Defining “Superficial” Interaction in SSA Disability Evaluations: Quality vs Quantity Distinction

Introduction

In Dawn Mabry-Schlicher v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Sixth Circuit tackled two interrelated questions: first, whether an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) properly complied with a district court’s remand order regarding a social‐interaction limitation described as “superficial,” and second, whether the ALJ erred by omitting vocational testimony about supervisory criticism on remand.

Dawn Mabry-Schlicher, the claimant, suffers from severe anxiety, depression, fibromyalgia, obesity, foot degeneration, and recurrent migraines. She applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in May 2015. After two administrative hearings and a district‐court remand directing the ALJ to consider “superficial” social limitations, the SSA denied her claim a third time. Mabry-Schlicher appealed that decision, arguing that the ALJ both flouted the remand order and ignored significant vocational testimony.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s final judgment denying benefits. It held that:

• The ALJ’s third decision did comply with the remand order by expressly adopting a “superficial” contact limitation and defining it in qualitative vocational terms.
• “Superficial” interaction is distinct from “occasional” interaction—referring to the quality, not merely the quantity, of social contacts—and the ALJ’s functional definition satisfied the district court’s direction.
• The ALJ was not required to revisit or explicitly discuss earlier vocational testimony about supervisory criticism, because he incorporated the remand‐directed limitation into his final residual functional capacity (RFC) finding and hypothetical to the vocational expert.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning drew on the following authorities:

• Law of the Case Doctrine (Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983)) – Once a district court issues a remand order establishing a principle, that principle governs subsequent proceedings in the same case.
• Substantial Evidence Standard (Blakley v. Commissioner, 581 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2009)) – A decision must be upheld if a reasonable mind could accept the evidence supporting it.
• Procedural Review (Ealy v. Commissioner, 594 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2010)) – Appellate review of an ALJ’s disability determination is de novo as to legal standards and for substantial evidence as to factual findings.
• Sequential Evaluation Process (Rabbers v. Commissioner, 582 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2009)) – The five‐step analysis for assessing disability under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
• Residual Functional Capacity (Hamilton v. Commissioner, 98 F.4th 800 (6th Cir. 2024)) – The claimant’s capacity to perform work despite impairments, a critical inquiry at Steps 4 and 5.

Legal Reasoning

1. Law of the Case and Remand Compliance
The 2022 remand order held that (a) “superficial” social interaction is vocationally relevant and (b) “superficial” (quality) differs from “occasional” (quantity). Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the ALJ had to follow that directive. On remand, the ALJ explicitly adopted a “superficial”‐contact limitation and defined it as permitting only simple, perfunctory exchanges (e.g., receiving instructions, asking simple questions, obtaining performance appraisals) while precluding complex interactions (e.g., persuading or advising). That formulation honored the district court’s guidance.

2. Defining “Superficial” vs. “Occasional”
The ALJ’s definition addressed the qualitative dimension of social interaction, distinguishing it from an “occasional” restriction that would limit the number of interactions without addressing their complexity. The Sixth Circuit found that delineation reasonable in light of the absence of any SSA regulation specifying a uniform definition of “superficial.”

3. Omission of Earlier Vocational Testimony
Although a prior vocational expert testified that employees must accept supervisory criticism and that such criticism is not “superficial,” the ALJ on remand tailored his hypothetical and ultimate RFC to the district court’s remand instructions, then obtained fresh vocational‐expert testimony. The court held that he was not required to repeat or separately analyze every earlier piece of vocational evidence, so long as the final hypothetical captured the remand-ordered limitation and was supported by substantial evidence.

Impact

This decision clarifies two important points for future Social Security disability determinations:

• An ALJ must follow a remand order’s directives regarding functional limitations under the law‐of‐the‐case doctrine, even if the judge personally disagrees with the prior ruling.
• When neither regulations nor agency guidance supply a precise definition of a functional limitation term (like “superficial”), an ALJ may craft a reasonable, record-based definition that captures the qualitative nature of the restriction.

Disability claimants and adjudicators should expect that courts will enforce remand-ordered limitations and that ALJs will have discretion to flesh out undefined terms so long as the record supports their approach.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): A person’s maximum ability to perform work activities, considering all impairments and symptoms.
• Substantial Evidence: Enough relevant evidence that a reasonable mind could accept the ALJ’s conclusion, even if other interpretations exist.
• Law of the Case: Once a court decides an issue in a case, that decision binds the same parties in later proceedings of that case.
• “Superficial” vs. “Occasional” Interactions:
  • “Superficial” refers to the depth and complexity of social contacts (simple, routine exchanges only).
  • “Occasional” refers to how often interactions occur (e.g., intermittent or infrequent contact).

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mabry-Schlicher reaffirms that adjudicators must respect remand orders—even if they disagree with earlier rulings—and that they may define undefined vocational terms in a manner consistent with record evidence. By upholding the ALJ’s qualitative “superficial” interaction limitation and rejecting the need to re-analyze every piece of prior vocational testimony, the court provided guidance on balancing judicial directives, administrative discretion, and the need for clear, record-based functional assessments in Social Security disability cases.