Defining “Interpreter” in Cost Recovery: Supreme Court Clarifies Oral Translation Only under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)

Defining “Interpreter” in Cost Recovery: Supreme Court Clarifies Oral Translation Only under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)

Introduction

In the landmark case Kouichi TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN, LTD., the United States Supreme Court addressed a pivotal issue regarding the scope of "compensation of interpreters" under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6). The petitioner, Kouichi Taniguchi, a professional baseball player from Japan, sought reimbursement for translation costs incurred during his personal injury lawsuit against Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of Marianas Resort and Spa in the Northern Mariana Islands. The crux of the dispute was whether these translation costs for written documents fell within the statutory definition of interpreter compensation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion delivered by Justice Alito, held that "compensation of interpreters" as delineated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) pertains exclusively to oral translation services. The Court emphasized that the ordinary meaning of "interpreter" refers to individuals who translate spoken language, thereby excluding costs associated with the translation of written documents. Consequently, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's affirmation and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court examined various precedents demonstrating divergent interpretations among Circuit Courts. For instance:

  • BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. (6th Cir., 2005) upheld that document translation falls under interpreter compensation.
  • Extra Equipamentos E Exportação Ltda. v. Case Corp. (7th Cir., 2008) rejected this, limiting interpreter compensation to oral translation.

These conflicting rulings presented a split among the appellate courts, necessitating Supreme Court intervention to harmonize the interpretation of § 1920(6) across jurisdictions.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's analysis hinged on the ordinary meaning of "interpreter." Extensive review of contemporaneous dictionaries revealed that "interpreter" primarily denotes someone who translates orally. The Court dismissed broader interpretations that encompassed written translation, citing authoritative sources like the Oxford English Dictionary, which classifies written translation under "translator" rather than "interpreter."

Furthermore, the statutory context of the Court Interpreters Act indicated an intention to fund oral translation services specifically. Terms like "simultaneous" and "consecutive" interpretation modes, detailed in § 1827(k), reinforced the focus on oral translation. The Court reasoned that including written translation under "interpreter" would deviate from Congress's apparent intent and the technical distinctions recognized in professional literature.

Impact

This judgment significantly narrows the scope of recoverable translation costs in federal litigation. Moving forward, parties cannot expect to recover expenses related to translating written documents under § 1920(6), limiting these recoveries to oral interpretation services. This clarification aids in reducing ambiguity in cost recoveries and ensures consistency across federal courts. However, litigants must now explore alternative avenues for recovering document translation costs, such as under different statutory provisions or through party agreements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interpreter vs. Translator

Interpreter: An individual who translates spoken language in real-time during court proceedings, facilitating oral communication between parties.

Translator: A professional who converts written documents from one language to another, ensuring that written materials are comprehensible to all parties involved.

28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)

This statute outlines the types of costs that can be awarded to prevailing parties in federal lawsuits. Subsection (6) specifically addresses the compensation of interpreters, aimed at covering expenses related to oral translation services necessary for effective communication in court.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)

Rule 54(d) grants courts the discretion to award costs to the prevailing party, excluding attorney's fees, unless a federal statute, rule, or court order provides otherwise. The Court clarified that this rule does not extend beyond the specific cost categories enumerated in § 1920.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in Kouichi TANIGUCHI v. KAN PACIFIC SAIPAN, LTD. establishes a clear precedent that "compensation of interpreters" under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) is confined to oral translation services. By adhering to the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” and considering the statutory context, the Court effectively delineates the boundaries of recoverable costs, promoting uniformity and predictability in federal litigation. This ruling underscores the importance of precise statutory interpretation and sets a definitive guideline for future cases involving translation cost recoveries.

Case Details

Year: 2012
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

Samuel A. Alito

Attorney(S)

Michael S. Fried, for Petitioner. Dan Himmelfarb, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Douglas F. Cushnie, Saipan, MP, Donald B. Ayer, Counsel of Record, Michael S. Fried, Christopher J. Smith, Jane E. Holman, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Thomas L. Roberts, Dooley Roberts & Fowler LLP, Tamuning, GU, Dan Himmelfarb, Counsel of Record, Paul W. Hughes, Michael B. Kimberly, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

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