Definitive Characterization of Second-Degree Attempted Assault under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) as a Crime of Violence

Introduction

In the case of United States of America, Appellee, v. Nasir Cooper, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a critical issue regarding the categorization of a prior conviction under New York Penal Law § 120.05(7). Nasir Cooper, the Defendant-Appellant, had pleaded guilty to possessing ammunition as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and subsequently challenged the district court’s determination that his prior conviction for second-degree attempted assault constitutes a “crime of violence” as defined in section 2K2.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines). The case, argued on December 9, 2024, and decided on March 14, 2025, thus raises pivotal questions about procedural objections and the proper interpretation of statutory elements in linking state assault statutes with federal definitions of violent crimes.

The parties in this litigation were the United States government, represented by Assistant United States Attorneys and Acting United States Attorney Matthew Podolsky, and Defendant Nasir Cooper, represented by Sarah Kunstler of the Law Offices of Sarah Kunstler. At issue was whether the district court erred in classifying Cooper’s veteran conviction—a second-degree attempted assault under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7)—as a violent crime for sentencing purposes.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellate decision affirms the district court’s judgment by concluding that Cooper’s prior conviction indeed falls within the ambit of “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). Central to this ruling was the application of either the categorical or modified categorical approach to assess the statutory elements of the state offense. The court’s reasoning was twofold. First, it held that Cooper’s repeated acknowledgments in his sentencing submissions confirmed his conviction under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7), thereby waiving any challenge on alternate statutory bases. Second, after examining the definitions provided in both the relevant sections of the Guidelines and the New York statute, the court determined that the standard for “physical force”—i.e., force capable of causing physical pain or injury—is met by the nature of second-degree attempted assault.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The decision references multiple precedents that collectively underpin the court’s rationale:

United States v. Jackson, 346 F.3d 22: This case reinforces the doctrine of waiver, explaining that if a party fails to timely object to specific errors, subsequent challenges may be viewed as waived. Cooper’s explicit acknowledgment of his conviction under § 120.05(7) directly relates to this principle.
United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289: The court relied on Quinones to illustrate that failure to raise an objection may forfeit appellate review, affirming that Cooper’s strategy to leverage an alternative interpretation was procedurally unsound.
United States v. Jones, 878 F.3d 10 and United States v. Moore, 916 F.3d 231: Both cases elucidate the use of the categorical and modified categorical approaches for determining whether a state-law offense qualifies as a "crime of violence" under federal sentencing guidelines.
Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. 73: This Supreme Court decision clarifies that the “physical force” element only requires force capable of causing physical pain or injury—a standard met even by seemingly minor but sufficiently forceful actions such as hitting or slapping.
United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94 and PEOPLE v. CHIDDICK: These decisions further inform and validate the interpretation of “physical injury” and the nature of force required under both the Guidelines and state law.

Collectively, these precedents cement the view that the statutory language in N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) aligns with the definition of a crime of violence as prescribed by the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s legal reasoning evolved along two principal lines:

Procedural Waiver and Acceptance of Statutory Identification: Cooper’s failure to object to the specific statutory reference in his sentencing submissions and his repeated acknowledgment that he was convicted under section 120.05(7) effectively waived his challenge. The court emphasized that any subsequent claims to the contrary were procedurally barred, relying on established doctrine from Jackson and Quinones.
Categorical Analysis of the Offense’s Elements: Incorporating the categorical approach, the court compared the elements of the state offense with those required by U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). The analysis focused on whether the offense under § 120.05(7) meets the low threshold of “physical force,” which is defined as force capable of causing physical pain or injury. Through close examination of statutory language – noting that New York law requires that the injury "impair[ment] of physical condition or substantial pain" – the court concluded that the elements of the victim’s injury satisfied even the minimal federal standard.

Moreover, the court dismissed alternate interpretations and misreadings of case law from United States v. Castleman and Johnson v. United States by underscoring the clarity put forth in Stokeling regarding what constitutes “physical force.”

Impact

This judgment is significant for several reasons:

It reinforces that defendants must appropriately raise objections at the earliest possible stage, or they risk waiving their right to challenge procedural interpretations on appeal.
The ruling clarifies the application of the categorical approach when assessing whether state offenses involve a sufficient use of physical force to be deemed crimes of violence under federal sentencing guidelines.
Future cases evaluating similarly structured state offenses against the federal definition of violence may now rely on this precedent, especially regarding offenses involving assault under divisibility provisions, ensuring a consistent application of both procedural and substantive standards.
The decision offers guidance to both trial courts and appellate courts on the weight to be given to the elements of state statutory language, emphasizing that even relatively low thresholds for physical injury can satisfy federal requirements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several complex legal concepts arise from this Judgment. For clarity, here are simplified explanations:

Categorical vs. Modified Categorical Approach: The categorical approach examines solely the elements of the crime as set forth in the statute, ignoring the specific facts of an individual case. When a statute provides multiple alternative definitions (i.e., it is “divisible”), a modified categorical approach is used. In this case, Cooper’s offense under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) was analyzed exclusively on its statutory language.
Physical Force Requirement: Under both the federal Guidelines and reinforced by Supreme Court case law, “physical force” does not have to be extreme. It simply needs to be of a magnitude that can cause physical pain or injury. Acts such as hitting or slapping are sufficient, contrary to arguments that “serious physical injury” is required.
Waiver of Objections: In legal proceedings, if a party does not challenge an error at the time it occurs, they generally cannot raise that issue later on appeal. Cooper’s failure to dispute the specific statutory reference during sentencing meant he effectively waived his right to later contest the classification.

Conclusion

In summation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that a second-degree attempted assault conviction under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). By strictly applying both procedural rules regarding waiver of objections and the categorical approach for evaluating state offenses, the court affirmed that the elements of the offense satisfy even the low threshold of physical force set forth in federal guidelines.

This Judgment not only solidifies the precedent for interpreting N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) but also has broader implications. It ensures consistency in how prior convictions are assessed within the federal sentencing framework and serves as a cautionary reminder to litigants regarding the timely assertion of objections. Overall, the case marks a significant step in bolstering the application of well-established federal standards in the sphere of criminal sentencing.