Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) Ludecke v. Watkins (1948)

The leading AEA case held judicial review is available for “questions of interpretation and constitutionality,” but not for second‑guessing the President’s political judgment about whether wartime conditions persist. The Fifth Circuit relies on Ludecke to recognize both limits and lanes: courts accept presidential fact findings (what happened and who directed it) but interpret and apply § 21’s legal predicates to those facts. That interpretive authority becomes the engine of the Fifth Circuit’s merits ruling.

2) Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950)

Eisentrager stated that courts can “ascertain the existence of a state of war.” The panel reads this as confirming that courts ensure statutory prerequisites exist (e.g., a declared war still in force)—a gloss that supports the court’s determination to decide whether the Proclamation’s facts, even if true, legally amount to the AEA’s alternate triggers (“invasion” or “predatory incursion”).

3) United States ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi (1952)

Jaegeler recognized Congress’s power to end a declared war, thereby terminating AEA authority grounded on that war. The panel cites Jaegeler to emphasize that AEA applicability turns on statutory predicates, not unreviewable executive fiat.

4) Sterling v. Constantin (1932)

Sterling distinguished between unreviewable executive determinations that an exigency exists (conclusive) and judicial review of the legality of measures taken in response. The panel analogizes: while accepting the President’s factual assertions, courts retain authority to decide whether those facts fit the statute’s legal categories (“invasion”/“predatory incursion”).

5) Martin v. Mott (1827)

Mott held the President’s decision under the Militia Act to call out the militia was conclusive. The panel views Mott as contextually distinct: immediate troop deployment decisions are not the same as categorically detaining/removing residents; and later, AEA‑specific precedents (Ludecke, Eisentrager, Jaegeler) govern here. Judge Oldham’s dissent, in contrast, treats Mott as controlling and expansive.

6) The Prize Cases (1862)

Invoked as background, the panel notes the Court treated the President’s blockade proclamation as conclusive evidence of a state of war; but emphasizes the context and limits, distinguishing the present, statutory interpretation task under the AEA.

7) Trump v. J.G.G. (2025) and A.A.R.P. v. Trump (2025)

These Supreme Court decisions frame the remand: (i) habeas is the vehicle for AEA challenges; (ii) courts must ensure AEA detainees receive notice sufficient to “actually seek habeas relief” in time; (iii) limited judicial review under the AEA exists for interpretation and constitutionality and to confirm whether particular individuals fall within the Proclamation’s categories. The Fifth Circuit applies this mandate, both to merits (interpretation) and notice (due process) questions.

Legal Reasoning

A. Scope of Review Under the AEA

The court stakes out a middle path: courts will not “second‑guess” presidential findings about what events occurred (e.g., that the Maduro regime directs TdA), but courts must interpret statutory terms and apply them to the facts the President publicly proclaims. This has two key consequences.

• Proclamation must contain factual predicates: Merely reciting the labels “invasion” or “predatory incursion” is insufficient. The proclamation must identify what is believed to be happening; courts then accept those facts and decide their legal significance under the AEA.
• Legal labels vs. facts: The court rejects “freestanding labels” like “irregular warfare” if unsupported by factual description; it accepts the factual claims (e.g., mass migration, drug trafficking used as a weapon) but asks whether those facts fit the statute’s predicates.

B. Construction of “Invasion” and “Predatory Incursion” in § 21

Using Founding‑era dictionaries, constitutional text, contemporaneous usage, and the AEA’s statutory neighborhood, the panel fixes meanings as of 1798 while acknowledging modern applications:

• “Invasion” in 1798 and the Constitution is a war term referring to militarized entry by or directed by a foreign nation with hostile intent—not a catch‑all for non‑military harms. The court declines to expand “invasion” to include mass, unarmed illegal immigration or narcotics proliferation.
• “Predatory incursion” historically described organized, armed raids by or on behalf of a sovereign—e.g., British or Mexican military raids, privateering at sea, or tribal warfare—not diffuse criminality. It is “less than invasion,” but still an armed, organized action directed by a state actor.
• Modern application principle: While statutory meaning is fixed, new applications may arise (e.g., cyber operations). But qualifying “modern” attacks must be analogous in kind to Founding‑era invasions or incursions, i.e., organized, armed, state‑directed operations.

