Definitive Adverse Position as Accrual Trigger for § 1983 Land-Use Claims

Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s April 10, 2025 summary order in Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach, No. 24-2033-cv. Plaintiff-appellant Philip G. Potter challenged multiple actions by the Village of Ocean Beach and its officials—chiefly, the revocation of his certificate of occupancy (CO) for a seasonal residence, criminal citations for alleged building-code violations, the denial of rental permits, and the Village’s failure to hold a hearing ordered by a New York state court. The central procedural issue was whether Potter’s § 1983 due process and Monell claims were time-barred by New York’s three-year statute of limitations and, if so, when each claim accrued. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, holding that all claims accrued more than three years before the August 29, 2023 filing date.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, in a summary order by Chief Judge Livingston, joined by Judges Lynch and Robinson, affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Potter’s amended complaint. It concluded:

Claims based on criminal citations issued in early 2012 and denials of rental permits in 2016–2018 plainly accrued more than three years before the August 29, 2023 filing date and were thus time-barred.
Although the Building Inspector first notified Potter of CO revocation in July 2011, the ultimate accrual of due process claims tied to that revocation occurred when the Village repeatedly denied his 2016–2018 permit applications on the ground that he lacked a valid CO—facts that gave Potter “reason to know” of a final adverse position by August 2020.
The continuing violation doctrine and equitable estoppel did not save Potter’s claims: each denial was a discrete act and Potter had already sued in state court in 2019 to vindicate his CO, demonstrating his awareness of the dispute.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Federal Rule 12(b)(6) Framework: Pettaway v. National Recovery Solutions, 955 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2020); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007).
Affirmative–Defense‐On‐Face‐of‐Complaint Doctrine: Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, 995 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2021); Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs., 547 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 2008); Sewell v. Bernardin, 795 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2015).
§ 1983 Statute of Limitations and Accrual: Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007); McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109 (2019); DeSuze v. Ammon, 990 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2021); Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722 (2d Cir. 1994); Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
Ripeness in Land‐Use Disputes: Williamson County Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Southview Assocs. Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992); Doughtery v. Town of North Hempstead, 282 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2002); Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474 (2021); Village Green at Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip, 43 F.4th 287 (2d Cir. 2022).
New York Preclusion Rules: 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420 (2d Cir. 1999); Impellizzeri v. Campagni, 194 N.Y.S.3d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023).
Equitable Estoppel and Continuing Violations: Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 774 F.3d 791 (2d Cir. 2014); Cerbone v. ILGWU, 768 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1985); Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2015); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s decision turned on well-settled federal limits on § 1983 accrual and state statutes of limitations:

Under Owens and its progeny, New York’s three‐year CPLR § 214(5) governs the length of the limitations period, while accrual is federal—and occurs when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and its cause (Wallace; DeSuze; Kronisch).
Claims tied to criminal citations in 2012 and denials in 2016–2018 plainly matured when issued, well before August 2020, so they are time-barred.
The CO revocation claim presented a closer question: the initial 2011 notice of revocation was subject to administrative review and thus not yet “final.” However, by repeatedly denying Potter’s permit applications in 2016–2018 on the ground that no valid CO existed, the Village manifested a definitive, adverse position. By the third such denial, Potter “had reason to know”—and indeed sued in state court in 2019—the claim was ripe and the § 1983 clock began to run.
Neither the continuing violation doctrine (which does not revive discrete adverse acts) nor equitable estoppel (no concealment of the claim, since Potter promptly litigated in state court) extended the limitations period.

Impact

This decision clarifies accrual of § 1983 due process claims in the land-use context:

Local government notices of revocation may not trigger accrual until the authority takes a “final, definitive” adverse position—often evidenced by formal denials or rejections in the permitting process.
Repeated permit denials based on an asserted revocation will themselves serve as a clear, discrete accrual event when it is obvious to the property owner that no administrative or judicial remedy remains pending.
Plaintiffs must be alert to both the initial administrative determination and any subsequent manifestations of finality—failure to file within three years of the most recent definitive denial risks dismissal.
The decision reaffirms that continuing violation and estoppel doctrines cannot salvage claims based on distinct acts of official misconduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Accrual vs. Limitations Period: Federal law says a § 1983 claim “accrues” when a plaintiff knows enough to sue—state law sets how long the suit must be filed thereafter.
Final Decision Requirement: In land-use cases, you cannot sue until the local authority has reached a definitive position (even if it is not labeled “final”).
Continuing Violation Doctrine: This doctrine applies when wrongs build up over time (e.g., a hostile work environment), not to discrete events like individual permit denials.
Equitable Estoppel: Stops a defendant from asserting a deadline if the defendant misled the plaintiff—but here, Potter promptly pursued state court relief, so no concealment occurred.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision in Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach underscores that § 1983 due process claims in land-use disputes accrue when a property owner fully appreciates the definitive adverse action—whether an administrative revocation or a series of permit denials. As demonstrated here, permit denials based on an asserted revocation of occupancy rights triggered the limitations clock. Future litigants must therefore monitor each administrative step for signs of finality and file suit within the three-year window. This ruling brings clarity to accrual timing in § 1983 land-use challenges, reinforcing the importance of prompt litigation once a municipal authority’s position becomes unequivocal.