Defining “Reasonable Opportunity” to Contact Counsel under Iowa Code § 804.20

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in State of Iowa v. Hope Jennifer Clark, 23–0964 (Iowa May 23, 2025), in which the Court clarified the scope of a suspect’s statutory right under Iowa Code § 804.20 to contact an attorney “without unnecessary delay.” The case arose from Hope Clark’s arrest for operating while intoxicated (OWI), first offense, following her refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test. Clark moved to suppress all evidence obtained after she invoked her right to counsel, claiming deputies denied her a reasonable opportunity to make a call. The district court and the court of appeals rejected her claim, and the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed that no violation of § 804.20 occurred.

2. Case Background and Key Issues

Parties: State of Iowa (Appellee) vs. Hope Jennifer Clark (Appellant).
Facts: Deputies stopped Clark for erratic driving, conducted field sobriety tests, and she failed. Upon request for a preliminary breath test, Clark said, “I need an attorney,” and was arrested. At booking she again invoked her right to counsel. Deputies read Miranda warnings, implied-consent advisories, and Iowa Code § 804.20, placed her cell phone within reach, and told her several times she could call an attorney.
Procedural History: Motion to suppress denied by district court; motion in limine to exclude dispatch statements denied; jury convicted; Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed; Iowa Supreme Court granted further review limited to the § 804.20 issue.
Key Legal Issue: Whether the deputies violated § 804.20 by failing to provide Hope Clark a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel “without unnecessary delay.”

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Iowa Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Christensen (joined by Justices Mansfield, McDonald, and May), held that:

Clark’s arrest processing involved approximately eleven minutes of routine administrative and safety procedures, which did not constitute an “unnecessary delay” under § 804.20.
By placing Clark’s personal cell phone within inches of her, reading her statutory advisories, explicitly informing her multiple times that she could make a “reasonable number of phone calls,” and gesturing toward the phone, deputies afforded Clark a “reasonable opportunity” to contact her attorney.
The district court’s suppression ruling and the court of appeals’ affirmance were correct, and Clark’s conviction for OWI (first offense) was affirmed.

Chief Justice Oxley filed a dissent (joined by Waterman and McDermott, JJ.), arguing that mere placement of the phone and generalized invitations did not satisfy the affirmative-duty standard established in State v. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 2010).

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited

State v. Vietor (261 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1978)) – Interpreted predecessor § 755.17 to require opportunity to call counsel before a suspect must choose whether to submit to chemical testing.
State v. Moorehead (699 N.W.2d 667 (Iowa 2005)) – Held that a suspect’s request to call counsel during OWI processing fell within § 804.20 and did not require the request be made at the final place of detention.
State v. Hicks (791 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 2010)) – Established that § 804.20 imposes an affirmative duty on officers to “take affirmative action” (e.g., direct detainee to phone, dial number if necessary) to ensure the request to call counsel is meaningfully honored.
State v. Starr (4 N.W.3d 686 (Iowa 2024)) – Explained that “without unnecessary delay” contemplates that certain processing steps may be necessary, but unjustified waits beyond legitimate administrative needs trigger suppression under § 804.20.
State v. Lamoreux (875 N.W.2d 172 (Iowa 2016)) and State v. Davis (922 N.W.2d 326 (Iowa 2019)) – Applied a pragmatic balancing test between an arrestee’s limited § 804.20 rights and the goals of Iowa’s chemical-testing statutes.
Bromeland v. Iowa Dept. of Transportation (562 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1997)) – Explained that § 804.20 confers only a limited right to contact counsel or family, requiring reasonableness in number and timing of calls.

4.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeded in two parts:

Unnecessary Delay: The Court recognized that routine booking, safety checks, and Miranda‐implied‐consent advisories necessarily precede any call to counsel. Eleven minutes between jail arrival and the opportunity to call did not exceed legitimate administrative needs and therefore did not violate the statute’s “without unnecessary delay” requirement.
Reasonable Opportunity: Applying Hicks, the Court found that inviting Clark to use her own cell phone—placed within inches of her—satisfied the statutory requirement. Clark was told multiple times, with verbal statements and gestures, that she could place a “reasonable number of phone calls” to counsel or family. Under a pragmatic balancing approach, these acts fulfilled the officer’s affirmative duty to provide access to counsel.

4.3 Impact and Significance

This decision settles several points of practical importance:

It confirms that routine processing before a § 804.20 call is not per se “unnecessary delay.”
It clarifies that providing a suspect with her own cell phone and explicitly informing her that she may call counsel suffices as “reasonable opportunity”—no requirement that officers dial the number themselves if the suspect’s equipment is accessible.
It may reduce suppression motions in OWI cases where suspects invoke § 804.20, so long as law enforcement integrates clear invitations to call counsel into booking procedures.
Dissenting views caution that vulnerable persons (e.g., hearing-impaired suspects) may need more affirmative guidance, suggesting that best practice remains to both invite and facilitate calls (e.g., officer-placed calls from jail phones) to avoid claims of illusory rights.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Unnecessary Delay”: Any waiting period beyond legitimate booking, fingerprinting, and statutorily required advisories.
“Reasonable Opportunity”: A meaningful chance to make or arrange a phone call to counsel, not a hollow promise.
“Implied Consent”: Iowa’s statutory scheme requiring a suspected OWI driver to submit to chemical testing (breath, blood, or urine) or face penalties and license suspension.
“Miranda Rights”: Constitutional advisories that a suspect in custody must receive (right to remain silent; anything said can be used against you; right to counsel).
“Motion in Limine”: A pretrial request to exclude certain evidence as inadmissible.
“Hearsay”: An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, generally inadmissible unless an exception applies.

6. Conclusion

State v. Clark provides a clear statutory interpretation of Iowa Code § 804.20, reinforcing that officers need not unduly delay booking or readminister rights to facilitate a suspect’s request for counsel. Placing the suspect’s personal phone in reach and delivering explicit invitations to call satisfies the “reasonable opportunity” requirement. While dissenters underscore the need for affirmative facilitation in some circumstances, the majority’s ruling offers practical guidance to law enforcement and practitioners: integrate § 804.20 advisories seamlessly into OWI processing and ensure suspects know, plainly and repeatedly, that they may contact their attorney before deciding on chemical testing.