Applying those definitions, the Proclamation’s cited facts—mass illegal migration, use of drugs as a weapon, generalized “irregular warfare”—do not, as a matter of law, constitute an invasion or predatory incursion under the AEA. These are grave concerns suitable for other authorities (the Immigration and Nationality Act, terrorism removal procedures), but not AEA triggers.

C. “Foreign Nation or Government” and Non‑State Proxies

The court accepts the Proclamation’s finding that the Maduro regime “directs” TdA and holds that state attribution would satisfy § 21’s “foreign nation or government” requirement if the predicate “invasion” or “incursion” existed. Historical analogies (French privateers; Hessian mercenaries) confirm that a sovereign’s use of auxiliaries does not defeat attribution. The President’s choice to target a subset (Venezuelans who are TdA members) narrows, rather than invalidates, the Proclamation’s scope.

D. Preliminary Injunction Factors

• Likelihood of success: Petitioners are likely to show that the AEA was improperly invoked because the Proclamation’s facts, accepted as true, do not meet § 21’s “invasion” or “predatory incursion” predicates.
• Irreparable harm: Removal to El Salvador carries a meaningful risk of irremediable loss; the record and Supreme Court’s interim analysis recognized practical barriers to return if removals are later found unlawful. The court does not rely on shifting government assurances to withhold relief, particularly for putative class members.
• Balance of equities and public interest: There is a public interest in preventing wrongful removals, particularly where return may be impossible. The injunction is carefully cabined to AEA removals; the Government retains robust tools under the INA and related national‑security statutes to detain and remove dangerous noncitizens.
• Scope: Relief extends to named petitioners and the putative class, consistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction that temporary classwide relief may be appropriate prior to class certification.

E. Due Process: What Notice is Due?

The Supreme Court held that “24‑hour” notice without practical information was inadequate and directed lower courts to identify notice that allows detainees to “actually seek habeas relief.” The Government’s revised notice provides:

• Language the detainee understands;
• Identification that the person is deemed a Venezuelan, 14 or older, non‑citizen/non‑LPR, and a TdA member;
• Seven days before removal;
• The correct district court and address; and
• Assurance of phone access and a list of potential counsel on request.

On the present, undeveloped record, and by reference to a roughly analogous INA ten‑day notice benchmark, the panel (two judges) holds the Government’s seven‑day regime is “likely” adequate. It emphasizes that due process is flexible and fact‑specific; the district court must take evidence on whether the timeframe genuinely allows access to counsel and filing. Judge Ramirez would require at least 21 days given evidence of transfer and access limitations at detention centers.

Impact and Practical Consequences

• Judicial gatekeeping of AEA predicates: Within the Fifth Circuit, presidential AEA proclamations face a clarified review: courts accept proclaimed facts but decide whether those facts satisfy § 21’s war‑related predicates. Proclamations must include factual predicates beyond conclusory labels.
• Narrowing effect on AEA use: “Invasion” and “predatory incursion” are now anchored to militarized, state‑directed action. Non‑military phenomena such as mass unlawful migration or criminal enterprises—even if coordinated transnationally—will generally not qualify.
• Shift to peacetime immigration tools: The opinion invites reliance on the INA’s extensive terrorism‑related grounds of inadmissibility and deportability and, where needed, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court to safeguard classified information—foreclosing AEA short‑cuts when statutory war predicates are absent.
• Executive branch drafting practices: Any future AEA proclamation must lay out factual findings with enough granularity to permit judicial application of § 21 and avoid purely conclusory “war” labels.
• Classwide interim relief: The decision reinforces that, following A.A.R.P., courts may issue pre‑certification classwide preliminary relief in AEA cases when the traditional factors are met—at least as to notice, and here also as to the merits of the AEA invocation.
• Notice standards in flux: While seven days is tentatively acceptable in this record, the district court is instructed to develop facts; other courts have imposed 14‑ to 30‑day regimes. Facilities’ communications capacity, attorney availability, and transfer practices will matter.
• Separation of powers: The majority’s approach distinguishes legal interpretation from political/military judgment, cabining judicial review to the statute’s “outer bounds.” Judge Oldham’s dissent warns of overreach and would treat the President’s determination as conclusive.