location

The decision reinforces a predictable forum rule: when the insured sues their own carrier for first-party benefits, Delaware will generally not exercise specific jurisdiction merely because the covered accident occurred in Delaware, where the policy was issued and the insured resides elsewhere. Claimants should expect to sue where jurisdiction is readily established—typically the state of policy issuance, insurer contacts, and insured residence (here, Maryland).

2) Clearer doctrinal boundary between liability-insurer jurisdiction and first-party-insurer jurisdiction

By distinguishing cases like State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dann and Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Intermodal Transp., Inc., the Court underscores that Delaware courts are more receptive to jurisdiction over out-of-state insurers when the insurer’s role is tied to defending/indemnifying a Delaware tort (liability posture) than when the insurer is sued as a first-party obligor under an out-of-state contract.

3) Limiting “dual jurisdiction” expansion beyond product settings

The Court’s refusal to treat an insurance policy as a “product” for dual-jurisdiction purposes prevents a potentially broad jurisdictional expansion. If accepted, the theory could have made insurers amenable to suit in any state where an accident occurs, based on ubiquitous nationwide coverage and general business presence—an outcome the Court viewed as inconsistent with Delaware’s long-arm framework and the injury-causation requirement emphasized in Boone v. Oy Partek Ab.

4) Appellate preservation matters: § 3104(c)(6) remains a live issue for future litigants

The Court’s reliance on Del. Sup. Ct. R. 8 signals that plaintiffs must develop all plausible statutory bases in the trial court. Strategically, future litigants who want Delaware to hear first-party insurance disputes tied to Delaware accidents will likely press § 3104(c)(6) early, building a record and engaging the text and Delaware precedent directly—something Berry did not do.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Personal jurisdiction: A court’s power to require a defendant to appear and defend a lawsuit in that state.
Specific jurisdiction: Jurisdiction tied to the defendant’s forum-related conduct that gives rise to the lawsuit (as opposed to “general jurisdiction,” which is broader and typically limited to where the defendant is “at home”).
Long-arm statute (10 Del. C. § 3104): Delaware’s statute listing specific categories of conduct that allow Delaware courts to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents.
§ 3104(c)(3): Commonly invoked for torts—tortious injury in Delaware caused by an act or omission in Delaware. The Court held it does not fit a first-party UIM contract claim against the insurer.
UIM (Underinsured Motorist) claim: A claim by an insured against their own insurer for additional compensation when the at-fault driver’s liability insurance is insufficient. It is typically treated as a contractual claim based on policy terms.
“Stands in the shoes”: A metaphor sometimes used in liability contexts (e.g., an insurer defending an insured tortfeasor). The Court emphasized it does not convert a first-party benefits dispute into a tort claim.
“Dual jurisdiction”: A theory combining two long-arm subsections to establish jurisdiction—used mainly in Delaware product cases—requiring both Delaware-directed market activity and injury caused by the product introduced into Delaware.
Waiver/Preservation (Del. Sup. Ct. R. 8): Issues not fairly presented to the trial court are usually not considered on appeal absent exceptional circumstances.

5. Conclusion

The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in James E. Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company cements a jurisdictional rule with practical bite: a Delaware accident, standing alone, does not provide a statutory basis under § 3104(c) to hale an out-of-state insurer into Delaware court for a first-party UIM benefits dispute arising from an out-of-state policy.

The opinion is significant for three reasons: it (1) reinforces the contract nature of first-party UIM litigation for jurisdictional analysis, (2) draws a firm boundary between first-party insurance disputes and cases involving liability insurers defending/indemnifying Delaware torts, and (3) prevents “dual jurisdiction” from becoming an all-purpose tool to sue nationwide insurers wherever an accident happens. At the same time, by resolving the case on preservation grounds, the Court leaves § 3104(c)(6)’s potential application to nationwide coverage for another day—making early, comprehensive long-arm briefing in the trial court essential in future cases.